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Executive summary 
The coordination of family benefits has become an issue of political interest in 
some Member States. It is argued that an unlimited export of these benefits 
granted to migrant workers whose children reside outside the Member State 
which has to grant benefits may not meet the policy aims behind these 
benefits. Therefore, the FreSsco team has been mandated to look into different 
options which could be a remedy for these political concerns.  
The options we have chosen (based on the mandate and some also added by 
us) to evaluate their impact (always compared to the status quo) are the 
following ones: 
 Option 1: Keeping the status quo. 
 Option 2 ,QWURGXFLQJDQDGMXVWPHQWPHFKDQLVPZKLFKGHYLDWHVIURPWRGD\¶V
unlimited amounts of family benefits for children living outside the Member 
State concerned and adjusts the amount due to the different cost of living in the 
Member State of residence compared to the Member State which has to grant the 
EHQHILW $V µDGMXVWPHQW¶ LV QRW D FOHDU QRWLRQ DQG DV ZH KDG DQ H[WHQGHG
exchange of ideas concerning the questions how such adjustments could work, 
what will be the outcome, and what legal obstacles could exist which hinder 
such adjustments, we have also elaborated on these questions in more detail. We 
have analysed the following three different sub-options: 
o Sub-option 2a: full upwards and downwards adjustment of the amounts. 
o Sub-option 2b: full upwards and downwards adjustment of the amounts 
but reimbursement of the amount of any upwards adjustments by the 
Member State of residence. 
o Sub-option 2c: only downwards adjustment. 
 Option 3: reversing the order of priority, and always making the Member State 
of residence of the children the State competent by priority. 
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o Sub-option 3a: reversing only the order of priority without additional 
measures. 
o Sub-option 3b: reversing the order of priority, and reimbursement by the 
Member State with primary competence XQGHU WRGD\¶V FRRUGLQDWLRQ RI
the amount it would have to grant today. 
o Sub-option 3c: reversing the order of priority, and adjusting the amount 
of the Member State which has secondary competence to an amount 
according to the level of costs of living in the Member State of residence 
(when calculating a differential supplement). 
For our evaluation of these six new options the following factors were 
considered: 
 Clarification: where clarity and transparency are an issue. 
 Simplification: is the solution simple or rather complex? 
 Protection of rights: for this evaluation benchmark it is important whether the 
persons concerned are well protected, whether they lose rights but also how safe 
and quick the procedures are which have to be followed to get a benefit. 
 Administrative burden and implementation arrangements: here the burden 
for administrations is scrutinised. 
 No risk of fraud and error: options should also not be construed in such a way 
that the persons concerned try to achieve better results (e.g. higher benefits) by 
simulating facts which do not correspond to reality. 
 Potential financial implications: behind this point the main question is hidden, 
as it seems that divergent points of view of Member States have been the 
incentive for this report; therefore, we refrained from really giving marks on this 
factor, but we only show the possible impact the option will have and leave it to 
the decision-makers to draw the conclusions from this; 
The discussion within our small group of experts already showed how difficult 
it would be to achieve a solution to which everyone can agree (we quickly saw 
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that on some points we did not agree and, thus, this also had to be reflected in 
this report). 
To help the reader more easily identify our conclusions concerning the 
different factors in relation to each option we used a system of marks where 
(+) means better than, (- ZRUVH WKDQ DQG § PHDQV Qearly the same as the 
status quo, while (?) indicates that we give the results of our analysis whereas 
it will be a decision for the political decision±maker to make, as we cannot. 
The following table presents the results of our evaluation.  
 
 Clarifi-
cation 
Simplifi-
cation Rights 
Admin. 
burden Fraud 
Financial 
implica-tions 
Option 2a - - ? - у ? 
Option 2b - - ? - у ? 
Option 2c - - - - у ? 
Option 3a + ? + + + ? 
Option 3b + - + - + у 
Option 3c - - ? - + ? 
 
The analysis also showed that export is not the only problem. Thus, if a 
revision of the family benefits chapter is envisaged also all other problems and 
shortcomings existing today should be examined. If possible also additional 
options could be achieved at the same time with the provision of the export 
principle. From our point of view the problems which arise due to some of the 
horizontal problems are much more important and, maybe, should be solved 
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with more energy of the legislature and urgency than the export question. We 
identified several issues, especially the following ones: the need for better 
definitions, a special coordination for child-raising benefits for persons in 
gainful employment (exclusive granting by the Member State which is 
competent for the person concerned) but also a clear rule on the question how 
PDQ\ µEDVNHWV RI EHQHILWV¶ KDYH WR EH PDGH IRU WKH FDOFXODWLRQ RI WKH
differential supplement. Some of these horizontal issues are so interlinked with 
our main topic of export of family benefits that we had to recommend to take 
them also on board for the planned revision. As an example we want to 
mention that we have all been convinced that, even if an adjustment of family 
benefits is decided to be an interesting option, this cannot apply to 
contributory benefits (when only the payment of contributions opens 
entitlement to benefits) or to those with an income replacement function (e.g. 
some child-raising benefits).  
Thus, our conclusion is that the examination of possibilities for a revision of 
the family benefits coordination rules is a valuable exercise which could 
improve the status quo. It should not be restricted only to the export question, 
but should also contain additional elements. Looking at the marks we have 
given to the different options it is clearly Sub-option 3a which seems to be the 
most suitable one for further analysis. Of course, also this option would be 
optimised by adding a special coordination e.g. for child-raising benefits. But 
it should never be forgotten that also this option would have negative aspects 
like e.g. a shift of the burden between the Member States, which has to be 
reflected upon when the political decision is taken. 
 19 
 
General remarks 
1.1 Notions used throughout the text 
To ease the reading of the text some notions used throughout the text have to 
be defined: 
µRegulation (EEC) No 1408/71¶PHDQV5HJXODWLRQ((&1RRIWKH
Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to 
employed persons and their families moving within the Community, as 
amended; 
µRegulation (EEC) No 574/72¶ PHDQV 5HJXODWLRQ ((& 1R  RI WKH
Council of 21 March 1972 fixing the procedures for implementing Regulation 
(EEC) No 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed 
persons and their families moving within the Community, as amended; 
µRegulation (EC) No 883/2004¶PHDQV5HJXODWLRQ(&1RRIWKH
European Parliament and the Council of 24 April 2004 on the coordination of 
social security systems, as amended; 
µRegulation (EC) No 987/2009¶PHDQV5HJXODWLRQ(&1RRIWKH
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 laying down 
the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the 
coordination of social security systems, as amended; 
µRegulation (EU) No 492/2011¶PHDQV5HJXODWLRQ(81RRIWKH
European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on the freedom of 
movement for workers within the Union; 
µCJEU¶ PHDQV WKH &RXUW RI -XVWLFH RI WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ UXOLQJV ZKLFK
dealt with Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 are also mentioned in relation to 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 if from our point of view these rulings are still 
valid under the new Regulation (the relevant material content did not change);  
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µfamily benefit¶PHDQVEHQHILWV LQNLQGDQG in cash intended to meet family 
expenses (definition of Article 1(u)(i) of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 and 
Article 1(z) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004); 
µfamily allowance¶ PHDQV SHULRGLFDO FDVK EHQHILWV JUDQWHG H[FOXVLYHO\ E\
reference to the number and, where appropriate, the age of the members of the 
family (definition of Article 1(u)(ii) of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71);1 
µmember of the family¶ PHDQV ± in accordance with Article 1(i) of 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 ± any person defined or recognised as a 
member of the family or as a member of the household by the legislation 
under which benefits are provided; thus, it is a question of definition under the 
legislation which applies in the concrete case; if this legislation makes it 
necessary that the person concerned lives in the same household as the insured 
person or the pensioner, this condition has to be regarded as satisfied if the 
person in question is mainly dependent on the insured person or pensioner; 
µexport¶LVIURPDOHJDOSRLQWRIYLHZPLVOHDGLQJ; in principle Regulation (EC) 
No 883/2004 obliges to grant the family benefits also for the children residing 
in another Member State; therefore, it depends mainly on the legislation of the 
Member State which has to grant the benefits to whom the benefits have to be 
granted; if they have to be granted directly to the children this indeed usually 
means export; if they have to be granted to one of the parents this is not 
export, but it is assumed that the person receiving the money spends it in 
favour of the children concerned; if this is not the case, Article 68a of 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 safeguards that the benefit is transferred to the 
person who really maintains the children; this is only a clarification for the 
reader; we do not intend to change anything in this respect under our options 
DQGGHFLGHG WR XVH WKHZRUG µH[SRUW¶ LQ D EURDGHU VHQVH IRU DOO VLWXDWLRQV LQ
which the children reside outside the Member State concerned; 
                                                 
1
 In MISSOC tables family allowances can usually be found under WKHKHDGLQJµ&ODVVLFFKLOGEHQHILWV¶ 
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µMember State with primary competence¶ means the Member State which 
has to grant its family benefits by priority (this Member State has to grant the 
full amount of the benefit under the legislation it applies). We will use this 
term throughout this report, also if we propose changing the rules of priority 
(for further details undeUWRGD\¶VFRRUGLQDWLRQSOHDVHUHDGFKDSWHU3.1.2).  
µMember State with secondary competence¶ means the Member State which 
only has to top up the family benefit of the Member State with primary 
competence in the event that the family benefits of this Member State with 
secondary competence are higher (differential supplement ± see below).  
µdifferential supplement¶PHDQV WKH WRSSLQJXSRI WKH IDPLO\EHQHILWRI WKH
Member State which has been declared primarily competent by the Member 
State which is secondarily competent to reach the amount of benefits in the 
latter Member State (which is only necessary if the latter amount is higher than 
the first one ± today provided under Article 68(2) of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004); 
The different States to which Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 applies have at 
certain points been abbreviated in the following way: Austria (AT); Belgium 
(BE); Bulgaria (BG); Switzerland (CH); Cyprus (CY); the Czech Republic 
(CZ); Germany (DE); Denmark (DK); Estonia (EE); Greece (EL); Spain 
(ES); Finland (FI); Liechtenstein (FL); France (FR); Hungary (HU); Croatia 
(HR); Ireland (IE); Iceland (IS); Italy (IT); Lithuania (LT); Latvia (LV); 
Luxemburg (LU); Malta (MT); the Netherlands (NL); Norway (NO); Poland 
(PL); Portugal (PT), Romania (RO); Slovenia (SI); Sweden (SE); Slovakia 
(SK) and the United Kingdom (UK). 
A bibliography, including selected literature on the coordination of family 
benefits for further reading, is attached as Annex 3. 
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1.2 Mapping 
We also want to already refer to the mapping which had to be done especially 
to reflect the specific impact of the proposed amendments (options) in the 
different Member States, but, also to map the current situation and the 
problems encountered. For this purpose questionnaires were sent to FreSsco 
national experts. The countries were chosen according to substantive and 
geographic criteria. Care was taken to select countries that provide family 
benefits as income replacement benefits and those with no link to employment 
and paying of social security contributions, those with very diverse family 
benefits and those with more simple ones, countries from continental Europe, 
Eastern Europe and a Scandinavian country. Hence, the questionnaire was sent 
to (and the replies were received from) Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Croatia, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovenia and Sweden. It 
has to be mentioned also that the selected Member States have very different 
levels of cost of living standards. Starting with the Member State with the 
highest level,2 Sweden is No 2, Luxembourg No 4, Belgium No 8, Austria 
No 10, Slovenia No 16, the Czech Republic No 22, Croatia No 23, Poland 
No 26 and Bulgaria No 28. Due to the very restricted time schedule for all 
three think tank reports (next to the present one also on special non-
contributory cash benefits and unemployment benefits), all three 
questionnaires could not be sent to the same national experts (candidate 
countries for the analysis of family benefits could also be DE, UK or FR), 
since this would clearly be overburdening for them. The results of the replies 
received have been incorporated into the report wherever best fitted. These 
parts are clearly distinguished in separate chapters. 
Whenever we refer in this report to the special situation in one Member State, 
this is as a rule the outcome of the replies to the questionnaire (thus, the 
opinion of the FreSsco experts) and not of other (e.g. official) sources.  
                                                 
2
 See chapter Error! Reference source not found.. 
 23 
 
 
 24 
 
Current situation and problems 
1.3 Legal background ± FRRUGLQDWLRQRIIDPLO\EHQHILWVXQGHUWRGD\¶VFRRUGLQDWLRQ
rules 
1.3.1 The coordination embedded in the general principles of the TFEU 
The substantive rules currently in force to coordinate family benefits in the EU 
are stipulated by Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, more precisely in its Title III, 
Chapter 8. Understandably the preamble of the said Regulation as well as 
Title I, which sets out general provisions, and Title II, which fixes the main 
principles for the determination of the applicable legislation, are extremely 
important, as well as implementation Regulation (EC) No 987/2009.  
To better understand the idea of the coordination rules, it is useful to note that 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 was enacted under the legal base of Articles 48 
and 352 TFEU. The former one obliges the EU institutions to adopt measures 
to secure the rights of migrant workers and their dependants in the field of 
social security, which are necessary to provide freedom of movement to 
ZRUNHUV,QRWKHUZRUGVRQHRIWKHDLPVRIWKH5HJXODWLRQLV³to contribute to 
the establishment of the greatest possible freedom of movement for migrant 
workers´ZKLFK LVRQHRI IRXU IXQGDPHQWDO IUHHGRPVRI WKH(8DORQJZLWK
free movement of capital, goods and services.  
It has to be mentioned that compared to the previous coordination Regulations, 
the current one is broader as it applies to all nationals of a Member State, 
stateless persons and refugees residing in a Member State who are or have 
been subject to the legislation of one or more Member States, as well as to the 
members of their families and to their survivors (Recital No 7; Article 2). 
Thus, it does not only cover economically active persons and their families, 
but everyone who has had some contact with the social security of several 
Member States. For persons who cannot be regarded as being active, the 
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Regulation was adopted following the procedure in Article 352 TFEU. The 
broader personal scope is logical, taking into account the general trend to 
expand also the rights of non-active EU citizens (especially under the 
fundamental right to free movement for all Union citizens under Article 18 
TFEU).  
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has consistently held that 
Article 48 TFEU provides for the coordination, not for the harmonisation, of 
the legislation of the Member States. The aim of coordination is to adjust 
social security schemes in relation to each other in order to regulate 
transnational questions, with the objective of protecting the social security 
position of migrants (or any other eligible persons according to the 
Regulation), by guaranteeing that persons do not lose their social security 
rights due to migration. At the same time the coordination rules have a neutral 
character, which means that in principle situations have to be accepted where, 
due to the change of applicable social security legislation, the migrant person 
may find him or herself in a less favourable situation deriving from the 
substantive law of the Member State where the person migrated to (as, for 
example, the substantive law, applicable according to coordination rules, 
provides for lower amounts of benefits). However, the situation could also be 
in favour of the migrant.  
Before going more into detail of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 it is also 
important to mention Article 18 TFEU, according to which, within the scope 
of application of the Treaties, any discrimination on grounds of nationality 
must be prohibited and Article 45 TFEU, which, in the context of free 
movement of workers prohibits any discrimination on grounds of the migrant 
ZRUNHU¶VQDWLRQDlity. 
The aim of all coordination rules, is, as previously said, to guarantee that a 
person, due to free movement, is not losing his or her social security rights. 
Looking at the preamble of the Regulation, especially recitals No 1, 7, 8, 13, 
and 17, and taking into account the legal base from the TFEU, it could be said 
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that the Regulation concentrates on securing the social security rights of all 
EU citizens who have used their right to free movement and their family 
members, and not especially of economically active persons. But, arguments 
could also be found which support the idea that the Regulation still gives 
priority to economically active persons and their families, especially 
concerning family benefits, (see also recitals No 8 and 17 of the preamble) as 
the previous Regulations did. This question of the personal scope is important 
in defining whether the aim is to particularly guarantee the equal treatment of 
migrant workers and their rights in the Member State of activity or whether the 
aim is more general ± to secure the social security rights of all persons who 
have used their right to move freely on whatever ground or have been in 
contact with that right through family members.  
1.3.2 Specific rules on coordination of family benefits 
This part gives a short description of the main principles of coordination of 
IDPLO\EHQHILWV7RJXDUDQWHHSHUVRQV¶ULJKWVDOVRWRIDPLO\EHQHILWVLQTitle 
I the Regulation provides for generally applicable principles, e.g. specific rules 
for aggregation of insurance etc, periods in different Member States, the 
assimilation of facts, the waiving of residence rules. The Regulation also 
enacts a general rule which should prevent overlapping of benefits (Article 10 
and specific rules in Title III). All these general principles are well-known to 
the reader and seem unnecessary to be repeated at this occasion. 
Title II of the Regulation determines which legislation is applicable to a 
person. As a general rule, the person covered by the Regulation should be 
subjected to the legislation of a single Member State (Article 11(1)). Article 
11(3) defines the general rules of applicable legislation: as in previous 
Regulations, the Member State in which the person concerned pursues his or 
her activity as an employed or self-employed person should be the (one and 
only) competent Member State in social security matters (see recital No 17 
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and Article 11(3)(a)) and that State should also apply the general principles 
mentioned above; in particular it should treat the person equally with its 
nationals (Articles 4 and 5). At the same time there are more and more rules in 
the Regulation which derogate from this general principle of competence of 
the Member State of gainful activity and which complement these rules, and 
also which regulate competence situations where a person is not economically 
active, but is still covered by the Regulation. This determination of the 
applicable legislation is of utmost importance for the coordination of family 
benefits as ± on the one hand ± only a Member State which is competent for 
one of the members of the family (including the one competent for a child) has 
the obligation to grant benefits under Regulation (EC) No 883/20043 and ± on 
the other hand ± every competent Member State is obliged to open entitlement 
to its family benefits for all family members, irrespective of whether they 
reside in the same or in another Member State (Article 67 of Regulation (EC) 
No 883/2004). 
Without any additional rules this could lead to overcompensation if all 
Member States competent have to grant the full amount of their family 
benefits. Therefore, Title III, Chapter 8 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
provides for priority rules which set up a hierarchy of competent Member 
States (especially Article 68). Only the Member State which has primary 
competence has to grant the full amount of its family benefits and any other 
competent Member States only have to grant a top-up in the event that the 
family benefits under the legislation of these Member States are higher than 
those of the Member State with primary competence. In a nutshell, this 
hierarchy could be described as follows: competence of a Member State due to 
work has priority over the competence of a Member State granting a pension,4 
                                                 
3
 To keep this part simple we do not want to refer to the specific solutions developed by the CJEU under the general principles of 
the TFEU in relation to Member States not competent for any member of the family which provide for entitlements 
under national legislation alone ± e.g. the judgment in Hudzinski and Wawrzyniak, C-611/10 and C-612/10, 
EU:C:2012:339. 
4
 The case of pensioners is special as it is not the Member State competent for the pensioner under Title II of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 (which would be, based on Article 11(3)(e), the Member State of residence) but the Member State which 
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which has priority over competence due to mere residence. The Regulation 
also contains special provisions for those cases in which more than one 
Member State at the same step of hierarchy is involved (e.g. two different 
Member States in which the parents exercise a gainful activity and thus are 
subject to the legislation of both Member States due to Article 11(3)(a) of 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004). In these cases the residence of the child gives 
priority. Should no result be obtained thanks to this rule either (e.g. the child 
resides outside the two Member States in which the parents exercise a gainful 
activity) there are additional rules which determine the Member State which 
has to grant its family benefits by priority. As these are very rare cases we do 
not want to go into the details of these rules.  
1.4 Legal problems 
The rules on family benefits under Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 are one of 
WRGD\¶V PRVW FRPSOH[ DQG GLVSXWHG ILHOGV RI FRRUGLQDWLRQ $PRQJ WKH
problems of a legal nature especially the following have to be mentioned: 
 Various and diverging types of family benefits in cash: Taking into account 
the rulings of the CJEU, not only the traditional family allowances have to be 
regarded as family benefits. This includes also a bouquet of other benefits which 
do not have a lot of common elements, but, which have a general aim, which is 
(at least in part) the intention to meet family expenses: child-raising benefits 
which are usually meant to help the concrete person taking care of the child and 
which, therefore, replace income which cannot be received during the child-
raising period;5 tax benefits which are granted as a tax bonus;6 an aid for child 
                                                                                                                                               
grants the pension; thus, the Regulation adds Member States which have to grant family benefits to those which are 
competent under its Title II.  
5
 E.g. the judgment in Hoever and Zachow, C-245/94 and C-312/94, EU:C:1996:379; the judgment in Kuusijärvi, C-275/96, 
EU:C:1998:279; the judgment in Weide, C-153/03, EU:C:2005:428; the judgment in Dodl and Oberhollenzer, C-543/03, 
EU:C:2005:364; and most recently the judgment in Wiering, C-347/12, EU:C:2014:300. 
6
 Judgment in Lachheb, C-177/12, EU:C:2013:689, concerning the aspects of tax benefits which are at the same time social security 
benefits; see B. Spiegel (ed.), K. Daxkobler, G. Strban & A.P. van der Mei, µ$QDO\WLFDO UHSRUW7KH UHODWLRQVKLS
EHWZHHQVRFLDOVHFXULW\FRRUGLQDWLRQDQGWD[DWLRQODZ¶FreSsco, European Commission, January 2015. 
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care at home if the public kindergartens are not used;7 but also advances of 
maintenance payments8 and childbirth and adoption allowances9 (this last group 
had to be explicitly excluded from the definition of family benefit to safeguard 
that Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 does not apply to them ± Article 1 (z)). This 
variety of benefits makes it difficult to know exactly which benefits have to be 
coordinated and which fall outside the material scope of the Regulation. 
 A transition from work-related concepts towards the inclusion of anybody 
covered by a social security scheme: While Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
switched from covering (in principle) only gainfully active persons and their 
dependents (as has been the case with Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71) towards 
covering all persons subject to any social security scheme (Article 2), the 
coordination rules for family benefits still follow the old logic by giving priority 
to the situation of the gainfully active persons. This could cause some tension 
with the rights which every EU citizen derives from European citizenship 
(which rights have priority: those as a European citizen as an own right or those 
derived from another gainfully active person?). Without going further into that 
issue we recommend that this is an aspect which could also be further taken into 
account when thinking about concrete reforms of the coordination of these 
benefits. 
 The calculation of the differential supplement: When the Member State 
which is not competent by priority has to top up the benefits of the Member 
State competent by priority many questions arise. The question if this top up has 
to be made for the total of all family benefits together or only per benefit 
category has been decided under Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 by the CJEU in 
favour of the second option.10 Although some doubt may arise whether this also 
applies for the application of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, there are 
convincing arguments in that direction.11 Another issue which is still not decided 
                                                 
7
 Judgment in Maaheimo, C-333/00, EU:C:2002:641. 
8
 Judgment in Offermanns, C-85/99, EU:C:2001:166, judgment in Humer, C-255/99, EU:C:2002:73, and judgment in Effing, C-
302/02, EU:C:2005:36. 
9
 If Luxemburg had not excluded this benefit explicitly it would have been covered by Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71; judgment in 
Leclere and Deaconescu, C-43/99, EU:C:2001:303. 
10
 Judgment in Wiering EU:C:2014:300. 
11
 See also Y. Jorens & J. De Coninck, µ5HSO\WRDQDGKRFUHTXHVWfor comparative analysis of national legislations. Family Benefits 
± Consequences of the Wiering judgment in C-¶)UH6VFR(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ'HFHPEHU, 132 p. 
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is whether this calculation has to be made per family or per child (which could 
also lead to totally different results, the latter one giving entitlement to higher 
benefits than the first one). 
 An unclear situation concerning benefits in kind: The notion of family 
benefits also covers all benefits in kind. Despite that, Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 does not provide for clear rules (as are e.g. provided in the field of 
sickness benefits in kind12) on which Member State has to grant these benefits. 
Although concrete rulings of the CJEU are still missing,13 it cannot be excluded 
that these benefits have to follow the general rules of coordination of family 
benefits including the obligation to grant them also for children residing outside 
the Member State concerned. Of course it is very difficult to imagine the export 
of e.g. free school books, free school milk or free travel from home to school to 
other Member States, but, would it not be possible that the CJEU, once asked, 
deducts from these rules an obligation to reimburse the expenses incurred 
outside the competent Member State?14 
 Which persons have to be regarded as members of the family: Under the 
traditional family concept the question which persons can open entitlement to 
family benefits was not so difficult to answer (the parents and the children). 
Modern family situations have altered this dramatically. Today it is in some 
situations very complicated to decide which persons might be involved. The 
CJEU had to respect these new situations and declared also persons outside the 
actual family as persons who might open entitlement to family benefits, e.g. a 
divorced parent.15 As a result, much more individuals could be concerned when 
                                                 
12
 There is a whole Chapter 1 under Title III of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 which deals with the various aspects of the granting of 
sickness benefits in kind. Most important is that there is no export of these benefits but an obligation of the Member 
State where the concrete treatment is effected to grant these benefits at the expense of the competent Member State.  
13
 In the judgment in Commission v Austria, C-75/11, EU:C:2012:605, the CJEU did not have to answer the question whether the 
Austrian reduced costs for public transport have to be regarded as family benefits in kind under Regulation (EEC) No 
1408/71. 
14
 )ROORZLQJHJWKHUHLPEXUVHPHQWREOLJDWLRQGHYHORSHGE\WKH&-(8LQWKHFDVHVRQµSDWLHQW-PRELOLW\¶EXWRIFRXUVHWKHFDVHVZH
are confronted with are usually not cases on the freedom to provide services under Article 56 et seq TFEU. As this is not 
the main subject of this report we do not examine this question more in depth; for our purpose it is most important to 
mention it as a problem. 
15
 Judgment in Slanina, C-363/08, EU:C:2009:732; this ruling is understood in Austria as extending the notion of member of the 
family beyond the definition of Article 1(i) as also children who have not been dependent on the insured person came 
within the notion of member of the family . 
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calculating the amounts of family benefits. The definition of family member 
under Article 1(i) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 should be analysed if it 
really gives enough clarity concerning all persons who could fall under the 
QRWLRQRIµIDPLO\PHPEHU¶$QRWKHULVVXHLVDOVRLIWRGD\¶VGHILQLWLRQFRYHUVLQD
sufficiently broad way all new forms of family which are recognised only under 
the legislation of some Member States (e.g. homosexual marriages).16 
1.5 Administrative problems 
1.5.1 Results from the mapping exercise 
The )UH6VFR QDWLRQDO H[SHUWV¶ replies to the questionnaire showed some 
details concerning administrative difficulties. Certain administrative problems 
were reported by the majority of FreSsco national experts, arguing that the 
coordination regime for family benefits does not function perfectly in practice. 
Causes might lie for instance in the difficulty of comparing distinctive family 
benefits, not only due to diversity in the nature of these benefits, but also due 
to diversity of eligibility conditions for claiming them (e.g. in LU). 
It seems that in Austria the principle that the whole family must be 
considered for the entitlement to family benefits leads to major administrative 
efforts for the competent institutions. They are obliged to identify all relevant 
facts regarding the mother, the father and the child. Also Poland reported 
problems regarding the classification of benefits and of a family (e.g. the legal 
situation of a step-parent). Similarly in Bulgaria, the reference to persons who 
have to be specified in part A of the E400 family benefit confirmation form 
creates certain difficulties. The form requires referral to a (former) spouse or 
other person/persons whose entitlement to family benefits in the country of 
residence of those family members should be verified. This allows referral of 
economically inactive persons (pensioners and even deceased relatives) and in 
                                                 
16
 See also Y. Jorens, B. Spiegel, J.-C. Fillon & G. Strban TKLQN 7DQN UHSRUW  µ.H\ FKDOOHQJHV IRU WKH VRFLDO VHFXULW\
FRRUGLQDWLRQ5HJXODWLRQVLQWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRI¶, Chapter 5. 
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that manner, to designate the other Member State as primarily competent 
(based on occupation). Moreover, in Bulgaria a large number of portable 
documents and certificates providing data only for family allowances for 
children in Bulgaria is being issued to individuals (by the Social Assistance 
Directorate at the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy). These do not provide 
information for occupation and activity in Bulgaria, and thus they cannot serve 
to determine the competent institution under the social security coordination 
rules. 
All that may result in rather long procedures. Lengthy procedures were 
reported not only by Austria, but also by Croatia and Slovenia. In the latter it 
appears that the reason lies especially in complicated matters of coordination 
of family benefits and the important increase of coordination issues since 
&URDWLD¶V DFFHVVLRQ WR WKH 8QLRQ ,Q DGGLWLRQ RQO\ IHZ H[SHUWV DUH GHDOLQJ
with the coordination of family benefits, which may result in administrative 
decisions being issued only after a year from claiming the benefits (with an 
even longer tendency in the future). Moreover, certain procedures, like the one 
for the recovery of benefits, are as a rule not even instigated. Interestingly, in 
order to prevent fraud and abuse of family benefits, it is reported that the 
Czech Republic is currently starting negotiations with Slovakian partners on a 
possible future anti-fraud bilateral agreement. However, this procedure is only 
in a very beginning stage and no details on the future content of such an 
agreement are known yet. 
So far, problems encountered and reported by the Croatian authorities relate 
also to cooperation with the competent institutions of other Member 
States. It seems that the main problem consists in obtaining the answer from 
another Member State, particularly where there is primary competence in 
another Member State on the basis of receipt of pension. The procedure is 
often long, without a reply from the Member State with primary competence. 
This results in the temporary granting of benefits by the Member State with 
secondary competence (i.e. HR), which could potentially lead to lengthy and 
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complicated reimbursement procedures. Another problem in communication 
arises with the forwarding of applications for family benefits, which are 
deemed submitted in all Member States if they are submitted in one Member 
State (which is then liable to forward it, if the facts of the case so require). 
Practice shows that applications are either not forwarded at all, or are 
forwarded without response from the other Member State.    
Administrative problems in the cross-border exchange of data were also 
reported by Belgium and Bulgaria. In Bulgaria it seems that the series E400 
forms and the SEDs of the F-series are exchanged on paper by regular post. 
As a result, the information flow lingers and a risk of losing documents always 
exists. Introduction of upcoming electronic exchange should accelerate and 
facilitate the process of data exchange. 
Reportedly, in Sweden there are problems concerning the coordination of 
income-replacing parental benefits (see 4.1.4 below). 
Another problem was reported by Austria in relation to family benefits. 
Entitlement to family benefits often effects inclusion into social insurance, 
like health or pension insurance. This can cause problems if the person 
concerned is already insured because of the prolongation of employment, e.g. 
during maternity leave. In this case the question arises which Member State is 
competent to provide social insurance coverage? This is also due to the fact 
that the material scope of Decision F1 of the Administrative Commission for 
the Coordination of Social Security Systems17 is not clear enough regarding 
the applicable legislation.  
Despite all the problems mentioned above, not many national court cases 
dealing with social security coordination of family benefits were reported. 
None or very few (non-recent) cases were reported by Belgium, Bulgaria, the 
                                                 
17
 Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social Security Systems, Decision F1 of 12 June 2009 concerning the 
interpretation of Article 68 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council relating to 
priority rules in the event of overlapping of family benefits, OJ C 106, 24.04.2010, p. 11-12. 
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Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg (apart from two famous cases, i.e. 
Lachheb18 and Wiering19 ± introducing insecurity for the Luxembourg 
institution CNPF20) and Slovenia. 
It is in Austria that several court cases were reported. In 2014 and 2015 (until 
end March) Austrian higher courts had to decide 23 cases regarding the 
coordination of family allowance (Familienbeihilfe) and two cases regarding 
the coordination of childcare cash benefits (Kinderbetreuungsgeld) under 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (or Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71, 
respectively).  
In Sweden (apart from the Kuusijärvi21 case, also mentioned below) courts 
had to deal with the question of the duration of export of residence-based 
family benefits, such as child allowance.22 Sweden also reported a specific 
problem with regard to the case law on the deduction of days to be made when 
parental benefits have been paid out in other Member States.23 The negative 
consequences for families with one frontier worker were also acknowledged in 
the Swedish media.  
                                                 
18
 Judgment in Lachheb EU:C:2013:689. 
19
 Judgment in Wiering EU:C:2014:300. 
20
 Caisse nationale des prestations familiales. 
21
 Judgment in Kuusijärvi EU:C:1998:279. 
22
 Reportedly, one case concerned a woman who had left Sweden for France. As long as she was a student there with Swedish study 
allowance, she was entitled to continued payments of child allowance. However, when her studies came to an end, the 
Social Insurance Agency claimed that she was no longer covered by Swedish legislation. The Administrative Court of 
Appeal found that the woman, due to a leave of absence from her Swedish employer, could not be regarded as having 
ceased all occupational activity in Sweden (compare with the Kuusijärvi case). The Social Insurance Agency appealed 
and claimed that the woman was no longer covered by any risk according to Swedish social security legislation, since a 
person during leave of absence is not covered by the Swedish work-based social security legislation (compare with the 
Dodl/Oberhollenzer cases). The case was not granted leave to appeal in the Supreme Administrative Court. 
23
 According to national legislation, Sweden is entitled to deduct days from the total of 480 Swedish days of benefits. However, to 
establish how many days have been taken out in another Member State may be problematic. The full Swedish parental 
benefit equals seven days of benefits a week. The Swedish Social Insurance Agency has taken the stance that, when 
transforming weeks taken out into days, a foreign week equals seven days, regardless of how many actual days the 
person has been granted in the other Member State during that week. In a situation where the mother worked in 
Denmark, for example, and had started the parental leave, the Swedish deduction led to situations where there were no 
days left for the father, working in Sweden, when he wanted to draw his parental benefit. 
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Several (administrative) court cases were also reported by Poland concerning 
overlapping of family benefits and the determination of the applicable 
legislation. Polish courts are of the opinion that the subject of comparison 
should be only the total amount of the benefit(s) granted, rather than the 
particular amounts of each type of benefits granted,24 which seems to be in 
opposition to the CJEU judgment in Wiering.25 
1.5.2 Short conclusions on the administrative problems 
As shown by the mapping exercise, many technical and administrative 
SUREOHPV RFFXU LQ WRGD\¶V DSSOLFDWLRQ RI 7LWOH ,,, &KDSWHU  RI 5HJXODWLRQ
(EC) No 883/2004 (beside the legal problems). It is not the subject of this 
report to deal with all the different problems; only those relevant to export will 
be analysed if needed. Nevertheless, from our point of view especially the 
following problems can be summed up (some of them stemming from the 
FreSsco national experts, some added from our experiences and knowledge):  
 problems identifying the Member State competent by priority; 
 problems calculating the differential amount by the other Member States; 
 very lengthy procedures which lead to situations in which the families concerned 
have to wait long before any benefit is paid; 
 problems calculating provisional benefits; 
 problems recovering overpayments. 
                                                 
24
 &I1DF]HOQ\6ąG$GPLQLVWUDF\MQ\DNW,26.,26. 
25
 Judgment in Wiering EU:C:2014:300. 
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1.6 Political problems 
1.6.1 General remarks 
On top of the legal and administrative problems, in recent years the 
coordination of family benefits also became the focus of political attention. 
$QHFGRWDOO\ VRPH VWDNHKROGHUV¶ PDLQ FRQFHUQ DQG SRLQW RI FULWLFLVP LV WKDW
the family benefits which have to be granted for children residing outside the 
competent Member State have to be exported without any limitation, 
LUUHVSHFWLYH RI WKH HFRQRPLF VLWXDWLRQ LQ WKHVH FKLOGUHQ¶V 0HPEHU 6WDWH RI
residence. Member States with relatively high amounts of family benefits 
could argue that this unlimited export is not fair, as it provides (in relation to 
the economic situation) much more money than the local families (without 
cross-border movement) get. Main purpose of the mandate for this report 
(which clearly mentions these concerns) is to look into various options for the 
export of family benefits which could solve the political problems. But, 
DOUHDG\DWWKDWRFFDVLRQLWKDVWREHVWUHVVHGWKDWRXUJURXSGLGQRWVHHWRGD\¶V
situation of unrestricted export of family benefits in such a dramatic way; in 
public discussion only very few Member States raised this issue. 
As any option which is different from the status quo will not be measured in 
relation to its impact on these political problems alone, but, also in relation to 
the legal and administrative problems described, we will also refer to them and 
have a look if these problems could also be solved or at least diminished. The 
option which could best solve all three categories of problems would be the 
preferred one.  
1.6.2 Results from the mapping exercise 
Despite all the problems mentioned and also the rationale behind our mandate, 
hardly any political debate on coordination of family benefits was reported by 
the FreSsco national experts. It is considered that the coordination 
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Regulations are a technical matter, giving rise to debates only between experts 
(e.g. CNPF in LU). For example, the Wiering case law26 is of great importance 
for Luxembourg, but it seems too hard to explain it in detail to the public. 
Some public debate on family benefits was reported by Slovenia (following 
the adoption of the new family benefits act) and Bulgaria (on very low family 
benefits and their entitlement for the Roma population), but none on the 
coordination of family benefits. No public debate on coordination was also 
reported by Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. 
Conversely, there was some public debate in Poland on transfer of family 
benefits from other Member States, especially from the United Kingdom to 
Poland. This started when David Cameron, British Prime Minister, stated that 
KHZRXOG WU\ WR UHQHJRWLDWH WKH8.¶VPHPEHUship of the European Union to 
allow it to withhold child benefits for children living in other EU countries.27 
This became an international affair, and Polish foreign minister Radek 
Sikorski, talking about reciprocity, wrote on his official site: "If Britain gets 
our taxpayers, shouldn't it also pay their benefits? Why should Polish 
taxpayers subsidise British taxpayers' children?"28 It has to be noted that in 
the United Kingdom child benefit claims under Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
in respect of children living in Poland are constantly decreasing.29 
                                                 
26
 Judgment in Wiering EU:C:2014:300. 
27
 'DYLG&DPHURQVDLG³,W
VDVLWXDWLRQWKDW,LQKHULWHG«,WKLQNLWZLOOWDNHWLPHEHFDXVHZHHLWKHUKDYHWRFKDQJHLWE\JHWWLQJ
agreement from other European countries ± and there are other European countries who, like me, think it's wrong that 
someone from PL who comes here, who works hard, and I am absolutely all in favour of that, but I don't think we should 
be paying child benefit to their family back at home in Poland.´ 5 0DVRQ µ&DPHURQ WR SXVK IRU FDS RQ (XURSHDQ
PLJUDQWV LQ 8. QHJRWLDWLRQV ZLWK (8¶ The Guardian, 5 January 2014, available at http://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2014/jan/05/cameron-cap-european-migrants-uk-negotiations-eu (last accessed 17 March 2015). 
28
 %:DWHUILHOGµ3RODQGDWWDFNV'DYLG&DPHURQSODQWREDQ3ROLVKDQG(8PLJUDQWVIURPFODLPLQJFKLOGEHQHILW¶The Telegraph, 6 
January 2014, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/poland/10553020/Poland-attacks-David-
Cameron-plan-to-ban-Polish-and-EU-migrants-from-claiming-child-benefit.html (last accessed 17 March 2015). He 
argued that Polish people contributed about double the amount to the British economy than they withdrew in benefits. 
According to statistics, migrants from the Central and Eastern European Member States are much less likely to claim 
benefits than British nationals. The majority claim child benefits. In the long run the United Kingdom is receiving the 
ILVFDOFRQWULEXWLRQRIPLJUDQWV¶ZRUNZLWKout paying for the education and training that enables them to work. 
29
 According to statistics, in 2009 there were 22,885 claims for 37,941 children in Poland. In 2013 there were 13,174 claims for 
22,093 children of migrants from Poland. R. McInnes, µ6WDWLVWLFV RQ PLJUDQWV DQG EHQHILWV¶ DYDLODEOH DW
http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06955/statistics-on-migrants-and-benefits (last accessed 31 March 2015). 
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Horizontal options which are relevant for all options examined with 
regard to export 
Before going into the concrete options concerning the export of benefits, we 
want to mention some horizontal issues which emerge when problems in 
relation to the coordination are mentioned and, therefore, also have relevance 
for these options. We recommend also including these aspects in any attempt 
to change the existing system, as they could have significance for the impact 
assessment of the different options. After our examination of the different 
options we are convinced that these horizontal questions cannot be left aside 
by the policy-makers who have to take a decision on which option on export 
of benefits to follow.  
Nevertheless, these additional options are not a must for the new coordination 
concerning export. They could help to avoid some additional problems, but, 
any export option would also perfectly work without them (maybe, with 
different pros and cons as a result of the impact assessment ± which can be of 
great importance for the decision-makers). As this was not explicitly requested 
we have also abstained from making a detailed impact assessment of these 
additional options. Whenever important we will refer to them during the 
impact assessment of the export options. Taking into account the very 
restricted time available for any reform of the export provisions it would not 
be realistic to expect that all these additional options will be taken on board at 
this next occasion. Maybe, these ideas could be further discussed for a more 
profound revision of the coordination of family benefits in future. 
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1.7 The same coordination for all family benefits? 
1.7.1 General remarks concerning the variety of benefits 
Of course export today concerns all family benefits in the same way (letting 
aside the advances of maintenance payments and special childbirth and 
adoption allowances which are included in Annex I of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004). Nevertheless, it should be examined if the same coordination for 
all family benefits is really the perfect solution. 
From a historical point of view (when Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 was 
drafted) family allowances have been the main benefits provided for by the 
legislation of the Member States. Later on, the bouquet of family benefits as 
described above expanded and covered more and more different types of 
benefits. If export is considered the problem which stimulated this search for 
new options, we have to examine first if all the different groups of family 
benefits cause the same problems. 
1.7.2 Results from the mapping exercise 
The diversity of political aims behind the different family benefits of the 
Member States also became very clear from the replies of the FreSsco 
national experts: 
In general, the aim of social security systems is to provide income security in 
cases of lost (or reduced) income and in cases of additional costs (through a 
process of broader or narrower social solidarity). More precisely, the primary 
goal of family benefits may be deducted from the actes préparatoires 
(legislative material for the adoption of a new act). As a rule, it is to cover 
(part of) additional costs a family has due to maintenance and education of a 
child or more children.  
 40 
 
For instance, in Austria in the preparatory documents30 for the adoption of the 
)DPLOLHV¶ %XUGHQ &RPSHQVDWLRQ $FW
(Familienlastenausgleichsgesetz/FLAG)31 regulating family allowance 
(Familienbeihilfe LW LVPHQWLRQHGWKDW WKHVRFLDOSROLF\DLPRI WKH)DPLOLHV¶
Burden Compensation Act is to support families with children when the costs 
of maintenance and education of children impair the standard of living, 
especially if a family has more than one child. It has been ascertained that 
compensating the additional financial burden of families for housing, clothing 
and nutrition is crucial for the existence of the whole Austrian society. This 
compensation is to be conducted between those who carry that burden ± also 
for the good of the whole society ± and those who do not carry such burden 
and therefore benefit from the fact that others do. 
In Slovenia the social policy aim of the parental care and family benefits 
scheme is expressed in the preparatory materials for the new ZSDP-1 (Zakon o 
VWDUãHYVNHPYDUVWYXLQGUXåLQVNLKSUHMHPNLK, Parental Care and Family Benefits 
Act).32 It is emphasised that family benefits are a link of the entire uniform 
family policy, which is exercised also via other policy areas. The ZSDP-1 is 
based on the social nature of the Slovenian state and the fact that the state 
cannot ignore the basic societal cell ± the family.  
The primary goal of family allowances to offset the costs of a family for 
raising children is reported also by every other Member State (covered by our 
questionnaire), i.e. Belgium, the Czech Republic, Poland, Luxembourg 
(where family allowances are a personal right of the child),33 Sweden (where 
family allowances should somewhat even out the differences between families 
                                                 
30
 RV 549 BlgNR 21.GP, 11. 
31
 Federal Gazette Number 376/1967, latest version Number 53/2014 
32
 Government of the RS, legislative proposal for the ZSDP-1, EVA 2013-2611-0042, 10.10.2013 
33
 Reportedly, since the beginning of the 21st Century, LU has adopted a new approach regarding welfare of children, based on the 
United Nations Convention on the rights of the child. Through reforms in fiscal matters ± the abolition of income tax 
classes taking into account the presence of children in a household and the creation of a "child bonus" (2007) ± and 
family benefits ± the creation of a childcare voucher (2009), the abolition of family allowances for young people over 18 
and the creation of a financial aid for young people in higher education (2010), the government recognised the child as 
an individual. 
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with children and those without) and Bulgaria (benefits should support 
parents to raise a child in the family environment). 
However, there are also ancillary (secondary) aims, like guaranteeing equal 
treatment of children (BE), or maximising the best interests of the child, 
increasing birth rates and nativity (HR), providing more gender equality, 
enabling workers with family responsibilities to balance between professional 
and family life (SI), or combating the decline in birth rates (AT). It is also 
important to note that family benefits should prevent or even alleviate poverty 
of children and their families (BE, BG). In Bulgaria it is discussed that 
instead of targeting poor people (especially Roma), family benefits should 
follow children in educational establishments, being dedicated to education 
DQGEHWWHUKHDOWK FDUH WR LQFUHDVHFKLOGUHQ¶VSRWHQWLDO IRU IXWXUH HPSOR\PHQW
and social inclusion. Some initial conceptualisations have, however, become 
obsolete (e.g. family benefits as a wage supplement for workers with families 
in BE).  
Taking all these primary and secondary aims into account, family benefits are 
shaped quite distinctively across Member States. Some amounts may depend 
on the number of children (e.g. in SE) and their age (e.g. in AT, CZ, SI for 
child benefits). Some may be income-related and some provided as a lump 
sum (e.g. in LU). Some may be income-tested or means-tested (HR, child 
allowance in CZ, guaranteed child benefit in BE, child benefit in SI, family 
allowances and supplements in PL). For some (permanent) residence may be 
required (e.g. in AT, SI). There may be special benefits (e.g. partial payment 
for lost income and childcare supplement in SI) or certain supplements for 
children with disabilities (e.g. in BE, BG, PL). Supplements may include 
additional amounts of certain family benefits for single parents (e.g. in BE 
where it is income-tested, SI) or for long-term unemployed, sick or 
incapacitated parents or those receiving an old-DJHRUVXUYLYRU¶VSHQVLRQHJ
the BE professional scheme), supplements for heating or electricity support (in 
BG), or within the housing benefit (in SE). 
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It should be emphasised that presenting all different features of all family 
benefits in all Member States is not the central focus of the present report. For 
this we refer to the annexes (country sheets) of the FreSsco report on the 
Wiering judgment34 and the MISSOC comparative tables on family benefits. 
However, it might be pertinent also for the present analysis whether the 
amounts of family benefits (and their adjustment) are linked to the 
(minimum or average) wage or social assistance or living costs in the Member 
State they are being provided. Linking family benefits to different factors 
might influence the possibility (or criteria) for their adjustment when 
exporting them to another Member State. 
The amounts of some family benefits are not directly linked to any of the 
abovementioned factors. For instance, in Austria, there is no defined 
percentage of living costs or average income which should be covered by the 
benefit. The amount is not directly related to minimum income or the social 
assistance amount. However, family allowance is not deducted when 
calculating social assistance (Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung) in 
comparison to e.g. cash childcare benefits. This is due to the fact that the latter 
DUH TXDOLILHG DV µLQFRPH¶ ZKLFK UHGXFHV WKH DPRXQW RI VRFLDO DVVLVWDQFH
accordingly. In contrast, the amount of social assistance even increases (plus 
18%) if the claimant has to care for a child receiving family allowance. 
In Belgium, in neither scheme (i.e. the professional and residual one) is there a 
defined percentage of the average income or living costs that should be 
covered by the benefit. In principle, the amount is not tied to the minimum 
income or to amounts of social assistance. However, the guaranteed child 
benefit is granted only to persons who receive social assistance or have a low 
income (hence, an indirect link to social assistance does exist), and certain 
supplements are income-tested. 
                                                 
34
 Y. Jorens & J. De Coninck, µ5HSO\ WR DQ DG KRF UHTXHVW IRU FRPSDUDWLYH DQDO\VLV RI QDWLRQDO OHJLVODWLRQV )DPLO\ %HQHILWV ± 
Consequences of the Wiering judgment in C-¶)UH6VFR(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ'ecember 2014, 132 p. 
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In Bulgaria, the amounts of family benefits are fixed annually by the State 
Budget Act for the respective year, which means they may differ from one 
year to another. Each family benefit or allowance type is a fixed sum and is 
not rate-related with living costs or average monthly or annual income. 
However, this does not apply to income-related family allowances. 
In the Czech Republic, the amount of family allowances is not related to 
minimum income (reportedly, it used to be, but is not anymore), or to social 
assistance amounts. Interestingly, for Czech parental allowance, it is up to the 
parent who claims this benefit to choose how long he or she wants to stay at 
home with the child. The shorter the period, the higher the amount per month 
(within certain limits). 
In Croatia benefits depend on monthly income per member of the household 
DV SXW LQ UHODWLRQ WR WKH 6WDWH %XGJHW %DVH RI +5.  ¼ WKH VDPH
base applied since 2002). Three income groups are eligible to receive the 
allowance: households who earn below 50% of the State Budget Base, those 
who earn below 33.66% of that base and those who earn below 16.33%. Those 
whose income exceeds 50% of this amount are not entitled. There are also 
additional supplements. The amount of the child allowance therefore depends 
directly on the amount of the State Budget Base, which is determined and laid 
down each year, by the Act on the Implementation of the State Budget for the 
current year.  
Also in Luxembourg, the effective costs of the presence of a child in a 
household have never been calculated. A universalist vision prevails, which 
means that all children have equal rights, that they have a right to family 
allowances of the same (lump sum) amount. It is not related to living costs, 
average income, minimum income or social assistant amounts.  
This is similar to Sweden, where child allowances and special supplements 
within housing benefits are not related to the minimum income/social 
assistance. Still, there appear to be discussions in Sweden from time to time on 
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whether child allowance should instead depend on the income level of the 
family. It is argued that in this case the costs for administrating the benefit 
would increase. 
Also in Poland family benefits are not defined as a percentage of living costs, 
average remuneration or social assistance. 
However, in Slovenia there seems to be a certain link to the minimum wage, 
e.g. parental allowance used to be determined as 55% of the minimum wage 
(and according to the new ZSDP-1 it is just set as a corresponding amount, no 
longer mentioning minimum wage as such). Also partial payments for lost 
income used to be equalled with (a proportional part or the entire) minimum 
wage (now the nominal amount is set, which corresponds to the minimum 
wage as it was set in the first half of 2010). Some benefits are targeted to those 
below 64 % of the average wage per family member (child benefit and large 
family supplement) 
The most evident link to (former) income (wage) exists in income replacement 
child-raising schemes, e.g. the Austrian income replacement scheme of the 
cash childcare benefits (Kinderbetreuungsgeld), or parental benefits in 
Sweden. 
Some family benefits do have a link with the cost of living in the country, 
which is evident from the adjustment (indexation) rules. Some family 
benefits are adjusted by the rate of inflation (e.g. in AT),35 some by the 
evolution in living costs (e.g. in BE or SI). It may also be that family benefit 
amounts are fixed amounts, which are, e.g. in Luxembourg, no longer 
adjusted to the evolution of living costs. 
                                                 
35
 In Austria, for the years 2016-2017 the amount of the family allowance will be increased by 1.9 %. The same applies for the year 
2018. That approximately corresponds to the calculated rate of inflation. 
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1.7.3 Benefits with the predominant aim to meet family expenses; questions of 
definition 
If the political decision behind a family benefit is (besides other policy aims 
like e.g. the promotion of families or the encouragement to have (more) 
children) to cover the additional expenses which are caused by the obligation 
to maintain children (e.g. additional or special nutrition, nappies, prams, 
school books etc.) it is arguable that this decision is usually only based on the 
situation in the Member State concerned. The costs of these goods there are 
the decisive factor. In an ideal transparent world national politics set a 
percentage of these additional costs which has to be covered by the family 
benefit. If this decision says e.g. that 20% of these additional costs has to be 
the amount of the family benefit, this decision is outbalanced if the children 
need these goods in another Member State where they live and this amount 
covers e.g. 100% or only 5% of these goods there. In these cases a political 
problem might arise. On the contrary, our mapping exercise (see 4.1.2 above) 
showed that national legislatures usually did not refer to a specific percentage 
of the living costs when a new family benefit was introduced, even if it is also 
provided for that these benefits have to be adjusted in correspondence to the 
development of the costs of living in the Member State concerned. Important 
is also that it seems that no Member State has adjusted its family benefits to 
different costs of living inside the relevant territory. 
For these benefits which include at least the classic family allowances, options 
could be considered which strive for a better way of achieving the political 
aims behind the benefit. These benefits will be the main focus of detailed 
options concerning the export of family benefits. Of course these options 
could also cover all other family benefits if no decision is taken to split the 
coordination for the different types of family benefits, but, we should never 
forget that especially these general benefits gave rise to the main problems 
ZLWKWRGD\¶VH[SRUWREOLJDWLRQV 
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Past FreSsco work unveiled the complexity of the notion of family benefits 
especially if benefits are concerned which are at the same time social tax 
benefits (benefits granted under tax law which have the clear purpose to cover 
at least a part of the additional costs due to having children to maintain).36 The 
perception from a national point of view of what constitutes a family benefit 
covered by Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and which benefits fall outside its 
scope are very often more influenced by national systematics than European 
approaches (which should only look into the policy aim of a measure to 
establish the material scope of the Regulation). This situation has been 
aggravated by new types of benefits added by the CJEU which are not so 
evidently covered by the existing definition of family benefits as they cover 
also other purposes (e.g. helping the person taking care of a child to reconcile 
work and family life as is very often the case with child-raising benefits).  
Therefore, it could be good to start any work on new ways of coordination 
with a new definition of a family benefit. This would be recommendable even 
if no specific coordination is provided for specific benefits which are income-
related (see 4.1.4 below). Such a new definition should draw a clear borderline 
in relation to social tax benefits which still remain outside the scope of 
coordination under the Regulation (if there are any) and should also cover all 
the other benefits (if no specific new coordination is provided for them). 
 
Proposal for an additional horizontal Option No 1 
The definition of family benefits should be adapted to avoid todD\¶V TXHVWLRQV RI
interpretation and to draw a clear borderline in relation to benefits which should remain 
outside the coordination. 
 
                                                 
36
 B. Spiegel, K. Daxkobler, G. Strban & A.P. van der Mei, µ$QDO\WLFDO UHSRUW  7KH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ VRFLDO VHFXULW\
FRRUGLQDWLRQDQGWD[DWLRQODZ¶)UH6VFR(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ-DQXDU\. 
 47 
 
1.7.4 Benefits which are employment-related 
1.7.4.1 Which benefits are special because they are employment-related? 
Opposed to the classic family benefits there are benefits with quite different 
political aims. They want to replace income of the person who actually takes 
care of a child and for that reason interrupts or at least reduces a gainful 
activity. This is most evident if the amount of the benefit has a clear income 
replacement function, which means it is calculated as a percentage of the 
former earnings. But also benefits which have a lump sum nature could be 
added under this category as long as they are granted to persons exercising a 
JDLQIXO DFWLYLW\ ,W FRXOG EH DVVXPHG WKDW XQGHU WRGD\¶V FRRUGLQDWLRQ WKHVH
benefits give rise to some problems and it is not safeguarded that all Member 
States apply Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 in the same way. 
1.7.4.2 Results from the mapping exercise 
The above has also been confirmed by the replies from the FreSsco national 
experts. They especially report the following points: 
Problems were reported with the coordination of family benefits in relation to 
Sweden, in particular as regards the parental benefit. When Sweden joined 
the EU it was considered that the parental benefit ± which is related to the 
income of the individual parent ± was to be regarded as a maternity benefit. 
However, the CJEU classified the parental benefit as a family benefit in the 
Kuusijärvi case.37 Reportedly, there have been many cases in national courts 
regarding parents moving during parental leave and the issue of their right to 
continued payments of benefits. The issue of non-actives moving to Sweden 
and claiming parental benefits has also come up in the courts. The Supreme 
Administrative Court referred such a case to the CJEU (Bergström).38 In 
general, it is argued that the coordination of family benefits has been one of 
                                                 
37
 Judgment in Kuusijärvi EU:C:1998:279. 
38
 Judgment in Bergström, C-257/10, EU:C:2011:839. 
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the main problematic issues when it comes to applying Regulation (EEC) No 
1408/71 and (EC) No 883/2004 in Sweden.  
There have also been some cases concerning the overlapping of benefits in 
Sweden. As mentioned, parental benefits compensate income loss, whereas 
µQRUPDO¶ IDPLO\ EHQHILWV DUH UHODWHG WR FRVWV LQ Jeneral for having a family. 
Since some other Member States do not classify their parental benefits as 
family benefits, Sweden has often been obliged to pay supplements for 
families residing in another State, while one of the parents is working in 
Sweden. The Swedish Social Insurance Agency issued two reports on this 
issue, one in 2004 and one in 2006, to look into the cost for Sweden.  
Also, the individual worker could be negatively affected by the fact that flat-
rate benefits were put in the same benefit basket as the income-related parental 
benefit. The following example came up in the case law: a worker in Sweden 
whose family and working husband were in Denmark was taking out a few 
days of parental benefit a month (reportedly, in Sweden this is a common way 
of reducing working hours when having small children, since parental benefits 
may be spread out over several years; also when the child is sick parental 
benefits can be taken out). Denmark is then primarily responsible for family 
benefits. The Danish child allowance is higher than the Swedish one. When 
calculating the supplement for Sweden to pay out in this situation, the Swedish 
parental benefit was regarded as a family benefit, meaning that the few days of 
SDUHQWDOEHQHILWµGLVDSSHDUHG¶LQUHODWLRQWR the higher Danish amount, despite 
covering income loss for the worker and not general costs for the family. 
The problems related to overlapping of benefits have led to a special solution 
in the 2012 Nordic Convention (a multilateral convention based on Regulation 
(EC) No 883/2004 between SE, DK, NO, FI and IS), meaning that when 
calculating differential supplements for family benefits in accordance with 
Article 68(2) of the Regulation, benefits intended to compensate income loss 
for parents are not to be included. 
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As of September 2011, Sweden reportedly has taken the view that the parental 
benefit is to be regarded as a maternity/paternity benefit. This means that the 
Social Insurance Agency from this date on no longer includes parental benefits 
when calculating differential supplements (i.e. the same solution as in the 
Nordic Convention). The re-classification of parental benefits is, however, 
questionable. From our point of view it is difficult to justify such a 
fundamental change in interpretation taking into account that the general 
principles of coordination and the definition of family benefits did not change 
when Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 was adopted. 
The fact that the parental benefit could be exported to family members in other 
Member States with no individual income in Sweden ± which was one of the 
consequences of the classification in Kuusijärvi39 ± has been considered quite 
odd. One problem that could occur was on which level the benefits had to be 
granted ± the income level of the spouse working in Sweden or the basic level 
granted in Sweden to non-actives.  
The above example shows the diversity of family benefits in general and 
specific features of employment-related benefits in particular. 
1.7.4.3 Proposal for a new way of coordination 
From our point of view the negative consequences of coordinating a family 
benefit with an income replacement function can be best shown by way of an 
example: 
Example: 
Member States A and B know a child-raising benefit for the person who 
interrupts the gainful activity and takes care of the child for one year after birth. 
The amount of the child-raising benefit is in Member State A 60% of the 
previous earnings; in Member State B it is 80%. In addition, Member State A 
                                                 
39
 Judgment in Kuusijärvi EU:C:1998:279. 
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knows a lump-sum benefit (fixed amount) for persons who were not gainfully 
active before they started taking care of a child. 
In a family which resides in Member State A the father works in Member State A 
while the mother works as a frontier worker in Member State B. The mother 
draws child-raising leave after maternity leave and stays with the child at home. 
8QGHUWRGD\¶VFRRUGLQDWLRQ40 Member State A has primary competence. Will it 
grant the child-raising benefit under its legislation by compensating 60% of the 
income of the mother (who has been subject to the legislation of Member State B 
and not of Member State A)?41 In this case Member State B (secondarily 
competent) will have to grant a differential amount of 20% to reach the 80% 
provided under its legislation. Or will it, maybe, only grant the lump-sum 
amount for non-active persons in that Member State and will Member State B 
grant a differential supplement to reach the 80% provided under its legislation? 
From the point of view of the persons concerned this solution is not 
understood. In principle they would expect that the legislation of the Member 
State where they exercise their work has to grant these benefits. This is 
especially the case if there is no clear-cut borderline between the duration of 
the maternity (paternity) benefit which has to be coordinated under Title III, 
Chapter 1 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and, thus, be granted from 
Member State B in our example, and the following child-raising benefit 
(sometimes the benefits even have the same amount).  
To avoid problems of coordination of these types of family benefits it should 
be considered to draft a specific coordination which is not connected to the 
coordination of the remaining family benefits. One way could be to state 
explicitly that for these benefits the same coordination as for maternity or 
equivalent paternity benefits (Title III, Chapter 1 of the Regulation) should 
                                                 
40
 Let us assume we apply the Wiering judgment and coordinate all child-raising benefits in one basket. 
41
 From the judgment in Bergström EU:C:2011:839, it could be assumed that under Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 such an 
obligation exists.  
 51 
 
apply, as seems to be the practice already in some Member States. Thus, only 
the situation of the person concerned would be relevant and not the one of 
other members of the family. It has to be admitted that such a radical change 
RIWRGD\¶VFRRUGLQDWLRQZKLFKLVDOVRDFRQVHTXHQFHRIWKHFOHDUUXOLQJVE\WKH
CJEU was not shared by all members of our group. Another way, more in line 
with the existing coordination, could be to provide under Title III, Chapter 8 of 
the Regulation specific rules for this kind of family benefits which strengthen 
the lex loci laboris principle of the person who wants to claim the benefit. To 
avoid overcompensation, only one parent should be entitled to claim such 
benefits for the family wherever the children reside. Should this 
recommendation (which is not the focus of this report and, therefore, will also 
not be elaborated in full detail) be chosen, all options which we will examine 
in relation to the export of benefits have to be read in such a sense that they do 
not cover these special child-raising benefits. 
For this option we recommend that also the following elements should be 
further examined:  
 Definition ,W FRXOG EH VDLG WKDW µFKLOG-raising benefits linked to a gainful 
DFWLYLW\¶DUHWKRVHZKLFKDUHSURYLGHGXQGHUQDWLRQDOOHJLVODWLRQIRUSHUVRQVZKR
are in a gainful activity and who interrupt or reduce this activity with the (sole) 
purpose to raise a child. 
 Problems with benefits which have both functions, i.e. benefits for all 
residents + benefits for the gainfully active: As an example the Austrian 
child-raising benefit could be mentioned, which consists in various lump sum 
options for all residents and an income replacement option for gainfully active 
persons. It has to be decided if only the income replacement option has to be 
coordinated under the new way of coordination or any of these options if the 
person is in a gainful employment (we favour the second alternative because this 
would give any person in gainful employment the option he or she also has 
under national legislation).  
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 But, it also has to be taken into account that this approach could take away 
ULJKWVZKLFKH[LVWXQGHUWRGD\¶VFRRUGLQDWLRQ. If we imagine in our example 
that Member State B does not have any such child-raising benefits, whereas 
Member State A does, there would be no entitlement. We think this is a 
consequence which has to be accepted, as it goes without saying that in this 
situation also e.g. cash sickness benefits would not have to be granted by 
Member State A if there is no entitlement to such benefits under the legislation 
of Member State B. Thus, this solution would correspond to coordination 
usually provided under the individualised approach towards benefits. 
 Another issue which should be clarified in that context: for the coordination it 
should not matter if a family benefit is financed by tax or contributions or if it 
is provided for all residents or only the gainfully active population. Always 
the same coordination rules should apply with ± in principle ± the same results. 
Of course, entitlement in contribution-based systems could be seen as 
problematic when no contribution has been paid into the scheme of that Member 
State. This is an issue which is further discussed under 5.2 below. 
 ,Q WKLV FRQWH[W ZH KDYH QRWLFHG WKDW XQGHU WRGD\¶V FRRUGLQDWLRQ WKH text of 
Article 68 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 is not as clear as it should be. The 
ZRUGV ³rights available on the basis of an activity as an employed or self-
employed person´ VHHP WR PHDQ WKDW WKH SHUVRQ FRQFHUQHG LV VXEMHFW WR WKH
legislation of the Member State in question due to the exercise of an activity as 
an employed or self-employed person under Title II of the Regulation.42 Yet, it 
could also mean that the scheme concerned is based on an activity as an 
employed or self-employed person (excluding residence-based schemes). If a 
reform of these provisions of the Regulation is undertaken, also this possibility 
of misunderstandings (which leads to totally different results of coordination) 
should be removed. Our discussion showed that also the last sentence of Article 
68(2) is not clear and could be made more explicit. 
 
                                                 
42
 Recital 35 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 is a strong indicator for that interpretation. 
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Proposal for an additional horizontal Option No 2 
We recommend to further analyse the coordination of child-raising benefits for gainfully 
active persons and to look for ways of coordination which could take better care of the 
peculiarities of these benefits compared to classic family benefits like e.g. family allowances.    
Proposal for an additional horizontal Option No 3 
:HUHFRPPHQGVRPHFODULILFDWLRQ LQ$UWLFOHRQ WKHPHDQLQJRI³rights available on the 
basis of an activity as an employed or self-employed person´ 
 
1.7.5 Benefits which have the function of special non-contributory cash benefits 
Up until now Annex X of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 does not contain any 
benefits which are related to family benefits. If export is a problem for some 
Member States because the benefit is strictly limited to the special needs of the 
local population, it could be examined whether an entry of these rare groups of 
EHQHILWVLIWKH\H[LVWDWDOOLQWRWKDWDQQH[LVSRVVLEOHDOUHDG\XQGHUWRGD\¶V
criteria for special non-contributory cash benefits.43 Or, it could be examined 
whether a revision of the criteria contained in Article 70(2) of the Regulation 
is advisable to cover also these family benefits. Thus, all the options discussed 
in relation to the export of benefits would not apply to these benefits, which 
could also ease the discussion. But, as this is a very radical and far-reaching 
approach which could have effect for other benefits, this recommendation is 
not supported by all members of our group. 
 
                                                 
43
 This is a decision the EU legislature will have to take when such requests for inclusion of new benefits into Annex X of the 
Regulation are forwarded by a Member State; the moment a benefit is not special but a general social security benefit it 
can never be listed in that Annex (see also the judgment in Hosse, C-286/03, EU:C:2006:125).  
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Proposal for an additional horizontal Option No 4 
We recommend an examination of the list of Annex X of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
especially to cover also some family benefits which show the relevant elements.    
 
1.7.6 Advances of maintenance payments and childbirth and adoption allowances 
This is only to mention the problems with the existing exclusion of these 
benefits from the coordination under Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 the 
moment they are listed in Annex I. As we know, excluding benefits for which 
the CJEU decided that they are family benefits of the Regulation does not 
exclude that the TFEU or even Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 applies to these 
benefits.44 When new ways of coordination of family benefits are considered 
also the special situation of these benefits should not be forgotten.  
1.7.7 Special new rules for benefits in kind 
As already said, the exact coordination of family benefits in kind is not clear 
under the existing coordination. A reform of this part of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 should also be used to insert the necessary clarifications. From our 
point of view various options are at our disposal: 
 The definition for family benefits could be changed and the application of the 
Regulation restricted to benefits in cash. This would not mean that benefits in 
kind would no longer fall under EU law, but all the other relevant instruments, 
like e.g. Article 45 TFEU or Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 would apply.45 
 If also family benefits in kind should remain covered by some provisions of 
Regulation (EC) No 883LWKDVWREHQRWHGWKDWXQGHUWRGD\¶VGHILQLWLRQRI
                                                 
44
 Judgment in Hartmann, C-212/05, EU:C:2007:437. 
45
 Judgment in Commission v Austria EU:C:2012:605. 
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benefits in kind (Article 1(va)) no reference is made to family benefits, which 
could be regarded as disturbing and should be clarified. 
 It could be provided that family benefits in kind always have to be provided only 
E\ WKH FKLOGUHQ¶V 0HPEHU 6WDWH RI UHVLGHQFH QR H[SRUW EXW RI FRXUVH
aggregation of periods if needed and equal treatment); this is what seems to be 
WRGD\¶VSUDFWLFHE\PDQ\0HPEHU6WDWHVEXWZLWKRXWDFOHDUOHJDOEDVLV 
 This last option could be complemented by a reimbursement provision (as today 
provided under the Regulation for sickness benefits in kind), thus making the 
provision quite complex, not changing anything for the beneficiaries concerned 
and ± as not all Member States share the same concept of family benefits in kind 
± burdening some Member States with costs of family benefits much higher that 
XQGHUWRGD\¶VFRRUGLQDWLRQ 
 
Proposal for an additional horizontal Option No 5 
A clearer rule concerning family benefits in kind should be introduced.    
 
1.7.8 Clustering of benefits for the purpose of calculating the differential supplement 
Of course, the consequences of the Wiering judgment are far from clear46 and 
Member States are not sure about the importance of this judgment in all the 
different situations. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that the legislature 
intervenes and clearly defines the different baskets within which the 
comparison of benefits has to be made to calculate the differential supplements 
or if all the benefits should be taken together. This would be especially 
important if no special coordination for child-raising benefits is provided for 
                                                 
46
 See also the FreSsco report by Y. Jorens & J. De Coninck, µ5HSO\ WR DQ DG KRF UHTXHVW IRU FRPSDUDWLYH DQDO\VLV RI QDWLRQDO
legislations. Family Benefits ± Consequences of the Wiering judgment in C-¶)UH6VFR(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ
December 2014, 132 p. 
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(see 4.1.4). Our analysis of the different options will not deal with this issue; 
the reader has to imagine how complex the situation would become if the 
method of coordination were to be applied to different baskets by some 
Member States but only to one basket by others if a common approach could 
not be achieved. 
This clarification would not only concern the calculation of the differential 
supplement but also other aspects like e.g. the obligation to reimburse half of 
the amount of the benefit(s) of the basket(s) concerned, granted under Article 
58 of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. In this context we have to mention that 
per se Article 58 of this Regulation is a provision which could also create a lot 
of problems. It is not always easy to identify the Member State with the 
³highest level of benefits´+RZGR\RXFRPSDUH D OXPS VXPEHQHILWZLWK D
benefit paid every month during years? What is more important, that the 
benefit lasts longer or the amount granted? What happens when the family 
benefits are very different? We think that the problems identified up until now 
with the calculation of the differential amount apply also to the reimbursement 
under Article 58. 
 
Proposal for an additional horizontal Option No 6 
A clear decision should be made if and, as the case may be, how many baskets of different 
types of family benefits have to be made for the calculation of the differential supplement and 
the reimbursement.    
 
1.8 Who is a member of the family at the side of the µJURZQ-XSV¶" 
As already shown many problems arise with regard to the question who is a 
member of the family, especially concerning the persons who could open 
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entitlements. To avoid these problems and safeguard a more synchronised 
application of the family benefit coordination between different Member 
6WDWHVZHUHFRPPHQGDPRUHGHWDLOHGGHILQLWLRQ WKDQ WRGD\¶V+RZHYHU WKH
legislature could even go further and decide ± under a common European 
definition ± e.g. whether the biological parent always has the stronger ties to a 
child and is thus entitled to open family benefits, even if the child already lives 
LQ D QHZ IDPLO\ DQG HJ WKH PRWKHU¶V QHZ SDUWQHU PDLQWDLQV WKH FKLOG 2U
should it be vice versa: always the partners in whose household the children 
(irrespective of the biological father or mother) really live and are maintained. 
Maybe there are also other possibilities to clarify the situation. This would 
GHYLDWH IURP WRGD\¶V SULQFLSOH XQGHU ZKLFK LW LV DOZD\V WKH WDVN RI QDWLRQDO
legislation to define which person has to be regarded as family member 
(letting aside the condition of the shared household47). This far-reaching 
approach was not supported by all of us. 
 
Proposal for an additional horizontal Option No 7 
It could be useful to specify or at least clarify who is a member of the family for the purpose 
of the coordination of family benefits.    
 
1.9 Also the child could open an entitlement under Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
If we combine the new elements of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (the 
personal scope is no longer restricted to active persons and their members of 
the family but covers all persons who are or have been subject to the 
legislation of a Member State ± Article 2) with the clarifications made by the 
                                                 
47
 Supplemented by the position of the CJEU e.g. in the judgment in Slanina EU:C:2009:732; which at least from the Austrian point 
of view added European elements to that national definition. 
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CJEU under Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 (it does not matter which family 
member opens entitlements under national legislation; in a cross-border 
situation all members of the family have to be treated as if they resided in the 
Member State concerned48) it could be discussed if children should always be 
(also) entitled or open entitlements (also) to family benefits under the 
legislation of their Member State of residence.49 Thus, in a situation where a 
family resides in Member State A and the father works in Member State B 
while the mother works in Member State C this family opens entitlement to 
family benefits under the legislation of all three Member States. Therefore, 
already in a Bosmann scenario50 (no entitlement to benefits in the Netherlands 
where the mother works and entitlement under national German legislation 
where the family, and thus also the child, lives) would Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 open entitlement to German family benefits.51 As discussions within 
our team showed that this question is not that clear and that the effects of 
Bosmann under the Regulation seem to need further examination as well, the 
FKLOG¶V VLWXDWLRQZLWK UHJDUG WRHQWLWOHPHQW WR IDPLO\EHQHILWV LQ WKH0HPEHU
State of residence if the parents exercise their gainful activities in another 
Member State could be fixed in a clearer way than today. 
 
Proposal for an additional horizontal Option No 8 
It should be clarified that also every child is covered by Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 as a 
non-active person and, thus, can open entitlement to family benefits in its own situation in the 
Member State of residence.    
 
                                                 
48
 E.g. the judgment in Dodl and Oberhollenzer EU:C:2005:364. 
49
 As they are subject to that legislation as inactive persons under Article 11(3)(e) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.  
50
 Judgment in Bosmann, C-352/06, EU:C:2008:290. 
51
 But, of course, this would neither solve situations as examined by the CJEU in Hudzinski and Wawrzyniak EU:C:2012:339, as in 
this case Germany was not competent under Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 for any member of the family (also the 
children resided outside Germany). 
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1.10 Problems with the place of residence of a child 
Problems can also arise with the determination of the Member State of 
residence for the purpose of applying the adjustment (if we opt for this 
solution).52 
It is not always easy to determine where a child resides in accordance with the 
Regulations. Verifying this can be more difficult, for example, if he or she 
does not attend school or, on the contrary, attends a boarding school. As is 
well known, the Member State of residence is where a person habitually 
resides53 or where the centre of his or her interests is located, and there is only 
one for the sake of coordination.54 Following the precedent case law,55 Article 
11 of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 provides for a non-exhaustive list of 
criteria based on relevant facts that should be used, with no clear order of 
precedence, in order to identify the residence (the centre of interests) in the 
event of disagreements between national institutions. As established by the 
CJEU, said criteria can also be considered relevant in case of disputes between 
an institution and the competent Member State.56 
The criteria do not suit children much. On the one hand, the Article mentions 
the duration and continuity of the presence, this presence being independent 
from the administrative residence terms established in Directive 2004/38/EC.57 
Regarding this criterion it is reasonable to wonder whether social security 
                                                 
52
 See for instance the judgment in Maaheimo EU:C:2002:641. Ms Maaheimo was a Finnish national, as were her husband and her 
children. Having obtained parental leave, she cared for her children at home. From 8 January 1998 she received the home 
child care allowance. During the period from 1 May 1998 to 30 April 1999, her husband worked in Germany as a posted 
employee. From 10 July 1998 to 31 March 1999 Ms Maaheimo and her children stayed with her husband in Germany. 
She claimed that her permanent domicile remained in Helsinki. During that period the whole family was subject to 
Finnish social security legislation. Finnish administration stopped paying this family benefit from 10 August 1998 on the 
ground that the children were not actually resident in Finland. 
53
 $UWLFOH M RI 5HJXODWLRQ (& 1R  $UWLFOH N LQ WXUQ GHILQHV ³stay´ DV WHPSRUDU\ UHVLGHQFH ZKLFK GRHV QRW
necessarily mean of short duration (See the judgment in I, C-255/13, EU:C:2014:1291) 
54
 Judgment in Wencel, C-589/10, EU:C:2013:303, paragraph 49. 
55
 Mainly the judgment in Swaddling, C-90/97, EU:C:1999:96.  
56
 See the judgment in I EU:C:2014:1291, paragraph 54. 
57
 Reiterated by the CJEU in the judgment in I EU:C:2014:1291. 
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systems can easily gather the relevant information involved and check the 
duration and frequency of stays, especially inside the Schengen Area. 
Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 also refers to different factors 
regarding the SHUVRQ¶V VLWXDWLRQ. The first factor is linked with the working 
status that in the case of minors would often be out of the question. Secondly 
it refers to the family status and family ties. Thirdly, with regard to students 
WKH5HJXODWLRQVSHFLILFDOO\HVWDEOLVKHVWKDW³WKHVRXUFHRIWKHLULQFRPH´ has to 
be taken into account (in our scenario this income would normally be the 
salary of the parent working in a Member State ZKLFK XQGHU WRGD\¶V
coordination is one of the Member States competent to grant family benefits). 
The last factors are housing situation and tax residence. This last criterion 
does not apply to non-active descendants either. 
If the criteria mentioned are not definitive, the SHUVRQ¶VLQWHQWLRQ, specifically 
the reason to move in the first place, should be considered. It does not seem 
WKDWWKHPLQRU¶VLQWHQWLRQFRXOGEHUHOHYDQWWRGHWHUPLQHWKHLUUHVLGHQFH 
In sum, if the adjustment mechanisms were implemented, ad-hoc criteria 
VKRXOGEHSURYLGHGWRGHWHUPLQHWKHFKLOGUHQ¶V0HPEHU6WDWHRIUHVLGHQFH 
 
Proposal for an additional horizontal Option No 9 
It could be useful to also envisage a revision of Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 
concerning the determination of the place where a child resides.    
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Horizontal principles which are relevant for the options concerning 
export of family benefits 
1.11 :KDWGRHV µDGMXVWPHQW¶PHDQIRU WKHRSWLRQVFRQFHUQLQJ WKHH[SRUWRI IDPLO\
benefits? 
As some options focus on the adjustment of family benefits to the living 
VWDQGDUGV LQ WKH FKLOGUHQ¶V 0HPEHU 6WDWH RI UHVLGHQFH ZH KDYH GHFLGHG WR
dedicate a special horizontal chapter to this issue and to not include it in the 
description of these options only. 
1.11.1 Why adjust family benefits? 
Already the definition of family benefits states that the main purpose of the 
benefit is to meet family expenses. As shown in chapter 4.1.3 these expenses 
can differ from one Member State to another. Thus, it could be argued that the 
social policy aim behind these benefits is no longer achieved. Adjusting the 
EHQHILWVWRWKHOHYHORIWKHFKLOG¶V0HPEHU6WDWHRIUHVLGHQFHVHHPVWRDYRLG
an imbalance and to safeguard that the social policy aim of the benefit is still 
achieved. This method would affect only the Member States which are 
competent to grant family benefits where the child does not reside. 
1.11.2 Which elements could be the base to determine the factor of adjustment? 
First of all we want to mention that the legal analysis of whether such 
adjustments are possible from a legal point of view is a tricky issue which 
merits a study on its own. Nevertheless, we have also spent some time on this 
question. Interesting details which could help the decision-maker in this 
respect can be found in Annex 2. 
The following elements could be used to set such adjustment. There are 
various figures which demonstrate economic differences between Member 
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States, e.g. gross domestic product per capita, average income or the price of 
living costs. Therefore, if the adjustment of social security benefits is 
discussed it is relevant which social policy aim is pursued with the benefit. If 
its purpose is to cover the costs of persons rendering services (e.g. in case of 
some long-term care benefits) it would be advisable to link it to the relations 
of average income between two Member States. If the purchase of goods and 
services is more the centre of the social policy decision, then e.g. the 
comparative price levels calculated by Eurostat58 could be a valid tool, as the 
different price levels in the Member States for specific goods are the base for 
the calculation of these factors. Of course it could be argued that the basket of 
goods taken for these general statistics is not specifically the one which 
children need, and it should be a more focussed basket of goods to calculate 
these factors (e.g. child nutrition, additional living expenses for households 
with more than two household members, nappies, prams, furniture for children 
and juveniles, school costs and school equipment etc). However, it would be 
quite complicated to get reliable data for such specific baskets and it could be 
assumed59 that such data are not regularly updated. Therefore, we recommend 
relying on general data which are published and reliable, unless more specific 
data with the same quality exist. 
The following table contains figures taken from Eurostat to demonstrate the 
functioning of these data. In the following paragraphs we will give some 
examples and explanations to better understand how these figures could be 
used. 
 
Country Factor  Country Factor  Country Factor 
                                                 
58
 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00120&plugin=1 (last accessed 25 March 
2015). 
59
 As it was not our task to examine the available data sets, we restricted our work to those elements which were really necessary to 
better understand and evaluate the export options. 
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EU-28 100.00  ES 93.50  NL 111.10 
BE 110.80  FR 109.80  AT 107.20 
BG 49.00  HR 67.50  PL 55.80 
CZ 68.70  IT 103.20  PT 81.30 
DK 139.40  CY 91.40  RO 54.00 
DE 102.30  LV 71.20  SI 83.10 
EE 78.10  LT 63.50  SK 69.40 
IE 120.00  LU 121.40  FI 123.10 
EL 89.20  HU 59.70  SE 131.60 
ES 93.50  MT 82.50  UK 114.60 
 
These figures have to be understood in such a way that they always refer to the 
average of the EU-28 (therefore, the factor for this average is 100.00). Thus, to 
adjust an amount from one Member State to the level of another Member State 
the factors for both countries are relevant. If we assume that e.g. Denmark has 
D IDPLO\ EHQHILW RI ¼60 and the child resides in Bulgaria, then the 
FDOFXODWLRQ ZRXOG EH ¼ : 139.40 x 49.00   ¼ 7KLV KDV DV D
consequence that the same amount of family benefits of different Member 
States in the end differs if the children reside in the same Member State. So, if 
DOVRWKH&]HFK5HSXEOLFKDVDIDPLO\EHQHILWRI¼DQGWKHFKLOGUHVLGHs in 
%XOJDULD WKLV ZRXOG OHDG WR ¼   [    ¼ 7KLV LV DOVR
                                                 
60
 We have deliberately not taken the actual figures of family benefits of the Member States chosen, but only fictitious amounts to 
better demonstrate the effects of adjustment. The reader can easily adapt these calculations to real live figures. 
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logical as the difference in living costs between Denmark and Bulgaria is 
higher than the RQH EHWZHHQ WKH &]HFK 5HSXEOLF DQG %XOJDULD 7KH ¼
family benefit in the Czech Republic has a much higher value of purchasing 
power in that country than in Denmark. Therefore, also when exported for a 
child in Bulgaria it must have a higher value than the benefit of Denmark.  
Of course this calculation method also works in the opposite sense. If we 
DVVXPH WKDW %XOJDULD KDV IDPLO\ EHQHILWV RI ¼ DQG WKH FKLOG UHVLGHV LQ
'HQPDUN WKLVZRXOG OHDG WR¼ [ ¼DQG LI WKHFKLOG
UHVLGHVLQWKH&]HFK5HSXEOLF¼[ ¼7KLVDGMXVWPHQW
would not only oblige Member States with comparatively low costs of living 
(e.g. those with an index below 100.00, thus below the average) to adjust their 
benefits by raising the national amounts, but in principle all Member States 
with the exception of the only one Member State with the highest index (DK); 
also the second one (SE) would have to raise its family benefit of an assumed 
¼ IRUDFKLOG UHVLGHQW LQ'HQPDUN LQ WKH IROORZLQJZD\¼ [
 ¼ 
An important final issue to mention: these adjustments do not really reflect on 
WKHOHYHORIIDPLO\EHQHILWVXQGHU WKHOHJLVODWLRQRI WKHFKLOG¶V0HPEHU6WDWH
of residence. Depending on the social policy decisions of this Member State 
they could be higher or lower than the adjusted benefits of the exporting 
Member State. Thus, also an option which includes adjustments could, on the 
one side, safeguard much higher amounts than the local level and could, on the 
other side, be supplemented also by the obligation to grant differential 
supplements. 
1.11.3 Would adjustment be possible from an administrative and technical point of 
view? 
Of course, such an adjustment cannot react to all developments of living costs 
in the Member States concerned. Some clear rules within which periodicity 
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such adjustments have to be revised are necessary. It would be strongly 
recommended, if such an option is chosen, to refer to already existing, well-
known and without any doubt usable tables. The ones for the application of the 
EU Staff Regulations (which contain rules for adjustment of wages and also 
some social benefits for EU civil servants residing outside Belgium and 
Luxemburg ± see also Annex 2) could e.g. be a good starting point,61 as these 
are also published in the OJ, as there is always a clear indication for which 
period they have to be used etc.   
1.12 How to treat persons in a contributory scheme or in an employment-related 
scheme who are not in such a situation in the relevant Member State 
Another important question is how the Member State of residence has to 
provide benefits when no gainful activity is exercised there. No problems 
should exist in relation to residence-based benefits which are granted on a 
lump sum base to all residents. But, how is the situation in relation to other 
types of benefits which are more or less employment-related? 
1.12.1 Benefits which are contribution-based but open entitlement to all residents 
These benefits should also create no problems. If such benefits are financed 
from contributions e.g. from the employer, but any resident (including families 
without any gainful activities) is entitled to benefits (as e.g. in AT) already 
under national law entitlements are given. Thus, the Member State of 
residence will grant entitlement also if the only gainfully active parent works 
in another Member State. 
                                                 
61
 Regulation No 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC), laying down the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other 
Servants of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (OJ 45, 14.6.1962, p. 
1385, as amended); the last publication can be found for the period beginning with 1.7.2014 in OJ C 444, 12.12.2014, p. 
10 . For more details see Annex 2. Something which would have to be further analysed is e.g. the question whether or 
not the special indexes for special cities which are provided under the Staff Regulations (Bonn, Karlsruhe, Munich, 
Varese and Cultham) should be maintained for family benefits also under Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
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1.12.2 Benefits which are provided only for insured persons 
1.12.2.1 General remarks 
More problematic are benefits which are contribution-related or employment-
related and for which entitlement is granted only to those persons who are 
insured or in the relevant employment. Does Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
open entitlement to such benefits if a gainful activity is only exercised in 
another Member State? 
If the Regulation provides for competence of the Member State of residence, 
the existing rulings of the CJEU seem to speak in favour of this solution. From 
the Bergström judgment62 it could be deduced that the ban on discrimination 
and, of course, also the assimilation of facts under Article 5 of the Regulation 
obliges the Member State of residence to take into account also employment 
(and the income received from such employment) in another Member State as 
VXFKHPSOR\PHQWLQWKHFKLOG¶V0HPEHU6WDWHRIUHVLGHQFH63 As the situation 
of the whole family always has to be treated as if it were in the Member State 
of residence of the child,64 it should also not matter that the person exercising 
such an employment is subject to the legislation of another Member State. 
Nevertheless, it has to be assumed that this is not always applied in a 
consistent way in all Member States. To avoid problems it could be interesting 
to exclude benefits which are employment-related like child-raising benefits 
from the general coordination and provide for the competence of only the 
Member State which is competent for the person taking care of the child (see 
4.1.4).  
                                                 
62
 Judgment in Bergström EU:C:2011:278. 
63
 For family benefits there is no specific rule concerning the calculation of benefits which would allow a deviation from these 
principles as can be found e.g. in Article 21 of the Regulation for sickness or maternity benefits, which allows to take 
into account only income received in the relevant Member State and, thus, excludes the obligation to grant benefits with 
an income replacement function in cases in which no such income was received in that State. 
64
 To be deduced from the judgment in Dodl and Oberhollenzer EU:C:2005:364. 
 67 
 
Finally, it has to be mentioned that also if there is a condition of a special 
duration of periods of insurance to be entitled to a benefit, the Regulation 
could help, as the aggregation principle is applicable to family benefits 
(Article 6 of the Regulation). 
1.12.2.2 Results from the mapping exercise 
Also the replies from FreSsco national experts show that benefits with an 
income replacement function are not always coordinated in a way as it might 
be necessary from e.g. the Bergström ruling. 
For instance, in Austria entitlement to the income replacement scheme 
requires (among others) that the person concerned has been employed for a 
minimum period of six months before childbirth. Section 24(2) of the Child 
Care Cash Benefit Code (Kinderbetreuungsgeldgesetz) clarifies that 
µHPSOR\PHQW¶PHDQV³HPSOR\PHQW WKDW LV VXEMHFW WR$XVWULDQ VRFLDO VHFXULW\
LQVXUDQFH´7KXV D SHUVRQZKR UHVLGHV LQ $XVWULD EXW LV ZRUNLQJ LQ DQRWKHU
Member State and is therefore subject to the social security scheme of that 
Member State, is not entitled to income replacing cash childcare benefits in 
Austria, although Austria is competent to grant family benefits e.g. because 
the other parent works there. Austria would not take the income replacement 
scheme as the basis for the calculation of the differential amount, but 
exclusively the lump sum scheme (of the cash childcare benefits).65 Similarly 
in Belgium LQRUGHU WRTXDOLI\XQGHUWKHµSURIHVVLRQDO¶VFKHPHZRUNKDVWR
be carried out in Belgium.  
Reportedly in Sweden the parental benefit was the only family benefit with an 
income replacement function. The Social Insurance Agency no longer 
                                                 
65
 Almost all Austrian family benefits are based on residence and not on employment. That applies especially to family allowance 
(Familienbeihilfe) as well as to cash childcare benefits (Kinderbetreuungsgeld). As regards the latter, however, the 
Austrian Child Care Cash Benefit Code (Kinderbetreuungsgeldgesetz) provides for two different schemes: a lump sum 
scheme and an income replacement scheme. Therefore, at least for the income replacement scheme employment is of 
relevance. 
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considers it a family benefit (but a maternity benefit) and therefore it is not 
included when calculating the differential amount for family benefits. 
In many Member States family benefits do not have an income replacement 
function. For those who have such function it could be assumed that they are 
sometimes coordinated under the maternity/paternity chapter of Regulation 
(EC) No 883/2004. An example could be the maternity benefit in the Czech 
Republic, or the maternity, paternity and parental benefits in Slovenia. 
Bulgaria stressed that family allowances differ from benefits under the Social 
Security Code and do not depend on personal contributions. Also in 
Luxembourg family benefits are only residence-based (and, therefore, no 
problems in that respect were reported). 
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Which options could be envisaged concerning the export of family 
benefits? 
Before starting the analysis of the different concrete options dealing with the 
export of family benefits we have to make some general remarks: 
For all options we have used one standard example to safeguard a better 
comparison of the effects of the different options. This standard example will 
be supplemented, if needed, by other examples to better demonstrate all 
different aspects of the option. 
 
Standard example: 
We assume the following situation:  
Member State ADPRXQWRI IDPLO\EHQHILWV¼ LQFDVHRIDGMXVWPHQWVGXH WRGLIIerent 
FRVWVRIOLYLQJLQ0HPEHU6WDWH%¼ 
Member State BDPRXQWRIIDPLO\EHQHILWV¼LQFDVHRIDGMXVWPHQWGXHWRGLIIHUHQWFRVWV
RI OLYLQJ LQ 0HPEHU 6WDWH $ ¼ H[DFWO\ ¼ ZKLFK KDV EHHQ URXQGHG XS IRU HDVLHU
reading) 
This standard example is used in two different scenarios: 
Scenario 1: cases where work is exercised only in Member State A while the residence of the 
family is in Member State B 
Scenario 2: cases where work is exercised only in Member State B while the residence of the 
family is in Member State A 
 
The numerical results of the different options, when applied to this standard 
example, have been made visible in graphs which form Annex 1 of this report.  
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The options will be examined by ways of an impact assessment, which was 
made by using the following parameters.66 
The different aspects analysed for each of these options were the following: 
 Clarification: Here we looked into the question whether the option is clear, easy 
to understand and transparent. From our point of view, the most important 
question with regard to clarification is whether persons concerned know in 
advance and without problems what their rights (and obligations) are. Naturally 
the option should be clear for institutions as well. However, as institutions 
would be involved in any case, also in complex legal situations, this does not 
have that great a weight. 
 Simplification: For this second aspect, we examined whether the solution is 
simple or complex. It was sometimes difficult to distinguish between this aspect 
and the first one, but also between this one and the administrative burden. 
Therefore, these three aspects have to be seen as related to each other. It also has 
to be mentioned that any new way of coordination ± as simple as it might seem 
if used for the first time ± would also cause problems during a period of 
transition from the existing coordination towards the new coordination. We 
have, however, no longer mentioned this in our analysis of the different options. 
So even if the transition might be complex, non-transparent and arduous for the 
institutions we have not changed our evaluation if the option itself ± looked at in 
an abstract way ± has to be regarded as positive compared to the status quo. 
 Protection of rights: A very important issue is whether the rights of the person 
concerned are well protected. This means we had to check if really all benefits 
which can be claimed can be granted, or if the family loses entitlements. In 
addition, the question how easily and how quickly the persons can get the 
benefits which are necessary to cover the costs related to having a family also 
plays a role. This evaluation was not clear in cases where political decisions 
need to be taken. Therefore, we abstained from evaluating, e.g. in case of 
                                                 
66
 We want to refer also to Y. Jorens, B. Spiegel, J.-C. Fillon & G. Strban, WU(66$QDO\WLF6WXG\µ/HJDOLPSDFWDVVHVVPHQWIRU
the revision of Regulation 883/2004 with regard to the coordination of long-WHUPFDUHEHQHILWV¶, which contains the same 
criteria for the impact assessment. We have, therefore, included the same description for the criteria into this report 
whenever possible and added a new one concerning the impact on migration.  
 71 
 
adjustments, if this is better or worse concerning the protection of rights. Of 
course in case of downwards adjustments a person might lose benefits which he 
or she is entitled to today. The political question which we did not answer under 
this point is whether it is necessary to always maintain the status quo (only 
higher benefits can be considered a plus with regard to protection of rights) or if 
also a solution is good with regard to the protection of rights if less benefits are 
awarded which, however, better meet the social policy decisions of the Member 
State granting the benefit. 
An issue which could also be discussed when talking about protection of rights 
is what the impact could be on the national system of a Member State as a whole 
(also in situations without cross-border elements). It could be argued that if a 
group of Member States has to grant, under one of our options, more or higher 
family benefits than under the status quo this could lead to the decision of the 
national legislature to reduce all family benefits to achieve the same result with 
regard to the costs of the system as before. If this were true, on the other hand, 
the group of Member States which have to grant in less cases or lower benefits 
could spend the money saved on increasing all family benefits und thus all 
persons receiving family benefits from these Member States could profit. As we 
have estimated that no option would result in such a significant impact on the 
budget of the national family benefits financing mechanisms, we will not 
mention this aspect in the context of the different options. Still, this could be an 
element which should not be forgotten when the political decision is taken. 
 Administrative burden and implementation arrangements: Here we deal 
with the institutions. Is it easy to administer the option without large additional 
processes or do we have to set up new processes? Does it need additional flows 
of information and does information have to be exchanged regularly? Will 
institutions have to set up new implementing arrangements to put the 
coordination into practice? The mere fact that e.g. under EESSI new SEDs or 
flows will become necessary does in itself not mean that an option adds to the 
administrative burden, because this will be a standard situation in the future if 
we change the existing ways of coordination.  
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 No risk of fraud or abuse: It also has to be examined if the option favours 
situations where the persons concerned could easily influence and manipulate 
their situation in such a way that they receive more benefits than they would 
otherwise be entitled to. We will also examine if the necessary checks are easy 
or not. 
 Potential financial implications: This point as well is not easy to answer and 
evaluate. First, it was not the task of this report to go into data and analyse what 
exactly the additional amounts would be which Member States would have to 
pay or what the amounts would be which Member States would save under the 
various options compared to the status quo. Therefore, we will only outline 
whether groups of Member States would have to pay more or less from a general 
point of view. But, this does in itself not give a clue for the evaluation of the 
different options. Is a solution which is more costly (for some Member States) 
better or worse than the status quo? Taking this question into account, we have 
decided to extend the examination of the financial impact also to the question 
whether an option leads to a fairer distribution of costs compared to the status 
quo.  
However, also the burden-sharing between the Member States involved is an 
LVVXH ZKLFK LV YHU\ GLIILFXOW WR HYDOXDWH 7KH µIDLU EXUGHQ-VKDULQJ¶ EHWZHHQ
Member States largely depends on the system the Member States apply. As the 
political concerns of some Member States that they have to pay too high 
amounts of family benefits for children residing outside their countries were the 
main reason for the whole exercise, a shifting of burdens seems to be a solution 
for that problem. Therefore, it will remain a political decision which transfer of 
burdens makes the system more balanced and from a political point of view 
more acceptable for the large majority of the Member States. We will present the 
pros and cons for the different groups of Member States concerned, but abstain 
from giving recommendations, as this will be something for which a political 
decision is necessary. 
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The results of our examination of the various aspects of the impact assessment 
have to be seen as the comparison with the status quo (therefore, the status 
quo, which remains an option, is neutral in that respect): 
(+) means better than the status quo; 
(-) means worse than the status quo; 
§ means (nearly) the same as the status quo; 
(?) means the decision has to be taken by the policy-makers. 
1.13 Option 1 ± Status quo  
1.13.1 Legal background and general remarks about Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
To better understand any new option it is always necessary, first, to recall the 
existing rules applicable to family benefits. With regard to the existing 
coordination rules for family benefits we want to refer to 3 above. In this 
context we only want to recall some elements which are necessary for our 
evaluation of this option. 
1.13.2 Rules in the event of no overlap of entitlements 
The specific rules for family benefits do not change the general rules to 
determine the applicable legislation. This is still to be decided in accordance 
with Title II of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, which means that the Member 
State of employment or any other competent State according to Title II (the 
only exception are pensioners, as for these it might be another Member State 
than the one competent under Title II, if this other Member State grants a 
pension) should pay family benefits, which is also the case in situations where 
the family members of eligible persons reside in another country (see Title II 
and Article 67). In the following examples we will focus on active persons, 
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their partners and their children and not deal with the specific situation of 
pensioners, as in practice they are not so significant. 
Family benefits are intended to meet family expenses. In this respect the sole 
situation of the employed person is not the only relevant one (which is the case 
mostly with e.g. unemployment benefits). The situation of the family, 
especially of dependent children, is also relevant (see also 4.3 above). Despite 
the latter fact, the Member State of employment or any other Member State 
competent according to Title II is responsible to pay the family benefits at its 
rate even when the children are residing in another Member State (in case of 
overlap of benefits, see below). This means that the situation of the family of 
migrant workers (or other eligible persons) could be more advantageous 
FRPSDUHGWRRWKHUIDPLOLHVLQWKHFKLOGUHQ¶V6WDWHRIUHVLGHQFH,IZHFRQVLGHU
that the aim of the Regulation is first and foremost to guarantee the equal 
treatment of migrant and domestic workers working in one country, and not so 
much to achieve the material equality of families, the provisions are rational. 
A strong argument to defend the status quo, especially in cases where the 
competent Member State is the State of employment, is that the person has 
also paid taxes and contributions there. Of course, paying e.g. tax is not such a 
strong argument if we think about situations in which tax has to be paid in a 
Member State other than the one which is competent under Title II of the 
Regulation.67 Or would this mean that the Member State collecting the taxes 
and not the one competent under Title II has to grant tax-financed benefits? 
This would be a totally new way of coordination which should be carefully 
examined. 
                                                 
67
 See for such cases B. Spiegel, K. Daxkobler, G. Strban & A.P. van der Mei, µ$QDO\WLFDOUHSRUW7KHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ
VRFLDOVHFXULW\FRRUGLQDWLRQDQGWD[DWLRQODZ¶)UH6VFR(XURSHDn Commission, January 2015. 
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1.13.3 Rules in the event of overlap 
As family benefits are granted mainly on behalf of dependent children, there 
are a great deal of cases in which family benefits overlap, for example as often 
both parents are eligible for benefits for the same child, but also the child itself 
could open entitlement to benefits in its Member State of residence. Article 68 
of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 tries to solve these questions.  
The priority rules applicable depend on whether benefits are paid on a 
different basis ± employment or residence ± or on the same basis (see also 
3.1.2 above; concerning possible problems of interpretation of that principle 
see also 4.1.4.3 above). In the first case Article 68(1)(a) of the Regulation is 
the applicable rule; in the latter case Article 68(1)(b). In both cases also Article 
68(2) is relevant, as the Member State which does not have primary 
competence according to Article 68(1) may have to pay a differential 
supplement. 
 
Standard example: 
Scenario 1: Member State A (primary competence) JUDQWV¼0HPEHU6WDWH%(secondary 
competence) does not grant a differential supplement 
Scenario 2: Member State B (primary competence) JUDQWV¼0HPEHU6WDWH$(secondary 
competence) JUDQWVDVDGLIIHUHQWLDOVXSSOHPHQW¼ 
 
Additional example to highlight the effects of the status quo:  
The family (mother, father, child) resides in Member State A, the father works in 
Member State A, the mother works as a frontier worker in Member State B; the 
amount of family benefits for a child is ¼120 in Member State A and ¼200 in 
Member State B. 
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Member State A (primary competence) has to grant ¼120; Member State B 
(secondary competence) grants a differential supplement of ¼80. 
1.13.4 Advantages and constraints of the status quo  
)RUOHJDODGPLQLVWUDWLYHDQGSROLWLFDOSUREOHPVUHODWHGWR WRGD\¶V5HJXODWLRQ
(EC) No 883/2004 with regard to export of family benefits and more general 
problems of coordination of family benefits see chapter 3 above.  
Below, the pros and cons of the current system of coordination of family 
benefits are shortly presented. Reference is also made to chapters 3 and 4. In 
this chapter we will not give +/-§"PDUNVDV WKHVWDWXVTXR LV WKHVLWXDWLRQ
against which the other solutions are evaluated, and it is hard and subjective to 
construct any ideal solution against which the status quo could itself be 
evaluated.  
 Clarification: The current Regulation is more or less clear for the migrant 
workers. They usually get the family benefits in their Member State of 
employment at the rate of that State, despite their family residing in another 
Member State (this is a clear case when the other parent is non-active; less clear 
when both parents work, are posted etc ± e.g. in cases where the priority of the 
States should be determined). The current option poses problems, but some of 
them are more general in nature. They arise more from the diverging nature of 
potential family benefits (what benefits exactly are family benefits that should 
be exported according to Articles 67 to 68) and from the question whether or not 
the benefits should be divided into baskets, for example to decide whether there 
is overlap to calculate the differential supplement± see also 4.1 above. 
Therefore, taking all these elements together, it could be said that tRGD\¶V
coordination is not as clear as it could be. 
 Simplification: If there is overlap of benefits, the current Regulation is not very 
simple. See also chapter 3 for existing problems and chapter 4 on our proposals 
for horizontal solutions.  
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 Protection of rights: Currently the Regulation is built around the migrant 
worker/ person, not around the children. This is logical, as the background of the 
Regulation is the necessity and aim to protect migrant workers (see also 3.1.1 
above under which TFEU Articles the Regulation is adopted). In principle the 
Regulation aims to guarantee that the migrant worker (as, still, often the State of 
employment is competent) is treated the same way as all other workers in that 
country ± he or she receives the same benefits also for his or her children, 
despite the economic situation in the Member State where they reside. There is 
also an economic logic behind it, as the worker usually pays taxes and 
contributions in the State of employment. The question whether the current 
Regulation sufficiently protects the rights of children is not easy to answer. It 
depends among other things on whether the children are living in a country with 
higher living costs or not; whether they have the rights to some residence-based 
family benefits in the country of residence; and how family benefits in kind are 
treated in the Member States concerned. A negative aspect for children in the 
current system is that it may take quite a long time before the institutions 
involved may take the necessary decisions and they receive the full amount of 
benefits, especially in cases where the priority rules are not easy to decide.  
In chapter 3.3 the question was analysed whether the current system is unfair to 
children, in the context that children whose parents are migrant workers may, in 
the context of unlimited export, get higher benefits than other children in the 
Member State where they reside. This could be a question of reverse 
discrimination of the children. At the same time, the discrimination could be 
justified with objective reasons (no comparable situations etc). 
$QRWKHUSRLQWZKHUHZHKDYHGRXEWVLIWRGD\¶VFRRUGLQDWLRQVXIILFLHQWO\SURWHFWs 
the rights of the persons concerned are child-raising benefits for employed 
persons (e.g. also with an income replacement function). This is an issue we 
have already dealt with under chapter 4.1.4. 
 Administrative burden and implementation arrangements: As analysed in 
chapters 3.1 and 3.2, the current system entails administrative difficulties. At the 
same time, the system has been in operation for years and the routines are 
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usually in place in the Member States. The difficulties in implementation do not 
lie in the fact that the benefits are not adjusted to the living standard of other 
Member States. They are caused by the existing general rules of the Regulation 
(e.g. Articles 10 and 68) and the interpretation given to them by the CJEU ± 
which benefits should be considered as family benefits, how to calculate the 
differential supplement etc. See also chapter 4 for horizontal solutions. 
 No risk of fraud and abuse: Every regulation runs the risk of being outsmarted. 
,Q WKH FRQWH[W RI H[SRUW RI EHQHILWV LW FRXOG KDSSHQ LQ UHODWLRQ WR FKLOGUHQ¶V
eligibility to benefits, as the competent State cannot always easily and quickly 
verify the eligibility of children in another country. When the benefits are high 
LQWKHFKLOGUHQ¶VFRXQWU\RIUHVLGHQFHWKHIDPLO\PD\ILUVWWU\WRTXLFNO\JHWWKH
benefits there, by denying the working activity of one parent in another Member 
State. In contrary cases it might be desirable WRµFUHDWH¶DJDLQIXODFWLYLW\HJD
µPLQL-MRE¶ RU DQ DFWLYLW\ ZKLFK H[LVWV RQO\ RQ SDSHU LQ D 0HPEHU 6WDWH ZLWK
high family benefits to receive these benefits for children living in another 
Member State (with not so high amounts of benefits). Also the concrete 
residence of children could be an issue when attempts are made to manipulate 
WKH HQWLWOHPHQW WR KLJKHU EHQHILWV 7KHUHIRUH LW FRXOG EH VDLG WKDW WRGD\¶V
coordination is not very fraud-proof. 
 Potential financial implications: 7RGD\¶V ILQancial implications should be 
NQRZQWR0HPEHU6WDWHV,VWRGD\¶VV\VWHPIDLUZLWKUHJDUGWRWKHVKDULQJRIWKH
burden between Member States? This is the main political question to be 
answered. It could be said that only if the Member State receiving contributions 
(and taxes) grants its full range of benefits this solution is fair. Others argue that 
when paying benefits which have the clear aim of covering additional costs of 
children and these costs differ between Member States, only e.g. an adjustment 
of amounts can lead to fair results. Therefore, we abstain from answering the 
TXHVWLRQZKHWKHUWRGD\¶VFRRUGLQDWLRQRIIDPLO\EHQHILWVLVIDLU 
 79 
 
1.14 Option 2 ± Adjustment of the amount of family benefits to the living standards 
in the Member State of residence of the child(ren) 
A general description of all sub-options summarised in this Option 2: 
Option 2 consists in maintaining the current principles, i.e. the so-called 
µVWDWXV TXR¶ GHVFULEHG LQ FKDSWHU 6.1, but adding a new rule affecting the 
calculation of the amount of the family benefits. This new rule would consist 
of the adjustment of the amount of the family benefit granted by each Member 
State to the living standards in the Member State where the child or children 
reside.68 The adjustment procedures and its logic were described above in 
chapter 5.1. 
It should be outlined that this adjustment would be linked to the different 
economic situation (cost of living) in the Member State involved and would 
not be affected by the level of protection in the said Member State, i.e. the 
amount of the family benefits. The living standard is expected to go hand in 
hand with the level of social protection, but this is not necessarily always the 
case. 
The top-up obligation (differential supplement) envisaged in Article 68(2) of 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 would still exist under this option. The 
difference would be that the Member State of residence of the children (if it is 
the Member State with secondary competence) may have to pay a differential 
supplement if the amount of the family benefit in said Member State exceeds 
the adjusted family benefit paid by the Member State that is primarily 
competent. That supplement would logically be limited to the sum exceeded. 
Taking into account the different levels of family benefits it could be assumed 
that such a top-up obligation would not occur very often. 
$VLQWKHµVWDWXVTXR¶WKH0HPEHU6WDWHRIHPSOR\PHQWZRXOGVWLOOEHWKHone 
with primary competence.69 Being the Member State of employment, i.e. the 
                                                 
68
 Hereinafter the chapter will refer to children in general, although the same would apply if there was a single child.  
69
 Regarding the determination of the legislation applicable to the entitlement of family benefits, the general rules established in 
Title II of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 would be applicable. Regarding active persons, lex loci laboris is the 
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State receiving the contributions and the majority of the taxes paid by the 
migrant workers, it could be said that a certain economic logic is maintained. 
The adjustment procedure, however, may disrupt this logic as the analysis of 
the burden-sharing will show. 
Once dealing with the idea of adjusting the amount of the family benefits to 
the living standarGV RI WKH FKLOGUHQ¶V 0HPEHU 6WDWH RI UHVLGHQFH VHYHUDO
possibilities arise and will therefore be analysed. The first possibility would be 
the upwards and downwards adjustment (Sub-option 2a). Simply put, 
under this sub-option, if the children reside in a less expensive Member State, 
the benefit would be adjusted downwards, while if they reside in a more 
expensive Member State, the benefit would be adjusted upwards. Logically the 
Member State having to pay such adjusted benefits may not have a problem 
paying a smaller benefit, but may oppose the idea of paying a higher benefit 
than the one received by the children residing in its territory. 
The second Sub-option 2b, a possible solution to this latter situation, would 
be the reimbursement of the upwards DGMXVWPHQW E\ WKH FKLOGUHQ¶V
Member State of residence (this sub-option was not included in our mandate 
but added by us to show also some alternatives). Under this sub-option the 
family benefits would be adjusted upwards and downwards as described in the 
previous paragraph. However, the competent Member State of employment 
(outside the Member State of residence of the children) would be reimbursed 
E\ WKH FKLOGUHQ¶V 0HPEHU 6WDWH RI UHVLGHQFH ZKLFK ZRXOG FRYHU WKH
difference between the original benefit and the one that was adjusted 
(upwards). The problem could be that said reimbursement may be linked to a 
benefit that is not envisaged by the social security legislation of the Member 
State where the children reside. Said Member State may again oppose the idea 
of paying part of a benefit that is not covered by its social security system.  
                                                                                                                                               
competence rule except e.g. in the case of posted workers (among others). In Title III, Chapter 8 there are no specific 
conflict rules; there are only priority rules in the event of overlapping. In Option 2 the status quo is kept unchanged. 
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Finally, the third sub-option would be adjusting only downwards (Sub-
option 2c). Under this sub-option, if the children reside in a comparatively 
less expensive Member State, the benefit paid by another Member State would 
be adjusted downwards, but if they reside in a more expensive Member State, 
they would receive the same family benefits as those residing in the Member 
State which has to grant these benefits. 
Finally, an issue which will be very important for any new option is whether 
the legal base of the TFEU will allow this solution (legal compatibility) or 
whether it is endangered if it is contrary to one of the principles enshrined in 
the TFEU. Analysing this question for the adjustment of benefits would merit 
a study on its own and was also not covered by the mandate of our report. 
Nevertheless, we have made some preliminary remarks also on that aspect in 
Annex 2 of this report. 
Something has to be recalled in this context: we think that any rule on 
adjustments cannot be applied also to benefits with an income replacement 
function. Therefore, all three sub-options would necessitate special rules 
(specific coordination ± see 4.1.4 above ± or at least exemption from the 
adjustment) for this category of benefits and, thus, should apply only to 
traditional family benefits like family allowances. When the adjustment 
mechanism is also applied to family benefits with an income replacement 
function (when the benefit is e.g. calculated as a specific percentage of 
previous earnings) we tend to give a (-) to all three sub-options with regard to 
³SURWHFWLRQ RI ULJKWV´ DV ULJKWV DFTXLUHG GXH WR D JDLQIXO DFWLYLW\ ZRXOG EH
endangered. This would without any doubt also be contrary to the fundamental 
principles of the TFEU. 
1.14.1 Sub-option 2a ± adjustment of the amount (no limits) 
A short description of this sub-option: This option would consist in 
maintaining the current rules of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, but adjusting 
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upwards and downwards the amount of the family benefit granted by any 
Member State for children residing in another Member State to the living 
standards in that Member State of residence of the children. 
To put it simply, under this option, if the children reside in a comparatively 
less expensive Member State, the benefit would be adjusted downwards, while 
if they reside in a more expensive Member State, the benefit would be 
adjusted upwards. 
 
Standard example: 
Scenario 1: Member State A (primary competence) JUDQWV¼0HPEHU6WDWH%(secondary 
competence) does not grant any differential supplement 
Scenario 2: Member State B (primary competence) JUDQWV¼0HPEHU6WDWH$(secondary 
competence) JUDQWVDGLIIHUHQWLDOVXSSOHPHQWRI¼ 
 
The upwards adjustment could have no effect for the children concerned in 
practice if the benefit has to be topped up by a differential supplement of the 
Member State of residence of the children and if said supplement exceeded the 
amount of the adjustment already under the status quo. In such a case this 
option would result in a mere modification of the sharing of the burden 
between Member States in favour of the Member State of residence. 
+RZHYHU LI WKH FKLOGUHQ¶V 0HPEHU 6WDWH RI UHVLGHQFH GLG QRW WRS XS WKH
benefit, the upwards adjustment would always result in an effective increment 
of the amount received by children residing in a Member State with a higher 
factor of adjustment. 
Additional examples to highlight the effects of this option: 
Example 1 
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The father works in Member State C, the mother and 2 children reside in 
Member State D, and the mother does not work. The amount of a certain family 
EHQHILW IRU  FKLOGUHQ LV ¼ LQ 0HPEHU 6WDWH & 7KHUH LV QR WRS-up (as the 
EHQHILWLQ0HPEHU6WDWH'ZRXOGDPRXQWWRRQO\¼7KHIDFWRURIDGMXVWPHQW
is 100 in Member State C to 120 in Member State D. 
Member State C (primary competence) JUDQWV ¼ 0HPEHU 6WDWH '
(secondary competence) does not grant any differential supplement.  
[Status quo: Member State C (primary competence) JUDQWV¼0HPEHU6WDWH
D (secondary competence) does not grant any differential supplement.] 
 
Example 2 
However, any adjustment of course also works in case of employment in two 
different Member States of the parents. 
The father works in Member State C, the mother and 2 children reside in 
Member State D, and the mother works there. The amount of a certain family 
EHQHILW IRU  FKLOGUHQ LV ¼ LQ 0HPEHU 6WDWH & The amount of the family 
benefits in Member State D is ¼7KHIDFWRURIDGMXVWPHQWLVLQ0HPEHU
State C to 120 in Member State D. 
Member State D (primary competence) JUDQWV ¼180: Member State C 
(secondary competence) grants a differential supplement RI ¼ WKH DGMXVWHG
IDPLO\EHQHILWVDPRXQWWR¼.  
[Status quo: Member State D (primary competence) JUDQWV¼180: Member State 
C (secondary competence) grants a differential supplement RI¼.] 
 
Evaluation of the option 
(-) Clarification 
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This option is less clear or easy to understand than the status quo as far as it 
does not simplify the current procedures and involves an additional adjustment 
procedure. Thus, it requires an additional factor of adjustment that is not self-
explanatory and therefore requires additional clarification. Furthermore, 
migrant workers would be less aware of their rights, as the amount of the 
family benefit received would suffer variations depending on various factors, 
such as macro-economic criteria or the country of residence of the children 
and it would be different from the one received by the sedentary workers 
around him or her. 
(-) Simplification 
This option is more complex to apply as far as it imposes additional 
obligations for migrant workers, such as the obligation to state and eventually 
prove the Member State of residence of the children. Possible changes in the 
Member State of residence of the children would result in additional 
administrative obligations for the migrant worker and in changes in the 
amount of the benefit granted by one and the same Member State. 
(?) Protection of rights 
The evaluation of how the protection of rights varies under this option is not 
HDV\DQGGHSHQGVRQWKHSRLQWRIYLHZHQYLVDJHG)LUVWRIDOOWKHµYDOXH¶RIWKLV
option largely depends on political points of view. If it is decided that an 
unrestricted export cannot be justified (and is not necessary from a legal point 
of view) than this option is best adapted to protect the rights, as children 
always receive the benefit which corresponds to their economic circumstances. 
If the decision is taken that the national amount of the competent Member 
State is a right which has been acquired by the migrant worker, then this 
option cannot protect these rights. 
The beneficiaries whose children are residing in a Member State with a 
higher factor of adjustment would see how their rights are better protected 
as they may receive a higher benefit to cover their family expenses. On the 
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other hand, the beneficiaries whose children are residing in a Member State 
with a lower factor of adjustment would see how the amount of their benefits 
is reduced. The processing times between the claim being filed and the benefit 
being received could be increased due to the verification of the residence, 
which might be more important, as it is decisive for the amount to be paid, in 
which Member State the children reside (which is not that important under the 
status quo from the point of view of the Member State of primary competence, 
as always the same amount is at stake, irrespective of whether the children 
reside e.g. in this or in any other Member State ± of course, only if the first 
Member State stays the one with primary competence also after any transfer of 
residence of the children). 
From the perspective of the States, the Member State with primary 
competence could have the perception that they are protecting the rights of 
their beneficiaries as a whole in a more balanced way, as each of them would 
receive an amount that covers a similar percentage of the related costs. A 
problem could arise, however, when States receive active migrants from 
Member States with a higher factor of adjustment, as they would have to 
allocate a higher share of their social budget to cover the benefits of children 
residing abroad, which could result in a diminished overall protection. 
Nevertheless, it is true that this is not expected to be a very common situation. 
From the point of view of the Member State of residence of the children, the 
perception would vary depending on whether it is a State with a high or a low 
factor of adjustment. In the first case, children would receive higher benefits 
from the Member State with primary competence, so they would be better 
protected. In the second case, children would receive lower benefits from the 
Member State with primary competence, they will be less protected and the 
State of residence may have to allocate additional funds to protect these 
children, for example topping up the benefits with a differential supplement to 
guarantee the level of protection which this Member State wants to grant to all 
children residing on its territory. 
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Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether this option provides a better or 
worse protection of the rights of beneficiaries as a whole. It is for the policy-
maker to determine this in the light of the level of protection which each of the 
groups mentioned currently has. 
(-) Administrative burden and implementation arrangements  
This option would result in a certain increase of the administrative burden. It is 
true that the implementation of the option would require some preliminary 
work, especially to establish the factors of adjustment, determining how the 
residence of the children needs to be proven and to include the additional 
adjustments in the national procedures, taking into account there will be 32 
adjustment indexes. The running cases would also need further administrative 
processes as e.g. the updating of the adjustment factors has to be made on a 
regular basis (even if national amounts do not change).  
$VWRWKHSUHYHQWLRQRIIUDXGOLQNHGZLWKWKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIWKHFKLOGUHQ¶V
Member State of residence, a certain increment of the administrative burden 
may also be supposed, but, this is expected to be minor. 
§ No risk of fraud or abuse 
Under this option, families could be tempted to declare that their children live 
in a Member State with a higher factor of adjustment (or even in the Member 
State with primary competence), as far as the amount of the benefits would 
GHSHQG RQ WKH FKLOGUHQ¶V SODFH RI UHVLGHQFH )RU WKH 0HPEHU 6WDWH with 
primary competenceWKHFKLOGUHQ¶VSODFHRIUHVLGHQFHLVXVXDOO\PRUHGLIILFXOW
to determine than e.g. the place of work, as has been stated above (see 4.4), so 
the risk of abuse could increase. Nevertheless, a change of residence from a 
Member State with low factors of adjustment to States with high factors may 
QRW EH YHU\ XVXDO LQ SUDFWLFH FKDQJHV LQ D FKLOG¶V UHVLGHQFH ZLWKRXW DQ\
previous link to that Member State are not easy to explain and, therefore, 
administrations should have some remedies to prove the contrary (e.g. if a 
family resides in PL and the father works in DE, it would not be very 
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plausible if the children claim that they have moved to DK). However, it could 
encourage looking for constructions under which the child would be deemed 
residing in the Member State with primary competence and thus entitled to the 
IXOO DPRXQW RI WKH IDPLO\ EHQHILW 8QGHU WRGD\¶V FRRUGLQDWLRQ WKLV LV QRW DQ
issue as the amount is always the same, irrespective of whether the children 
reside in the Member State with primary competence or anywhere else. 
On the other hand, this option does not prevent or diminish the current risk of 
abuse, as it does not provide any additional instruments preventing the 
fraudulent overlapping accumulation of benefits. 
(?) potential financial implications 
This option shifts the burden from the Member States with a higher factor of 
adjustment, i.e. those where income and costs are higher, to Member States 
with lower factors of adjustment. This is made worse due to the effect of the 
differential supplement. 
If the Member State of residence (in case it is the Member State with 
secondary competence) has a lower factor of adjustment, the benefit paid by 
the Member State of primary competence would be adjusted downwards. 
Consequently, the top-up obligation for the Member State of residence could 
emerge, if its benefits are higher than the downwards adjusted benefits from 
the Member State with primary competence (which is not very likely to 
occur). On the other hand, if the Member State of residence has a higher factor 
of adjustment, probably a less common situation, the benefit paid by the 
Member State with primary competence would be adjusted upwards. Thus, if 
the Member State of residence tops up the benefit, the amount of the 
supplement would be reduced in a proportional way. 
Taking into account that migration usually heads from Member States with 
lower living standards to those with higher standards, this option would 
probably shift the burden from the latter to the former. This could result in a 
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certain disruption of the economic logic that assigns the obligation to pay the 
family benefits to the Member State receiving the contributions and taxes. 
In sum, it is difficult to determine whether this modification of the burden-
sharing is fairer or not and what the exact financial impact for every Member 
State would be. This should thus be decided by the policy-makers in the light 
of a broader analysis of the economic relationships between Member States. 
1.14.2 Sub-option 2b ± adjustment of the amount (no limits) and reimbursement 
A short description of this sub-option: This option would consist in 
maintaining the current rules of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and adjusting 
upwards and downwards the amount of the family benefit granted by any other 
Member State to the living standards in the Member State of residence of the 
children, as in Sub-option 2a. Additionally, under this option the Member 
State of residence would reimburse the upwards adjustment to the other 
Member State(s), which might be (a) Member State(s) with primary or 
secondary competence. 
In plain words, under this option, if the children reside in a less expensive 
Member State, the benefit would be adjusted downwards. If the children reside 
in a more expensive Member State, the benefit would be adjusted upwards. 
The difference between the national amount of the family benefit and the 
adjusted amount will be paid by the other Member State, but will be 
reimbursed to this State by the Member State of residence of the children. 
 
Standard example: 
Scenario 1: Member State A (primary competence) JUDQWV¼0HPEHU6WDWH%(secondary 
competence) does not grant any differential supplement 
Scenario 2: Member State B (primary competence) JUDQWV¼0HPEHU6WDWH$(secondary 
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competence) graQWVDGLIIHUHQWLDOVXSSOHPHQWRI¼DQGUHLPEXUVHV¼WR0HPEHU6WDWH% 
 
The reimbursement of the adjustment could seem to have a certain parallelism 
with the payment of a differential supplement (top-up) by the Member State of 
residence of the children (if it is the one with secondary competence ± 
envisaged in Article 68(2) of the Regulation) although they work differently. 
The adjustment and reimbursement results from the existence of a different 
economic situation (cost of living) in each Member State. The differential 
supplement, in turn, derives from a difference in the level of protection in each 
Member State, i.e. the Member State of residence of the children may have to 
top up the family benefit if the amount of the family benefit in said Member 
State is higher than the amount of the benefit in any Member State with 
primary competence, irrespective of the cost of living in each Member State. 
Additional example to highlight the effects of this option: 
Example 1 
The father works in Member State C, the mother and 2 children reside in 
Member State D, and the mother does not work. The amount of a certain family 
EHQHILW IRU  FKLOGUHQ LV ¼ LQ 0HPEHU 6WDWH & 7KHUH LV QR WRS-up (as the 
EHQHILWLQ0HPEHU6WDWH'ZRXOGDPRXQWRQO\WR¼7KHIDFWRURf adjustment 
is 100 in Member State C to 120 in Member State D. 
Member State C (primary competence) JUDQWV ¼ 0HPEHU 6WDWH '
(secondary competence) does not grant any differential supplement but 
UHLPEXUVHV¼WR0HPEHU6WDWH& 
[Status quo: Member State C (primary competence) JUDQWV¼0HPEHU6WDWH
D (secondary competence) does not grant any differential supplement.] 
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Example 2 
The father works in Member State C, the mother and 2 children reside in 
Member State D, and the mother works there. The amount of a certain family 
EHQHILW IRU  FKLOGUHQ LV ¼ LQ 0HPEHU 6WDWH & The amount of the family 
benefits in Member State D is ¼7KHIDFWRURIDGMXVWPHQWLVLQ0HPEHU
State C to 120 in Member State D. 
Member State D (primary competence) JUDQWV ¼180: Member State C 
(secondary competence) grants a differential supplement RI ¼ DGMXVWHG
DPRXQWRIWKHEHQHILW¼0HPEHU6WDWH'UHLPEXUVHV¼WR0HPEHU6WDWH
C. 
Status quo: Member State D (primary competence) JUDQWV¼180: Member State 
C (secondary competence) grants a differential supplement RI¼. 
 
Evaluation of the option 
(-) Clarification 
As with Sub-option 2a, and for the same reasons, this option is less clear or 
easy to understand than the status quo as far as it does not simplify the current 
procedures and involves an additional adjustment procedure. 
(-) Simplification 
As with Sub-option 2a, and for the same reasons, this option is more complex 
to apply. As for the reimbursement, it does not affect the beneficiaries, but 
only the institutions of the Member States involved.  
(?) Protection of rights 
As with Sub-option 2a, the evaluation of how the protection of rights varies 
under this option is not simple and depends on the point of view envisaged. 
For the beneficiaries, the situation is identical to the one described under Sub-
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option 2a. Those with children residing in a Member State with a higher factor 
of adjustment could see their benefit increased, while those with children 
residing in a Member State with a lower factor of adjustment could see their 
benefit reduced. 
So again it is difficult to determine whether this option offers a better or worse 
protection of the rights of beneficiaries as a whole. This is for the policy-
makers to determine in the light of the level of protection which each of the 
groups mentioned currently has. 
(-) Administrative burden and implementation arrangements  
This option would result in a significant increment of the administrative burden, as far 
as it involves reimbursement of the upwards adjustment of the family benefits and 
adjustments. As reimbursement of healthcare costs has shown, said procedures require a 
significant exchange of information, involve constant delays,70 and result in an 
additional administrative burden. It is true that the existing reimbursement procedures 
for healthcare benefits in kind could be applied, but that may not be the case depending 
on the internal organisation of the national administrations. Of course, also for family 
benefits reimbursement is not totally new (cf Article 58 of Regulation (EC) No 
987/2009), but, the existing reimbursement provision concerns only few cases, while 
this reimbursement would cover much more cases. Consequently, this option is even 
more complex than Sub-option 2a from an administrative point of view. 
§ No risk of fraud or abuse 
As with Sub-option 2a, and for similar reasons, under this option the risk of abuse 
would increase although to a lesser extent. It is true that when the benefit is adjusted 
upwards, the Member State of residences would have to reimburse the difference and 
would therefore have an active role verifying the place of residence of the children. 
However, such verification would probably be less exhaustive when the benefit is 
adjusted downwards (the same as under Sub-option 2a). 
As for the current risk of abuse, when the benefit is adjusted upwards the Member State 
of residence is expected to receive updated information regarding the benefits received 
by children residing in their territory (requests for reimbursement). As a result, the risk 
                                                 
70
 See e.g. Decision S9 of 20 June 2013 concerning refund procedures for the implementation of Articles 35 and 41 of Regulation 
883/2004, OJ C 279, 27.09.2013, p. 8. 
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of fraudulent accumulation of benefits would decrease. However, when the benefits are 
adjusted downwards such prevention mechanism would not exist (therefore, also in this 
respect, in cases of downwards adjustments, the same as under Sub-option 2a). 
(?) potential financial implications 
This option shifts the burden between Member States due to the effect of the differential 
supplement, but it does it in a less predictable way. As with Sub-option 2a, if the 
Member State of residence has a lower factor of adjustment, the benefit paid by any 
Member State competent which is not the Member State of residence of the children 
would be adjusted downwards; thus the top-up obligation for the Member State of 
residence might emerge. 
If the Member State of residence tops up the benefit (as a Member State with 
secondary competence), it will pay a lower supplement as in the status quo, as the 
supplement would be reduced by the same amount, as the reimbursement will have to 
be paid in addition. So, in principle, the Member State of residence would end up 
paying the same amount as under the status quo (part of it as reimbursement, part of it 
as top-up). But, if the Member State of residence does not top up the benefit, it will 
result in a higher burden for the said Member State (as it has to grant reimbursement 
irrespective of any differential supplements). Furthermore, the Member State of 
residence will be in a situation where it is obliged to pay part of a benefit that is not 
envisaged by its social security system. That would be, on the one hand, an imposition 
of the Regulations difficult to justify in the light of the mere coordination of social VHFXULW\V\VWHPV+RZHYHU WKLVFRXOGRQWKHRWKHUKDQGDOVREHIRXQGXQGHUWRGD\¶V
coordination of e.g. sickness benefits, where the competent Member State also has to 
reimburse benefits in kind which are granted in another Member State and which are not 
provided under its legislation. 
In any case, like Sub-option 2a, this option would bring a financial relief for the 
Member State with a higher factor of adjustment (as they could downgrade their family 
benefits for children living in Member States with lower factors of adjustment, while 
Member States with lower factors of adjustment would not see any change in their 
situation in cases where they have to grant benefits for children residing in Member 
States with higher factors of adjustment. However, they could be affected by the 
obligation to grant higher differential amounts (which is not very likely). This could 
result in a certain disruption of the economic logic that assigns the obligation to pay the 
family benefits to the Member State receiving the contributions and taxes. 
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In sum, it is difficult to determine whether this modification of the burden-
sharing is fairer or not. Thus, this should be decided by the policy-makers in 
the light of a broader analysis of existing figures and economic relationships 
between Member States.  
1.14.3 Sub-option 2c ± adjustment of the amount (limit national amount) 
A short description of this sub-option: This option would consist in 
maintaining the current rules of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and in 
adjusting the amount of the family benefit granted by any Member State other 
than the Member State of residence of the children to the living standards in 
the Member State of residence of the children, but limited to the amount 
provided by the social security system of the Member State having to grant the 
benefits. So, in practice, adjustment would only work downwards but not 
upwards. 
Simply put, under this option, if the children reside in a less expensive 
Member State, the benefit would be adjusted downwards, while if the children 
reside in a more expensive Member State, the benefit would not be adjusted. 
 
Standard example: 
Scenario 1: Member State A (primary competence) JUDQWV¼0HPEHU6WDWH%(secondary 
competence) does not grant any differential supplement 
Scenario 2: Member State B (primary competence) JUDQWV¼0HPEHU6WDWH$(secondary 
competence) JUDQWVDGLIIHUHQWLDOVXSSOHPHQWRI¼ 
 
If the benefit is topped up by the Member State of residence of the children, 
the supplement could neutralise the negative impact of the adjustment. 
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However, if the Member State of residence of the children does not top up the 
benefit, this option would generate unbalanced results: it only reduces the 
amount received by children living in Member States with lower factors of 
adjustment without increasing the amount received by children living in 
Member States with a higher factor of adjustment. 
Additional examples to highlight the effects of this option: 
Example 1:  
The father works in Member State C, the mother and 2 children reside in 
Member State D, and the mother does not work. The amount of a certain family 
EHQHILWIRUFKLOGUHQLV¼LQ0HPEHU6WDWH&DQG¼LQ0HPEHU6tate D. 
The factor of adjustment is 100 in Member State C to 120 in Member State D. 
Member State C (primary competence) JUDQWV ¼ QR XSZDUGV DGMXVWPHQW
Member State D (secondary competence) does not grant any differential 
supplement. 
[Status quo: 0HPEHU6WDWH&JUDQWV¼0HPEHU6WDWH'GRHVQRWJUDQWDQ\
differential supplement.] 
Example 2:  
The father works in Member State E, the mother and a child reside in Member 
State F, and the mother does not work. The amount of a certain family benefit 
foURQHFKLOGLV¼LQ0HPEHU6WDWH(DQG¼LQ0HPEHU6WDWH)7KHIDFWRU
of adjustment is 100 in Member State E to 80 in Member State F. 
Member State E (primary competence) JUDQWV¼0HPEHU6WDWH)(secondary 
competence) grants a differential supplemeQWRI¼ 
>6WDWXVTXR0HPEHU6WDWH(JUDQWV¼0HPEHU6WDWH)GRHVQRWJUDQWDQ\
differential supplement.] 
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Evaluation of the option 
(-) Clarification 
As with Sub-option 2a, and for the same reasons, this option is less clear or 
easy to understand than the status quo as far as it does not simplify the current 
procedures and involves an additional adjustment procedure. In addition, it 
distinguishes between two groups of Member States ± those with 
comparatively higher factors of adjustment (they can decrease their family 
benefits) and those with lower factors of adjustment (they can grant their 
national amounts). As this is not fixed and depends on every bilateral relation 
(for every Member State there is a different borderline in relation to which 
Member States the national amount has to be granted and where the 
downwards adjustment has to start; this borderline could also change with the 
time) it is even more unclear than Sub-option 2a. 
(-) Simplification 
As with Sub-option 2a, and for the same reasons, this option is more complex 
to apply as far as it imposes additional obligations for migrant workers such as 
the obligation to state and eventually prove the Member State of residence of 
the children. 
(-) Protection of rights 
This option provides a worse protection of the rights of a certain group of 
beneficiaries, i.e. those residing in Member States with a lower factor of 
adjustment, while it does not improve the protection of the rights of 
beneficiaries residing in Member States with a higher factor of adjustment. 
In sum, this is an asymmetrical solution that lacks consistency. The amount of 
the family benefits should be adjusted to the living standard always or never.  
(-) Administrative burden and implementation arrangements  
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As with Sub-option 2a, and for the same reasons, this option would result in a certain 
increment of the administrative burden, due to the inclusion of the adjustment step in 
the national procedures and the need for additional prevention of fraud. 
§ No risk of fraud or abuse 
Comparable to Sub-option 2a, and for the same reasons, under this option the risk of 
abuse would increase. Of course, this option would no longer be an incentive to move 
the children to a Member State with a higher factor of adjustment, but it could still be an 
incentive to move from Member States with lower factors of adjustment to the Member 
State which is competent to grant the benefits. Therefore, this option does not prevent or 
diminish the current risk of abuse, as it does not provide any additional instruments 
preventing the fraudulent accumulation of benefits. 
(?) Potential financial implications 
This option could shift (again) the burden from Member States with a higher factor of 
adjustment to Member States with a lower factor of adjustment, in a similar way as with 
Sub-option 2a. Of course, this option differs from Sub-option 2a, as it takes away the 
obligation of Member States with lower factors of adjustment to make an upwards 
adjustment if the children reside in a Member State with higher adjustment factors. 
If the Member State of residence has a lower factor of adjustment, the benefit paid by 
any other Member State would be adjusted downwards. The top-up obligation for the 
Member State of residence (if this is the Member State with secondary competence) is WKXV PRUH OLNHO\ WR HPHUJH &RQVHTXHQWO\ WRGD\¶V VLWXDWLRQ ZRXOG EH GLVWRUWHG DV LW
shifts some obligations from Member States with higher levels of costs of living 
towards Member States with lower levels. 
1.15 Option 3 ± reversed competence of the Member State of residence before the 
Member State of employment 
General description of all sub-options summarised in this Option 3: The 
FKLOG¶V 0HPEHU 6WDWH RI UHVLGHQFH DOZD\V KDV FRPSHWHQFH E\ SULRULW\ $Q\
other Member State involved could only be competent at a secondary level. 
Thus, these other Member States would only have to grant differential 
supplements (as Member States with secondary competence) if their family 
benefits are higher than those of the Member State of residence of the child. 
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Again various sub-options are possible. First Sub-option 3a: the differential 
supplements would have to be granted based on the unreduced national 
amount in the same way as differential supplements are calculated today. This 
is the main difference with Sub-option 3c (which was not contained in the 
mandate, but added by us for the sake of completeness), where only adjusted 
amounts will be taken as the base for the calculation of the differential 
supplement. In between sits again Sub-option 3b (which has also been added 
by us), according to which no adjustment takes place, but, the benefits 
provided by the Member State of residence have to be reimbursed by any 
Member State with primary competence XQGHU WRGD\¶V FRRUGLQDWLRQ to 
safeguard the same burden-sharing between Member States as today. Of 
course there is also room for a fourth sub-option (adjustment + 
reimbursement). However, we have refrained from a detailed description of 
this sub-option as it seems to be too complex. Nevertheless, the other pros and 
cons for this additional fourth sub-option are comparable to the ones described 
in Sub-options 3a to 3c. 
These options would mean a total FKDQJHRIWRGD\¶VFDVFDGHRIFRPSHWHQFHV
of Article 68(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 to determine the Member 
State with primary and secondary competenceDVQRORQJHUµJDLQIXODFWLYLW\¶
EXWµUHVLGHQFHRIWKHFKLOG¶ZRXOGEHRQWRSIROORZHGE\µJDLQIXODFWLYLW\¶DQG
µUHFHLSWRIDSHQVLRQ¶µ5HVLGHQFH¶RIDQ\RWKHUSHUVRQWKDQWKHFKLOGDVDODVW
resort is not necessary from our point of view as it should not be the intention 
RIWKLVRSWLRQWRFKDQJHWRGD\¶V$UWLFOHODVWVHQWHQFHRIWKH5HJXODWion, 
under which a member of the family other than a child (e.g. a father) only 
residing in another Member State without being gainfully active there or 
receiving a pension cannot open entitlement to a differential supplement.71  
To avoid any misunderstandings: this option only works properly if it is clear 
that the Member State(s) where the parents exercise a gainful activity pay their 
                                                 
71
 Concerning the necessity to clarify this sentence see also Error! Reference source not found.. 
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supplements (which could reach 100% of their national amounts in cases in 
which the Member State of residence of the child cannot grant any benefit 
under its legislation) also if the national legislation of these Member States of 
activity are residence-based schemes. Additional provisions to safeguard such 
a common understanding would be advisable to avoid disadvantages for the 
persons concerned.  
One issue which is very important with this option is whether or not some of 
the horizontal options are also taken on board. This concerns especially the 
question whether benefits which are employment-related are also covered by 
WKLV RSWLRQ DOVR IRU WKHVH EHQHILWV LW LV DOZD\V WKH FKLOG¶V 0HPEHU 6WDWH RI
residence which has to grant benefits with primary competence), or whether a 
special coordination is provided which would make this option easier to accept 
(our recommended option for these benefits can be found in 4.1.4 above). Also 
the additional clarifications we have made under chapter 5.2 above, e.g. 
concerning contribution-based benefits, are especially relevant for that option. 
Therefore, the impact assessment could show a different outcome depending 
on these horizontal decisions. 
For these Options a special and separated coordination of family benefits with 
income replacement function (see under 4.1.4 above) could be advisable. This 
could safeguard that those family benefits which are clearly linked to a gainful 
activity of one parent exercised outside the Member State of residence of the 
children would still have to be granted by that Member State and not by the 
Member State of residence. 
Concerning the legal framework (especially the legal compatibility with the 
TFEU) it has to be said that this solution should safeguard exactly the same 
DPRXQWIRUWKHEHQHILFLDULHV$VWRGD\¶VVROXWLRQQHYHUKDVEHHQFKDOOHQJHGE\
the CJEU it could be assumed that also this option would not raise any 
problems from the perspective of the total amount of the benefits granted. Of 
course it would shift the competences, thus it might happen that a person 
ZRXOG ORVH LPPHGLDWH HQWLWOHPHQW WR KLJK EHQHILWV E\ WRGD\¶V 0ember State 
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with primary competence e.g. where one parent works and have to start with 
comparatively low benefits from the Member State of residence of the 
children. But, we do not think that this could endanger the compliance with the 
TFEU as the same is valid also today if the Member State of residence of the 
children is the one with primary competence because one parent works there 
and a differential supplement has to be paid by another Member (e.g. where 
the other parent works). There are already measures provided to grant the 
differential supplement as quickly as possible. In case these measures are not 
yet sufficient it would be up to the Community legislator to look for further 
improvements.  
1.15.1 Sub-option 3a ± reversed competence of the Member State of residence before 
the Member State(s) of employment, no adjustment, no reimbursement 
A short description of this sub-option: This sub-option declares the 
FKLOGUHQ¶V0HPEHU6WDWHRIUHVLGHQFHDVWKHRQHwith primary competence and 
any other Member States (e.g. those where the parents work) only competent 
to grant differential supplements as Member States with secondary 
competence, if the family benefits under that legislation are higher. The 
amounts of the family benefits taken into consideration are not adjusted. 
 
Standard example: 
Scenario 1: Member State B (primary competent) JUDQWV ¼ 0HPEHU6WDWH$ (secondary 
competent) JUDQWVDGLIIHUHQWLDOVXSSOHPHQWRI¼ 
Scenario 2: Member State A (primary competent) JUDQWV¼QRGLIIHUHQWLDOVXSSOHPHQWE\
Member State B (secondary competent) 
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Additional examples to highlight the effects of this option: 
Example 1: 
The family (mother, father, 2 children) resides in Member State A, the mother 
does not work, and the father works as a frontier worker in Member State B; the 
DPRXQWRIIDPLO\EHQHILWVIRUFKLOGUHQLV¼LQ0HPEHU6WDWH$DQG¼LQ
Member State B. 
Member State A (primary competence) KDV WR JUDQW LWV ¼ LPPHGLDWHO\
Member State B (secondary competence) grants a differential supplement of 
¼ 
[Status quo: Member State B (primary competence) KDV WR JUDQW LWV ¼
immediately; no differential supplement by Member State A (secondary 
competence).] 
Example 2: 
The family (mother, father, 2 children) resides in Member State A, the mother 
works in Member State A, and the father works as a frontier worker in Member 
6WDWH%WKHDPRXQWRIIDPLO\EHQHILWVIRUFKLOGUHQLV¼LQ0HPEHU6WDWH$
DQG¼LQ0HPEHU6WDWH% 
Member State A (primary competence) KDV WR JUDQW LWV ¼ LPPHGLDWHO\
Member State B (secondary competence) grants a differential supplement of 
¼ 
[Status quo: The same ± Member State A (primary competence) has to grant its 
¼LPPHGLDWHO\0HPEHU6WDWH%(secondary competence) grants a differential 
VXSSOHPHQWRI¼.] 
Example 3: 
[This might be considered a not very realistic example; nevertheless, we want to 
mention it.] The family (mother, father, 2 children) resides in Member State C, 
the mother works as a frontier worker in Member State D, the father works as a 
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seasonal worker in Member State E; the amount of family benefits for 2 children 
LV¼LQ0HPEHU6WDWHC¼LQ0HPEHU6WDWHD DQG¼LQ0HPEHU6WDWH
E. 
Member State C (primary competence) KDV WR JUDQW LWV ¼ LPPHGLDWHO\
Member State D (secondary competence) grants a differential supplement of 
¼¼EHLQJUHLPEXUVHG WR0HPEHU6WDWHD by Member State E (tertiary72 
competence).73 
[Status quo: Member State D (primary competence) KDV WR JUDQW LWV ¼
LPPHGLDWHO\ ¼ EHLQJ UHLPEXUVHG E\ 0HPEHU 6WDWH E (secondary 
competence); no differential supplement by Member State C (tertiary 
competence).] 
Evaluation of the option: 
(+) Clarification 
As the Member State which is competent by priority is always the Member 
State of residence of the children, it is clear which Member State has to start 
granting its benefits. In case of residence-based family benefits this is the 
clearest situation possible, as all children entitled to benefits under national 
legislation will get these benefits under Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 as well. 
0DQ\GLVSXWHVZKLFKWRGD\¶VFRRUGLQDWLRQFRXOGFDXVHLI0HPEHU6WDWHVGR
not agree on which Member State is the primarily competent one) could be 
avoided. Nevertheless, this option is not the optimum with regard to clarity as 
we still have more than one Member State which could be competent to grant 
benefits (which includes differential supplements). From this perspective, the 
competence of only one Member State to grant its family benefits could be 
regarded as the clearest option. 
                                                 
72
 As also today there is a hierarchy between Member States which are competent due to the same element (more activities, more 
pensions), we think there are already today more than two competent Member States at stake; therefore, in this example 
we call Member State E the Member State with tertiary competence. 
73
 If we keep Article 58 of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 and extend it also to these cases. 
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Anyhow, the advantages concerning clarity are very important. The Member 
State of residence of the children becomes the anchor for family benefits. 
Irrespective of where the parents work and how often they switch their 
workplace, the Member State of residence of the children always stays the one 
with primary competence and the children will continuously receive the same 
benefits. Only the differential supplement can change whenever a new activity 
is started by one parent in a new Member State.  
(?) Simplification 
On the one hand this option could be regarded as simpler, as always the same 
Member State is the competent one, irrespective of the fact whether the 
parents work and in which Member State they work (it is always the same 
Member State which is the one with primary competence). This could lead to a 
(+). On the other hand, this option is as complex as the status quo, as 
differential supplements are still provided. The reverse order of priority does 
not change the overall systematic. So, from an abstract point of view this 
option could be regarded as neutral compared to the status quo. But, in 
practice this option could lead to much more cases with differential 
supplements than today (if we assume that in general the family benefits in 
Member States to which workers migrate are higher than in the Member State 
of residence of the children). From this perspective we would have to evaluate 
it with a (-). Thus, a (?) seems to be a fair value for this option. 
(+) Protection of rights 
This option is much better than the status quo, as it will safeguard that all 
children immediately receive the benefits which are provided for children 
under the legislation of the Member State where they reside. It could be 
assumed that, consequently, families do not have to wait any longer for the 
final settlements of conflicts or rely on payment of provisional amounts of 
benefits.74 Thus, the policy aims of the Member State of residence on how 
                                                 
74
 Article 60(4) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. 
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much money a family should receive which resides in its territory is fully 
achieved. In addition, higher amounts of benefits in other Member States 
(especially those where one or both parents work) are also not lost, as there 
would be a differential supplement from these Member States. The best results 
concerning the protection of rights would be achieved if employment-related 
benefits (e.g. child-raising benefits with an income replacement function) 
remain within the competence of the Member State which is competent for the 
person taking care of the child. If this was not the case and all family benefits 
were covered in the same way by this new coordination, we think that many 
positive elements which this option really has, would be taken away again. 
Another important issue is that, when the Member State of residence always 
has to grant its benefits with primary cRPSHWHQFH WKLV WDNHV DZD\ WRGD\¶V
obligation of this Member State to grant provisional benefits in the event of 
dispute of competences (Article 60(4) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009). 
Thus, as benefits are granted immediately, this definitively adds to legal 
certainty and the protection of the persons concerned. It also safeguards that 
not so many cases of recovery of overpayments will occur (which is often the 
case today when the final competence differs from the provisional competence 
and thus overpayments have to be recovered (Article 6(5) and Title IV, 
Chapter III of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009). 
Finally, in this context it has to be mentioned that, as family benefits in the 
Member State of residence could usually be assumed as being lower than 
those in D SDUHQW¶V 0HPEHU State of work, this option could result in much 
more differential supplements than today. For these cases the procedures will 
take longer until they get the final amount of family benefits they are entitled 
to. This diminishes the (+). 
(+) Administrative burden and implementation arrangements  
No new administrative procedures have to be created, as the existing ones will 
work in the same way as today (sometimes only by exchanging the Member 
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6WDWHV¶ UROHV +RZHYHU WKH OHQJWK RI SURFHGXUHV will be considerably 
shortened and provisional competences and all the administrative problems 
related to this (including the recovery of overpayments) could be largely 
DYRLGHG,QVWLWXWLRQVRIWKHFKLOG¶VSODFHRIUHVLGHQFHFDQWUHDWDOODSSOLFDWLRQV
in WKHVDPHZD\ LUUHVSHFWLYHRI WKHSDUHQWV¶SODFHRIZRUNAgain, the fewer 
cases of overpayment and recovery of overpayments (see under protection of 
rights) have to be mentioned. The possible increase of cases in which 
differential supplements have to be paid is something which could add 
negative aspects to this option. 
(+) No risk of fraud or abuse 
The Member State of residence will check the family in the same way as any 
other family resident there. Usually checking and evaluating the situation is 
easier in the same Member State than abroad and also if all residents are 
subject to the same checking procedures. Problems of the status quo, where 
sometimes a work of a parent in another Member State has been dissimulated 
to immediately get the benefits from the Member State of residence would no 
longer be an issue, as the Member State of residence is the competent one in 
all cases. 
(?) Potential financial implications 
This option shifts the burden in cases of only one working parent abroad (in 
principle only in these cases) from the Member State of work to the Member 
State of residence. It is difficult to decide whether this is fairer or not ± this 
remains a political decision balancing the pros and cons mentioned below (this 
might also depend on the schemes involved). In case of a residence-based 
scheme in the Member State of residence this could be regarded as fairer, as 
already without the Regulation all residents would be entitled to the benefits. 
This would change if the Member State of residence has a contributory 
scheme and, thus, has to grant also benefits for persons not contributing to the 
scheme (if we assume that this is the consequence of this option, which has to 
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be clarified anyhow ± see also 4.1.4 and 5.2 above75). Member States of 
residence could see too much burden on their shoulders (they will have to 
grant more family benefits than today) taking into account that a parent works 
and pays tax and/or contributions in another Member State, while this other 
Member State only has to grant a differential supplement. Therefore, we have 
to stress that, compared to the status quo, this solution will lead to savings of 
the Member State of gainful DFWLYLW\ DW WKH FRVW RI WKH FKLOGUHQ¶V 0HPEHU
States of residence. From the point of view of the Member States of 
employment this could be seen the other way around (the higher family 
benefits are only planned for the children resident on their territory and, 
therefore, it is only fair that they do not have to export the whole amount but 
only have to grant a differential supplement). 
It could be assumed that this option is more valued by the Member States of work of 
migrant workers than those where the family resides (Member States from which the 
migrant worker came). Maybe the remaining unrestricted export obligation (which can 
result in sometimes considerable differential supplements by these Member States of 
work) could be an argument which convinces also these Member States of residence? 
1.15.2 Sub-option 3b ± reversed competence of the Member State of residence before 
the Member State of employment +  reimbursement 
A short description of this sub-option: This sub-option is very similar to 
Sub-option 3a (therefore, unless otherwise stated the remarks under Sub-
option 3a apply to this sub-RSWLRQ DV ZHOO ,W GHFODUHV DJDLQ WKH FKLOGUHQ¶V
Member State of residence as the one with primary competence and any other 
                                                 
75
 This shows, again, how many questions have to be solved before a reform of the family benefit coordination chapter can be 
regarded as finished in a satisfactory way. We want to recall the following issue: if the Member State of residence has a 
contributory family benefits scheme (only active persons who contribute are entitled to benefits), does the competence of 
this Member State mean that also a person gainfully active in another Member State and, thus, not contributing to that 
scheme can open entitlement to such benefits if the children reside there or is this not the case? In the latter case this 
would not change toda\¶VVLWXDWLRQ in which the Member State outside the Member State of residence of the children 
where the parent works has to grant its family benefits. And, it could be said that also this new coordination does not 
safeguard that the Member State of residence of the children grants all the benefits which it would have to in purely 
internal situations. Member States with only residence-based schemes could say that such an outcome has to be regarded 
as not balanced. 
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Member State (e.g. those where the parents work) only competent to grant 
differential supplements (secondary competence), if the family benefits under 
that legislation are higher. The amounts of the family benefits taken into 
consideration are not adjusted. The only difference is that the Member State 
which would have primary competence XQGHU WRGD\¶V FRRUGLQDWLRQ ZRXOG
have to reimburse the Member State of residence with an amount which 
corresponds to its obligation today. Thus, this option would combine the 
advantages for the persons concerned (immediate entitlement to the benefits 
provided under the legislation of the Member State of residence) with the 
well-known burden-VKDULQJRIWRGD\¶VFRRUGLQDWLRQ 
 
Standard example: 
Scenario 1: Member State B (primary competence) JUDQWV¼0HPEHU6WDWH$(secondary 
competence) JUDQWV D GLIIHUHQWLDO VXSSOHPHQW RI ¼ DQG UHLPEXUVHV WKH ¼ JUDQWHG E\
Member State B 
Scenario 2: Member State A (primary competence) JUDQWV¼QRGLIIHUHQWLDOVXSSOHPHQW
by Member State B (secondary competence), but, reimbursePHQWWR0HPEHU6WDWH$RI¼ 
 
Additional examples to highlight the effects of this option: 
Example 1: 
The family (mother, father, 2 children) resides in Member State A, the mother 
does not work, and the father works as a frontier worker in Member State B; the 
DPRXQWRIIDPLO\EHQHILWVIRUFKLOGUHQLV¼LQ0HPEHU6WDWH$DQG¼LQ
Member State B. 
Member State A (primary competence) KDV WR JUDQW LWV ¼ LPPHGLDWHO\
Member State B (secondary competence) grants a differential supplement of 
¼DQGUHLPEXUVHV¼WR0HPEHU6WDWH$ 
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[Status quo: Member State B (primary competence) KDV WR JUDQW LWV ¼
immediately; no differential supplement by Member State A (secondary 
competence)]. 
Example 2: 
The family (mother, father, 2 children) resides in Member State A, the mother 
works in Member State A, and the father works as a frontier worker in Member 
6WDWH%WKHDPRXQWRIIDPLO\EHQHILWVIRUFKLOGUHQLV¼LQ0HPEHU6WDWH$
DQG¼LQ0HPEHU6WDWH% 
Member State A (primary competence) KDV WR JUDQW LWV ¼ LPPHGLDWHO\
Member State B (secondary competence) grants a differential supplement of 
¼ 
[Status quo: The same ± Member State A (primary competence) has to grant its 
¼LPPHGLDWHO\0HPEHU6WDWHB (secondary competence) grants a differential 
VXSSOHPHQWRI¼@ 
Example 3: 
[This might be seen as a not very realistic example; nevertheless, we want to 
mention it.] The family (mother, father, 2 children) resides in Member State C, 
the mother works as a frontier worker in Member State D, and the father works 
as a seasonal worker in Member State E; the amount of family benefits for 2 
FKLOGUHQ LV ¼ LQ 0HPEHU 6WDWH C ¼ LQ 0HPEHU 6WDWH D DQG ¼ LQ
Member State E. 
Member State C (primary competence) KDV WR JUDQW LWV ¼ LPPHGLDWHO\
Member State D (secondary competence) grants a differential supplement of 
¼ DQG UHLPEXUVHV WKH ¼ WR 0HPEHU 6WDWH C ¼ EHLQJ UHLPEXUVHG WR
Member State D by Member State E (tertiary competence).76 
                                                 
76
 If we keep Article 58 of (EC) No Regulation 987/2009 and extend it to these cases. 
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[Status quo: Member State D (primary competence) KDV WR JUDQW LWV ¼
LPPHGLDWHO\ ¼ EHLQJ UHLPEXUVHG E\ 0HPEHU 6WDWH E (secondary 
competence); no differential supplement by Member State C (tertiary 
competence)]. 
Evaluation of the option: 
(+) Clarification 
For the persons concerned the same advantages as under Sub-option 3a apply. 
Nevertheless, for the institutions it is less clear, as additional reimbursement is 
included. This is an issue which we have not dealt with under clarification, but 
under administrative burden. 
(-) Simplification 
This option is more complex as the reimbursement is added to the obligation 
to grant differential supplements. 
(+) Protection of rights 
For the persons concerned this option is as positive as Sub-option 3a.   
(-) Administrative burden and implementation arrangements 
As an obligation of reimbursement is added, this sub-option is more complex 
than the status quo. The points mentioned in relation to Sub-option 2b apply to 
this sub-option as well.   
(+) No risk of fraud or abuse 
The same arguments as under Sub-option 3a apply, but, it might be assumed 
that this sub-option is even more fraud-proof than Sub-option 3a, as also the 
Member State of employment which has to reimburse will check the case 
(even if no differential supplement has to be paid). 
;уͿ potential financial implications 
For this option we can clearly indicate the effects on fair burden-sharing, as it 
will lead to exactly the same results as the status quo. 
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1.15.3 Sub-option 3c ± reversed competence of the Member State of residence before 
the Member State of employment +  adjustment 
A short description of this sub-option: This sub-option is, again, very 
similar to Sub-option 3a (therefore, unless otherwise stated the remarks under 
Sub-option 3a apply also to this sub-option). It declareV DJDLQ WKH FKLOGUHQ¶V
Member State of residence as the one with primary competence and any other 
Member State (e.g. those where the parents work) only competent to grant 
differential supplements, if the family benefits under that legislation are 
higher. Different from Sub-option 3a the amounts of the family benefits taken 
into consideration have to be adjusted. Reimbursement, as contained in Sub-
option 3b, is not part of this sub-option, as it would make it even more 
complex. 
 
Standard example: 
Scenario 1: Member State B (primary competence) JUDQWV¼0HPEHU6WDWH$(secondary 
competence) JUDQWVDGLIIHUHQWLDOVXSSOHPHQWRI¼ 
Scenario 2: Member State A (primary competence) JUDQWV¼QRGLIIHUHQWLDOVXSSOHPHQW
by Member State B (secondary competence) 
 
Additional examples to highlight the effects of this option: 
Example 1: 
The family (mother, father, 2 children) resides in Member State A, the mother 
does not work, and the father works as a frontier worker in Member State B; the 
DPRXQWRIIDPLO\EHQHILWVIRUFKLOGUHQLV¼LQ0HPEHU6WDWH$DQG¼LQ
Member StDWH%GXHWRDGMXVWPHQWWKLVDPRXQWZRXOGEHUHGXFHGWR¼ (the 
factor of adjustment is 100 in Member State A to 150 in Member State B). 
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Member State A (primary competence) KDV WR JUDQW LWV ¼ LPPHGLDWHO\
Member State B (secondary competence) grants a differential supplement of 
¼ 
[Status quo: Member State B (primary competence) KDV WR JUDQW LWV ¼
immediately; no differential supplement by Member State A (secondary 
competence)]. 
Example 2: 
The family (mother, father, 2 children) resides in Member State A, the mother 
works in Member State A, and the father works as a frontier worker in Member 
6WDWH%WKHDPRXQWRIIDPLO\EHQHILWVIRUFKLOGUHQLV¼LQ0HPEHU6WDWH$
DQG¼LQ0HPEHU6WDWH%GXHWRDGMXVWPHQWWKLVDPRXQWZRXOGEHUHGXFHG
to ¼ (the factor of adjustment is 100 in Member State A to 150 in Member 
State B). 
Member State A (primary competence) KDV WR JUDQW LWV ¼ LPPHGLDWHO\
Member State B (secondary competence) grants a differential supplement of 
¼ 
[Status quo: Member State A (primary competence) KDV WR JUDQW LWV ¼
immediately; Member State B (secondary competence) grants a differential 
VXSSOHPHQWRI¼@ 
Example 3: 
[This might be considered a not very realistic example; nevertheless, we want to 
mention it.] The family (mother, father, 2 children) resides in Member State C, 
the mother works as a frontier worker in Member State D, and the father works 
as a seasonal worker in Member State E; the amount of family benefits for 2 
FKLOGUHQLV¼LQ0ember State C¼LQ0HPEHU6WDWHD; due to adjustment 
WKLV DPRXQW ZRXOG EH UHGXFHG WR ¼ DQG ¼ LQ 0HPEHU 6WDWH E; due to 
DGMXVWPHQW WKLV DPRXQWZRXOGEH UHGXFHG WR¼ (the factor of adjustment is 
100 in Member State C to 150 in Member State D and 166 in Member State E). 
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Member State C (primary competence) KDV WR JUDQW LWV ¼ LPPHGLDWHO\
Member State D (secondary competence) grants a differential supplement of 
¼ ¼ EHLQJ UHLPEXUVHG WR 0HPEHU 6WDWH D by Member State E (tertiary 
competence).77 
[Status quo: Member State D (primary competence) has to grant immediately its 
¼¼EHLQJ UHLPEXUVHGE\0HPEHU6WDWH E (secondary competence); no 
differential supplement by Member State C (tertiary competence)]. 
Evaluation of the option: 
(-) Clarification 
It would be easier for the persons concerned, as they would in all cases be 
entitled to the family benefits of the Member State of residence. Compared to 
Sub-options 3a and 3b, this sub-option would not be so clear, as adjustments 
have to be made. This sub-option is close to Sub-option 2a. As the 
disadvantages seem to be stronger than the advantages it could be said that this 
option is worse than the status quo. 
(-) Simplification 
Adding adjustments to the coordination always makes it more complex. 
(?) Protection of rights 
Again, as an adjustment is involved, this is a question of political decision. 
The arguments mentioned e.g. under Sub-option 2a also apply to this sub-
option. 
(-) Administrative burden and implementation arrangements 
As an obligation of adjustment is added, this sub-option is more complex than 
the status quo. The points mentioned in relation to Sub-option 2a apply to this 
sub-option as well.   
(+) No risk of fraud or abuse 
                                                 
77
 If we keep Article 58 of (EC) No Regulation 987/2009 and extend it also to these cases. 
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The same arguments as under Sub-option 3a apply. 
(?) Potential financial implications  
Here, again, we are confronted with a necessary political decision. This sub-
option could be seen by some Member States as one of the best, as the 
Member State of residence has to grant all its benefits by priority, and if 
another Member State has to grant differential supplements these supplements 
can be adjusted to the costs of living in the Member State of residence. But, 
Member States which are in favour of an unrestricted export of all family 
benefits as it happens today will oppose this sub-option, maybe even violently, 
as it does not only give the Member State of residence primary competence, 
but might also reduce benefits exported into these Member States. From this 
perspective, this option appears much worse than Sub-option 3a. 
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Conclusions 
Having analysed the existing coordination of family benefits and possible 
options to modify the current system we came to the following conclusions. 
1. The existing coordination of family benefits is complex, covers a great variety of 
different types of benefits and has become the subject of political debate in 
recent times. 
2. If the existing coordination is perceived as not being fair, this is a political 
VWDWHPHQW 7KHUHIRUH DOVR WKH VHDUFK IRU D µIDLUHU¶ GLVWULEXWLRQ RI WKH EXUGHQ
dHSHQGVRQDSROLWLFDOGHFLVLRQZHFDQQRWPDNH1HYHUWKHOHVVIURPRXUH[SHUWV¶
point of view some recommendations can be made irrespective of the political 
decision to be taken. 
3. A re-examination of the existing coordination rules is advisable. 
4. Export (undeUVWRRGDVD0HPEHU6WDWH¶VREOLJDWLRQWRJUDQWIDPLO\EHQHILWVDOVR
to the children residing in another Member State) is the main focus of the 
debate. Nevertheless, also other elements should not be forgotten. Some of these 
horizontal questions and problems could be regarded as more important and 
more burning issues than export.  
5. Therefore, when discussing a reform of the coordination of family benefits we 
propose also clarifications ancillary to the export issue, like e.g. new or 
improved definitions, but also a special coordination for benefits which show a 
strong link to gainful activities, e.g. child-raising benefits for persons in 
employment. Only if these issues are solved in a satisfactory way, the options 
proposed for export could be a realistic alternative to the status quo. 
6. Mapping has shown ± at the level of FreSsco national experts ± some support 
and advancement of legal arguments in favour of adjusting family benefits to the 
living costs of the country where the children reside, especially from some 
higher income Member States. Conversely, some lower income Member States 
were advancing arguments against such adjustment. It could be assumed that 
this will also be the official position of the Member States concerned. 
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Whichever solution will be further discussed, its pros and cons should be well 
evaluated and an EU-wide socially just solution should be adopted. 
7. If there is really a political will to change the existing mechanism of export of 
family benefits, we think that the option which only reverses the competences 
IURP WKH 0HPEHU 6WDWH RI HPSOR\PHQW WRZDUGV WKH FKLOG¶V 0HPEHU 6WDWH RI
residence is a solution much easier to achieve and would also not take away any 
benefits granted today. Under this option, families would immediately receive 
the family benefits of the Member State of residence of the child (thus it can be 
assumed that from the perspective of the persons concerned it can be an 
improvement compared to the status quo). But, we have to note that this option 
cannot be presented as the only positive one. As it shifts the burden of the 
benefits from the Member State receiving the contributions and normally the 
taxes to the Member State of residence of the children, the fairness of this option 
can be disputed. It would most probably also result in more differential 
supplements than today and thus add administrative burden for the institutions. 
Anyhow, if an option is further examined to modify the existing coordination, 
we recommend analysing this option, as it contains the most positive elements of 
the options examined compared to the status quo.   
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Annex 1 ± Overview of the effects of the different options 
Option 1 (status quo) 
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Option 2a (adjustment of the amounts, no limits) 
 
 
Option 2b (adjustment and reimbursement of difference) 
[As the decision towards the person concerned must show the whole 
suspended amount, the amount of the reimbursement has to be added to the 
total amount to show the real effects for the Member State of residence.] 
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Option 2c (adjustment + limit national amount) 
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Option 3a (reverse competence, no adjustment, no reimbursement) 
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Option 3b (reverse competence + reimbursement) 
[As the decision towards the person concerned must show the whole 
suspended amount, the amount of the reimbursement has to be added to the 
total amount to show the real effects for the Member State of work.] 
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Option 3c (reverse competence + adjustment) 
 
Annex 2 ± Elements for analysing the legal possibilities to adjust 
the amount of family benefits to the living costs 
Although the examination of a legal base for any adjustment (see 5.1 and 
Option 2) was not an explicit part of the mandate for this report, we have, 
nevertheless, collected some ideas, elements and background information to 
feed this examination. 
Results from the mapping exercise 
First, it was interesting to explore how such adjustments would have to be 
regarded from a national perspective.  
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From the replies of the FreSsco national experts it seems that the 
introduction of a new coordination rule, stating that family benefits have to be 
adjusted according to the living costs of the Member State where the children 
reside, is not completely unambiguous from the viewpoint of national law. 
The main concern is the principle of equality, but it also depends on what is 
being compared (who is taken as a reference group, and who as comparative 
group). 
Such new coordination rule might be in line with the constitutional values of 
some Member States. Reportedly, Article 7 of the Austrian Federal 
Constitution (Bundesverfassungsgesetz, B-VG) imposes equal treatment on the 
legislature. This means that not only persons in the same situation must be 
treated equally, but also that distinctive situations must be treated differently. 
Such a different situation may also be effectuated by different living costs in 
respect to family benefits which are aimed at compensating the financial 
burden of childcare. Thus, such a new principle would be in line with Article 7 
B-VG, provided that the different living costs can be determined effectively. 
A similar estimate is made for e.g. Polish, Swedish, Luxembourg and 
Belgian constitutions. It seems that the Polish constitution entails only general 
principles. Also in Sweden, there are no constitutional principles to prevent 
the adjustment of family benefits. For Luxembourg it is argued that, a priori, 
there would be no conflict with constitutional or general principles of 
Luxembourg law, since family benefits are already considered as personal 
rights of the children. Moreover, the adjustment of family benefits to the living 
standard in another Member State is also unlikely to raise constitutional issues 
in Belgium. Certain traces of a benefit adjustment approach can already be 
found in bilateral agreements of Belgium with Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia, 
in which specific, lower amounts are exported instead of the normal sums that 
would be due in Belgium. However, one may wonder whether it would exceed 
the tasks of coordination, especially where it results in the amount of the 
Belgian benefit being raised above the level that would be due in Belgium.  
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The argument of equal treatment may also go in another direction, arguing that 
adjusting family benefits might be against the equality principle. For instance, 
if the Czech Republic would have to pay a higher or lower amount of family 
benefits to children abroad only on the ground e.g. that the parents moved with 
the child to another Member State, this might breach the equality of children 
living in the Czech Republic and abroad, if the Czech Republic would remain 
the competent State. Obstacles for adjusting family benefits and possible 
breach of the equality principle were also advanced by e.g. the Bulgarian 
expert, arguing that adjustment might be against the Bulgarian Constitution 
and also Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 itself. In the Slovenian 
constitution unequal treatment based on any personal circumstance (which 
might include the place of residence of children) is as a rule prohibited, unless 
it could be proven that formally unequal treatment and positive measures are 
required to guarantee substantive (material) equality (although reducing family 
benefits might be difficult to perceive as a positive measure). 
For the legislative acts, it is argued that national law would either have to be 
modified (since no adjustment is provided for, e.g. in AT; there is also no 
parallel to it in BE, HR or SI law), or the (accordingly modified) coordination 
Regulation would have to be directly applicable. However, in some Member 
States there seem to be specific conditions. For instance in Luxembourg, the 
Caisse nationale des prestations familiales (CNPF) would be in favour of such 
reform under one precise condition: the coordination Regulation has to be 
changed in accordance with the coordination provisions regarding 
unemployment benefits. For example, a Polish institution would pay family 
benefits according to the living costs in Poland to the children of a parent 
working in Luxembourg and the CNPF would have to pay the differential 
amount. In this case, the CNPF might agree with this change, if the costs could 
be reimbursed by the CNPF to the Polish institution in other words, if it would 
not have to pay the differential amount directly to the parent/child residing in 
Poland. The financial channels would have to be changed from the 
 124 
 
parent/child to the institution (these suggestions are very similar to the ones 
we have further elaborated under Options 2 and 3). 
What appears equally important as pure national law is the purpose (the 
SKLORVRSK\RIIDPLO\EHQHILWVLQWKH0HPEHU6WDWHVZKLFKDUHµEHKLQG¶OHJDO
rules). It is argued that the adjustment of family benefits according to the 
living costs of the individual family is quite odd from a Swedish point of 
view, since family benefits according to national legislation are flat-rate and 
only vary with the number of children. A similar argument was advanced e.g. 
by Slovenia, where certain family benefits are (indirectly) linked to the 
minimum or average wage in the country. Adjusting them according to the 
living costs in another Member State might distort this balance. Also in 
Poland there is no criterion of the cost of living to determine family benefits. 
The Croatian Act on Child Allowance would have to be amended 
accordingly, but such an amendment could be contrary to the national 
situation. The calculation of the State Budget Base (see 4.1.2) would also have 
to follow the costs of living and be adjusted accordingly. Although the living 
costs have increased in Croatia in the last decade, the State Budget Base, 
which is the base for calculation of many other benefits (not only within the 
family benefits system) has not been changed since 2002. The latest available 
Household Income Survey of 2011, published by the Croatian Bureau of 
Statistics, for example shows a dramatic increase in the percentage of 
households which have a lower income than the living costs (70% of 
households, in comparison with 40% of households in the previous year). 
However, there are no plans to recalculate and adjust the amount of the State 
Budget Base. An obligation to perform adjustments at European level could 
result in pressure also for the purely national cases. 
This is even more the case with income-related family benefits. It is argued 
that adjustment of family benefits, whether an increase or a decrease, would sit 
XQHDVLO\ZLWKWKHFRQWULEXWRU\QDWXUHRIWKHµSURIHVVLRQDO¶EHQHILWLQBelgium, 
since it would loosen the nexus between the amount of the benefit received 
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and the amount of the contributions paid (for this reasoning we also refer to 
5.2.). 
From this point of view the current coordination regime is perceived as 
socially just, since it is in the first place established to enable economic 
mobility within the EU. In a Member State with primary competence, 
(unadjusted) contributions and taxes are paid, from which also family benefits 
are being financed. In addition, it is argued that living costs may also be 
distinct within one Member State (e.g. in the capital city, compared to other 
towns and rural areas), but this has no influence on the level of family 
benefits. The same principle might be applied also Union-wide. 
This leads us to another interesting aspect. Imagine a Member State has 
already today in its national legislation a rule which stipulates such 
adjustments (e.g. higher family benefits in the big cities or in regions with 
higher living costs than in the rest of the country). Would this Member State 
be entitled to apply this national rule already today (under the current wording 
of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004) and reduce or increase its family benefits for 
children residing in another Member State, or would it be obliged to grant the 
amount of the region where the migrant worker actually works on its territory 
also for children resident in another Member State? The existing court rulings 
are not at all clear. While the EFTA Court seems to favour the first approach,78 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) seems to support the latter 
one.79 This is also an aspect which would merit further examination. 
Would such adjustments be possible from our point of view? 
Introductory remarks 
First of all, we have to mention that we all considered it very important that 
this analysis was done and that all the pros and cons were very carefully 
                                                 
78
 Case E-3/05, EFTA Surveillance Authority v The Kingdom of Norway (concerning the Finnmark supplement). 
79
 Judgment in Gouvernement de la Communauté française and Gouvernement Wallon, C-212/06, EU:C:2008:178 (concerning the 
Flemish care insurance). 
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examined. We have to admit that we do not see this question completely in the 
same way. While some of us were convinced that an adjustment of family 
benefits would be in contradiction to the fundamental principles of the TFEU, 
others thought that it could be justified and thus not be that problematic. The 
following part has to be read bearing these divergent opinions of the authors in 
mind. 
Would it be legally possible to adjust family benefits to the costs of living? 
It should be examined if such adjustments (which lead to reduced or increased 
amounts of benefits depending on the Member States involved) are in 
conformity with the general principles of the TFEU (e.g. equal treatment of 
migrant workers under Article 45, the export obligation under Article 48, but 
also the core principles of coordination enshrined in Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 itself, e.g. neutrality, assimilation of facts, equal treatment and 
exportability). Of course, this is a question which has to be examined very 
carefully and does not lie within our mandate. Nevertheless, if the TFEU does 
not allow such measures under any circumstances this would ± without any 
doubt ± also influence the impact assessment.  
Any modification of the Regulations which goes for an adjustment of family 
benefits requires a careful review. The following considerations could be taken 
into account when analysing them as far as the adjustment procedures could 
affect the coordination especially concerning the neutrality principle, the 
general assimilation of facts principle, the equality of treatment principle 
and the principle of exportability of the acquired rights. 
Neutrality principle 
As is well-known, the TFEU provides for the coordination, not the 
harmonisation, of the legislation of the Member States, with regard to 
differences between WKH 0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶ VRFLDO VHFXULW\ V\VWHPV DQG
consequently, between the rights of persons working in the different Member 
States. It follows that those substantive and procedural differences between the 
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0HPEHU6WDWHV¶ VRFLDO VHFXULW\ V\VWHPVDQGKHQFHbetween the rights of the 
persons working in the Member States, are unaffected by the Treaty.80 
The coordination Regulation, with regard to family benefits, has so far 
identified the applicable social security legislation and granted migrants the 
right to obtain a certain benefit as established in said national social security 
legislation. Under the scenarios envisaged here, the Regulation would go a 
step further by introducing an adjustment of the amount of the benefit 
established by the national legislation. Even if the substance of the national 
legislation remains unchanged, its result would be distorted. 
As the CJEU has said, the objective of the free movement of workers within 
the EU is facilitated if conditions of employment (including social security 
rules), are as similar as possible in the various Member States. However, this 
objective is imperilled and made more difficult to realise if unnecessary 
differences in the social security rules are introduced by the Regulations. 
According to the Treaty, the EU legislature must refrain from adding to the 
disparities which already stem from the absence of harmonisation of national 
legislations (due to the famous Pinna case).81 It would be important to 
determine whether or not the adjustment procedures constitute such an 
unnecessary disparity. However, of course Pinna concerned a situation in 
which all Member States applied one coordination, while France was allowed, 
pursuant to the Regulation, to apply a different coordination. Therefore, it has 
to be examined if the Pinna obstacle would also apply to a rule under which 
all Member States have to adjust their benefits in the same way. 
7KH5HJXODWLRQ¶Vconflict rules have an indirect effect, as they only determine 
the national legislation applicable.82 Under this law, the protection of the 
                                                 
80
 Judgment in Lenoir, C-313/86, EU:C:1988:452, paragraph 13 and judgment in Hervein and Lorthiois, C-393/99 and C-394/99, 
EU:C:2002:182, paragraph 51. 
81
 Judgment in Pinna v Caisse d'allocations familiales de la Savoie, C-41/84, EU:C:1986:1, paragraph 21. 
82
 Judgment in Hervein and Lorthiois EU:C:2002:182, paragraph 53. 
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migrant (lex loci laboris in our case) can be more or less advantageous to the 
interests of the migrant. 
Under the applicable law, the Regulations guarantee, on the one hand, that the 
migrant is treated equally with the nationals assured under this legislation 
(we will return to this point later on), and on the other hand, that he or she 
does not ORVHDQ\RIWKHQDWLRQDOV¶EHQHILWV that he or she has been entitled to 
if the Regulations had not been applied. This is the so-called Petroni principle, 
establishing that the Regulations cannot freely limit benefits received in the 
light of the national legislation alone.83 In fact, according to Articles 45 and 48 
7)(8 ZKLFK FRQVWLWXWH WKH EDVLV RI WKH FRRUGLQDWLRQ ³limitation may be 
imposed on migrant workers to balance the social security advantages which 
they derive from the Community regulations and which they could not obtain 
without them´ EXW WKH 5HJXODWLRQV PD\ QRW ZLWKGUDZ RU UHGXFH WKH VRFLDO
security advantages that derive from the legislation of a single Member 
State.84 
Therefore, it could be said that the adjustment procedure could only be applied 
if the right to the family benefit was opened by the Regulations only (no 
entitlement under national law alone), i.e. by applying the aggregation of 
periods or the assimilation of facts mechanisms (e.g. concerning the residence 
of the child) envisaged by the Regulations. If the right was recognised by mere 
application of the national social security legislation, the entitlement would be 
considered autonomous from and intangible for the Regulations. This 
important limitation for the EU legislature, defending the intangibility of 
DXWRQRPRXVµQDWLRQDOEHQHILWV¶LVDKHUPHQHXWLFDOSULQFLSOHDSSOLHGUHSHDWHGO\
by the CJEU since 1975 in the Petroni case. 
                                                 
83
 Judgment in Petroni, C-24/75, EU:C:1975:129. On the application of this principle on the differential supplement of family 
benefits, see the judgment in Dammer, C-168/88, not available, paragraph 21. The same principle is also followed in the 
judgment in Bosmann EU:C:2008:290, paragraph 30, for letting a Member State which lacks competence retain (under 
some conditions) the possibility of granting family benefits (voluntarily?) if there are specific and particularly close 
connecting factors between the territory of that State and the situation at issue. This possibility disappears when there are 
not enough connecting factors (see the judgment in B., C-394/13, EU:C:2014:2199). 
84
 Judgment in Jerzak, C-279/82, EU:C:1983:228, paragraphs 11 and 12. 
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General assimilation of facts principle 
This principle envisaged under Article 5(b) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
should also be considered. Children living in a different Member State have to 
be treated as if they were residing in the competent Member State with regard 
to the acquisition of the right to a benefit and the calculation of the amount of 
the benefit. There is even a specific and a partly reiterative ad-hoc rule 
regarding family benefits under Article 67 of the Regulation.85 
Establishing an adjustment procedure for the calculation of the amount of the 
benefit of the children living abroad could be in contradiction with the 
assimilation principle. In fact, the adjustment would result in an unequal 
treatment of a certain group of migrants, i.e. those leaving their children in 
their home Member State. But, of course, the whole Article 5 of the 
5HJXODWLRQ LV XQGHU WKH FRQGLWLRQ ³unless otherwise provided in the 
Regulation´ DQG WKXV WKH(8 OHJLVODWXUH FRXOG LQ WKHRU\GHYLDWH IURP WKHVH
principles. This unequal treatment of children depending on their place of 
residence could be considered an indirect discrimination unless there would be 
a reasonable and objective justification for this measure and a reasonable 
proportionality between the means employed and that legitimate aim which is 
sought to be realised.   
Equality of treatment principle 
Finally, the principle of equal treatment could be affected especially when 
considering downwards adjustment. Under such circumstances, the migrant 
worker would not enjoy the same benefits as the sedentary workers, something 
that may contravene Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. Furthermore, 
the level of protection will depend on the living standards of the Member State 
where his or her children live. With regard to family benefits, there would be 
                                                 
85
 The aim of this rule, envisaged in the precedent Regulation, was to prevent Member States from making entitlement to, and the 
amount of, family benefits dependent on residence of the worker's family members in the Member State providing the 
benefits, so that EU workers are not deterred from exercising their right to freedom of movement (see, in particular, the 
judgment in Merino García v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, C-266/95, EU:C:1997:292, paragraph 28).  
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no equality of treatment between migrant workers and domestic workers. 
From this point of view, it can be argued that the employed person concerned 
would be impeded in his or her right to free movement. 
From another perspective it could be argued that, if the purpose of the family 
benefit is to meet family expenses, children are protected to the level 
HVWDEOLVKHGE\WKHFRPSHWHQW0HPEHU6WDWH¶VVRFLDOVHFXULW\V\VWHPDVIDUDVD
similar rate of their family expenses is being covered. Following this 
argument, the principle of equal treatment would be broken in our Sub-option 
2c only when the upwards adjustment is not applied. But even if we admit that 
under the current Regulation there is a certain overprotection of children living 
abroad compared to children living in the competent Member State, this would 
not be breaking the equality principle, as the Regulations may provide a more 
favourable treatment of migrant workers compared to sedentary workers, as 
stated by the CJEU.86 
The adjustment procedure under this option could remind one of the Pinna I 
case. Although the situation was slightly similar (a worker insured in France 
whose children were residing in another Member State received a different 
benefit from the workers whose children were residing in France), the 
provision included in the Regulation was fairly different. It established that, as 
the competent Member State, France could pay the family benefits granted by 
the Member State of residences of the children instead of the family benefits 
they granted to children residing in France. The CJEU considered this 
provision illegal because it gave rise to an indirect discrimination on grounds 
of nationality, as the unjustified provision denied the right to obtain French 
family benefits to a group of workers that consisted mainly of migrants. The 
                                                 
86
 Judgment in Movrin, C-73/99, EU:C:2000:369, paragraph 51 ³That consequence would result not from the interpretation of 
Community law but from the system at present in force, which, in the absence of a common social security scheme, is 
based on a simple coordination of national legislative systems which have not been harmonised (see, in particular, Case 
27/71 Keller v Caisse Régionale d'Assurance Vieillesse des Travailleurs Salariés de Strasbourg [1971] ECR 885, 
paragraph 13, and Case 22/77 Fonds National de Retraite des Ouvriers Mineurs v Mura [1977] ECR1699, paragraph 
10)´ 
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CJEU stated that the right to freedom of movement was at stake if the migrant 
worker received less than the national workers just because his or her spouse 
and children remained in the Member State of origin. 
Unlike Pinna I, our Option 2 proposes the adjustment of the family benefits 
provided by the competent Member State to the living standards of the 
Member State of residence of the children, not the substitution of those 
benefits for the ones provided by the Member State of residence of the 
children. It could be argued that all children entitled to benefits in a certain 
Member State will receive a benefit covering the same rate of their protected 
needs, irrespective of their place of residence, at least under the first Sub-
options 2a and 2b analysed. For Sub-option 2c this argument could not be 
used. 
Finally, the references to the first recital of Regulation (EC) No 883/200487 by 
the CJEU88 should be taken into account. The CJEU stated that migrant 
workers leave their countries to improve their living standard; not to 
maintain it. 
Exportability of the acquired rights principle 
As is well-known, Article 48 TFEU on the minimum content of the 
coordination Regulations mentions only two principles: aggregation and 
exportability of the acquired rights. Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
GHYHORSLQJ WKH H[SRUWDELOLW\ SULQFLSOH HVWDEOLVKHV WKDW ³Unless otherwise 
provided for by this Regulation, cash benefits payable under the legislation of 
one or more Member States or under this Regulation shall not be subject to 
any reduction, amendment, suspension, withdrawal or confiscation on 
account of the fact that the beneficiary or the members of his/her family reside 
                                                 
87
 ³The rules for coordination of national social security systems fall within the framework of free movement of persons and should 
contribute towards improving their standard of living and conditions of employment´ 
88
 See e.g. the judgment in Hudzinski and Wawrzyniak EU:C:2012:339, paragraph 47; and the judgment in Bosmann 
EU:C:2008:290, paragraph 30. 
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in a Member State other than that in which the institution responsible for 
SURYLGLQJEHQHILWVLVVLWXDWHG´ 
Even if family benefits are, in this case, not subjected to a real exportation, and 
exceptions to this exportation principle have been accepted in relation to other 
types of benefits, this provision should also be considered when determining 
the viability of adjusting the family benefits on the basis of the fact that the 
members of the family reside in another Member State. 
From our point of view it goes without saying that any benefits which are 
based on contributions where the amount of the benefit also reflects the 
duration of the payment and the amount of these contributions (classic 
example: pensions) have to be exported without any restriction. If benefits are 
lump sums or specific amounts to cover special needs inside the Member State 
concerned, the CJEU has already accepted export restrictions for special non-
contributory cash benefits (no export at all).89 Would it be the same if we 
introduced an export restriction for family benefits (by adjusting them to the 
local living costs)? Of course, these benefits cannot be considered as being 
µVSHFLDO¶&RQVHTXHQWO\WKHDUJXPHQWVZKLFKVSHDNLQIDYRXURIQRQ-export of 
special non-contributory cash benefits as a rule cannot be used in relation to 
non-contributory family benefits. So, other arguments must be used to justify 
VXFKDGHYLDWLRQIURPWRGD\¶VSULQFLSOHV$Q\KRZVXFKDVROXWLRQZRXOGRQO\
be justifiable in relation to benefits which are not income-related like e.g. the 
child-raising benefits with an income replacement function (see 4.1.4). 
Therefore, from our point of view any adjustment option would need a 
special coordination for these benefits to stay in conformity with the 
TFEU. 
Finally, the case law of the Strasbourg ECHR on benefits considered as 
private property could merit mentioning (e.g. case 9134/06, Efe against 
Austria, which seems to indicate that the ECHR allows different treatment 
                                                 
89
 Judgment in Snares, C-20/96, EU:C:1997:518. 
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concerning the amount of family benefits for children inside and outside a 
State, but, of course, taking into account the much more developed principles 
in the EU we are convinced that this cannot be transposed 1:1 also in the EU; 
thus, also this judgment cannot be used as an argument to justify the 
adjustment approach under the Regulation). 
Some final additional remarks 
We have also found some additional hints which we would like to mention: 
x In one case, Advocate General Kokott already pleaded for an adjustment of a 
benefit by taking into account the different living costs to avoid results which 
DUHHPEDUUDVVLQJIURPWKHH[SRUWLQJ0HPEHU6WDWH¶VSRLQWRIYLHZ90 
x Just for consideration of the decision-makers we also would like to mention the 
way the remuneration of EU civil servants is adjusted in case of service outside 
Belgium and Luxemburg. Due to the EU Staff Regulations91 also in these cases 
an adjustment to the different living costs has to be made (Article 64 of the Staff 
Regulations ± of course, this concerns only the salary92). The same adjustment 
seems to be applicable also to the family allowances paid under the Staff 
Regulations (Article 67(4)93). The relevant tables are published on a yearly basis 
in the Official Journal.94 These indexes slightly differ from the Eurostat indexes 
mentioned in chapter 5.1 as not the EU-28 are the factor 100 from which all 
calculations have to start, but the situation in Belgium and Luxemburg. 
Therefore, the figures indicated for the different Member States cannot be the 
same as the ones from Eurostat. As such an adjustment has already been done 
                                                 
90
 Opinion of the Advocate General in Hosse, C-286/03, EU:C:2005:621, paragraph 109. 
91
 Regulation No 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC), laying down the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other 
Servants of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (OJ 45, 14.6.1962, p. 
1385, as amended). 
92
 It seems to be a common feature of many remuneration systems that they adjust at least some parts of the salary to local costs; this 
could be found e.g. also for diplomats or other civil servants, but also for employees of private employers who post them 
abroad. It seems that the general non-discrimination principle which, of course, covers also the remuneration does not 
create any problems in this respect. 
93
 But we have to be careful! Interestingly this adjustment only applies if the allowance is directly paid to a person other than the 
official to whom the custody of the child is entrusted. 
94
 For the period beginning with 1.7.2014: OJ C 444, 12.12.2014, p. 10. 
 134 
 
for decades for EU civil servants,95 this seems to be, from our point of view, an 
interesting model which could also be used if the decision is taken to make an 
adjustment also of family benefits granted under Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
Of course, it should be further examined if these rules for EU civil servants can 
give any answer concerning a valid legal base to introduce such measures for 
migrant workers between Member States. 
Taking into account all these different aspects we think that, after this short 
examination which really did not go into depth, it seems that such an 
adjustment should be further analysed. 
 
 
  
                                                 
95
 Taking into account the mandate of this report we have not further examined whether this scheme for EU civil servants has 
already been disputed or even analysed by the CJEU. 
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Executive summary 
On the agenda of this report are reform proposals in the area of Chapter 6 of 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, which coordinates unemployment benefits. The 
focus is on the principle of aggregation and the calculation of unemployment 
benefits as they are laid down in Article 61 and Article 62 of Regulation (EC) 
No 883/2004. Should these provisions be preserved in their present state 
(Option 1)? Or are changes desired or necessary as envisaged in the 
presentations of Option 2 and Option 3? To be able to assess these Options, an 
analysis must be carried out. 
Together with the principle of export of benefits, the principle of aggregation 
forms the backbone of the system of coordination of social security, which 
was enacted in 1958 in Article 51 of the EEC Treaty and which is now to be 
found in Article 48 TFEU. The principle of aggregation was conceived as a 
remedy to what is usually called the principle of territoriality, which is a 
characteristic of nearly all social security systems of the Member States. These 
systems show a clear tendency toward making entitlement to benefits 
dependent on territorial requirements. As a result, a benefit is very often 
granted on condition that the claimant has completed periods of insurance or 
employment in the territory of the granting Member State, periods completed 
elsewhere not being taken into account. The principle of aggregation helps to 
overcome this restriction and renders periods completed in another Member 
State equivalent. They are not equal, but of equal value in terms of relevance 
for entitlement to benefits. 
Through this mechanism the principle of aggregation makes an important 
contribution to the freedom of movement of persons. With a view to Article 48 
TFEU (and its precursor provisions) the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) considers the purpose of the aggregation principle to ensure 
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that exercising the right to freedom of movement, conferred by the Treaty, 
does not deprive a worker of social security advantages to which he or she 
would have been entitled if he or she had spent his or her working life in only 
one Member State. Otherwise, this might discourage EU workers from 
exercising the right to freedom of movement and would therefore constitute an 
obstacle to that freedom. 
From the beginning, Regulation (EEC) No 3/58, and later on, Regulation 
(EEC) No 1408/71 implemented the principle of aggregation through 
numerous provisions in different chapters. Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 did 
away with this approach and formed the principle and its essence in the 
general rule in Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. With Decision H6 
of the Administrative Commission the principle of aggregation additionally 
gained in substance and precision giving good guidance to its application. 
Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, however, leaves room for 
GHURJDWLQJ SURYLVLRQV ³XQOHVV RWKHUZLVH SURYLGHG IRU³ Article 61(1) of 
Regulation 883/2004 is in line with the exceptional clause in its Article 6. It 
does not abrogate the principle, but modifies it. It restricts unconditional 
application of the principle to periods of insurance, whereas periods of (self-
)employment are not taken into account unless they would have been 
considered periods of insurance, had they been completed in accordance with 
the applicable legislation. A further restriction is laid down in Article 61(2) of 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. The relevant periods must have been 
completed most recently in accordance with the legislation on which the 
claimant bases his or her claim. This exception does not apply to persons in 
terms of Article 65(5)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
The reason for the divergent application of the aggregation principle required 
by Article 61(1) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (and which was also 
required by Regulation (EEC) No 3/58 and Regulation 1408/71) is usually 
seen in the diversity of the unemployment benefit schemes available in the 
Member States. Some of them are based on periods of insurance for 
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entitlement, others prefer periods of employment to become entitled to 
unemployment benefits. 
Whereas Article 61 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 gives guidance on the 
application of the aggregation principle when the competent institution has to 
ascertain whether there is a right to an unemployment benefit, Article 62 deals 
with the quantitative dimension of the benefit, the level of the benefit. 
Unemployment cash benefits are overwhelmingly income-related in the 
Member States¶OHJLVODWLRQV. They are intended to replace income lost through 
unemployment. As a result the level of the benefit is a statutorily fixed portion 
of the preceding income. This line of thought is in tune with the view held 
consistently by the CJEU, who associates a benefit with the risk of 
unemployment if it is to replace a salary lost as a result of unemployment and 
is therefore intended for the upkeep of the unemployed worker. 
Most Member States calculate the benefit on the basis of income earned 
during shorter or longer periods of reference preceding the unemployment. 
Coordination law has to give an answer to this question in cases in which 
income preceding the occurrence of unemployment was earned in different 
Member States. The answer given in Article 62(1) of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 opts for the exclusive account of salary or professional income 
received by the person concerned in respect of his or her last activity as an 
employed or self-employed person under this legislation. The CJEU 
interpreted Article 62(1) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, and the preceding 
provision in Article 68(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1408/71, to the effect that 
the previous wage or salary which normally constitutes the basis of calculation 
is the wage or salary received in the last employment of the worker. In this 
way mobility of workers is not impeded. 
Article 62(2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 takes account of the reference 
periods widely provided for in national legislation. In this event, too, the basic 
calculation principle of this Article applies. In contrast to Article 62(1) and (2) 
of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, Article 62(3) provides a different mode of 
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calculation for frontier and similar workers (Article 65(5)(a) of Regulation 
(EC) No 883/2004). Following the Fellinger case, Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 requires the competent institution of the Member State of residence 
to take into account the salary or professional income received by the person 
concerned in the Member State to whose legislation he or she was subject 
during the last period of (self-)employment. 
Option 1 is intended to keep to the status quo, as described above. 
In the outline of the mandate reference is made to the one-day rule according 
to which aggregation is possible if there is any insurance in the new Member 
State, irrespective of the length of the insurance. Whether this interpretation is 
the right one is a moot point. 
With regard to Article 61(1) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (and to every 
other provision of EU law) a uniform interpretation has to be achieved. 
Perhaps there is a uniform interpretation of Article 61 of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 by Member States in theory, but there is no uniform application of 
the one-day rule in its practical implementation. Some Member States require 
longer periods to be completed under their legislation before the aggregation 
mechanism is activated. And this is certainly a drawback of the present state of 
law. Perhaps the different application of Article 61 of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 does not result from the wording, but from the outcome of the 
application of the one-day rule which may be seen as undesired. For example, 
one Member State¶V UHSO\ to the FreSsco questionnaire stated that a one-day 
insurance/employment period completed is often treated by the competent 
institutions of this State as a deceitful/abusive action. Generally speaking and 
judging by the replies to the questionnaire, the picture of application of the 
aggregation principle is not uniform. A Member State reported the adoption of 
a one-week rule due to the fact that in this Member State relevant periods are 
not expressed in days but in weeks. The rejection of the one-day clause is also 
motivated by the lack of guarantee that the person concerned is integrated into 
the labour market of this State. This thus pleads in defence of a solution 
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similar to what Option 2 has in mind. In addition, it is reported that local 
institutions follow different approaches in their decision-making. As a result, 
uniform application of the law is not secured, which could be a reason to 
consider a revision of the wording to respond to the Member States¶LQWHUHVWV 
or to address their concerns. 
An important topic in the examination of Article 61 of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 and its one-day interpretation is integration into the national labour 
market and financial implications. Nobody would say that a one-day 
employment is sufficient integration. However, one could argue that other 
short-term benefits (e.g. sickness benefits) are treated likewise offering 
protection on a one-day basis. 
It cannot be ruled out that Article 61 of Regulation 883/2004, in its 
interpretation of applying the aggregation mechanism even after one day, may 
tempt people to benefit from it in a fraudulent way. A typical example could 
be when a person induces or connives with an employer to establish an 
employment relation which in reality is disguised employment. Other 
examples could be added, in particular against the background of Article 64 of 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
Despite these critical arguments against and the evident drawbacks of Article 
61 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, the defenders of the present state of law 
may put forward good reasons. The question may be raised as to whether a 
change of this Article would also entail a divergence from the application of 
aggregation rules for other benefits. In addition, the fact that everything lies in 
the hands of the competent State of the last employment is an advantage since 
it offers legal certainty. Administrative procedures need not be altered and no 
transitional provision is needed. Against the integration argument it may be 
said that the goal of unemployment benefits is not only income replacement 
but also support for job searching. As a result, if the final decision were the 
choice of Option 1, to enhance a uniform application of the aggregation 
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principle, a decision by the Administrative Commission could be made which 
renders the one-day rule obligatory. 
The amendments under Option 2 keep the principle of aggregation intact, but 
they aim at a postponed application of the aggregation. One month or three 
months of insurance or (self-)employment would have to be completed before 
aggregation can be applied. 
Since these proposals interfere with the principle of aggregation, the 
examination of their compatibility with primary law, in particular with Article 
48 and Article 45 TFEU, is of the utmost importance. As was already 
underscored above, the principle of aggregation is one of the central pillars of 
social security coordination. This was the reason why it was enshrined in the 
EEC Treaty in 1958. 
Article 48 TFEU is placed within the legal framework of the free movement of 
workers provisions. Free movement of workers is a fundamental right. It 
protects every European citizen willing to go to and stay in another Member 
State for work and he or she must not be discriminated against. Compliance 
with the provisions on free movement of workers is binding not only on 
Member States but also on all EU institutions. In particular, secondary 
legislation has to be in accordance with the wording and purpose of Article 45 
et seq TFEU. 
Against this background the amendments envisaged have to be examined since 
they would constitute a change of the reach of the principle of aggregation in 
Article 61 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. Following the scheme which the 
CJEU has developed in its case law concerning the testing of compatibility of 
secondary law with primary law, the first step is to define the scope of the 
Treaty provision and then to see whether the derived law interferes with it. If 
there is interference, a second step has to be taken and possible justification 
sought. 
 155 
 
The principle of aggregation as it is laid down in Article 48(a) TFEU is 
designed to abolish as far as possible the territorial limitations of the domestic 
social security schemes. Without guaranteeing aggregation the access to and 
the amount of benefits the person has worked for could be lost. 
As far as the equality of treatment principle pursuant to Article 45 TFEU is 
concerned, the CJEU emphasised its importance in the arena of social security 
coordination very early in its case law. With reference to the Pinna case, the 
CJEU ruled that the adoption of rules which provide for unequal treatment 
among citizens is not permitted. Equality of treatment prohibits all covert 
forms of discrimination which, by applying other distinguishing criteria, in 
fact achieve the same result. 
If Option 2 is implemented, migrant workers who become unemployed will 
have to accept a qualifying period the completion of which is necessary to 
acquire the protection through the application of aggregation of periods. As a 
result the amendments envisaged represent a restriction to the free movement 
of workers. 
This brings the analysis and the compatibility examination to its second step, 
i.e. the search for the existence of justifying reasons. It has to be considered 
that the law-giving bodies of the EU may choose the most appropriate 
measures for attaining the objective of Article 48 TFEU and therefore dispose 
of a wide discretion. This includes the possibility to depart from coordination 
mechanisms designed by this provision. 
Since there are no written reasons to justify restrictions with regard to Article 
48 TFEU, only overriding reasons or mandatory requirements may justify 
restrictions. Case law specific to this problem in the area of social security is 
rare. Most of the judgments delivered by the CJEU concern discrimination 
resulting from national law. But it is possible to indirectly draw lessons from 
such cases. Below, the criteria mentioned in the mandate will be picked up and 
subjected to scrutiny from the viewpoint of justification. 
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The aspect of fighting fraud and abuse is certainly of great weight. 
Nevertheless, it has to be said that a good reason alone is not sufficient for 
justification. The CJEU sets great store on the proportionality principle. Is it 
really justified to partially dispense with aggregation (which is the case with 
stating a qualifying period) and punish unemployed people for the unwanted 
behaviour of a probably small group of claimants? Doubts may be cast on this. 
The same is true of the argument of lacking integration into the competent 
Member State¶V labour market. Even if integration is still weak due to the 
short length of gainful activity, does this really justify the suspension of the 
principle of aggregation? 
A serious argument refers to the protection of the stability of national social 
security systems. That one Member State even after one day of employment 
has to bear the whole burden of unemployment benefits can be considered as 
inappropriate. However, under the proportionality test we might ask whether 
the solution to this problem should lie on the shoulders of the unemployed, or 
is there a way out through the introduction of a reimbursement scheme (see 
below). 
Aspects of simplification and clarification alone are certainly no justifying 
reason. On the contrary, the realisation of the amendments would require 
additional rules concerning which State should be competent during the course 
of the qualifying period. 
Weighing the arguments above it seems doubtful whether the CJEU would 
consider the new law to be in conformity with Article 48 and 45 TFEU. As a 
consequence additional measures have to be taken into consideration. 
The envisaged amendments under Option 2 require an answer to the question 
which Member State should substitute the State of last employment if the 
minimum threshold is not met. Without a workable solution to this problem a 
violation of Article 48 TFEU would occur. Several alternatives can be taken 
into consideration, all of which have significant drawbacks.  
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Clarity alone could not justify substantial amendments which significantly 
change the legal position of large groups of migrant workers to their detriment. 
If the one-day rule should no longer be accepted, the present law could be 
modified in the sense of the amendment. But perhaps an interpretation in a 
decision by the Administrative Commission expressing the will behind the 
amendments could be sufficient. From the point of view of simplification the 
new law would certainly not be recommendable, since extensive amendments 
to other provisions, e.g. Article 64, 65 and 65a of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 could be required. 
The most serious doubts have to be put forward as far as protection of rights is 
concerned. As was mentioned above, the referral of the unemployed person to 
a Member State other than that of the last professional activity due to the 
introduction of a threshold may be a significant disadvantage for this person. 
In many cases it could be incompatible with the current life situation and the 
personal goals of the person concerned. To remedy these disadvantages an 
altered scheme of this presently laid down in Article 64 Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 would be needed. 
The enormous amount of problems as to the competence of Member States in 
the wake of the new law weigh heavily also under the aspect of administrative 
burden and implementation arrangements. A new procedure would have to be 
established, including the use of new forms and SEDs. 
The threshold of one month or three months could reduce cases of fraud and 
abuse, a period of three months even more than a period of one month. Still, 
one cannot rule out that bogus employment would also occur, lasting either 
one month or three months. 
From the angle of financial implications, it has already been said that the new 
law, with its shift of costs from the Member State of the last professional 
activity to another Member State, might only partially lead to a cost-effective 
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solution. In addition, costs may be incurred by the unemployed persons due to 
their change of residence which would possibly be necessary. 
Against this background of significant problems resulting from the enactment 
of the amendments under Option 2, the preservation of the present scheme in 
Article 61 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 could be preferable to the 
amendments envisaged. Alternatively, a new reimbursement scheme could be 
installed. To implement such a new reimbursement scheme the existing 
scheme in Article 65(6) to (8) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 could serve as 
a template. 
Option 3 aims at a change of Article 62 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 by 
introducing a new model for the calculation of unemployment benefits. This 
calculation will also be based on the salaries earned in the previous Member 
State(s). Here again the assessment must be undertaken using the criteria and 
the objectives contained in the mandate. In particular, concerning Option 3 the 
mandate requires scrutiny of whether the calculation of the amount of the 
unemployment benefit on very short periods of employment may lead to 
arbitrary results. 
The function of unemployment cash benefits under national law is 
replacement of the income lost through unemployment. This is why 
unemployment benefits are income-related and why income preceding the 
unemployment is the calculation basis. The same is true of unemployment 
cash benefits on the coordination level. This is confirmed by the consistent 
case law of the CJEU. As far as the income is concerned upon which the 
calculation is based, Member States usually lay down reference periods 
(following the information in the mandate, on average 12 months). Article 
62(2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 indirectly confirms the relevance of 
reference periods. At any rate, Article 62(1) and (2) state that income earned 
exclusively in the territory of WKH SHUVRQ¶V last (self-)employment has to be 
taken into account. A derogation from these rules applies for persons in terms 
of Article 65(5)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (Article 62(3) of 
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Regulation (EC) No 883/2004). Both amendments under Option 3 favour a 
change of the basic rule in Article 62(1) and (2) in cases in which the period of 
(self-)employment of the claimant was very short (less than one month/three 
months). In this event the income basis is extended to (self-)employment in the 
previous Member State(s). 
The new law would not pose problems from the viewpoint of clarification and 
simplification. A different judgment has to be made when the problem of the 
administrative burden and implementation arrangements has to be assessed. 
Taking into account income received in the previous Member State 
presupposes reliable information from the competent institutions in this State. 
As a consequence, an exchange of relevant data has to take place. Compared 
to the present law a further administrative step is necessary. This additional 
administrative burden could be relieved if use were made of the information 
channel which is currently used in cases concerning frontier and similar 
workers according to Article 62(3) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. The 
implementing rule in Article 54(2) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 could be 
extended to cases under the new law. Otherwise the competent institution 
would apply its law and the income communicated would be fitted into its 
calculation scheme. 
An argument against the introduction of the new mode of calculation could be 
that it delays the award of the unemployment benefit. However, if this 
problem arises the benefit could be granted on a provisional basis according to 
Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. As far as the implementation of the 
new scheme is concerned the wording of Article 62(1) and (2) of Regulation 
(EC) No 883/2004 has to be altered correspondingly and jointly with the 
mentioned extension of Article 54(2) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. 
Perhaps the most central aspect of the change of law is the protection of rights, 
since this is what coordination of social security aims at. Is the application of 
the present scheme with its exclusive reference to the income earned in the last 
professional activity to the advantage or to the detriment of the unemployed 
 160 
 
person? It depends on the level of income at the time of the occurrence of 
unemployment compared to that of the previous State. That the person 
concerned is better off when his or her recent income is higher is certainly 
acceptable if he or she was insured under the applicable scheme for a 
reasonable time. But how to judge if this was not so? 
In legal doctrine, the fact that the present scheme is built on chance is seen by 
authors as a wrong legal policy. Many an author goes a step further and asserts 
that indirect discrimination and as a result a violation of Article 45/48 TFEU 
takes place in cases in which the migrant worker takes up a lower paid 
employment and becomes unemployed after a very short time. The former 
income will not be taken into account, which may lead to the person 
concerned being treated worse than a person who has completed his or her 
periods of insurance in one and the same country. 
Another weighty problem might be seen in terms of justice and fairness. As 
ZDVVDLGDQGVKRZQDERYH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶OHJLVODWLRQs overwhelmingly adopt 
calculation schemes which form the benefit level according to a longer 
insurance record. In this way one could say that this method does justice both 
to the unemployed person and to the granting institution which administers the 
financial resources and has to use them economically in the interest of all the 
contributing workers affiliated to the scheme. We are confronted here with the 
problem related to one of the objectives stated in the mandate, i.e. the 
objective as to ensure that the financial burden for paying unemployment 
benefits does not arise in situations where mobile EU workers have not yet 
made a significant contribution to the scheme of the new Member State. 
However, this objective is not achieved under the current law in cases where 
migrant workers with a low level of income in the previous Member State 
benefit from the high level in the new Member State, even after very short 
periods of (self-)employment (in the extreme case one day). 
The aspect of fraud and abuse has already been touched upon above and the 
mode of calculation may have a rather modest impact upon fraudulent 
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behaviour. Yet one aspect seems to be important at this point. The problem of 
moral hazard has long since been discussed in theory and policy of 
unemployment insurance. It is requested that unemployment insurance has to 
be shaped in such a way that it does not allow people to stay unemployed 
instead of taking up employment even if the income is lower. The present law 
of Article 62 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 could favour such undesired 
behaviour. 
Many an argument discussed above with regard to the protection of rights may 
again be put forward here. The nucleus of the problem refers to the question 
whether enjoying the full benefit level, despite only a short time of 
employment and as a consequence few contributions to a scheme plus weak 
integration into the scheme, is in harmony with the sound financing of 
unemployment insurance. It is hard to find an answer in the affirmative. 
Introduction 
1 The principle of aggregation of periods (Article 61 of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004) 
1.1 The principle under primary law 
The principle of aggregation of periods is one of the leading pillars of 
coordination and therefore was already enshrined in (now) Article 48 TFEU. 
The principle has to be seen against the background of the division of 
competence between EU law and national law. It is consistent case law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) that EU law does not detract 
from the powers of Member States to organize their social security systems.96 
This is the consequence of Article 48 TFEU providing for the coordination, 
                                                 
96
 This basic statement was for the first time pronounced in the judgment in Duphar, C-238/82, EU:C:1984:45, paragraph 16. See 
for a recent case the judgment in Salgado Gonzalez, C-282/11, EU:C:2013:86, paragraph 35. 
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not the harmonisation of the Member States¶ OHJLVODWLRQV97 This means that 
periods qualifying for the acquisition, retention, duration or recovery of a right 
to benefits are defined by the law of the Member States. From the beginning 
the CJEU has underscored this empowerment of Member States and it is now 
consistent CJEU case law that it is up to the Member States to provide for 
relevant periods and its premises. It has stated that Regulation (EEC) No 
1408/71 (and the same is true of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004) does not 
determine the conditions governing the constitution of periods of employment 
or insurance. Those conditions, as is apparent from Article 1(r) of that 
Regulation (now Article 1(t) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004), are defined by 
the Member State¶V OHJLVODWLRQ under which the periods in question are 
completed.98 
Domestic law traditionally follows the principle of territoriality.99 And at this 
point the coordination principles come into operation. In essence, the principle 
of aggregation aims at overcoming the principle of territoriality as far as 
periods under domestic law are concerned. From a legal point of view this 
extension of territoriality takes place through a specific legal technique: 
equivalence. The aggregation of periods renders periods completed under 
different systems of social security equivalent. They are not equal, but of equal 
value in terms of relevance for entitlement to benefits. Therefore, it has quite 
rightly been said that the aggregation of periods completed under different 
types of social security is not a sinecure.100 In other words, a process of 
assimilation is often needed to offer the possibility of aggregation. 
                                                 
97
 This is one of the statements which emerge in many judgments by the CJEU, see for example recently the judgment in Jeltes, C-
443/13, EU:C:2013:224, paragraph 43. 
98
 Judgment in Schmitt, C-29/88, EU:C:1989:61, paragraph 15; judgment in Alonso, C-306/03, EU:C:2005:44, paragraph 30. 
Emphasis is laid on this legal position also in doctrine: see for example N. Guastavino (ed.), F. Basurko & M. Boto, 
Lecciones de derecho social de la Unión Europea, Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, 2012, p. 208; S. van Raepenbusch, La 
spFXULWp VRFLDOHGHVSHUVRQQHVTXLFLUFXOHQWj O¶LQWpULHXUGH OD&RPPXQDXWpeFRQRPLTXH(XURSpHQQH, Story Scientia, 
Brussels, 1991, p. 198. 
99
 See for this F. Pennings, European social security law, Intersentia, Antwerp, 2010 (5th edition), p. 9 et seq. 
100
 F. Pennings, European social security law, ibid, p. 10. 
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The aggregation of periods is, if its conditions are met, a way for a migrant 
worker to retain the rights acquired under a legislation which is different from 
the one presently applicable. This happens because the aggregation 
mechanism leads to a unification of PLJUDQWZRUNHUV¶professional career.101 It 
is based on the irrefutable presumption that the claimant of benefits has to be 
treated as if he or she had always and continuously performed his or her work 
under the social security system of that Member State from which he or she 
claims benefits.102 
Against this background we can formulate the rationale of the aggregation 
principle and we can rely for this on the case law of the CJEU. With a view to 
Article 48 TFEU (and the precursor provision) the case law conceives the 
purpose of the aggregation principle to ensure that exercising the right to 
freedom of movement, conferred by the Treaty, does not deprive a worker of 
social security advantages to which he or she would have been entitled if he or 
she had spent his or her working life in only one Member State. Such a 
consequence might discourage community workers from exercising the right 
to freedom of movement and would therefore constitute an obstacle to that 
freedom.103 With this statement the CJEU confers in respect of the aggregation 
principle what has to be observed as a general rule: all the provisions of the 
regulations must be interpreted in the light of Article 48 TFEU. The aim must 
be to remove all barriers in the sphere of social security which impede a 
generally free movement of workers.104 
                                                 
101
 Cf P. Mavridis, /DVpFXULWpVRFLDOHjOµpSUHXYHGHO¶LQWpJUDWLRQHXURSpHQQH, Bruylant, Brussels, 2003, p. 501. 
102
 M. Fuchs, Introduction, in M. Fuchs (ed.), Europäisches Sozialrecht, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2013 (6th edition). 
103
 Judgment in Alonso EU:C:2005:44, paragraph 29 with reference to the former judgment in Moscato, C-481/93, EU:C:1995:44, 
paragraph 28. 
104
 5&RUQHOLVVHQµ\HDUVRI(XURSHDQVRFLDOVHFXULW\FRRUGLQDWLRQ¶LQEuropean Journal of Social Security, 9 (15). 
 164 
 
1.2 The codification of the aggregation principle in Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 
Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 renounced a general rule on aggregation of 
periods. It preferred to lay down specific rules in different sections of the 
Regulation. By contrast, Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 opted for a general rule 
in Article 6. It was intended in this provision to do away with the numerous 
aggregation rules contained in various sections of the Regulation and to create 
a unitary and comprehensive regulation for all cases in which aggregation is 
needed.105 From Recital 12 and 13 of the Preamble we can gather that the 
principle of aggregation serves the aim to retain the rights and the advantages 
acquired and in the course of being acquired by persons moving within the 
Community and their dependants. The mechanism of aggregation secures the 
acquisition and retention of the right to benefits and makes the calculation of 
the amount of benefits possible.106 
The principle of aggregation has been concretised by the Administrative 
Commission in Decision H6. This Decision partly relies on the case law of the 
CJEU, but goes a step further. Firstly it requires to take into account all 
periods for the relevant contingency completed under the legislation of another 
Member State by applying the principle of aggregation. Obviously, relevant 
periods are very often not identical with regard to their elements. Nevertheless, 
point 2 of the Decision requires that periods communicated by other Member 
States must be aggregated without questioning their quality. However, point 3 
DFNQRZOHGJHV WKH 0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶ MXULVGLFWLRQ WR GHWHUPLQH WKHLU RWKHU
conditions for granting social security benefits taking into account Article 5 of 
                                                 
105
 B. Spiegel, in B. Spiegel (ed.), Zwischenstaatliches Sozialversicherungsrecht, Manz-Verlag, Vienna, 2012, Article 6(2) of 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
106
 Emphasis by M. Fuchs. I emphasise this aspect because it could have a direct impact on our discussion of the calculation of 
benefits under Article 62 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
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Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. This is a clear reference to the case law of the 
CJEU.107 
Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 shows that this principle is not of 
an exclusive nature. It opens up for other provisions which deviate from what 
is stated in Article  ³unless otherwise provided for by this Regulation´
Article 61 is one of the rare specific rules of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
which derogate from what is required under Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004.108 
1.3 Aggregation of periods under Article 61 ± the exception to the rule 
1.3.1 The main contents of Article 61 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
Article 61(1) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 does not do away with the 
principle of aggregation of periods. However, compared to Article 6 of 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 it restricts the reach of the principle. This 
restriction is of a two-fold nature: firstly, periods taken into consideration are 
only periods of insurance or (self-)employment. Secondly, periods of (self-
)employment have a lesser value than periods of insurance (61(1), second 
paragraph). 
Why is it that Article 61 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 partly derogates 
from an unfettered application of the aggregation principle in the sense of 
Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004? The distinction between insurance 
periods and periods of employment was already made in Article 33(1) and (2) 
of Regulation (EEC) No 3/58. Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 has continued 
this distinction between insurance periods and periods of employment.109 
Article 61 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 is likewise based upon this 
distinction. For an explanation of the necessity of the distinction, reference is 
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 Reported above. 
108
 With regard to pre-retirement benefits, Article 6 will not apply (Article 66 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004). 
109
 Article 67 of Regulation (EC) No 1408/71. 
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usually made to the diversity of existing unemployment benefit schemes, 
which are based either on periods of insurance or periods of employment.110 
1.4 The functioning of the aggregation of periods under Article 61(1) of Regulation 
(EC) No 883/2004 
Due to the wording of Article 61(1) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 three variants can 
be discerned and have to be treated accordingly in what follows. 
1.4.1 The competent State and the other Member State follow the insurance 
approach. 
If the law on unemployment benefits in both Member States in question 
pursues the insurance model, i.e. benefits are dependent on the completion of 
insurance periods, the aggregation of periods completed in both Member 
States is obvious. Periods of insurance have to be taken into account also if the 
law of the competent Member State is based on periods of employment.111 The 
competent Member State has no power or discretion to qualify a period of 
insurance completed and communicated by the authorities of the other 
Member State. 
1.4.2 The competent Member State follows the insurance approach. The other 
Member State builds upon periods of employment. 
In this case Article 61(1), second paragraph is applicable. If the aggregation of 
periods principle is to apply, the periods of employment in the other Member 
State have to be periods of insurance under the legislation of the competent 
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 P. Watson, Social Security Law of the European Communities, Mansell Publ., London, 1980, 229 et seq; E. Eichenhofer, 
Sozialrecht der Europäischen Union, Beck, Munich, 2013 (5th edition), p. 248; M. Fuchs in M. Fuchs (ed.), Europäisches 
Sozialrecht, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2013 (6th edition), Article 61(1) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. For more detailed 
information about the different approaches see U. Rönsberg, Die gemeinschaftsrechtliche Koordinierung von Leistungen 
bei Arbeitslosigkeit, Centaurus, Herbolzheim, 2006, p. 22 et seq. 
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 Judgment in Frangiamore, C-126/77, EU:C:1978:64. See for a detailed analysis S. van Raepenbusch, La sécurité sociale des 
SHUVRQQHVTXLFLUFXOHQWjO¶LQWpULHXUGHOD&RPPXQDXWpeFRQRPLTXH(XURSpHQQH, Story-Scientia, Brussels, 1991, p. 458 
et seq. 
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Member State. This provision has been criticised because it could deprive the 
migrant worker of her or his protection against the risk of unemployment, a 
protection which she or he has possibly earned due to contributions to the 
unemployment system in her or his country on the basis of an employment 
relationship which is not acknowledged in the competent Member State.112 
In the Warmerdam-Steggerda case113 the question was raised whether the 
aggregation of periods of employment completed in another Member State 
presupposes that such periods should be regarded as periods of insurance for 
the same branch of social security by the legislation under which they were 
completed. The CJEU denies the existence of such a condition. It suffices that 
the period of employment is considered as a period of insurance according to 
the applicable law. 
1.4.3 The competent Member State and the other Member State take into account 
periods of employment. 
This case has not been subject of controversy so far. And it seems to be 
obvious that aggregation has to take place. The reason for it can be taken from 
Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 or Article 61(1) of Regulation (EC) 
No 883/2004. Article 6 clearly states the necessity of aggregation, because 
Article 61(1) GRHVQRW³provide otherwise´ 
1.5 Requirement for the application of the aggregation principle (Article 61(2) of 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004) 
Article 61(2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 is sometimes wrongly 
understood as a conflict-of-law rule. However, the applicability of the 
legislation for the award of unemployment benefits has to be determined by 
Article 11 to 16 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. This was clearly stated by 
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 S. Van Raepenbusch, /DVpFXULWpVRFLDOHGHVSHUVRQQHVTXLFLUFXOHQWjO¶LQWpULHXUGHOD&RPPXQDXWpeFRQRPLTXH(XURSpHQQH, 
Story-Scientia, Brussels, 1991. 
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 Judgment in Warmerdam-Steggerda, C-388/87, EU:C:1989:196. 
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the judgment in Adanez-Vega.114 With the exception of frontier workers 
Article 61(2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 requires the aggregation of 
SHULRGV RQ FRQGLWLRQ WKDW WKH SHUVRQ FRQFHUQHG KDV ³the most recently 
completed´SHULRGVLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHOHJLVODWLRQXQGHUZKLFKWKHEHQHILWV
are claimed. The objective of this provision is ± following the reasoning by the 
CJEU ± to encourage the search for work in the Member State in which the 
person concerned last paid contributions to the unemployment scheme and to 
make that State bear the burden of providing the unemployment benefit.115 
This requirement is met if, regardless of the lapse of time between the 
completion of the last period of insurance and the application for the benefit, 
no other period of insurance was completed in another Member State in the 
interim.116 
The requirement under Article 61(2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 is 
cogent and, as a consequence, does not preclude a Member State from refusing 
to grant a worker unemployment benefits if the worker has not most recently 
completed periods of insurance or employment in that Member State.117 
Article 61(2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 is in tune with Article 48 
TFEU.118 
                                                 
114
 Judgment in Adanez-Vega, C-372/02, EU:C:2004:705. In this judgment the CJEU presented a clear-cut scheme how to operate 
this determination; see paragraph 17 et seq of the judgment. 
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 See the judgment in Gray v Adjudication Officer, C-62/91, EU:C:1992:177, paragraph 12. 
116
 Judgment in Adanez-Vega EU:C:2004:705, paragraph 52. 
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 Judgment in Van Noorden, C-272/90, EU:C:1991:219. However, it is not compatible with Article 45(2) TFEU and Article 4 of 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 if a Member State of residence denies unemployment benefits to a national of another 
Member State on the ground that, on the date when the benefit claim was submitted, the person concerned had not 
completed a specified period of employment in that Member State of residence, whereas there is no such requirement for 
nationals of that Member State. See the judgment in Chateignier, C-346/05, EU:C:2006:711. 
118
 See the judgment in Commission v Belgium, C-62/92, EU:C:1992:177, paragraph 12. 
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2 Calculation of benefits (Article 62 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004) 
2.1 The basic principle (62(1)) 
Unemployment benefits in cash are typical income replacement benefits. This 
is why Member States usually shape these benefits with reference to income 
lost through unemployment. If income was earned in different Member States 
during periods preceding the unemployment, an answer has to be given by 
coordination law which income should be the relevant income for the 
calculation of an unemployment benefit. In principle this answer is offered by 
Article 62(1) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, where the competent 
institution is required to take into account exclusively the salary or 
professional income received by the person concerned in respect of her or his 
last activity as an employed or self-employed person under this legislation. 
The CJEU has remarked on this provision referring to the Preamble that in 
order to secure the mobility of labour under improved conditions, the 
Regulation seeks to ensure the worker without employment the unemployment 
benefit provided for by the legislation of the Member State to which he or she 
was last subject. And it goes on interpreting Article 68(1) of Regulation (EC) 
No 1408/71 (now Article 62(1) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004) in such a 
way that the previous wage or salary which normally constitutes the basis of 
calculation of unemployment benefits is the wage or salary received from the 
last employment of the worker. In such a manner the unemployment benefit is 
regarded as not to impede the mobility of workers and to that end seek to 
ensure that the persons concerned receive benefits which take account as far as 
possible of the conditions of employment, and in particular of the 
remuneration, which they enjoyed under the legislation of the Member State of 
last employment.119 
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 Judgment in Fellinger, C-67/79, EU:C:1980:59, paragraph 7. 
 170 
 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 has not taken up the provision in Article 68(1), 
second sentence of Regulation (EC) No 1408/71, pursuant to which a four-
week clause has to be observed. If the worker had his or her last employment 
in the territory of the competent institution for less than four weeks, the benefit 
has to be calculated on the basis of the normal wage or salary in the place 
where the unemployed person was residing or staying corresponding to an 
employment equivalent or similar to his or her last employment in the territory 
of another Member State. 
2.2 Reference periods 
0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶ Xnemployment benefit schemes very often refer to specific 
reference periods when the income for the calculation of benefits is to be 
established. Article 62(2) states that in this event, too, the basic principle laid 
down in 62(1) has to be applied. 
2.3 The special case of frontier workers (62(3)) 
Regulation (EC) No 1408/71 did not contain a provision on the calculation of 
benefits concerning frontier workers. In a preliminary ruling the CJEU decided 
that the competent institution of the Member State of residence must take into 
account the wage or salary received by the worker in the last employment held 
by him or her in the Member State in which he or she was engaged 
immediately prior to his or her becoming unemployed. This CJEU case law 
was adopted in Article 62(3) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.120 For 
unemployed persons to whom Article 65(5)(a) is applicable, the institution of 
the place of residence must, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 987/2009, take 
into account the salary or professional income received by the person 
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 6HH DOVR LQ WKLV UHVSHFW 5 &RUQHOLVVHQ µ7KH QHZ (8 &RRUGLQDWLRQ 6\VWHP IRU :RUNHUV ZKR %HFRPH 8QHPSOR\HG¶ 
European Journal of Social Security, 187, 198 et seq. 
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concerned in the Member State to whose legislation he or she was subject 
during the last period of (self-)employment. 
The Member States¶ OHJLVODWLRQV very often provide for a ceiling within the 
framework of calculating both contributions and benefits, whereby 
contributions are levied from the income that is taken into consideration up to 
the assessment ceiling for contributions. This is also decisive for the income 
used to assess the benefit. In the Grisvard and Kreitz121 case the CJEU referred 
to Article 71(1)(a(ii) and (b(ii) of Regulation (EC) No 1408/71 and held that 
frontier workers who are wholly unemployed must receive benefits in 
accordance with the legislation of the Member State in the territory of which 
they reside as though they had been subject to that legislation while last 
employed. The legislation of the Member State of residence alone has to be 
applied and not, therefore, the legislation of the State of employment, 
including any rules it lays down on ceilings.122 As the contents of Article 65(5) 
correspond with the former provisions of Article 71, existing case law can also 
claim validity under the new legislation.123 
Option 1 
Option 1 ± status quo: ³one-day rule´DJJUHJDWLRQLVpossible, if there is any 
insurance in the new Member State, irrespective of the length of the insurance. 
The unemployment benefit is only calculated on the basis of the salary earned 
in the State of last activity. 
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 Judgment in Grisvard and Kreitz, C-201/91, EU:C:1992:368. 
122
 Judgment in Grisvard and Kreitz EU:C:1992:368, paragraph 16. 
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1 The structure and the contents of Article 61 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
1.1 General consideration 
Taking into account that the general content of Article 61 was placed under 
close scrutiny in the preceding paragraphs, here Option 1 will be examined, 
pointing out pros and contras. This Option entails the maintenance of this 
provision with the current wording, without the introduction of any change. 
Moreover, it is necessary to check out some aspects of this provision that 
could be considered as controversial. Finally, a possible solution will be 
provided for the best and a uniform application of this Article. 
On the other hand, it has to be stressed that Option 1 not only deals with 
Article 61, but also with Article 62, the calculation of benefits. In that regard, 
in this part all the references will be made to Article 61, leaving the analysis of 
Article 62 for Option 3. 
Article 61 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 establishes a special rule for the 
aggregation of periods of insurance or (self-)employment, which derogates 
from the general rule of Article 6. However, it can be considered that the basic 
principles of Article 6 are maintained in Article 61 with some particularities. 
In fact, what Article 6 and Article 61 demand as a prerequisite for the 
activation of the aggregation principle, is that the person concerned who 
claims benefits has a link with the competent State ± usually through the 
completion of ± at least ± one day of insurance or (self-)employment in the 
said Member State. 
1.2 Drawbacks of the current provisions 
1.2.1 In the search for the uniform interpretation of Article 61 
The need for a uniform interpretation of all EU law and, in this case, of Article 
61 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 is D³PXVW´DVWKHCourt of Justice of the 
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European Union (CJEU) often reminds. Indeed, one of the principles of the 
EU and a prerequisite or condition for its survival and for its development is 
the uniform application of its law by all Member States. 
The CJEU, referring to the said uniform application, determined in 
Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf124 in a very clear way that this ³is essential for the 
preservation of the Community character of the law established by the Treaty 
and has the object of ensuring that in all circumstances this law is the same in 
DOO 6WDWHV RI WKH &RPPXQLW\´ and that it ³DLPV WR DYRLG GLYHUJHQFHV LQ WKH
interpretation of Community law. [«] Consequently any gap in the system so 
organized could undermine the effectiveness of the provisions of the Treaty 
and of the secondary Community.´ 
In theory, there is probably a unanimous interpretation of Article 61. 
Unfortunately, this unanimity is not reflected in its practical application. 
,QGHHGWKH³RQH-GD\UXOH´LVQRWIRllowed by all Member States that require, 
for some cases, longer periods completed under their legislation to activate the 
aggregation mechanism. As a consequence, the mandatory uniform application 
of the law is not achieved. 
Maybe the problem of the different application of Article 61 does not emanate 
from the wording of the provision, but from the undesirable and unwanted 
results of the one-day clause. Some Member States do not consider it 
appropriate that with a single day of insurance or (self-)employment a Member 
State has to aggregate periods of other Member States and bear the costs of the 
whole unemployment benefits. In this regard the answer of one Member State 
to the questionnaire of FreSsco is very enlightening ³However, a one-day 
insurance/employment period completed in our Member State is often treated 
by the X institution as a deceitful/abusive action, targeting at the granting of 
the unemployment benefit. Thus, a period longer than one day, completed to 
our Member StateLVPRVWO\UHTXLUHG´. 
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 Judgment in Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf, C-166-73, EU:C:1974:3. 
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On the other hand it has to be pointed out that it is possible, for some Member 
States, to start the aggregation mechanism with some (few) hours of work and 
not with a complete working day. This fraction of a day could be rounded up 
and be considered as one day. More problematic is the practice followed by 
other Member States which do not apply the one-day rule, but the one-week 
rule, because their periods of insurance or (self-)employment are expressed not 
LQ GD\V EXW LQ ZHHNV ³the Member State X would not therefore aggregate 
insurance from another Member State until the minimum period of insurance 
RIRQHZHHNKDGEHHQFRPSOHWHGLHµUHJLVWHUHG¶RQWKHV\VWHP´ 
In an indirect way, this position of rejection responds to the idea that the one-
day clause does not guarantee the integration of the person concerned in the 
labour market of the competent State and defends ± with its practical and not 
harmonised application of Article 61 ± WKH ³PRUH-GD\V FODXVH´ RU LQ RWKHU
words, Option 2 of this report. 
Indeed, from one reply received to the questionnaire, it can be concluded that 
the requirement of more than one day to start with the aggregation mechanism 
is not only a rare, atypical practice or an exception, but a frequent and 
common exercise (³However, since no domestic rule expressly consolidates 
the µone-day rule¶, local unemployment institutions may alternately decide 
that one day is not sufficient for the purpose of aggregation. A uniform 
application in X of µthe one-day rule¶ is therefore not guaranteed´). 
Conversely, in theory, the zero-day rule to activate the aggregation mechanism 
could be envisaged for those Member States which do not require that the 
claimant of benefits, under their legislations, had completed a specified period 
of employment in that Member State. In that regard it seems that neither 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004125 nor the CJEU126 have validated this thesis. In 
consequence, this possibility will not be dealt with here. 
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 See Recitals 10, 11 and 12 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
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 Judgment in Chateignier EU:C:2006:711. 
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1.2.2 Simplification and clarity 
This report does not pretend to go into the considerations and the reasons why 
some Member States do not apply the one-day clause and require more days of 
insurance or (self-)employment to start the aggregation mechanism. In fact, 
one of the advantages of Article 61 in comparison with Article 6 is precisely 
that ³WKHRUHWLFDOO\´ LWRIIHUVDFOHDUUXOHIRU the activation of the aggregation 
mechanism, which makes a uniform application of the provision possible. 
Indeed, Member States where the person concerned claims benefits have to 
look if, under their legislation, periods of insurance or (self-)employment were 
most recently completed and if the nature of these periods fills the 
requirements of their applicable legislation. If the answer is yes, they start the 
aggregation mechanism. 
It has to be said that the practical implementation of this mechanism can be 
complicated taking into account in particular some rulings127 of the CJEU. 
However, this problem does not concern the purpose of this report. 
In principle, no major difficulties appear for the designation of the competent 
State, according to Article 61 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. The real 
problem comes later when the competent State applies Article 61. At that 
pointWKH³RQH-GD\UXOH´RUWKH³PRUH-GD\VUXOH´SOD\DUROHGHSHQGLQJRQWKH
different interpretation or practical application of Article 61(2). Unfortunately, 
maybe the wording of this provision opens up possibilities of different 
interpretations or, some Member States intentionally do not apply the content 
of this provision because they do not agree with it. This means that one of the 
pros of the current provision, its clarity, is lost and the uniform application of 
the law, as required by the CJEU, not achieved. Perhaps a revision is needed to 
match Member States¶LQWHUHVWV or address their concerns. 
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1.2.3 Integration in the national labour market and financial implications 
On the other side, and going deeply into the content, sense and logic of the 
current Article 61, it has to be questioned whether with only one day of 
insurance or (self-)employment the person concerned is integrated in the 
labour market of the Member State where benefits are claimed or, in other 
words, if this rule contributes to the labour integration or if the opposite is 
true. Indeed it can be argued that with respect to other short-term benefits (e.g. 
sickness benefits) also the one-day rule is applied. However, unemployment 
benefits are much linked and dependent on the labour market and the 
integration in this market plays a very important role taking into account the 
nature and goal of these benefits and the different active and passive measures. 
Moreover, and stressing the importance of the integration factor, it does not 
seem appropriate that one Member State is obliged to bear all the costs of the 
unemployment benefits when the person concerned only completed very short 
periods (one day is enough) of insurance or (self-)employment under the 
legislation of this Member State, due to the fact that all periods completed in 
other Member States have to be taken into account as a result of the 
aggregation mechanism. 
Precisely to avoid or reduce these drawbacks, a kind of sharing of cost was 
established in Article 65 (unemployed persons who resided in a Member State 
other than the competent State). Accordingly, reimbursements between 
Member States were introduced. 
The aim of these reimbursements was to compensate the Member State of 
residence which has to provide benefits in accordance with its legLVODWLRQ³as if 
the person concerned had been subject to that legislation during his last 
activity as an employed or self-employed person´ 
The logic of Article 65 was clear. The Member State of residence where 
possibly no periods of insurance or (self-)employment were completed cannot 
be the only State responsible to bear all the costs. 
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The reimbursements, between Member States, usually follow a very 
complicated procedure and for this reason legislatures have always been very 
reluctant to introduce such instruments, although, at least from the perspective 
of proportionality, it does not look inappropriate. 
Some defenders of the current provision could argue that the situation of 
Article 65 cannot be compared with the situation of Article 61. In fact, it can 
be imagined that a frontier worker, for instance, has completed no period 
(zero-day rule) of insurance or (self-)employment in the Member State of 
residence, and that this Member State will be considered as the competent 
Member State and has to provide benefits for a long period. It is reasonable, 
accordingly, that this Member State receives, as compensation, reimbursement 
up to five months of the cost of the benefits paid. In the same way, it can also 
be envisaged that under Article 61 a Member State may be competent as a 
result of a single day of insurance or (self-)employment. In this regard the 
difference of the zero-day and one-day rule is very small. Then again, the 
difference of cost (five months reimbursement/nothing) can be enormous. 
It can be agreed that the situations of Article 61 and 65 are totally dissimilar. 
However, the rationale underlying Article 65 is to avoid that a Member State 
has to bear a disproportional cost related to the periods completed under its 
legislation. Unfortunately, this proportionality principle does not appear in the 
current wording of Article 61, taking into account that it is possible that with 
one single day of insurance or (self-)employment a Member State is obliged, 
based on the aggregation mechanism, to provide benefits 6, 12, 18, or 24 
months or longer. For this reason the critics of the wording of the current 
Article 61 are, in some cases, easy to understand. And the voices that call for 
some restrictions and limits on the aggregation (periods of one or three months 
completed in the Member State where the benefits are claimed) may to some 
extent be considered justified and reasonable. 
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1.2.4 Fraud and abuse 
It has to be analysed whether the current Article 61 might foster fraud and 
abuse. In fact, beside health tourism, social tourism, and poverty tourism also 
unemployment tourism may be anticipated and, if possible, prevented. Indeed, 
under the current provision, a single day of employment suffices to be subject 
to the social security system of the Member State of employment. This could 
increase the temptation/attraction for nationals of another Member State to 
seek employment for a few days with a fraudulent intention. For example, the 
person concerned may induce or agree with an employer to establish an 
employment relation in a way that in reality is a form of disguised 
employment. After a dismissal, Article 61 will be applicable and the 
aggregation mechanism activated, with the possible consequence of many 
months of unemployment benefits. Moreover, the joint application of Article 
61 and Article 62 (calculation of benefits) may as a result entail a pull factor 
IRU ZKDW LV FDOOHG ³XQHPSOR\PHQW WRXULVP´ LQ SDUWLFXODU LQ the direction of 
Member States with a high level of wages and protection, undermining the 
sense of the unemployment benefits coordination provisions. 
From a quite different perspective, the current wording of Article 61 may also 
increase the risk of fraud distorting the correct meaning of the restrictions on 
the export of benefits of Article 64 of the Regulation. An example could be the 
best way to describe this problem which may affect in particular but not only 
the Member States of origin of the unemployment claimants. A national of 
State A who has been working X years in State B becomes unemployed and 
decides to return to his or her State of origin. The person concerned knows that 
the export of benefits is limited to three months (six months exceptionally in 
some Member States) and that he or she has to be registered as a person 
seeking work with the employment services of the competent Member State 
for at least four weeks. To overcome these restrictions, he or she immediately 
returns to the country of origin. There, this person may, as explained in the 
precedent paragraph, establish an artificial work relationship and provoke a 
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simulated dismissal. As a consequence, Article 61 will be applicable and the 
aggregation mechanism activated with possibly many months of 
unemployment benefits provided by State A. 
This problem is well-known by some Member States, as reflected in a reply to 
the FreSsco questionnaire ³$ UHSUHVHQWDWLYH IURP WKH ; 8QHPSOR\PHQW
Service reports that they tend to review all possible simulation of professional 
relationships (fraud) including also those related with the application of the 
aggregation after a very short period of insurance in X. Simulation, however, 
is almost impossible to prove in most cases, especially when the person is 
hired via a temporary employment agency [«].´ ³$FFRUGLQJ WR [the] 
Department of Coordination of Social Security Systems in the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Policy of X Member State, it is estimated that over 90% 
from 1517 cases in 2013 were from its own citizens.´³Therefore I believe that 
a significant percentage of them are expected to be Nationals from X Member 
6WDWHWKDWZDQWWRFRPHEDFNWRWKLV0HPEHU6WDWHDIWHUDSHULRGDEURDG´. 
1.3 Advantages of the current provision 
It can be considered, after reading the precedent paragraphs, that this report 
makes a plea in favour of the modification of Article 61. In part this is true and 
in part it is not. OUDV9ROWDLUHVDLG³tKHEHWWHULVWKHHQHP\RIWKHJRRG´ 
It is true that the current wording of Article 61 has declared enemies but also 
good friends, the latter being those who consider that any changes introduced 
in this provision will imply more drawbacks than advantages. In fact, the 
defenders of the status quo estimate that the one-day rule is the common 
principle and practice, applicable for other benefits (except pensions). They 
believe that any restriction to the aggregation mechanism for unemployment 
benefits could entail a kind of time bomb that could undermine the root and 
pillar of the coordination system. 
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The arguments put forward by the defenders of maintaining Article 61 as it is 
now, without any change, are solid. In fact for migrant workers it is a very 
appropriate solution, taking into account that the Member State where the last 
employment was carried out will always be the competent State. Actually, this 
solution offers a legal certainty that perhaps will not be offered by other 
alternatives. 
Also for the competent institutions an unchanged Article 61 implies 
advantages. For instance, the administrative procedures as they are now may 
continue. Moreover, no transitional provision will be needed. 
Concerning fraud and abuse we do not seem to be confronted with a problem 
of great magnitude. In fact, Member States have their own legislative 
instruments to fight disguised employment and simulated lay-offs. Moreover, 
as the European Commission (EC) DGPLWV ³EU citizens do not use welfare 
EHQHILWVPRUHLQWHQVLYHO\WKDQWKHKRVWFRXQWU\¶VQDWLRQDOV´ 
A similar opinion is shared by the experts128 of the University College London 
(UCL). They declared that ³>W@KHUHDUHFODLPV WKDW LPPLJUDQWV IURP(XURSH
take advantage of the social security system. But, despite the controversy 
surrounding this issue, evidence for how much immigrants take out of and 
contribute to the public purse is surprisingly sparse. Our new research 
published by the Royal Economic Society in the Economic Journal aims to fill 
this void. Our findings show that European immigrants have paid more in 
taxes than they received in benefits, helping to relieve the fiscal burden and 
contributing to the financing of public services´ 
Consequently it appears that fraud and abuse have more a political dimension 
than a real dimension. 
On the other hand, the argument of the need of integration in the labour market 
of the competent State is not quite consistent. Indeed, the goal of 
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unemployment benefits is not only to replace income but also to facilitate the 
search for a new job. For this reason, benefits and job search are linked and 
any separation or distribution of competences between Member States can 
have, in principle, negative consequences for the employment of this person. 
In fact, the current provision follows the idea that the unemployed person has 
to make him or herself available in the Member State that offers the most 
favourable conditions to find new employment. 
1.4 An alternative proposal for amendment 
In case the final decision about Article 61 would be the election of Option 1, 
i.e. the maintenance of the current text, it could be appropriate to look for a 
uniform application of this provision, avoiding misunderstandings or different 
interpretations. For this purpose, the best solution would be the adoption of a 
'HFLVLRQE\WKH$GPLQLVWUDWLYH&RPPLVVLRQHVWDEOLVKLQJZLWKFODULW\WKH³RQH-
GD\ UXOH´ IRU WKH DFWLYDWLRQ RI WKH DJJUHJDWLRQ PHFKDQLVP DQG HOLPLQDWLQJ
RWKHUDOWHUQDWLYHVLQSDUWLFXODUWKH³PRUH-than-one-GD\UXOH´ 
Option 2 
Option 2: a threshold is applied for the aggregation of periods of insurance or 
(self-)employment fulfilled in another Member State. 
Sub-option 2a: One month of insurance or (self-)employment needs to be 
completed before aggregation can be applied. 
Sub-option 2b: three months of insurance or (self-)employment needs to be 
completed before aggregation can be applied. 
The principle of aggregation has a specific aim. It protects migrants from 
disadvantages that could be provoked by movements from one Member State 
to another. This aim is expressively assigned in Article 48 TFEU (see above 
Introduction, 1). Option 2 derogates from this principle. The idea produced by 
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the European Commission (EC) LV WRLQWURGXFHD³WKUHVKROG´RQHFRXOGDOVR
FDOOLWD³TXDOLI\LQJ´RU³ZDLWLQJ´SHULRG'XULQJDFHUWDLQSHULRGRIWLPHone 
or three months), the aggregation principle would not apply and, as a 
consequence, the person concerned would not be able to bring into account 
periods accomplished under the legislation of the previous Member State. 
Given the fundamental character of the aggregation principle on the one hand 
and the sharpness of the proposal on the other hand, we can note that Option 2, 
as such (without any protecting rules), is not compatible with superior EU law, 
especially with the Treaties. There is some relevant case law of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU)129 as well as doctrine130 about the 
question (see Introduction, 1). In order to avoid a violation of primary law, 
additional rules should be adopted concerning the situation during the 
proposed qualifying (or waiting) period and connected questions (return of 
contributions if the waiting period is not fulfilled and if no benefits have been 
paid, access to other benefits and employment services etc). The report 
therefore includes considerations how to organise a lawful treatment of the 
person concerned and formulates some draft rules (see Option 2, 2). 
1 The compatibility of Option 2 with higher ranked EU Law 
The first part of the present report (see Introduction) explains the functioning 
of the aggregation principle. Option 2, however, calls for some additional 
remarks, because it is focused on persons who are pursuing a professional 
activity. It sets up a rule which covers workers. It is therefore more difficult to 
justify a restriction, especially by referring to the integration argument, 
because working and contributing to the social security system does represent 
a good way to integrate into the local job market. 
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 Judgment in Vougioukas, C-443/93, EU:C:1995:394, paragraph 30. Also see Opinion of the Court 1/91, EU:C:1991:490³EEC 
Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of an international agreement, nonetheless constitutes the constitutional charter of a 
Community based on the rule of law´ 
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 U. Becker, in J. Schwarze (ed.), EU-Kommentar, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2012 (3rd edition), Article 48 AEUV/3. 
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The following shortly recalls the legal effect of the rights granted by the 
Treaty (1.1), summarises the obligations of the EU legislature in terms of 
coordination (1.2), explains why the draft rule deviates from essential 
coordination rules required by the Treaty (1.3) and finally looks at the 
justifying reasons mentioned in the mandate (1.4). 
1.1 Free movement of workers and entitlements associated to the right of free 
movement 
Free movement of workers is a fundamental principle of European law131 and 
has the function of a fundamental right.132 It provides a legally protected 
position to every European citizen willing to work and stay in a Member 
State.133 The relevant rules (especially Article 45 TFEU) are directly 
applicable,134 prevail over contrary national law135 and can establish a claim of 
compensation if violated.136 In respect of Option 2, it should be recalled that 
the right of free movement is binding not only for the Member States but also 
for all EU institutions.137 
1.2 Obligations of the EU legislature in terms of social protection 
The EU legislature is required to set up a system to enable workers to 
overcome obstacles with which they might be confronted in national social 
security rules.138 It is also obliged to omit measures which introduce additional 
obstacles to the free movement of workers, such as rules which allow the 
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freedom to seek employment, to work, to exercise the right of establishment and to provide services in any Member 
State´DQGZKLFKLs binding for the EU. 
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Member States to discriminate against EU citizens.139 This follows from 
Article 45 TFEU combined with Article 48 TFEU.140 It hence could be held 
that the legislature does not fully discharge its obligations under Article 45 and 
Article 48 TFEU if Option 2, without alternatives, were adopted. 
1.2.1 Aggregation of periods 
The aggregation principle is expressively mentioned in Article 48 TFEU. It 
therefore appears to be part of the coordination principles the Treaty assumes 
to be important. The other coordination rules, like the designation of the law 
applicable, rules opening the access to cross-border health care, the 
cooperation between national social security institutions, are not. Article 48 
TFEU focuses on two instruments: the aggregation of periods and the 
H[SRUWDWLRQRIEHQHILWV7KRVHSULQFLSOHVDUH³intended to ensure that workers 
do not lose, as a result of their exercising the right to freedom of movement, 
social security advantages granted to them by the legislation of a Member 
State´.141 7KH\ DUH GHVLJQHG WR DEROLVK ³as far as possible the territorial 
limitations´ RI WKH GRPHVWLF VRFLDO VHFXULW\ VFKHPHV.142 The principle is 
fundamental because without aggregation the access to and the amount of 
benefits the person has already worked for could be lost.143 It is necessary in 
order to undertake a useful implementation of Article 48 TFEU. Hence 
aggregation of periods belongs to the measures the legislature is required to set 
up.144 Consequently, the CJEU has held that Article 48 TFEU does not only 
provide the competence to adopt legal acts. Article 48 TFEU also contains a 
mandate the legislature has to observe.145 This follows from Article 45 TFEU, 
which is the µUDLVRQG¶rWUH¶ of Article 48 TFEU: as the CJEU has pointed out 
VHYHUDO WLPHV ³the establishment of as complete freedom of movement for 
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workers as possible, which forms part of the foundations of the Community, 
constitutes the ultimate objective of Article 51 of the EEC Treaty and thereby 
conditions the exercise of the power which it confers upon the Council´146 
1.2.2 Equality of treatment 
Equality of treatment is anchored in Article 20 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and all measures taken by the EU have to conform to this 
right.147 This is also true for Article 45(2) TFEU, ZKLFK SURKLELWV ³any 
discrimination based on nationality´ Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 applies the principle to social security. The formulation used by this 
Article ³unless otherwise provided for by this Regulation´ VXJJHVWV WKDW
waivers could be allowed by the legislature. According to the CJEU, however, 
coordination must secure the equal treatment laid down by Article 45 TFEU148 
and must not add to the disparities caused by national legislation.149 As stated 
by the CJEU in the Pinna I case concerning a French family allowance, EU 
institutions are not permitted to adopt rules which provide unequal treatment 
among citizens; such rules are void as contrary to the Treaties, especially in 
respect to Article 45 TFEU mentioned above. Equality of treatment also 
³SURKLELWV « DOO FRYHUW IRUPV RI GLVFULPLQDWLRQ ZKLFK E\ DSSO\LQJ RWKHU
distinguishing criteria, in fact achieve the same result´.150 This was the case in 
the Pinna judgment mentioned above. 
1.3 Derogation from the above-noted principles 
According to Option 2, people who move their work from one Member State 
to another have to wait one or three months before the aggregation principle 
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applies. Therefore, the proposal restricts free movement of workers. The 
aggregation principle (1.3.1) is affected, since the draft says to not apply it. 
The principle of equality of treatment is also concerned because it potentially 
allows Member States to treat foreign workers differently (1.3.2). 
1.3.1 Aggregation of periods 
Option 2 deviates from a rule prescribed by the Treaty. Article 48 TFEU 
clearly shows that the aggregation rule is one of the principles that allows 
workers to move freely within the European Union. The solution suggested 
under Option 2, however, does exactly the opposite. Whereas the Treaty says 
³GR DJJUHJDWH´ 2SWLRQ  VD\V ³GR QRW DJJUHJDWH´ 7KHUHIRUH WKH UHVXOW RI
Option 2 does not correspond with the aims pursued by the Treaty. The 
proposed change would create obstacles to the free movement of workers, 
because for the moment, the national legislation is not harmonised. Member 
States are fully allowed to define all kinds of qualifying periods. Without 
aggregation of periods, migrant workers would not get the protection 
necessary to encourage free movement. 
1.3.2 Equality of treatment 
The draft rule of Option 2 does not expressly refer to the nationality of 
workers. Therefore, it does not constitute an overt discrimination. But it allows 
Member States to not take into account periods accomplished under the 
legislation of another Member State.151 This type of disguised or hidden 
discrimination can be avoided by aggregation of periods. Option 2, instead, 
opens the door to such treatments. There is some case law concerning similar 
rules which might be interesting to mention. 
In the Roviello case, the CJEU declared void a rule adopted by the Council in 
1983. The rule in question did not itself lay down any formal difference in 
treatment between nationals and European citizens, but it allowed a Member 
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State to do so152 LW ZDV ³not of such a nature as to guarantee the equal 
treatment [«] and therefore [had] no place in the coordination of national 
law´.153 According to the CJEU, such provisions are liable to have an effect on 
foreigners more often than on nationals and include the risk of placing them at 
a particular disadvantage. The same is true for Option 2 as well, because the 
waiting period will typically apply to migrants; it is evident, moreover, that it 
reduces the rights of those migrants because unemployment benefits might be 
refused to them. It is therefore plausible to affirm that Option 2 is not 
compatible with the principle of equal treatment. 
Option 2 is also problematic in terms of mutuality, because the migrant worker 
is not protected by the system of the receiving Member State although it is 
likely that the worker will have to pay social security contributions there. In 
several judgments the CJEU has held that an unlawful disadvantage occurs if 
EU citizens, other than nationals, must pay higher contributions than usual 
without being entitled to additional benefits154 or if they are subject to social 
FRQWULEXWLRQV³on which there is no return´.155 
1.4 Justifying reasons 
1.4.1 ³WKUHVKROG´ 
The EU legislature may choose the most appropriate measures to attain the 
REMHFWLYHRI$UWLFOH7)(8DQGWKHUHIRUHGLVSRVHVRID³wide discretion´156 
This includes the right to formulate formal conditions, like the obligation to 
register as a jobseeker at the employment services of the competent Member 
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State (Article 64(1) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004).157 Furthermore, 
material conditions may be set, for instance the necessity of having the most 
recently completed period in the competent Member State (Article 61(2) of 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004).158 And finally, it also includes the possibility 
to depart from the coordination mechanisms designed by this provision.159 As 
a consequence, exceptions or restrictions provided by EU coordination law 
may be regarded as valid even if they do not furnish the whole protection 
assigned by Article 48 TFEU.160 
This leads to the questions whether deviations from fundamental principles 
must be justified by overriding reasons and how those reasons are to be 
examined. They are not completely solved yet. The case law concerning 
restrictions and exemptions decided by the EU legislature is relatively rare. 
Some decisions do not discuss justifying reasons as such. In the Pinna case, 
the CJEU does not examine the existence of justifying reasons at all.161 The 
Testa judgment concerning the three-month limitation to exportation of 
unemployment benefits does not mention justifying reasons either; it only 
explains that the rule is reasonable, because it confers the possibility to seek 
employment outside the competent Member State.162 In the Gray case, the 
CJEU notes WKDWWKH³Council considered it necessary´WRDWWDFKFRQGLWLRQVWR
the entitlement to unemployment benefits (the obligation to register and the 
necessity to have the most recent period in the competent Member State); the 
CJEU also explains that people should be encouraged to seek work in the 
Member State in which they were last employed and that the latter should have 
the financial burden of providing the unemployment benefits.163 Technical 
difficulties due to profound differences between Member State law were 
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discussed but denied in the Vougioukas case.164 In the Snares case the CJEU 
accepted the argument that special non-contributory benefits are closely linked 
with the social environment and therefore justify the condition of residence 
introduced by the EU legislature in 1992.165 This case law at least answers the 
first question. It shows that deviations need to be justified by some reasons 
and, evidently, that a reason must outweigh the rights conferred by Article 45 
TFEU. This approach is consistent with the rule of law laid down in Article 2 
TEU. 
The second question could be answered in the light of the Gray judgment 
mentioned above, in which the CJEU held that the Treaty does not prohibit the 
Community legislature from attaching conditions to the rights granted by 
Article 45. In the Gray case the CJEU identified and approved the intention of 
the legislature to encourage persons to seek work in the Member State they 
were last employed. Therefore, the restriction is considered as valid. As 
Advocate General Tesauro pointed out in this case, the idea of Article 61(2) 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 is to ³avoid the exportation of 
unemployment´166 This aim does not exactly correspond to the problem 
focused on by Option 2. Option 2 wants to avoid abuse and excessive financial 
burden for the Member States, especially the Member State where the worker 
has lost his or her last job. This motivation is different from the one protected 
by the CJEU in the Gray case, even if the rule proposed might have a similar 
impact on the European job market. For this reason we do not think that the 
argumentation used in the Gray case may be transposed on Option 2. 
Furthermore, the case law related to deviations set up by the EU legislature 
does mention justifying reasons such as technical difficulties of coordination 
or the financial burden due to the exportation of benefits. However, they do 
not go much further, for instance explaining that the reasons put forward must 
                                                 
164
 Judgment in Vougioukas EU:C:1995:394, paragraph 32. 
165
 Judgment in Snares, C-20/96, EU:C:1997:518, paragraph 42. 
166
 Opinion of the Advocate General in Gray, C-62/91, EU:C:1992:18, paragraph 5. 
 190 
 
be rational and that every restrictive measure has to respect the principle of 
proportionality; those arguments are proper to the case law related to measures 
taken by the Member States.167 However, they should also govern the use of 
competence by the Union, as Article 5(1) TEU stipulates. The necessity to 
have the most recent period in the competent Member State, as examined in 
the Gray case, has an effect on the aggregation principle because the jobseeker 
cannot ask for aggregation before having worked at least one day in the 
receiving Member State. But this rule is less severe than Option 2, which 
applies to people who have already worked in this State. Option 2 goes a step 
further than the existent law. It refuses aggregation to workers who already 
have found a job in another Member State and thus have established a link to 
the legal system of this Member State; those workers may not apply for 
benefits in the former Member State any longer. The existent law might be 
considered sufficient to protect the Member States¶ financial interests. 
As far as we know, the arguments mentioned by the EC (mandate, p. 2, p. 3: 
clarification, simplification, risk of fraud and abuse, uneven financial burden 
for Member States) have not yet been subject to CJEU decisions concerning 
the validity of EU coordination law. In any case, arguments which allow to 
justify a restriction of the fundamental right of free movement of workers have 
to be solid. They are typically related to important interests such as inner 
security, public health and hospital planning.168 This follows from the case law 
related to the internal market in general because the necessity of rational and 
proportionate justifying reasons are relevant for all the freedoms granted by 
the Treaty, especially for free movement of goods, free movement of persons 
(movement of workers and right of establishment) and freedom of services.169 
In the field of unemployment benefits or benefits which are similar to the 
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latter, the CJEU has held that conditions such as a residence requirement have 
to be proportionate.170 It should also be noted that most of the case law about 
the question how to justify discriminating rules concern national law. 
ReVWULFWLRQVFDQEHMXVWLILHGXQGHU(8ODZ³if [they are] based on objective 
considerations independent of the nationality of the persons concerned and 
(are) proportionate to the legitimate objective of the national provisions.´171 
7KH UXOH PXVW EH ³appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective 
pursued´DQGLWPXVWQRW³go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it´172 
Usually, the CJEU takes into account the particular national rules and 
circumstances. In the Stewart case, for instance, the CJEU had to consider the 
situation of a British subject to whom a disability allowance was refused, for 
the sole reason that she was not present in Great Britain on the date on which 
she claimed the allowance.173 The CJEU held that this restriction could not be 
described as appropriate; it neither ensured a genuine link between the 
claimant and Great Britain nor was it necessary to preserve the financial 
balance of the British social security system.174 In other words, the amendment 
proposal would have to explain why, in certain Member States, the waiting 
period is necessary. It would also be necessary to define under which 
conditions or in which kind of situation a waiting period would not apply (e.g. 
to persons who had already worked in the receiving Member State in former 
times and have contributed to the social security system of the State). 
1.4.2 Justifying reasons such as mentioned in the mandate 
The mandate also explains that the current rules bear the risk of fraud or abuse 
because people can claim benefits just after arriving in another Member State 
(p. 2 of the mandate). According to the EC, Option 2 would limit this risk, 
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since the person would have to wait a certain period of time before he or she 
could ask for aggregation. In the field of social security, the CJEU has not yet 
discussed the risk of fraud and abuse as a justifying reason. This might be due 
to the fact that parts of the case law mentioned above go back to the 1970s and 
1980s. Today, the Treaties include a chapter about Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice, wherein the Union is to prevent and combat crime (Article 67(3) 
TFEU); the European Anti-Fraud Office investigates fraud against the EU 
budget. Therefore, it seems plausible that the EU is also concerned about fraud 
and abuse directed against its members. As recently pointed out by the EC, EU 
ODZ FRQWDLQV ³a range of robust safeguards to help Member States to fight 
abuse and fraud´175. In the field of social security coordination, the Treaty 
does not expressly mention rules fighting fraud and abuse, but neither does it 
prohibit such rules (Article 48 TFEU). Hence, the risk of fraud and abuse may 
be taken into account by the EU legislature while adopting coordination rules. 
It could even constitute a justifying reason for exemptions and deviations from 
the principles mentioned in Article 48 TFEU. The question, however, if 
Option 2 is justified by this argument needs some additional clarifications. It 
should first be verified if the fear about possible abuse is based on objective 
IDFWV 7KH VWDWLVWLFV VHHP WR LQGLFDWH WKH RSSRVLWH ³EU citizens do not use 
ZHOIDUH EHQHILWV PRUH LQWHQVLYHO\ WKDQ WKH KRVW FRXQWU\¶V QDWLRQDOV´.176 
Furthermore, it should be asked if the simple risk of abuse is sufficient. Would 
it not be more appropriate and proportional to figure out a rule which sanctions 
abuse committed by persons instead of choosing a measure of general 
prevention? Such measures are not allowed when adopted by the Member 
States and, consequently, should not be used by the EU legislature either.177 
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Moreover, the waiting period could help to make sure that the migrant worker 
is fully integrated in the job market before getting unemployment benefits. But 
the integration argument (p. 1 of the mandate) is problematic if we consider 
the relevant Treaty provisions and the settled case law of the CJEU. The 
Member States may indeed adopt rules which require the migrant to show a 
certain degree of integration; the CJEU XVHV WKH H[SUHVVLRQ ³degree of 
connection to society´DQGDGPLWVWKDW³the aim of solidarity may constitute an 
objective consideration of public interest.´178 Conditions of territory, however, 
usually fail to comply with the principle of proportionality; they are not an 
appropriate means by which to obtain the objective of solidarity if the person 
who has his or her residence in another Member State is in fact as well 
integrated as a resident.179 Several CJEU decisions did not even evoke the 
possibility that the refusal to take into account external events might be 
justified; the CJEU found a violation of EU law without discussing any 
overriding consideration.180 In the Mulders case, the CJEU held that a Member 
State cannot preclude, as a period of insurance, an entire period during which 
contributions were paid for the sole reason that the person concerned did not 
reside in that Member State during this period.181 It should also be noted that 
the recent case law concerning persons who move into another Member State 
without the intention to work, cannot be applied to the present situation.182 The 
draft amendment concerns migrant workers, which means persons who intend 
to accomplish a gainful activity and therefore contribute to the national 
economy of the receiving Member State. This is an important factor proving 
integration. In the case mentioned above it was completely absent; the 
applicants did not have any economic activity, nor did they look for such an 
activity.183 
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The waiting period might be desired by some Member States, especially by 
Member States with a high level of EU immigration. The mandate (p. 2) 
mentions the financial burden put on the shoulders of those Member States 
and hence refers to another important principle of the EU. The Treaties indeed 
contain several provisions which refer to economic difficulties the Member 
States have to face. Beside rules concerning the economic and social cohesion 
(Article 162 and 174 TFEU), competition rules184 and the chapter concerning 
the Monetary Union (Article 140 TFEU) take into account the financial and 
economic power of the Member States. All Member States of the Eurozone 
have to guarantee financial stability and must not overload their budget. 
Therefore, it is plausible to defend that solidarity and the limits inherent to the 
latter require a measure such as Option 2. But the proposal then raises the 
question how to cover the person during the qualifying period and which 
Member State should reasonably have the financial burden (see 2 below). 
This also answers the question if Option 2 could be justified by the 
simplification argument (p. 2 of the mandate). We do not think so. If the aim is 
to adopt simple coordination rules, the legislature should choose a system in 
which the worker is clearly subject to the law of one Member State. Option 2, 
however, requires the adoption of additional rules about access to benefits 
during the waiting period (see 2 hereafter: a paragraph added to Article 61 of 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 provides exportation of unemployment benefits 
from the previous Member State). The system does not become easier this 
way. Moreover, by abandoning the one-day rule, the draft introduces the 
necessity to calculate terms and periods. Such calculations do not promise any 
simplification. 
A last reason mentioned is to ensure uniform application of the rules on 
aggregation of periods by all Member States (p. 2 of the mandate). This aim, 
however, can already be attained by a correct application of the existing law. 
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The mapping, which is attached to this report shows that most of the 
questioned Member States apply the one-day rule (e.g. Germany, the 
Netherlands). If other Member States might not do so, they would deviate 
from a uniform rule and therefore violate EU law. 
1.5 Intermediate result 
Option 2 is not, as such, compatible with Articles 45 and 48 TFEU. By 
deviating from the aggregation principle it does the opposite of what is 
prescribed in Article 48 TFEU. It allows Member States to refuse 
unemployment benefits if the person concerned has less than three months (or 
one month) of a working period under domestic law. The motivating reasons 
are not solid enough to justify the restriction entailed. Even if the rule were 
qualified valid, a person could claim aggregation directly on the ground of 
Article 45 TFEU.185 The provisions would also have to be interpreted 
restrictively186 and in the light of this Article.187 The additional rules proposed 
hereafter (see 2) take into account this aspect. 
An amendment of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 which introduces a waiting 
period must guarantee that the free movement of workers would not be 
restricted. Therefore, the following part outlines additional provisions in order 
to enhance Option 2 (see 2). The proposal contains rules about the protection 
the migrant worker gets during his or her waiting period. Those rules indicate 
the Member State competent to pay benefits. The new system should also be 
proportionate (Article 5(4) TFEU). Introducing a waiting period might be 
considered as such since it does not totally exclude aggregation but provides a 
temporary limitation; a waiting period of one month rather than three months 
might suffice (for more details see the draft provision in the following part of 
this report, 2). 
                                                 
185
 Judgment in Vougioukas EU:C:1995:394, paragraph 36 and 44. 
186
 Judgment in Jauch, C-215/99, EU:C:2001:139. 
187
 Judgment in Elsen EU:C:2000:647. 
 196 
 
2 Evaluation of Option 2 
2.1 Which Member State could be competent to aggregate if the minimum period in 
the last Member State of employment is not fulfilled? 
There can be no doubt that currently the focus of the rules to coordinate 
unemployment benefits lies predominantly on the migrant workers¶ LQWHUHVWV, 
providing the most favourite conditions for finding new employment. The 
financial concerns of the institutions are being taken into account to a much 
lesser extent. At least this is the case while the unemployed person is available 
to the employment services of the State that pays the benefits. The proposals 
by the EC in Option 2 would shift the focus significantly to the institutions¶ 
interests by ensuring that the financial burden for paying unemployment 
benefits does not arise in situations where mobile EU workers have not yet 
made a significant contribution to the scheme of the new Member State. 
However, this would only be the case with regard to certain groups of migrant 
workers, while the coordination provisions for migrant workers falling under 
Article 65 would remain unchanged, unless wider amendments to Regulation 
(EC) No 883/2004 are implemented. 
Option 2 would mean that migrant workers would not be entitled to benefits in 
the last Member State of employment if aggregation with periods concluded in 
other Member States would be necessary in order to fulfil the waiting period 
of this Member State. As shown in the mapping at the end of this report, this 
would concern 7,188 persons in only six selected Member States in a period of 
one year (2013, respectively 2014). If the Regulation were not to provide for 
another Member State to apply aggregation in such cases, this would lead to 
the situation that the migrant workers concerned would be entitled to benefits 
in no Member State at all, unless entitlement would be opened purely under 
the national legislation of a Member State. This would undoubtedly form an 
obstacle to the free movement of workers and ± as shown above ± would most 
probably be incompatible with the Treaty. 
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We therefore hold the view that a different Member State would have to 
substitute the last State of employment and apply the aggregation rule under 
Article 61 if the minimum threshold is not fulfilled. It would be most likely a 
violation of primary law to stipulate that periods completed by the person 
concerned would be aggregated in no Member State at all. Which institution 
could be obliged to apply the aggregation provision and pay the 
unemployment benefit instead of the last Member State of employment if the 
minimum period of insurance or (self-)employment was not completed in the 
competent Member State? 
2.1.1 The second to last Member State of employment without requiring any 
minimum period of insurance or (self-)employment in this State 
Example: A worker resides and works in Member State A for five years. 
Afterwards he or she works in Member State B for three weeks. Then he or she 
moves his or her residence to Member State C and takes up employment there, 
but is dismissed after only two weeks. 
Referring to the second to last Member State of employment without any 
condition for the person concerned of having completed there the same 
minimum period of one or three months would be unreasonable. If the 
institutions¶ interests are relevant, why should the second to last Member State 
be less protected against claims of persons with only short careers than the last 
Member State? 
2.1.2 The Member State of employment where the minimum period of one or three 
months of insurance or (self-)employment was lastly fulfilled 
Example: A worker resides and works in Member State A for five years. 
Afterwards he or she works in Member State B for three weeks. Then he or she 
moves his or her residence to Member State C and takes up employment there 
but is dismissed after only two weeks. The unemployed person must make him 
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or herself available to the employment services of Member State A, the 
institution of which provides the benefits. 
This option would pursue the objective to make a Member State pay the 
benefits where the unemployed had completed periods for a relevant time 
span. However, this could lead to situations where it would be quite difficult 
for the unemployed person to register as a person seeking work with the 
employment services of that Member State; to be subject to the control 
procedure organised there; and to adhere to the conditions laid down under the 
legislation of that Member State. As the CJEU pointed out, ³the circumstances 
which must exist for the condition as to availability to be satisfied cannot have 
the direct or indirect effect of requiring the person concerned to change his 
[or her] residence.´188 Particularly in cases where the person concerned has 
moved his or her place of residence to the last Member State of employment, 
further amendments to the Regulation would be required to avoid impairments 
of the XQHPSOR\HG SHUVRQ¶V situation that would raise huge legal concerns 
with regard to violation of the Treaty. 
What further amendments could be necessary will be analysed under 2.2.3 (see 
2.2.3).  
2.1.3 The Member State of residence 
This option can only apply to persons falling under Article 65 of Regulation 
(EC) No 883/2004 who in principle have the right to make themselves 
available in the Member State of last employment. It would be the most 
reasonable solution for this group of persons, as the Regulation is built on the 
assumption that the Member State of residence provides the most favourable 
conditions for finding new employment and because this is the alternative 
offered to them already under the current legal framework. 
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2.1.4 The previous State of residence 
This option could apply to workers who worked and resided in the same 
Member State when they became unemployed, but have fallen under Article 
65 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 before. 
Example: A worker resides in Member A and works as a frontier worker in 
Member State B for five years. He or she terminates his or her employment in 
Member State B and moves his or her residence to Member State C. He or she 
is employed there for only three weeks and is then dismissed by his or her 
employer. 
As the minimum insurance period in Member State C is not fulfilled, this 
Member State is not competent to apply the aggregation provision and provide 
benefits. At first sight it would appear reasonable to impose this obligation on 
Member State B instead, because this is the second to last Member State of 
employment and the worker has paid contributions for five years to the 
scheme of that State. However, at that time he or she was a frontier worker. If 
he or she would have become unemployed while residing in Member State A, 
his or her Member State of residence would have provided the benefits and 
Member State B would have provided reimbursement under Article 65(6) 
only. It seems doubtful whether the obligation to provide benefits can be 
imposed on Member State B now. It would seem more in line with the current 
structure of the Regulation that the previous Member State of residence A had 
to substitute the last Member State of employment C. If so, then the second to 
last Member State of employment B would have to provide reimbursement to 
Member State C under Article 65(6). 
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2.2 Identification and assessment of how the proposed options and sub-options 
presented by the EC would respond to certain criteria (social, economic and 
political pros and cons) 
2.2.1 Clarification 
$V SRLQWHG RXW LQ WKH PDQGDWH RQO\ ³most Member States apply the 
µDJJUHJDWLRQUXOH¶DIWHURQHGD\RILQVXUDQFH´,WIROORZVWKDWVRPH0HPEHU
States interpret Article 61(2) in a way that also longer periods can be required 
in order to trigger aggregation if this finds a reasoning in the national 
legislation applied. 
7KHSURYLVLRQ LQ LWV FXUUHQWYHUVLRQ VSHDNVDERXW ³SHULRGV´RI LQVXUDQFHDQG
(self-)employment, terms that can be considered not fully clear and subject to 
GLIIHUHQWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVLILQQDWLRQDOOHJLVODWLRQD³SHULRG´LVDORQJHUSHULRG
than one day (e.g. one week). Against this backdrop the legal situation could 
be clarified by explicitly stipulating in Article 61(2) that one or three months 
of insurance or (self-)employment are required in the last Member State of 
employment in order to impose on this State the obligation to apply the 
aggregation provision. 
However, the same clarity could be achieved by amending Article 61(2) 
without changing its substance. What should be relevant is the political 
intention of the legislature to apply a minimum threshold of one day, of 30 
days or of 90 days. If the intention is clear it is up to the legal technique of the 
legislature to reflect this in a proper wording. Also the Administrative 
Commission could make this clarification in a decision, as proposed for 
Option 1, notwithstanding the non-binding effect of such decisions. The aim of 
clarity alone cannot justify substantial amendments that significantly change 
the legal position of large groups of migrant workers to their detriment. 
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2.2.2 Simplification 
Providing for a minimum threshold of one or three months instead of one day 
in order to apply aggregation under Article 61 of the Regulation would be 
neutral under the aspect of simplification when focusing on Article 61 only.  
However, we have shown that inserting a minimum threshold into the 
aggregation provision would most likely require extensive amendments of 
other provisions as well, particularly of Article 64, 65 and 65a. Also the 
procedures would be more complicated by involving at least one more 
Member States that would have to substitute the obligations of the last 
Member State of employment. 
We come to the conclusion that neither the Regulation nor the procedures 
would be simpler if Sub-options 2a or 2b were implemented. 
2.2.3 Protection of rights 
Within the current legal framework the one-day rule in the aggregation 
provision under Article 61(2) applies to unemployed persons who make 
themselves available in the Member State of last employment, i.e. to persons 
who during their last employment resided in the competent Member State and 
to persons other than frontier workers who fall under Article 65 and make 
themselves available in the competent Member State. By introducing a 
minimum threshold of one or three months for applying aggregation under 
Article 61, a significant number of persons would not be entitled to benefits in 
the last Member State of employment and thus lose a right which is currently 
awarded to them.  
This loss of right in the last Member State of employment could be mitigated 
by awarding a new right in another Member State. As regards persons other 
than frontier workers who fall under Article 65 it was proposed that they 
should be referred to their Member State of residence when not fulfilling the 
 202 
 
quo this would be a clear loss of rights as these persons would lose their right 
of option. Nevertheless, this loss of right would seem to be acceptable as the 
right of option is a privilege within Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and 
imposing on them the obligation to make themselves available in their 
Member State of residence complies with the general rule for frontier workers. 
For unemployed persons other than frontier workers several alternative models 
were discussed under point 2.1. Requiring a minimum period of insurance or 
(self-)employment in their Member State of last employment which is also 
their Member State of residence would deprive these persons of their right to 
make themselves primarily available to the employment services in this State 
(which is both their Member State of last employment and their Member State 
of residence). This would be a clear change of concept of Chapter 6 because 
currently another Member State only comes into play when the export rule 
under Article 64 applies. 
The obligation to make oneself available in a third Member State, be it a 
previous Member State of employment or the (previous) Member State of 
residence, can be to the detriment of the unemployed person, as in many 
circumstances this obligation cannot be fulfilled without transferring the place 
of residence or habitual stay to this Member State. 
Example: A mother resides and works in Member State A for two years. She 
moves her residence with her family to Member State B, her State of origin, 
and takes up employment there but is dismissed by her employer after only 
three weeks. If Member State A, as second to last State of employment, is 
competent for the person she can either make use of an amended export 
provision (see below) and receive benefits for up to three (six) months, or she 
would have to go back to Member State A and reside or habitually stay there 
again by perhaps leaving her family behind. 
Implementing Sub-options 2a and 2b would raise significant concerns with 
regard to the protection of rights of the unemployed and to their legal 
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certainty, if no additional amendments to the Regulation would be 
implemented. 
Adopting provisions that the last Member State of employment is not 
competent and substituted by another Member State, if a minimum period of 
insurance or (self-)employment was not completed, could put unemployed 
persons in a difficult or maybe even desperate position if no accompanying 
amendments to the Regulation were implemented. In many cases going back 
to a previous State of employment or residence will be incompatible with the 
current life situation and the personal goals of the person concerned. As 
pointed out, the CJEU has held that the circumstances which must exist for the 
condition as to availability to be satisfied cannot have the direct or indirect 
effect of requiring the person concerned to change his or her residence.189 It 
follows that certain accompanying amendments would be absolutely necessary 
to avoid violations of the freedom of movement of workers. 
The situation could be mitigated if the person concerned was enabled to seek 
work in his or her Member State of residence while receiving benefits in cash 
from the competent Member State under Article 64 of the Regulation. 
However Article 64 stipulates quite harsh conditions and limits to allow an 
unemployed person to seek work in a Member State that is not competent 
while retaining entitlement to unemployment benefits. Particularly it requires 
that before his or her departure, the unemployed person must have registered 
as a person seeking work with the employment services of the competent 
Member State and have remained available there for at least four weeks after 
becoming unemployed. 
First of all the unemployed person should not be forced to go back to the 
competent Member State to register with the employment services in that 
State. He or she should have the possibility to register with the employment 
services of the Member State of residence and submit a claim to benefits there, 
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being subject to the control procedure organised there, and adhere to the 
conditions laid down under the legislation of that Member State. The 
institution must forward the registration and claim to the institution of the 
competent Member State. The date of registration with the employment 
services in the Member State of residence must apply in the institution of the 
competent Member State. 
Secondly, the unemployed person must not be committed to being available to 
the employment services of the competent Member State for at least four 
weeks after becoming unemployed. This deviation from the general rule is 
already laid down in Article 65a(3) for former self-employed frontier workers 
who make themselves available in their Member State of residence only.190 
The situation of these persons is to a certain extent comparable with the 
situations discussed in this report. 
A minimum threshold to apply aggregation by the last Member State of 
employment and to determine a previous Member State as competent can 
create situations where the unemployed person cannot go to the competent 
Member State in order to seek work without completely changing his or her 
current life situation. We therefore suggest that the competent institution may 
extend the export period up to the end of the period of entitlement to benefits 
as already provided for under Article 65a(3), last sentence, or up to six months 
without discretion. It should even be discussed that the unemployed person is 
granted a right to that extension of the export period. 
2.2.4 Administrative burden and implementation arrangements 
Only implementing a minimum threshold of one or three months for applying 
aggregation would not create any additional burden or require new 
implementing arrangements. One could even say that the administrative 
burden for the institution in the last Member Sate of employment would be 
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reduced, because a significant number of applications for benefits could be 
rejected. 
However, as was shown, applying a threshold in the aggregation provision 
would not make the legal situation simpler if another Member State would 
have to take over the obligations of the last Member State of employment. 
This would necessitate the development of a new procedure which could cause 
administrative costs for the institutions involved to be higher than under the 
current legal framework. The Administrative Commission would have to 
develop new forms and SEDs. It goes without saying that identifying the 
competent Member States and handling all necessary formalities would 
require a quick procedure, as the unemployed person must know within hours 
or days the competent Member State. 
Example: After an amendment, Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 stipulates that a 
threshold of three months applies in Article 61(2) and imposes on the Member 
State where the minimum threshold of three months of insurance or (self-
)employment was lastly completed to take over the obligations of the last 
Member State of employment. A person works and resides in Member State A 
for three years. He or she moves his or her residence to Member State B and 
works there for two months. Then he or she moves his or her residence to 
Member State C and is dismissed after only two months of employment. 
Member State C knows that it is not obliged to apply aggregation and provide 
unemployment benefits. However, it cannot simply reject an application by the 
person concerned but must support him or her to find the competent Member 
State. In our example information exchanges between the unemployed person 
and Member State C and between Member States A, B and C seem to be 
necessary before the unemployed person can be definitely referred to the 
employment services of Member State A. 
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2.2.5 No risk of fraud and abuse 
Reducing the risk of fraud and abuse is one of the central tasks of applying a 
threshold for aggregating periods of insurance or (self-)employment. The 
WHUPV ³IUDXG DQG DEXVH´ must be restricted to cases of bogus employment 
only. 
Example 1: A worker resides and works in Member State A for two years. He 
or she is dismissed by this employer and moves his or her residence back to 
Member State B. The unemployment benefit paid by Member State A would be 
exported for three months only. In order to circumvent this limited period of 
entitlement, the unemployed person agrees with a friendly entrepreneur in 
Member State B to take up bogus employment and be dismissed after one 
week. 
Example 2: As above, but the worker takes up employment in Member State B 
without fraudulent agreement with the employer, but with the intention to 
terminate the employment by his or her own choice after only one week in 
order to receive unemployment benefits from Member State B. 
Within the current legal framework Member State B would have to pay 
unemployment benefits by aggregating periods completed in other Member 
States and as long as provided for by national legislation. If a minimum 
threshold would apply in Article 61(2) of the Regulation, Member State B 
would not apply aggregation and the unemployed person would probably fall 
under the competence of Member State A again if the legislature amended the 
Regulation accordingly. 
Cases of short-term employment without a bogus nature cannot be described 
as fraud and abuse. If in the example above the worker takes up normal 
employment and is dismissed after one week for whatever reason this would 
oblige the institution in the last Member State of employment to pay benefits 
to a person who had contributed to the scheme for a very short time only, but 
this is not a fraudulent or abusive situation. 
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Undoubtedly a threshold of one month or three months could reduce cases of 
fraud and abuse, as it would make it more difficult to create fraudulent and 
abusive situations for a longer period; a period of three months more than a 
period of one month.  
It is doubtful whether the changes would be significant. Why should the 
unemployed person and the employer in Example 1 not agree on bogus 
employment of one month or three months? Why should the unemployed 
person in Example 2 not terminate the employment by his or her own decision 
after one month or three months? 
It seems that the consequences of a threshold would be much bigger with 
regard to normal cases of short-term employment. This will be discussed 
under the next point. 
2.2.6 Potential financial implications 
Applying a threshold of one or three months in Article 61(2) would release the 
competent Member State from the obligation of providing benefits to 
unemployed persons after very short periods of employment. This would 
correspond to the financial interests of paying benefits only to persons who 
have contributed for a relevant period to the scheme concerned. It would have 
a positive impact on the finances of the last Member State of employment. It 
goes without saying that the positive financial impacts for the last Member 
State of employment would be much more significant when applying a three-
month threshold. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that ± when not 
abolishing the one-day-rule under the current legal framework ± in the longer 
term the competent Member State of last employment (usually the place of 
current residence) is likely to benefit from the jobseeker's future employment 
through future insurance contributions and associated contributions to the 
competent Member State¶V economy. Particularly in times of demographic 
changes any loss of human resources may be regrettable. 
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Furthermore, we have explained that the obligation to provide benefits of the 
last Member State of employment should be substituted by a different Member 
State. Therefore, the savings for the last Member State of employment by not 
paying benefits for persons who did not complete the minimum period of 
insurance or (self-)employment under its legislation could ± at least partly ± be 
compensated in other cases where it must take over payment obligations for 
persons where it was not the last Member State of employment but for 
example the second to last Member State of employment. 
Another financial concern could be that imposing on an unemployed person 
the obligation to make him or herself available to the employment services of 
a Member State other than the last Member State of employment could mean 
that this person must move his or her place of residence or habitual stay to 
another Member State in order to fulfil the requirements of the national 
legislation of that State. Of course a move of residence or stay gives rise to 
costs and it could be argued that the Member State where the unemployed 
person must make him or herself available would have to reimburse these 
costs, at least to a certain extent. 
However, if a one-month threshold is applied, it is questionable if this quite 
severe measure would be appropriate, given the many concerns and detriments 
for the unemployed persons, because the difference in periods of contributing 
to the unemployment scheme of the last Member State of employment would 
in most cases amount to only a few days or weeks. 
2.3 Alternative proposal 
In order to reduce the financial burden for the Member State of last 
employment where not at least one month or three months of insurance or 
(self-)employment were completed, a new reimbursement mechanism could be 
installed. Analogous to Article 65(6) to (8) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, 
the benefits provided by the institution of the place of last employment should 
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continue to be at its own expense. However, the competent institution of the 
Member State where the person concerned lastly completed at least one month 
or three months of insurance or (self-)employment should reimburse to the 
institution of the place of last employment the full amount of the benefits 
provided by the latter institution during the first three months. The amount of 
the reimbursement during this period may not be higher than the amount 
payable, in the case of unemployment, under the legislation of the debtor 
Member State. 
As elaborated above, introducing a minimum period of insurance or (self-
)employment for aggregation under Article 61 of the Regulation could impair 
the position of unemployed migrant workers to find new employment. To 
avoid this and at the same time take into account the just financial interests of 
the institutions, a new reimbursement mechanism could shift the financial 
burden at least partly to a Member State where relevant contributions have 
been paid, while safeguarding the right of unemployed persons as they are 
currently provided. This proposal follows the model of Article 65(6) to (8) of 
the Regulation, which is the method currently applied in Chapter 6 of the 
Regulation to reconcile the interests of both the unemployed persons and of 
the institutions. The obligation of the Member State of residence to provide 
benefits to frontier workers, although the Member State of last employment 
received the contributions, seems to be comparable with the obligation of the 
Member State of last employment to pay benefits to migrant workers after a 
very short period of employment. Why should the solution not be the same 
one? Problems of interpretation that were posed by Article 65 should be 
avoided. In particular it should be clarified, that reimbursement is only due if 
the person concerned was entitled to benefits in the debtor State.191 In 
principle a new reimbursement mechanism should follow the same criteria as 
applied in Article 65(6) to (8) in order to facilitate administration by the 
institutions. 
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2.4 Concerns about unequal treatment of workers within Chapter 6 of Regulation 
(EC) No 883/2004 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 currently builds on the assumption that the 
Member State of residence provides for the most favourite conditions to find 
new employment. Although this is explicitly laid down only for persons 
falling under Article 65(2), first sentence, it must be noted that other migrant 
workers not falling under Article 65, who must make themselves available in 
the competent Member State, by definition usually also reside in this State. 
The analysis of these basic principles of the Regulation reveals that the 
implementation of a minimum threshold to apply the aggregation rule under 
Article 61 of the Regulation could give rise to concerns as regards equal 
treatment of different groups of workers. As the one-day rule in Article 61(2) 
applies ³except in the cases referred to in Article 65(5)(a)´ WKLV PLQLPXP
threshold would not apply to workers falling under Article 65(2) of the 
Regulation. 
Example: Mr X and Mr Y both move their residence from Member State A to 
Member State B. Mr X works for an employer in Member State B. Mr Y works 
for an employer in Member State C and goes back to his home in Member 
State B every day. After two and a half months both workers are dismissed by 
their employers. Under the current legal framework both workers would be 
entitled to benefits in Member State B, because the competent institution in 
this Member State would take into account their periods of insurance or (self-
)employment completed in other Member States. If Option 2b were adopted, 
Mr X would not be entitled to benefits in Member State B because ± as he did 
not complete the minimum period of three months under the national 
legislation of this Member State ± the institution would not aggregate. Mr Y, 
however, would still be entitled to benefits in Member State B, because Mr Y 
falls under Article 65 of the Regulation and the institution in Member State B 
would take into account his periods completed in other Member States. Mr X 
would be denied aggregation although he has completed two and a half 
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months of insurance under the legislation of Member State B. Mr Y could rely 
on aggregation although he has completed no period in Member State B at all. 
Furthermore it must be noted that under Article 65(6) of Regulation (EC) No 
833/2004 the competent institution of the Member State to whose legislation 
the person concerned was last subject must reimburse to the institution of the 
place of residence the full amount of the benefits provided by the latter 
institution during the first three months after only one day of insurance in that 
State. 
The 2012 trESS Think Tank Report on the coordination of unemployment 
benefits192 proposed that the competence to provide unemployment benefits 
should be exclusively with the institutions of the State of last (self-
)employment. By introducing a minimum threshold to apply the aggregation 
principle under Article 61 of the Regulation this proposal could find new 
support, because equal treatment of frontier workers and non-frontier workers 
within the legal framework of the Regulation could be achieved. 
 
 
Clarifi-
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Rights Administr. 
burden 
Fraud and 
abuse 
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implications 
Option 2a/b + у - - + ? 
 
Option 3 
Option 3: instead of introducing a minimum period for aggregation, only the 
calculation of unemployment benefits changes: i.e. in case of short 
                                                 
192
 C. G. de Cortázar (ed.), E. Rentola (ed.), M. Fuchs & S. Klosse, trESS Think Tank Report 2012 µCoordination of unemployment 
benefits¶. 
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employment in the new Member State, the calculation will also be based on 
the salaries earned in the previous Member State(s). 
Sub-option 3a: the salary earned in the previous Member State is also 
taken into account for the calculation of the unemployment benefit by the 
competent Member State, if less than one month of insurance or (self-
)employment is completed. 
Sub-option 3b: the salary earned in the previous Member State is also 
taken into account for the calculation of the unemployment benefit by the 
competent Member State, if less than three months of insurance or (self-
)employment are completed. 
1 Unemployment benefits ± legislation in the Member States 
If we are to give answers to the questions under Option 3, we have to begin 
with a short analysis of how unemployment benefits are shaped and conceived 
in the Member States as far as calculation of benefits is concerned. From the 
legislation studied it clearly appears that unemployment benefits are conceived 
mainly as income replacement benefits. The unemployed person has lost his or 
her income which regularly is the basis for his or her living expenses. The 
unemployment benefit compensates the loss of this financial basis. To serve 
this purpose the unemployment benefit has to be shaped correspondingly. As a 
consequence, the manner in which the calculation of benefits is carried out is 
of the utmost importance. 
Apart from a system in which only a flat rate is paid, two conceptions are 
available. The first one takes into account the income earned at the moment 
when the employment relationship ended. In other words, the income received 
most recently is the most important factor of calculation which mainly 
determines the level of the unemployment benefit.193 
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 Other factors like the length of the employment relationship or the members of the family may play a role. 
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The second approach relies for the calculation of the benefit on income earned 
during a longer period which precedes the occurrence of unemployment 
(income earned during a reference period). 
The first approach is very rarely taken.194 Most other countries prefer reference 
periods, ranging from three months to twelve months, and in very few cases up 
to 24 months.195 
The first approach is to the advantage of the unemployed person if he or she 
had a higher income when he or she became unemployed compared to his or 
her income in the past. But, of course, if the reverse true, the method is to his 
or her disadvantage. To put it simple, the method builds on chance. 
The second approach, however, extends the account of earnings to a longer 
period and, as a consequence, the determination of the relevant income is done 
on a basis less dependent on chance. It strikes a balance between periods of 
low and high levels of income and creates an average income. 
Experience from some Member States shows that the second approach is 
mainly chosen. According to the mandate the amount of the unemployment 
benefit depends on average earnings gained during a certain preceding period 
(normally 12 months). 
2 Calculation of unemployment benefits under coordination law 
In principle, coordination of unemployment benefits has to serve the same 
purpose as does national legislation. But in contrast to what is needed in the 
national arena, coordination has to deal with the transnational dimension. 
Coordination has to offer solutions for the situation in which the unemployed 
person has earned income in different Member States. 
                                                 
194
 The Netherlands take the last daily wage into account. Belgium refers to the average salary earned in the last position. See 
European Commission, Paper on Automatic Stabilisers, Brussels, 04 October 2013, p. 36. 
195
 See European Commission, Paper on Automatic Stabilisers, Brussels, 04 October 2013, p. 36. 
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However, the main purpose of unemployment benefits, i.e. to secure the 
financial basis of the person concerned, is no different from what is required 
by national unemployment benefit schemes. To facilitate income replacement 
is therefore the main aim which Article 62 is indebted to.196 
Article 62 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 requires the calculation of benefits 
on the basis of the amount of the salary in the State of last employment 
(Article 62(1)). Article 62(2) requires the same mode of calculation if the 
legislation of a Member State provides for a reference period. A different rule 
applies for persons covered by Article 65(5)(a) of the Regulation. The 
institution of the place of residence takes into account the income received in 
the Member State of last activity. 
3 The perspective of Option 3 
3.1 Sub-options 3a and 3b 
Both sub-options derogate from what is now established in Article 62(1) and 
(2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, insofar as they require taking into 
account also salary earned in a previous Member State. This renders them 
similar to what applies for workers in the terms of Article 65(5)(a). In 
principle, Sub-options 3a and 3b are identical, but they differ in respect of the 
time span which renders the extension to salaries received in a previous 
Member State necessary. 
3.2 Assessment of Sub-options 3a and 3b 
According to point 5) of the mandate, the analytical report is required to 
identify how the proposed options and sub-options would respond to the 
                                                 
196
 This is also the conception of unemployment cash benefits by the consistent case law of the CJEU; see for example the judgment 
in Knoch, C-102/91, EU:C:1992:303, paragraph 44; the judgment in Meints, C-57/96, EU:C:1997:564, paragraph 27. 
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criteria specifically listed. In addition, XQGHU LWV KHDGLQJ ³&RQVLGHUHG
DPHQGPHQWV´ the mandate makes it very clear that basing the calculation of 
the amount of the unemployment benefit on very short periods of employment 
may lead to arbitrary results. Against this background the assessment of Sub-
option 3a and 3b will be made.  
3.2.1 Clarification/Simplification 
From the clarification and simplification point of view the envisaged 
amendment is not much different from the existing calculation rule. The new 
rule would not create many difficulties of interpretation. Besides the income 
earned in the competent State income received in the previous State has to be 
taken into account pursuant to the rules of the competent institution. This is an 
operation which for other cases is provided for in Article 5(a) of Regulation 
(EC) No 883/2004. For this reason, the amendment envisaged is clear and 
simple. 
3.2.2 Administrative burden and implementation arrangements 
1.15.3.1.1 Exchange of information 
The present mode of calculation in Article 62(1) of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 is simple and easy to apply from the administrative viewpoint. The 
competent institution can exclusively rely on the income earned in its country 
and the data are available. In contrast to this, calculation under the envisaged 
amendment has to be extended. Earnings received in the previous Member 
State have to be put into the calculation. To get the income data needed for 
calculation the competent institution has to address the institution of the 
previous Member State and information has to be forwarded from the latter to 
the former. 
As a consequence and compared to the administrative burden under the current 
law, a second administrative step has to be taken, which thus increases the 
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burden of the handling of cases. This additional activity is certainly a 
disadvantage of the amendment. However, the additional burden could be 
facilitated if use were made of the information channel which serves for cases 
for which Article 62(3) of the Regulation applies. To get the data about the 
income earned in the previous State, the implementing rule in Article 54(2) of 
Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 could be extended to the situation under the 
amendment. Another or additional way could be the use of current forms for 
aggregation of periods including the data on income. 
Apart from taking into account income earned in the previous Member State 
the competent institution applies its legislation. Particular rules existing in the 
previous Member State must not be applied. In particular ceilings provided for 
in the legislation of the previous Member State may not be taken into account 
by the competent institution.197 
1.15.3.1.2 Effects on the length of the awarding process 
A critical point of the amendment envisaged could be that it increases the 
length of the awarding of the benefit. Whether this would really be the case, is 
an open question, since the institutions are familiar with this situation, as it is 
identical or similar to what the calculation of the unemployment benefit 
requires from them in application of Article 62(3) of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004. But even if a certain delay occurred, the unemployment benefit 
could in favour of the claimant be awarded on a provisional basis according to 
what is laid down in Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. 
1.15.3.1.3 Implementing arrangements 
The realisation of the amendments under Options 3a and 3b would need a 
change of the wording in Article 61(1) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 in 
order to take into account income received in the previous Member State. The 
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 See the judgment in Grisvard and Kreitz EU:C:1992:368. 
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following sentence could be added to Article 61(1) ³,I LQVXUDQFH RU VHOI-
)employment completed in the competent Member State was less than one 
month/three months, salary earned in the previous Member State is also taken 
into account as if it had been earned in the competent Member State. 
It has already been said (see above ¶([FKDQJH RI LQIRUPDWLRQ¶) that an 
extension of the duty resulting from Article 54(2) of Regulation (EC) No 
987/2009 would be reasonable to conform with the requirements under the 
new mode of calculation. 
3.2.3 Protection of rights 
As every provision of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, the provisions in Chapter 
6, too, have to be guided by the wording, spirit and purpose of Article 48 
TFEU. In the Fellinger case, in which it had to be decided which income is 
relevant for frontier workers, the CJEU also made an important statement 
about the general rule in Article 68(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1408/71 (now 
Article 62(1) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004)198 and held that the previous 
wage or salary which normally constitutes the basis of calculation of 
unemployment benefits is the wage or salary received from the last 
employment of the worker. In such a manner unemployment benefits are 
regarded as not to impede the mobility of workers and to that end seek to 
ensure that the persons concerned receive benefits which take account as far as 
possible of the conditions of employment, and in particular of remuneration, 
which they enjoyed under the legislation of the Member State of last 
employment.199 
Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that the CJEU made a short hint at 
exceptional cases where the general rule alone was not fully appropriate. 
Obviously the CJEU referred to the then existing provision in Article 68(1), 
second sentence, of Regulation (EC) No 1408/71, which required that if the 
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 Judgment in Fellinger EU:C:1980:59, paragraph 7. 
199
 Judgment in Fellinger EU:C:1980:59, paragraph 7. 
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person concerned had been in his or her last employment in that territory for 
less than four weeks, the benefits had to be calculated on the basis of the 
normal wage or salary corresponding in the place where the unemployed 
person is residing or staying to an equivalent or similar employment to his or 
her last employment in the territory of another Member State. This provision 
was not taken up by Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, and we think with good 
reason, because its application was burdensome and lacked certainty of law. 
Nevertheless, this abrogated provision contains a grain of salt of sound reason 
which may be useful to take into consideration with regard to the amendment 
discussed here. It is a strong argument to say that the exclusive calculation on 
the basis of the income from the last (self-)employment is not quite adequate if 
the time of employment completed in the competent Member State is very 
short. Sub-option 3a expresses this line of thought. 
1.15.3.1.4 Advantages and disadvantages of the current calculation scheme 
The current scheme puts exclusive emphasis on the income earned in the 
Member State of (self-)employment. Income received elsewhere is irrelevant. 
This provision favours unemployed persons who earn a higher income in this 
Member State compared to that acquired in the previous State. And it 
disadvantages persons in an inverse income situation. As said above, Article 
62 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 makes the benefit level dependent on 
chance. 
This seems to be acceptable if the person concerned has completed a 
significant time in the Member State of (self-)employment. But is this solution 
acceptable if the period completed is very short, in the extreme case one day? 
The envisaged amendment seems to state it is not. To give an answer to this 
problem one has to check relevant criteria, whereby the yardstick is the 
protection of rights. 
1.15.3.1.5 Equality of treatment/indirect discrimination 
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In legal doctrine doubts have been cast upon the compatibility of Article 62(1) 
of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 with provisions on the free movement of 
workers in view of the disadvantage for a worker who moves from a high-
income country to a low-income country and becomes unemployed. 
Calculation of his or her unemployment benefit is done on her or his low 
wages in her or his country of employment. There are authors who criticise 
Article 62(1) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, saying that it is a wrong legal 
policy provision, but leaving it open to question whether the provision is a 
violation of Article 45 or 48 TFEU.200 Yet many an author goes a step further. 
With reference to the aforementioned situation (movement from a high-wage 
country to a low-wage country) the argument of indirect discrimination is 
formulated. An author in the leading Austrian commentary on social security 
coordination discusses just this situation characterised by low wages for a very 
short period in his or her Member State of last employment in contrast to a 
higher income in the previous State and concludes the following201 ³In this 
way the person concerned can be treated worse than a person who has 
completed his or her periods of insurance and as a consequence his or her 
income basis in one and the same country. Article 62 may consequently lead to 
an indirect discrimination of migrant workers.´202 
1.15.3.1.6 Justice and fairness 
Against the current provision in Article 62 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
we may also formulate doubts under the aspects of fairness and justice. It 
seems to be not quite fair or just if, in some cases, a person without having 
paid a reasonable amount of contributions and consequently being only 
weakly integrated203 into the unemployment scheme is treated on an equal 
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 6HHIRUWKLVRSLQLRQ5:DOWHUPDQQµ$UEHLWVORVLJNHLW¶LQEuropäisches Arbeits- und Sozialrecht 2, 9140, paragraph 25. 
201
 E. Felten, in B. Spiegel (ed.), Zwischenstaatliches Sozialversicherungsrecht, Manz, Wien, 2012, Article 62(1). 
202
 Translation by Maximilian Fuchs. 
203
 It has to be reminded that the CJEU in its consistent case law has held that with regard to unemployment benefits a real link of 
the person claiming the unemployment benefit and the labour market is an important element. See the judgments in 
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footing with other insured persons who have been living and working in this 
Member State for a longer time. 
As was shown above (see above, 1) national unemployment benefit systems 
usually provide for statutory reference periods. From this we may derive that it 
is widely held that a sound system of defining the level of unemployment 
benefits should take into account a longer stretch of time to guarantee a level 
of benefits which corresponds to and is in line with contributions to an 
unemployment benefit scheme. In this way the level of benefits is defined not 
dependent on a very short income situation which by chance may favour or 
disadvantage the unemployed person, but based on the preceding income 
situation which compensates for possible lows and highs of earnings. The 
current law is not in line with the ideas behind statutory reference periods in 
national legislation, since even with the existence of such reference periods 
there is a gap in logic between national legislation and the mode of calculation 
in Article 62 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, since Article 62(2) requires the 
application of the calculation scheme of 62(1). If the period of income earned 
in the Member State of last (self-)employment is very short, the aim which 
national statutory reference periods wish to achieve is impeded.  
Example: A worker W has worked in Member State B for five months, earning 
a monthly salary of ¼2,000. After that she takes up employment in Member 
State A where he or she draws a monthly salary of ¼3,000. After two weeks he 
or she becomes unemployed. The reference SHULRG LQ WKLV 0HPEHU 6WDWH¶V
legislation is six months. 
On the basis of the present rule in Article 62(1) and (2) of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 the reference period has to be respected, but the income to be used 
as calculation basis is exclusively that of the Member State A. In other words 
the reference period under national law loses its inherent logic, the logic 
                                                                                                                                               
'¶+RRS, C-224/98, EU:C:2002:432; Ioannidis, C-258/04, EU:C:2005:559; Vatsouras and Koupatantze, C-22/08, 
EU:C:2009:344. 
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requiring that income earned over a time span of six months has to be taken 
into account in order to establish a balanced and rational calculation basis. On 
the other hand, under the present law the momentary income at the time of 
becoming unemployed exclusively prevails. With good reason one can call 
this result, relying on the wording of the mandate, arbitrary. The 
dissatisfaction with this discrepancy between coordination law and domestic 
ODZFRXOGSRVVLEO\EHWKHUHDVRQZK\VRPH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶LQVWLWXWLRQVGRQRW
comply with Article 62 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. The competent 
institution in the case reported by the German expert (see below, µMapping¶) 
applied national rules for short-term (self-)employment against the clear 
wording of Article 62 of the Regulation. In addition, Article 62(1) could be a 
barrier to access to unemployment benefits. The calculation model reported for 
the Contribution-EDVHG -REVHHNHUV¶ $OORZDQFH LQ WKH 8. VHH below, 
µMapping¶) provides for a 26-week minimum limit for national insurance 
contributions which the claimant must have paid during a fixed period before 
the occurrence of unemployment in order to become entitled to the allowance. 
For the worker in the example above, leaving out income in Member State B 
seems to deprive him or her of the allowance. Against this background sub-
option 3a and to a higher degree Sub-option 3b further the protection of rights 
in a more balanced way than the present provision of Article 62 of Regulation 
(EC) No 883/2004. 
It cannot be denied that the new law could be to the detriment of those migrant 
workers who in their new employment receive a higher income compared to 
the income earned in the previous Member State. As a consequence the level 
of the unemployment benefit could be significantly lower. However, this is in 
line with the logic of the new mode of calculation: balancing the income 
fluctuations. Moreover, it is not against what is required by Article 45 and 
Article 48 TFEU. It is consistent case ODZRIWKH&-(8WKDW³Treaty rules on 
freedom of movement cannot guarantee to an insured person that a move to 
another Member State will be neutral as regards social security. In view of the 
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disparities existing between the schemes and legislation of the Member States 
in this field, such a move may, depending on the case, be more or less 
financially advantageous or disadvantageous for the person concerned.´204 To 
argue that a migrant worker having worked for a very short period in a 
Member State should be treated in the same way, if it is about calculation of 
benefits, as persons who have worked in this Member State for a longer period 
and have paid contributions to the unemployment benefit scheme 
correspondingly, is difficult to justify. 
3.2.4 No risk of fraud and abuse 
We have already discussed this topic above under Option 1 and 2. A few 
observations may be added. In some countries there is an ongoing discussion 
about fraud and abuse of social rights with regard to immigrants, in particular 
those from low-income countries. A less critical argument is called social or 
benefit tourism. On second thoughts the arguments do not hold water.205 Free 
movement of workers is an essential principle of market economies. The right 
to free movement realises what economists call efficient allocation of 
resources. This economic thinking was already present in the Spaak Report.206 
The Spaak Report envisaged, by means of eliminating obstacles to the free 
movement of factors of production, that labour movements were stimulated 
from Member States of low productivity to industrial regions and sectors 
where productivity and demand for labour were highest.207 Consequently, the 
EEC Treaty enshrined the freedom of movement of workers as a fundamental 
right. This fundamental right is secured by guaranteeing free access to 
employment and a ban on discrimination. This right is furthermore flanked by 
social security coordination, which extends freedom of movement and equal 
treatment to the arena of social security. 
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 See for this the recent judgment in Jeltes EU:C:2013:224, paragraph 44. 
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 &I0)XFKVµ)UHL]JLJHU6R]LDOWRXULVPXV"¶(2014) ZESAR, 103 et seq. 
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 &I62¶/HDU\µ)UHHPRYHPHQWRISHUVRQVDQGVHUYLFHV¶ LQ3&UDLJ	*'H%~UFDHG The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2011 (2nd edition), 499 (503). 
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Therefore, the exercise of these rights can never represent abuse or fraud. To 
speak about fraud and abuse is justified only for a quite different behaviour 
that takes place. For example, it is well known that a ± fortunately only very 
small ± portion of immigrants falsifies documents or violates their duties of 
information in order to become entitled to social security benefits from the 
host State. To prevent this or fight against this is an affair of criminal law and 
of the law enforcement authorities. It cannot be entrusted to coordination law. 
We think that from the angle of abuse and fraud the mode of calculation of 
benefits used under the regime of coordination presumably plays a minor part. 
But it should be remembered that in the economic theory on unemployment 
insurance the problem of moral hazard plays a role.208 Reference is made to 
the behaviour of unemployed persons who might be tempted to stay 
unemployed and receive the unemployment benefit instead of taking up a job 
even if the income is lower. As a consequence, it is requested that 
unemployment insurance is shaped in a way that avoids incentives which 
could contribute to such behaviour. 
Example: A person, after working in a low-wage country, has got a well-paid 
job in another Member State and becomes unemployed after less than a 
month. Although he or she could get a job in the former Member State, he or 
she is not inclined to take up employment there due to the high level of the 
unemployment benefit (compared to the salary to be expected) acquired after a 
very short time of employment and based on the exclusive relevance of income 
earned in this country of employment. 
The current law may favour to behave in this way.209 The envisaged 
amendment of the calculation model could possibly be a disincentive to prefer 
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 5&KHWW\µ0RUDOKD]DUGYVOLTXLGLW\DQGRSWLPDOXQHPSOR\PHQWLQVXUDQFH¶LQ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Journal of Political Economy, 116 (2), p. 
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 See for this argument also E. Felten, in B. Spiegel (ed.), Zwischenstaatliches Sozialversicherungsrecht, Manz, Wien, 2012, 
$UWLFOHZKRZULWHV WKDW$UWLFOHKDVHIIHFWV UHVWULFWLQJ IUHHGRPRIPRYHPHQW ³when persons, who despite 
menacing unemployment rather accept the loss of employment instead of taking up lower-paid employment in another 
EU country, in order to avoid a lower benefit level in the case of later unemployment´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unemployment to entrance into the labour market in a low-wage country, since 
the unemployment benefit would be significantly lower due to the taking into 
account of the former income in this country. 
3.2.5 Potential financial implications 
As far as financial implications are concerned the current law shows a clear 
tendency to put a financial burden on the Member State of (self-)employment. 
This risk allocation is totally justified as long as the competent institution has 
received a sufficient amount of contributions by the now unemployed person. 
But here again justification is doubtful if only a short time of employment has 
created the right to an unemployment benefit. 
If we assume migration from low to high-wage countries as the typical case, 
the latter are disadvantaged since they have to shoulder the expenses for 
unemployment benefits on the basis of their wage levels without getting 
corresponding contributions if the period of (self-)employment is short. 
Compared to this situation a one or three-month clause decreases this 
disparity, since wages earned prior to the employment in the competent 
Member State have to be taken into account. Certainly in cases of migration 
from a high-wage country to a low-wage country the inverse is the case. Apart 
from the fact that this is the statistically rarer situation in labour migration, we 
would value the protection of rights higher than the financial interests of the 
institutions affected. The reason is that the unemployed persons deserve the 
protection, since they have earned this protection through their contributions. 
We should not forget that critics of the amendments might use the financial 
argument with reference to the numerous immigrants who after a certain 
amount of time return to their country of origin. In this respect it has to be 
considered that the Member State of origin does not apply aggregation if 
claims are made, since Article 61(2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
precludes it. And, obviously the institution of the Member State of origin 
benefits from the one-month/three-month rule. 
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The mandate requires answers to how the envisaged amendments under 
Option 3 respond to the specified criteria. Therefore, the foregoing analysis 
laid emphasis on elaborating the cons and pros which can be identified vis-à-
vis the current law and its prospective changes, and its effects on the parties 
involved: the unemployed persons and the institutions which administer the 
award of unemployment benefits. However, persons not unemployed but in 
work and financing the benefits must not be forgotten. National 
unemployment schemes need to be shaped in a way that they obey sound 
economic requirements. A balance has to be found between the interests which 
result from the need of protection, the economic use of financial resources and 
a smooth administrative operation. Since secondary law has to be in 
accordance with primary law, questions of compatibility with Article 48 TFEU 
had to be raised.  
Is a change of the current law recommendable? It depends. It depends on the 
preferences of the reader, observer and, needless to say, of the decision-
making bodies. It is quite possible that who studies the presentation of the 
cons and pros is in favour of the status quo as laid down in Article 62 of 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. Its simplicity and its easy administration may 
convince him or her, putting less weight on aspects of fairness and justice or 
compatibility problems. Then again other experts may consider administrative 
problems to be rather easily solved, thinking that the increase in administrative 
burden is slight and the experience with the same administrative practice 
which applies for frontier workers will help to manage the handling of cases. 
They might see clear advantages with regard to the protection of the 
unemployed and a better realisation of the aims, which are inherent to national 
unemployment benefit schemes, on the coordination level. It has to be 
reminded that the mandate formulates as one of the objectives to ensure that 
the financial burden for paying unemployment benefits does not arise in 
situations where mobile EU workers have not yet made a significant 
contribution to the scheme of the new Member State. As was shown above, the 
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present law does not live up to this aim in cases of migration from low to high 
income countries if the person concerned becomes unemployed after a very 
short time of (self-)employment. Moreover, Article 62(1) of Regulation (EC) 
No 883/2004 requires to exclusively base the calculation on the income of the 
Member State of last employment, even when the income period is very short, 
in the extreme event only one day. It follows that the risk of what the mandate 
describes as arbitrary results when the calculation of the amount of the benefit 
is based on very short periods of employment, can materialise. Further 
weighing strategies could be continued. 
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Conclusion 
In our report we have outlined the pros and cons with regard to Options 1, 2 
and 3 as they were formulated and explained in the mandate. The Executive 
Summary contains an abridgment of the arguments we considered decisive for 
the assessment of the different options. 
In a nutshell, the report can be summarised as follows: 
To decide in favour of Option 1 would mean the preservation of the legal 
status quo as it is laid down in Article 61(1) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
For a number of reasons, the mandatory uniform application of Article 61 of 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 in the Member States is not achieved. Several 
disadvantages may be stated of the present legal situation (weak integration of 
the unemployed person into the labour market of the new Member State, the 
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financial burden for this State for lack of significant contributions to its 
unemployment benefit scheme) due to the fact that even a one-day 
employment is sufficient to enjoy the benefits with application of the 
aggregation principle. On the other hand, Article 61 of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 is easy to apply and offers legal certainty and in particular 
substantially protects the rights of unemployed persons. And, for the increased 
financial burden of the State of last employment a remedy could be the 
introduction of a reimbursement scheme whereby the one contained in Article 
65 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 could serve as a template. 
Option 2 contains the introduction of a qualifying period (one month/three 
months) the completion of which is necessary for the application of the 
principle of aggregation. With a view to Article 48 and Article 45 TFEU and 
the corresponding case law of the CJEU, serious doubts may be cast on the 
solutions proposed under Option 2. As a consequence, to avoid the risk of 
violation of primary law, protection of the unemployed persons has to be 
secured through the substitution of the State of last employment by a different 
Member State. Our analysis shows that all solutions for the definition of the 
³ULJKW´ 6WDWH KDYH VLJQLILFDQW GUDZEDFNV 7KH DVVHVVPHQW RI 2SWLRQ  SXWV
emphasis on the disadvantages with regard to nearly all the criteria which the 
mandate considers as relevant. The release of the financial burden of the 
Member State of last employment, the most important advantage resulting 
from Option 2, could be realised on another route which would at the same 
time avoid the disadvantages mentioned before. A reimbursement scheme as 
proposed above could offer the necessary compensation. 
In cases of short employment in the new Member State, instead of a minimum 
period for aggregation, Option 3 wishes calculation to also be based on the 
salaries earned in the previous Member State(s). Its simple application and 
administration speaks in favour of the present calculation model in Article 62 
of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, since there is no need to seek information 
about the income in the previous State. The main dilemma of the present 
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calculation scheme is the fact that it is based on chance. It is in favour of 
migrant workers coming from low-wage to high-wage employment and is to 
the detriment in the inverse case. The financial burden of the Member States 
concerned increases or decreases correspondingly. The balancing effect which 
is achieved in most Member States which provide for reference periods is not 
achieved at the coordination level. Therefore, in legal doctrine many an author 
considers Article 62 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 as wrong legal policy 
and it is argued that indirect discrimination in terms of free movement of 
workers may take place. The mandate, especially the objective described under 
(2), intends that the financial burden to pay unemployment benefits does not 
arise in situations where mobile EU workers have not yet made a significant 
contribution to the unemployment scheme of the new Member State. Under 
the present law, this aim is hard to achieve in many cases. 
Mapping 
According to point 6 of the mandate a mapping has to be included of the 
specific impact of the proposed amendments in eight to ten Member States 
with the highest number/share of EU emigrants and immigrants. Information 
was gathered from France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
In principle most of these Member States apply the one-day rule. However, in 
France there is no specific national law or administrative circular which takes 
a SUHFLVH SRVLWLRQ RQ WKH ³RQH-GD\ UXOH´ &LUFXODU 8QpGLF -23 of 17 
DecembHURQO\SURYLGHVWKDW³the latest period of employed activity must 
have been completed in France´,QSUDFWLFHFHQWUDOVRFLDOVHFXULW\DXWKRULWLHV
as well as the French central unemployment institution (Unédic) consider that 
a literal interpretation of Article 61 should prevail. This means that 
aggregation may start after one day of work in France or even less (in some 
cases, aggregation has seemingly been implemented for migrants who had 
worked a few hours under a so-called µchèque emploi service¶, a simplified 
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system of salary payment). However, the French national expert pointed out 
that since no domestic rule expressly consolidates the one-day rule, local 
unemployment institutions may alternately decide that one day is not sufficient 
for the purpose of aggregation. A uniform application in France of the one-day 
rule is therefore not guaranteed. 
If the State of last employment is Greece, the competent institution, where the 
application is submitted, is obliged to take into consideration the periods of 
insurance and employment completed in another Member State. However, 
according to the Greek national expert, a one-day insurance/employment 
period completed in Greece is often treated by the Greek institution as a 
deceitful/abusive action, targeting at the granting of the unemployment 
benefit. Thus, a period longer than one day, completed in Greece, is mostly 
required. However, while periods of very short work in a Member State can 
give rise to further examination by the institutions, we believe that the 
automatic assumption that most cases concerned are about deceitful or abusive 
action seems to be problematic and a thorough examination on a case-by-case 
basis is required. 
The United Kingdom works in qualifying weeks. So for example to meet the 
first contribution condition for Contribution-EDVHG -REVHHNHU¶V $OORZDQFH
(JSA(C)) a claimant must have paid, or have been treated as having paid, 
national insurance contributions for at least 26 (weeks) times the Lower 
Earnings Limit (LEL) for that tax year. The United Kingdom does not 
aggregate insurance from another Member State until the minimum period of 
insurance of one week in the United Kingdom has been completed, i.e. 
µregistered¶ on the system. 
Although we cannot provide data for Finland and Denmark, it should be 
noted that these two Member States have introduced a specific waiting period 
for the purpose of aggregating periods of unemployment insurance in their 
respective national legislations. 
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Section 9 of Chapter 5 of the Finnish Unemployment Security Act 
1290/2002 reads as follows (translation): 
³,QVXUDQFHDQGHPSOR\PHQWSHULRGVFRPSOHWHGLQDQRWKHU6WDWH    
If periods of insurance or employment completed in another State must be 
included in the previous employment requirement under a social security 
agreement concluded by Finland or the provisions of the Social Security 
Regulation or the Basic Regulation, these periods shall only be taken into 
account if the person concerned has pursued an activity as an employed 
person in Finland for at least four weeks or as a self-employed person for at 
OHDVWIRXUPRQWKVLPPHGLDWHO\EHIRUHEHFRPLQJXQHPSOR\HG´ 
§2 of the Danish Ordinance No 490 of 30 May 2012 on the Danish 
unemployment insurance provides that if a person who has not been a member 
of a Danish unemployment insurance fund within the last five years, but has 
been insured in another Member State, WKLV SHUVRQ¶V periods of insurance 
completed in another Member State will be taken into account only under the 
following conditions: 
Firstly, the person must apply in writing for membership of a Danish 
unemployment insurance fund within eight weeks after he or she ceased to be 
covered by the other Member State's unemployment insurance scheme. 
Secondly, within this eight-week period the person must have taken up 
employment or self-employment in Denmark.  
Thirdly, prior to unemployment the person must have worked continuously on 
a full-time basis, i.e. for at least 296 working hours in the past 12 weeks or 
three months, or, for partially employed persons, 148 working hours in the 
past 12 weeks or three months. In the case of self-employment, the equivalent 
condition is eight full weeks within a period of 12 weeks or three months prior 
to the unemployment.  
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It is a huge concern how migrant workers could cope with a situation where 
they are denied aggregation and benefits in the last Member State of 
employment if a threshold of one or three months was implemented. In 
Finland and Denmark this situation can already occur because of their national 
legislations. If relevant data were available, one could analyse how the persons 
concerned in these two Member States cope with the situation. 
As for the numbers of cases concerned France provided data for the year 
2014, the other Member States for 2013. Germany and Italy did not provide 
data. The Italian national expert explained that INPS is not able to detect in 
detail the required information, nor to give an estimate of such data, since 
there is currently no EU-wide system and information exchanges are still 
paper-based, not having implemented the Electronic Exchange of Social 
Security Information (EESSI) procedure. The difference in numbers between 
France and other Member States, particularly the United Kingdom, is 
remarkable. 
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Poland was also able to provide data of rejected claims in 2013: 1,062 
benefits faced 454 negative decisions. On the basis of up to one month 
insurance in Poland, 49 claims were rejected (115 benefits awarded); on the 
basis of more than one and less than three months of insurance in Poland, 113 
claims were rejected (265 benefits awarded). The data do not show the reasons 
for the rejections. 
The Department for Work and Pensions of the United Kingdom stated in a 
note accompanying the provided figures that these cases represent a small 
subset of job-seeking EEA migrants in the United Kingdom. In the same 
period around 90,000 JSA income-based (listed as a special non-contributory 
benefit in Regulation (EC) No 883/2004) claims were made by EEA migrants. 
In addition, 3,594 migrants used the Regulation to import their unemployment 
benefit into the United Kingdom. In isolation therefore the data provided does 
not serve to fully illustrate the United Kingdom¶V concerns with the social 
security coordination Regulations in this area or more widely. 
A particular interest was in the share of nationals of the Member State 
concerned who claimed unemployment benefits after very short periods of 
work in the last Member State of employment. There is the assumption that 
nationals of the receiving State could use the one-day rule when going back to 
their Member State of origin in order to circumvent the limited export period 
under Article 64 of the Regulation. Only one Member State could give precise 
data on the share of nationals in the figures above. In Romania factually all of 
the migrant workers concerned were Romanian citizens. In Poland the share is 
estimated to amount to 90%. As for Spain it was not possible to obtain a 
breakdown by nationality of the persons concerned and there is no information 
in order to make a reliable estimation of the percentage of Spanish nationals 
among them. However, the national expert pointed out that it is logical to think 
that the persons concerned probably have a strong link with Spain as far as 
they want to receive an unemployment benefit in Spain. It can be assumed that 
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they have information regarding the amount of these benefits and their length. 
Therefore, the expert believes that a significant percentage of them are 
expected to be Spanish nationals that want to come back to Spain after a 
period abroad. 
The German national experts reported a case which shows that the competent 
institution did not take into account income pursuant to Article 62 of 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, since the income received by the Belgian 
frontier worker in Germany was earned within less than 150 days. According 
to German law, in these cases a fictitious income forms the basis for 
calculation. The Landessozialgericht of the Land Nordrhein-Westfalen held 
that the arguments against the current law in Article 62 of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 cannot justify the non-application of Article 62 in view of the clear 
wording. The Bundessozialgericht confirmed the judgment (its reasons are not 
yet published). 
Bibliography 
1.16 Legislative documents 
1.16.1 EU legislation 
 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 
391-407. 
 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012 , p. 47-
390. 
 
 Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application 
of social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within 
the Community. 
 235 
 
 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems (Text with 
relevance for the EEA and for Switzerland). 
 Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 September 2009 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation 
(EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems (Text with 
relevance for the EEA and for Switzerland). 
1.16.2 European Commission 
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, Free movement of EU citizens and their families: Five actions to make 
a difference (COM (2013) 837 final). 
1.17 Case law 
1.17.1 Court of Justice of the European Union 
 Judgment in Singer, C-44/65, EU:C:1965:122. 
 Judgment in Kingdom of the Netherlands v Commission, C-28/66, EU:C:1968:5. 
 Judgment in Ugliola, C-15/69, EU:C:1969:46. 
 Judgment in Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf, C-166-73, EU:C:1974:3. 
 Judgment in Sotgiu, C-152/73, EU:C:1974:13. 
 Judgment in Van Duyn, C-41/74, EU:C:1974:133. 
 Judgment in Watson and Belmann, C-118/75, EU:C:1976:106. 
 Judgment in Frangiamore, C-126/77, EU:C:1978:64. 
 Judgment in Koninklijke Scholten-Honig NV and Others v Hoofdproduktschaap 
voor Akkerbouwprodukten, C-125/77, EU:C:1978:187. 
 Judgment in Fellinger, C-67/79, EU:C:1980:59. 
 Judgment in Testa, C-41/79, 121/79 and 796/79, EU:C:1980:163. 
 236 
 
 Judgment in Duphar, C-238/82, EU:C:1984:45. 
 Judgment in Razzouk v Commission, C-117/82, EU:C:1984:116. 
 Judgment in Pinna v Caisse d'allocations familiales de la Savoie, C-41/84, 
EU:C:1986:1. 
 Judgment in Heylens, C-222/86, EU:C:1987:442. 
 Judgment in Roviello, C-20/85, EU:C:1988:283. 
 Judgment in Schmitt, C-29/88, EU:C:1989:61. 
 Judgment in Warmerdam-Steggerda, C-388/87, EU:C:1989:196. 
 Judgment in Van Noorden, C-272/90, EU:C:1991:219. 
 Judgment in Gray v Adjudication Officer, C-62/91, EU:C:1992:177. 
 Judgment in Commission v Belgium, C-62/92, EU:C:1992:177. 
 judgment in Knoch, C-102/91, EU:C:1992:303. 
 Judgment in Grisvard and Kreitz, C-201/91, EU:C:1992:368 
 Judgment in Drake, C-12/93, EU:C:1994:336. 
 Judgment in Moscato, C-481/93, EU:C:1995:44. 
 Judgment in Vougioukas, C-443/93, EU:C:1995:394. 
 Judgment in Naruschawicus, C-308/94, EU:C:1996:28. 
 Judgment in Snares, C-20/96, EU:C:1997:518. 
 judgment in Meints, C-57/96, EU:C:1997:564. 
 Judgment in Terhoeve, C-18/95, EU:C:1999:22. 
 Judgment in Elsen, C-135/99, EU:C:2000:647. 
 Judgment in Jauch, C-215/99, EU:C:2001:139. 
 Judgment in Larsy, C-118/00, EU:C:2001:368. 
 Judgment in Khalil, C-95/99, EU:C:2001:532. 
 237 
 
 Judgment in Hervein and Others, C-393/99 and C-394/99, EU:C:2002:182. 
 Judgments in '¶+RRS, C-224/98, EU:C:2002:432. 
 Judgment in Adanez-Vega, C-372/02, EU:C:2004:705. 
 Judgment in Alonso, C-306/03, EU:C:2005:44. 
 Judgment in Ioannidis, C-258/04, EU:C:2005:559. 
 Judgment in Piatkowski, C-493/04, EU:C:2006:167. 
 Judgment in Watts, C-372/04, EU:C:2006:325. 
 Judgment in De Cuyper, C-406/04, EU:C:2006:491. 
 Judgment in Tas-Hagen, C-192/05, EU:C:2006:676. 
 Judgment in Chateignier, C-346/05, EU:C:2006:711. 
 Judgment in P - Lindorfer v Council, C-227/04, EU:C:2007:490. 
 Judgment in Klöppel, C-507/06, EU:C:2008:110. 
 Judgment in Petersen, C-228/07, EU:C:2008:494. 
 Judgment in Vatsouras and Koupatantze, C-22/08, EU:C:2009:344. 
 Judgment in van Delft and Others, C-345/09, EU:C:2011:57. 
 Judgment in da Silva Martins, C-388/09, EU:C:2011:439. 
 Judgment in Stewart, C-503/09, EU:C:2011:500. 
 Judgment in Salgado Gonzalez, C-282/11, EU:C:2013:86. 
 Judgment in Jeltes, C-443/13, EU:C:2013:224. 
 Judgment in Mulders, C-548/11, EU:C:2013:249. 
 Judgment in Dano, C-333/13, EU:C:2014:2358. 
 
 Opinion of the Court 1/91, EU:C:1991:490. 
 Opinion of the Advocate General in Gray, C-62/91, EU:C:1992:18. 
 238 
 
1.18 Legal literature 
 BECKER, U., in SCHWARZE, J. (ed.), EU-Kommentar, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 
2012 (3rd edition). 
 BIEBER, R. & MAIANI, F., Précis de droit européen, Bern, 2011 (2nd edition), 
p. 191. 
 &+(77< 5 µ0RUDO KD]DUG YV OLTXLGLW\ DQG RSWLPDO XQHPSOR\PHQW
LQVXUDQFH¶Journal of Political Economy 116 (2). 
 &251(/,66(1 5 µ7KH QHZ (8 &RRUGLQDWLRQ 6\VWHP IRU :RUNHUV ZKR
%HFRPH8QHPSOR\HG¶European Journal of Social Security. 
 &251(/,66(15µ\HDUVRI(XURSHDQVRFLDOVHFXULW\FRRUGLQDWLRQ¶(2009) 
European Journal of Social Security 9 (15). 
 DE CORTÁZAR, C. G., (ed.), RENTOLA, E. (ed.), FUCHS, M. & KLOSSE, 
6WU(667KLQN7DQN5HSRUWµ&RRUGLQDWLRQRIXQHPSOR\PHQWEHQHILWV¶ 
 EICHENHOFER, E., Sozialrecht der Europäischen Union, Beck, Munich, 2013 
(5th edition). 
 (XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ µ3DSHU RQ $XWRPDWLF 6WDELOLVHUV¶ %UXVVHOV  2FWREHU
2013. 
 FELTEN, E., in SPIEGEL, B. (ed.), Zwischenstaatliches 
Sozialversicherungsrecht, Manz, Wien, 2012. 
 FUCHS, M., Introduction, in FUCHS, M., (ed.), Europäisches Sozialrecht, 
Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2013 (6th edition). 
 )8&+60µ)UHL]JLJHU6R]LDOWRXULVPXV"¶Zeitschrift für europäisches 
Sozial- und Arbeitsrecht. 
 GUASTAVINO, N. (ed.), BASURKO, F. & BOTO, M., Lecciones de derecho 
social de la Unión Europea, Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, 2012, p. 208. 
 LANGER, R., in FUCHS, M. (ed.), Europäisches Sozialrecht, Nomos, Baden-
Baden, 2013 (6th edition). 
 239 
 
 MAVRIDIS, P., La VpFXULWp VRFLDOH j OµpSUHXYH GH O¶LQWpJUDWLRQ HXURSpHQQH, 
Bruylant, Brussels, 2003. 
 2¶/($5<6 µ)UHHPRYHPHQWRISHUVRQVDQGVHUYLFHV¶ LQ&5$,*3	'(
BÚRCA, G. (ed.), The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2011 (2nd edition). 
 PENNINGS, F., European social security law, Intersentia, Antwerp, 2010 (5th 
edition). 
 µ5DSSRUW GHV &KHIV GH 'pOpJDWLRQ DX 0LQLVWUH GHV $IIDLUHV eWUDQJqUHV¶ 
[7KHµ6SDDNUHSRUW¶] 
 RÖNSBERG, U., Die gemeinschaftsrechtliche Koordinierung von Leistungen 
bei Arbeitslosigkeit, Centaurus, Herbolzheim, 2006. 
 SPIEGEL, B., in SPIEGEL, B. (ed.), Zwischenstaatliches 
Sozialversicherungsrecht, Manz-Verlag, Vienna, 2012. 
 VAN RAEPENBUSCH, S., La sécurité sociale des personnes qui circulent à 
O¶LQWpULHXU GH OD &RPPXQDXWp Économique Européenne, Story Scientia, 
Brussels, 1991, p. 198. 
 :$/7(50$11 5 µ$UEHLWVORVLJNHLW¶ LQ  Europäisches Arbeits- und 
Sozialrecht 2, 9140. 
 WATSON, P., Social Security Law of the European Communities, Mansell 
Publ., London, 1980. 
1.18.1 Newspaper articles 
 &'XVWPDQ	7)UDWWLQL µ<HV(8 LPPLJUDQWVGRKDYH DSRVLWLYH LPSDFW RQ
SXEOLFILQDQFHV¶The New Statesman, 5 November 2014. 
 
 
 
 
 240 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analytical Report 2015 
 
Assessment of the impact of amendments to the EU 
social security coordination rules to clarify its 
relationship with Directive 2004/38/EC as regards 
economically inactive persons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Report prepared under Contract No 
VC/2014/1011 - FreSsco  
June 2015 
 241 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Written by Prof Dr Jean-Philippe Lhernould (ed.), Prof Dr Eberhard Eichenhofer, 
Nicolas Rennuy, Dr Filip Van Overmeiren and Prof Dr Ferdinand Wollenschläger 
This report was prepared in the framework of Contract No VC/2014/1011 
³1HWZRUNRI([SHUWVRQLQWUD-EU mobility ± social security coordination and 
free movement of workers / Lot 1: Legal expertise in the field of social 
security coordination and free movemeQW RI ZRUNHUV´ 7KLV FRQWUDFW ZDV
 242 
 
awarded to FreSsco, a network of independent experts from 32 European 
countries coordinated by Ghent University.  
 
 
 
Authors: 
Prof Dr Jean-Philippe Lhernould, Professor of private law, University of 
Nantes. 
Prof Dr Eberhard Eichenhofer, Professor of social and civil Law, Friedrich-
Schiller Universität Jena. 
Nicolas Rennuy, PhD Fellow of the Research Foundation ± Flanders (FWO), 
Ghent University. 
Dr Filip Van Overmeiren, Researcher, Ghent University.  
Prof Dr Ferdinand Wollenschläger, Chair for Public Law, European Law and 
Public Economic Law, University of Augsburg. 
 
 
 
  
 243 
 
ANNEX VIII: FRESSCO REPORT: SPECIAL NON-
CONTRIBUTORY BENEFITS 
 
 
 
 
  
 244 
 
 
 
 
Suggested citation: 
LHERNOULD, J.-P. (ed.), EICHENHOFER, E., RENNUY, N., VAN 
OVERMEIREN, F. and WOLLENSCHLÄGER, F., Assessment of the impact 
of amendments to the EU social security coordination rules to clarify its 
relationship with Directive 2004/38/EC as regards economically inactive 
persons, Analytical Report 2015, FreSsco, European Commission, June 2015, 
71 p.  
 
Disclaimer: 
This document has been prepared for the European Commission. However, it 
reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held 
responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained 
therein.  
 
© European Union, 2015 
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 
  
 245 
 
Table of Contents 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................... 3 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 6 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................. 7 
1 LEGAL BACKGROUND .......................................................................................... 10 
1.1 Rules applicable before special non-contributory cash benefits 
(SNCBs) ........................................................................................................... 10 
1.2 The concept of SNCBs and the rationale of Regulation (EEC) No 
1247/92 ............................................................................................................ 11 
1.3 SNCBs regime: What would have EHHQ0U%UH\DQG0V'DQR¶VULJKWV
under the exclusive application of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004? ................ 12 
1.3.1 Regime ............................................................................................... 12 
1.3.2 0U %UH\ DQG 0V 'DQR¶V VWDWXV XQGHU 5HJXODWLRQ (& 1R
883/2004 ............................................................................................ 13 
1.4 The interplay between Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and Directive 
2004/38/EC: introductory elements ................................................................. 14 
2 OPTION 1: STATUS QUO: DIRECT APPLICATION OF THE CASE 
LAW .......................................................................................................................... 16 
2.1 Legal analysis of the proposal............................................................................. 16 
2.1.1 Background: the cases Brey and Dano .............................................. 16 
2.1.2 Access to SNCBs under EU law ........................................................ 19 
2.1.3 Conclusion ......................................................................................... 29 
2.2 Assessment of the proposal (pros/cons) .............................................................. 29 
2.2.1 Clarification ....................................................................................... 29 
2.2.2 Simplification .................................................................................... 30 
 246 
 
2.2.3 Protection of rights ............................................................................ 30 
2.2.4 Administrative burden and implementation arrangements ................ 31 
2.2.5 Avoiding the risk of fraud and abuse ................................................. 32 
2.2.6 Potential financial implications ......................................................... 33 
2.3 A mapping of the impact in the Member States ................................................. 33 
2.4 General evaluation of Option 1 ........................................................................... 34 
3 OPTION 2A: LIMITATION OF THE EQUAL TREATMENT PRINCIPLE 
SET OUT IN ARTICLE 4 BR FOR SPECIAL NON-CONTRIBUTORY 
CASH BENEFITS (SNCBS) .................................................................................... 36 
3.1 Legal analysis of the proposal............................................................................. 36 
3.1.1 Incorporation of Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC into 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 ........................................................... 36 
3.1.2 Possible legislative solutions ............................................................. 36 
3.2 Assessment of the proposal (pros/cons) .............................................................. 40 
3.2.1 Clarification ....................................................................................... 40 
3.2.2 Simplification .................................................................................... 40 
3.2.3 Protection of rights ............................................................................ 40 
3.2.4 Administrative burden and implementation arrangements ................ 40 
3.2.5 Avoiding the risk of fraud and abuse ................................................. 41 
3.2.6 Potential financial implications ......................................................... 41 
3.3 A mapping of the impact in the Member States ................................................. 41 
3.4 General evaluation of Option 2a ......................................................................... 41 
4 OPTION 2B: REMOVAL OF THE SPECIAL NON-CONTRIBUTORY 
CASH BENEFITS (SNCBS) FROM THE MATERIAL SCOPE OF 
REGULATION (EC) NO 883/2004 .......................................................................... 43 
 247 
 
4.1 Legal analysis of the proposal............................................................................. 43 
4.1.1 Introduction ....................................................................................... 43 
4.1.2 Towards a case-by-case assessment of the real link .......................... 44 
4.1.3 The principle of equal treatment (Article 4 BR) ................................ 46 
4.1.4 The principle of equal treatment of facts (Article 5 BR) ................... 47 
4.1.5 The principle of aggregation (Article 6 BR) ..................................... 48 
4.1.6 Agencies (Title IV BR) ...................................................................... 49 
4.1.7 Administrative cooperation (Title V BR) .......................................... 49 
4.1.8 The complete irrelevance of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004? ........... 50 
4.1.9 Overview ........................................................................................... 51 
4.2 Assessment of the proposal ................................................................................. 52 
4.2.1 Clarification ....................................................................................... 52 
4.2.2 Simplification .................................................................................... 52 
4.2.3 Protection of rights ............................................................................ 52 
4.2.4 Administrative burden and implementation arrangements ................ 53 
4.2.5 Avoiding the risk of fraud and abuse ................................................. 53 
4.2.6 Potential financial implications ......................................................... 54 
4.3 A mapping of the impact in the Member States ................................................. 54 
4.4 General evaluation of Option 2b ......................................................................... 55 
5 ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS .................................................................................... 56 
5.1 A µVWDWXVTXR¶IURPWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRI5HJXODWLRQ(&1R .............. 57 
5.2 Integrating proportionality in the current proposals ........................................... 58 
5.2.1 Status quo and proportionality ........................................................... 58 
5.2.2 Referring to Directive 2004/38/EC and proportionality .................... 58 
 248 
 
5.3 Safeguarding SNCB coordination from residence requirements in 
Directive 2004/38/EC ...................................................................................... 60 
5.4 IntrRGXFLQJ D µIUDXG DQG DEXVH RI ULJKWV¶ LQ 5HJXODWLRQ (& 1R
883/2004 .......................................................................................................... 61 
6 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 63 
6.1 General evaluation of the proposals .................................................................... 63 
6.2 Alternative/adapted proposals ............................................................................. 65 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................. 66 
Legislative documents ............................................................................................... 66 
EU legislation .................................................................................................. 66 
European Commission ..................................................................................... 67 
Administrative Commission ............................................................................ 67 
Case law ..................................................................................................................... 67 
Court of Justice of the European Union .......................................................... 67 
National case law ............................................................................................. 70 
Legal literature ........................................................................................................... 70 
 
  
 249 
 
Introduction 
Within the framework of the FreSsco project, the European Commission 
mandated an Ad Hoc Analytical Study Group of FreSsco experts to provide a 
legal analysis in order to assess the impact of possible amendments to the EU 
social security coordination rules which would clarify its relationship with 
Directive 2004/38/EC as regards economically inactive persons.  
Since the coming into force in 2010 of the modernised social security 
coordination Regulations, i.e. Regulations (EC) No 883/2004 (BR) and (EC) 
No 987/2009 (IR), there has been both political and legal debate about the 
rights of migrant EU citizens who are not economically active. Several 
Member States have raised concerns about the possible abuse of the right of 
free movement of workers. 
Against this backdrop, requests for preliminary rulings were submitted by 
national courts to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) aimed at 
interpreting current EU law, notably the relationship between Regulation (EC) 
No 883/2004 and Directive 2004/38/EC, with regard to access of inactive 
migrants to welfare benefits of the Member States. 
Following the two recent rulings in cases Brey210 and Dano,211 the CJEU 
clarified that in the case of economically inactive EU mobile citizens, the 
income-related special non-contributory cash benefits falling under the scope 
of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 are to be treated as social assistance within 
the meaning of Directive 2004/38/EC. This means that they do not need to be 
paid during the first three months of residence, and thereafter only if the 
recipient has a legal right of residence in the host Member State. 
In view of these judgments, the European Commission (EC) considers it may 
be necessary to amend the social security coordination rules, to take into 
                                                 
210
 Judgment in Brey, C-140/12, EU:C:2013:565. 
211
 Judgment in Dano, C-333/13, EU:C:2014:2358. 
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account the direction taken by the CJEU. The aim of the possible amendment 
is to ensure the uniform application of these judgments in the Member States 
and to provide more legal clarity for EU citizens, the Member States and their 
social security institutions. 
The FreSsco network was asked to perform a legal analysis of possible 
amendments of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 following judgments of the 
CJEU in the Brey and Dano cases. The objective of the report is thus to 
analyse the three possible amendments proposed by the EC:  
 Option 1: Status quo: direct application of the case law of the CJEU in Brey and 
Dano, allowing for derogations from the equal treatment principle as regards 
persons who do not have a legal right of residence, or have resided for less than 
three months in the host State. 
 Option 2: amendment of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 to take into account the 
case law of the CJEU. 
o Sub-option 2a: limitation of the equal treatment principle for income-
related special non-contributory cash benefits, under Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 by referring to the provisions of Directive 2004/38/EC. 
o Sub-option 2b: removal of the income-related special non-contributory 
cash benefits from the material scope of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
The equal treatment principle and other provisions from the Regulation 
no longer apply. 
Executive summary 
In the Brey and Dano rulings, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) clarified that in the case of economically inactive EU mobile citizens, 
the income-related special non-contributory cash benefits (SNCBs) falling 
under the scope of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 are to be treated as social 
assistance within the meaning of Directive 2004/38/EC (Residence Directive). 
As a consequence thereof, the FreSsco network was asked to perform a legal 
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analysis of possible amendments of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 following 
judgments of the CJEU in the Brey and Dano cases. The objective of the 
report is thus to analyse the three possible amendments proposed by the EC:  
 Option 1: Status quo: direct application of the case law of the CJEU in Brey and 
Dano, allowing for derogations from the equal treatment principle as regards 
persons who do not have a legal right of residence, or have resided for less than 
three months in the host State. 
 Option 2: amendment of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 to take into account the 
case law of the CJEU. 
o Sub-option 2a: limitation of the equal treatment principle for income-
related SNCBs, under Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 by referring to the 
provisions of Directive 2004/38/EC. 
o Sub-option 2b: removal of the income-related SNCBs from the material 
scope of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. The equal treatment principle 
and other provisions from the Regulation no longer apply. 
The purpose of the report is to identify and assess how the proposed options 
respond to the following criteria: 
- clarification;  
- simplification; 
- protection of rights; 
- administrative burden and implementation arrangements; 
- risk of fraud and abuse; 
- potential financial implications.   
The differences between the three proposed options appear to be narrow. 
Whereas Option 1 (legislative status quo) entails that access to social 
assistance is subject to a condition of legal residence in the host Member State 
such as defined by the recent case law of the CJEU, Option 2a aims at 
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reaching an equivalent effect with the transposition of the CJEU case law into 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (limitation of the principle of equality of 
treatment for SNCBs). Option 2b would have a broader impact: by deleting the 
FDWHJRU\RI61&%VµPL[HGEHQHILWV¶PD\QRORQJHUWDNHDGYDQWDJHRIDQ\RI
the coordination principles.   
The assessment of these three options takes into account the fact that it is still 
unclear how the Dano/Brey cases are to be interpreted. How will the CJEU 
analyse further claims to SNCBs by jobseekers, former workers, family 
PHPEHUVRUZRUNHUVZLWKORZLQFRPH"0D\WKHH[LVWHQFHRIDµJHQXLQHOLQN¶
between the claimant and the Member State where the claim is made support 
the right to social assistance and how would this link be assessed? How will 
WKHUHTXLUHPHQWRIµILQDQFLDOVROLGDULW\¶LPSDFWWKHDFFHVVWRVRFLDODVVLVWDQFH"
No response is available yet. 
Even if the objective of unifying the regime of social assistance for migrants 
into one single instrument could improve clarity and simplicity, the complex 
and unstable legal context makes it necessary to highlight the drawbacks of the 
European Commission proposals. The rapporteurs also kept in mind the 
objective to preserve the coherence of coordination rules and to protect the 
social rights of mobile citizens within the European Union. 
1. The deletion of SNCBs as a distinct legal category (Option 2b) would have 
consequences going far beyond the CJEU case law. It would raise the cost of 
administering SNCBs, decrease legal certainty and threaten the protection of 
the rights of migrants and hinder the fight against fraud, abuse and error. In 
particular, it will not answer the question of how to tUHDW 8QLRQ FLWL]HQV¶
entitlement to SNCBs in future cases, leaving these types of social benefits 
without any specific regulation somewhere between the rules of Directive 
2004/38/EC, Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and EU primary law. 
2. The limitation of the principle of equality of treatment for SNCBs (Option 
2a) would raise the delicate question how to concretely insert Article 24 of the 
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Residence Directive into the coordination regime. A thorough analysis shows 
that none of the sub-options envisaged for the insertion of Article 24 are 
satisfactory. The fact that the CJEU case law is not stable yet makes it even 
less reasonable to set rules aiming to limit the equal treatment principle for 
SNCBs. The amendment of the coordination Regulations would in any case 
undermine the historical compromise of Regulation (EEC) No 1247/92 on 
SNCBs. 
3. The proposal to retain the status quo (Option 1) would give the CJEU time 
to refine its case law. In this respect, this option could be a reasonable choice. 
1HYHUWKHOHVVLWDOVRKDVPDQ\GUDZEDFNV0HPEHU6WDWHV¶GLVFUHWLRQWRJUDQW
entitlement to SNCBs would be considerable, a situation which would be ill-
adapted for migrant situations. Some Member States could take advantage of 
this possibility to exclude non-active Union citizens from access to SNCBs. 
Many deprived migrants might find themselves without social assistance. 
There could be a flow of cases before courts concerning the interpretation in 
concrete cases of the Residence Directive (in connection with coordination 
rules) and of Treaty provisions. Without EU guidance, national welfare 
institutions may go through a period of turbulence. Option 1 is not supposed to 
be a long-term option. The CJEU case law should be considered as a work in 
progress. A wait-and-see position should be appropriate for the next few years 
by analogy with what happened with the patient mobility case law. Later, 
legislative action should be taken at its best on the basis of a matured case law. 
A common consequence of the three propositions is that pURWHFWLRQRIFLWL]HQV¶
rights would be in danger. Administrative burden would also increase. There 
would be no guarantee that the overall expenses of social assistance by EU 
countries in favour of migrants would diminish. As far as fraud and abuse are 
concerned, the risk of double payment in the Options 1 and 2a) seems to be 
largely reduced by the Regulation even if undue payments could increase for 
practical reasons. On balance, Option 2b would hinder the fight against fraud, 
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abuse and error more than facilitate it. The coherence and the rationale of the 
coordination rules would be undermined. 
The discussion within our small group of experts showed how difficult it 
would be to achieve a solution to which everyone could entirely agree. The 
report is the result of a compromise on some points, but the main legal 
analysis, arguments and outcomes are supported by the entire group. To help 
the reader more easily identify our conclusions concerning the different factors 
in relation to each option we used a system of marks where (++) PHDQVµYHU\
SRVLWLYH¶  PHDQV µSRVLWLYH¶   PHDQV QHXWUDO - PHDQV µQHJDWLYH¶ --) 
PHDQVµYHU\QHJDWLYH¶DQG"PHDQV µXQFOHDU¶The following table presents 
the results of our evaluation of the three options.  
 
 
Clarification Simpli-
fication 
Rights Admin. 
burden 
Fraud & 
abuse 
Financial 
impact 
Option 1 - - - - = ? 
Option 2a - -- -- - = ? 
Option 2b -- -- -- -- - ? 
 
In conformity with the mandate, three categories of alternative proposals are 
made in the report with the objective to promote a balanced relationship 
between both instruments, taking into account the free movement of Union 
citizens and the principle of proportionality: 
1. If the option of a status quo (Option 1) was further explored, some 
initiatives would need to be taken to clarify the relationship between 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and Directive 2004/38/EC, for instance by 
drafting guidelines. The main goal of such guidelines would be to strike a 
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correct balance between the equal treatment provision of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 and legal residence requirements for non-active persons. 
2. If an explicit integration of the relevant articles of Directive 2004/38/EC 
into the SNCB title of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 were to remain on the 
agenda, it would be possible to translate the residence requirements of 
Directive 2004/38/EC explicitly into the text of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
WKURXJKDQµ2SWLRQ¶ZKLch would connect the social assistance rights to the 
length of stay. 
3. Instead of adapting Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, it would be conceivable 
to protect its coherence. A first option would be to remove all doubts about the 
relationship between Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and Directive 2004/38/EC 
by defining a status of lex specialis for the coordination Regulation. A second 
option would be to provide a definition of social assistance in Directive 
2004/38/EC that would not encompass SNCBs included in Annex X of 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
 256 
 
1 Legal background 
1.1 Rules applicable before special non-contributory cash benefits (SNCBs) 
With regard to the material scope of the coordination rules, ancient Regulation 
(EEC) No 3/58 and Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 (in its initial version of 
1971) made a basic distinction between social security and social assistance. 
Whereas the old regulations applied to all social security schemes, they did not 
cover social and medical assistance. 
In several cases brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) in the 1970s and 1980s, the delineation between the fields of social 
security and social assistance was discussed by individuals and national 
institutions. Supporting a dynamic interpretation of the field of application of 
social security coordination rules, the CJEU ruled that the concept of social 
security should be interpreted broadly. The reasoning was especially adapted 
to hybrid/mixed benefits, which have simultaneous ties with social security 
and social assistance. In Frilli212 for instance, the CJEU UXOHGWKDW³Although it 
may seem desirable, from the point of view of applying the regulation, to 
establish a clear distinction between legislative schemes which come within 
social security and those which come within assistance, it is possible that 
certain laws, because of the classes of persons to which they apply, their 
objectives, and the detailed rules for their application, may simultaneously 
contain elements belonging to both the categories mentioned and thus defy any 
general classification´ 
The attraction of benefits aiming to guarantee a subsistence level in the area of 
social security was explained in the same case by the fact that they confer on 
UHFLSLHQWVD³legally defined position giving them the right to a benefit which is 
analogous to a social security benefit´ 0L[HG EHQHILWV KDYH ³a double 
function; it consists on the one hand in guaranteeing a subsistence level to 
                                                 
212 Judgment in Frilli, C-1/72, EU:C:1972:56. 
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persons wholly outside the social security system, and on the other hand in 
providing an income supplement for persons in receipt of inadequate social 
security benefits´ 7KH &-(8 concluded in Frilli that these benefits come 
within the field of social security ³FRYHUHG E\ $UWLFOH  RI WKH 7UHDW\ DQG
within the regulations adopted in application of that article´ 
This reasoning was repeated on many occasions about invalidity,213 
disability214 or old-age215 benefits. The term 'benefits' was also understood in 
the widest possible sense as referring to all benefits including all fractions 
thereof, chargeable to public funds, increments, revaluation allowances or 
supplementary allowances.216 Provided that they were awarded on the grounds 
of legally defined criteria, all benefits connected to a social security risk 
falling within the scope of the regulations were covered by coordination rules 
LUUHVSHFWLYH RI WKH IDFW WKDW WKH\ ZHUH FODVVLILHG DV µVRFLDO DVVLVWDQFH¶ XQGHU
national law.217  
Most welfare benefits therefore fell in the field of application of the 
coordination Regulations. The principles of equality of treatment, of 
aggregation and of export of benefits were entirely applicable. A migrant 
could not be denied a mixed benefit in a Member State where he or she was 
actually residing for the sole reason that he was not a national of that Member 
State. A person could not be precluded from acquiring or retaining entitlement 
to such benefits on the sole ground that he or she did not reside within the 
territory of the Member State in which the institution responsible for payment 
was situated.218 
                                                 
213 Judgment in Biason, C-24/74, EU:C:1974:99. 
214 Judgment in Stanton Newton, C-356/89, EU:C:1991:265. 
215 Judgment in Giletti, C-379, 380, 381/85 and 93/86, EU:C:1987:98. 
216 E.g. the judgment in Biason EU:C:1974:99, paragraph 14. 
217 E.g. the judgment in Giletti EU:C:1987:98, paragraph 10. 
218 Judgment in Giletti EU:C:1987:98, paragraph 17; judgment in Biason EU:C:1974:99, 
paragraph 22. 
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Nevertheless, the expansion of the case law was not limitless. First, 
discretionary benefits and general minimum income remained excluded from 
the scope of coordination rules. Second, in Stanton Newton219 the CJEU made 
a subtle distinction based on the status of the migrant worker. It ruled that 
³legislative provisions of a Member State cannot be regarded as falling within 
the field of social security within the meaning of Article 51 of the Treaty and 
Regulation 1408/71 in the case of persons who have been subject as employed 
or self-employed persons exclusively to the legislation of other Member 
States´ 2WKHUZLVH ³the stability of the system instituted by national 
OHJLVODWLRQ >«@ FRXOG EH VHULRXVO\ DIIHFWHG´ 7KH OLPLW IL[HG LQ Stanton 
Newton, not far from the modHUQFRQFHSWRI µJHQXLQH OLQN¶ZDV MXVWLILHGE\
the fact that the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 1408/71 ³cannot be 
interpreted in such a way as to upset the system instituted by national 
legislation´ 
1.2 The concept of SNCBs and the rationale of Regulation (EEC) No 1247/92    
The CJEU was aware of the problems deriving from its case law on national 
VRFLDOSURWHFWLRQVFKHPHV,WKRZHYHUFRQVLGHUHGWKDW³these difficulties, taken 
as a whole, can only be resolved within the context of a legislative action 
taken by the Community.´220  
It took years for Member States to amend Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71. The 
initial proposal from the European Commission was issued in 1985221 whilst 
the vote of the Council occurred only seven years later. Regulation (EEC) No 
1247/92 oI$SULOLQVWLWXWHGWKHFDWHJRU\RI³VSHFLDOQRQ-contributory 
FDVKEHQHILWV´ZLWKWKHGHVLJQWRLPSRVHVSHFLILFUXOHVIRUEHQHILWVZKLFKIDOO
simultaneously within the categories of social security and social assistance. 
                                                 
219 Judgment in Stanton Newton EU:C:1991:265. 
220 Judgment in Frilli EU:C:1972:56, paragraph 21. 
221 COM (85) 396 final, OJ C 240, 21.09.1985, p. 6-8. 
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Regulation (EEC) No 1247/92 was based on a compromise. One major 
advantage for migrant people deriving from case law was abolished: mixed 
benefits were no longer exportable. To make up for this important restriction 
to the free movement of workers, Regulation (EEC) No 1247/92 reinforced the 
principle of equality of treatment. Not only the condition of nationality was 
inapplicable, but all forms of indirect discrimination were eliminated through 
the principles of aggregation and assimilation.222 Also, the restriction designed 
by the CJEU in Stanton Newton was removed: benefit entitlement was no 
longer conditional on the claimant having previously been subject to the social 
security legislation of the State in which he or she applied for the benefit, 
whereas this was the case prior to the entry into force of Regulation (EEC) No 
1247/92.223  
In Dano WKH &-(8 WDNHV JRRG QRWH RI WKLV OHJLVODWLYH FRPSURPLVH ³The 
specific provision which the EU legislature thus inserted into Regulation 
1408/71 by means of Regulation No 1247/92 is thus characterised by non 
exportability of special non-contributory cash benefits as the counterpart of 
equal treatment in the State of residence.´224 
The rationale of Regulation (EEC) No 1247/92 has been well explained by the 
&-(8 7KH V\VWHP HVWDEOLVKHG ³contains coordination rules whose very 
purpose, as is clear from the sixth recital in the preamble to Regulation No 
1247/92, is to protect the interests of migrant workers in accordance with the 
                                                 
222 See Article 10(a) of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 (amended): the institution of a Member 
State under whose legislation entitlement to SNCBs is subject to the completion of periods of 
employment, self-employment or residence shall regard, to the extent necessary, periods of 
employment, self-employment or residence completed in the territory of any other Member 
State as periods completed in the territory of the first Member State. Also, where entitlement 
to an SNCB granted in the form of a supplement is subject, under the legislation of a Member 
State, to receipt of a social security benefit and no such benefit is due under that legislation, 
any corresponding benefit granted under the legislation of any other Member State shall be 
treated as a benefit granted under the legislation of the first Member State for the purposes 
of entitlement to the supplement. 
223 Judgment in Snares, C-20/96, EU:C:1997:518, paragraph 50. 
224 Judgment in Dano EU:C:2014:2358, paragraph 54. 
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provisions of Article 51 of the Treaty.´225 Discussing Article 70(4) of 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, which introduces the principle of the lex loci 
domicilii IRU61&%V WKH&-(8LQGLFDWHV WKDW³that provision is intended not 
only to prevent the concurrent application of a number of national legislative 
systems and the complications which might ensue, but also to ensure that 
persons covered by Regulation 883/2004 are not left without social security 
cover because there is no legislation which is applicable to them.´226 In 
Snares, the CJEU ruled that Regulation (EEC) No 1247/92 was compatible 
with Article 51 of the EEC Treaty (now 48 TFEU) even if the application of 
WKHVSHFLILFFRRUGLQDWLRQUXOHVRQ61&%V³could have the effect of diminishing 
the means of the person concerned´ 7KH WUDQVIHU RI 61&%V ZDV DQ\ZD\
immediate: the loss of SNCBs in the former State of habitual residence was 
immediately compensated in the new State of habitual residence. 
1.3 61&%VUHJLPH:KDWZRXOGKDYHEHHQ0U%UH\DQG0V'DQR¶V ULJKWVXQGHU
the exclusive application of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004?  
1.3.1 Regime 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 consolidates the category of SNCBs. It contains 
a precise definition of SNCBs such as set out in Regulation (EC) No 647/2005 
of 13 April 2005 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71. If it does not cover 
social and medical assistaQFH ³[t]his Regulation shall also apply to the 
special non-contributory cash benefits covered by Article 70´ $UWLFOH 
61&%VDUHGHILQHGDV³benefits which are provided under legislation which, 
because of its personal scope, objectives and/or conditions for entitlement, has 
characteristics both of the social security legislation referred to in Article 3(1) 
and of social assistance´$UWLFOH%5 
                                                 
225 Judgment in Snares EU:C:1997:518, paragraph 48. 
226 Judgment in Brey EU:C:2013:565, paragraph 50. 
 261 
 
Modernised rules of coordination state that SNCBs can either provide 
³supplementary, substitute or ancillary cover against the risks covered by the 
branches of social security referred to in Article 3(1), and which guarantee the 
persons concerned a minimum subsistence income having regard to the 
economic and social situation in the Member State concerned´ RU ³solely 
specific protection for the disabled, closely linked to the said person's social 
environment in the Member State concerned´$UWLFOHD%5 
One additional condition is inspired by the case law of the CJEU: the 
financing of SNCBs deriveV ³H[FOXVLYHO\ >«@ IURP FRPSXOVRU\ WD[DWLRQ
intended to cover general public expenditure and the conditions for providing 
and for calculating the benefits are not dependent on any contribution in 
respect of the beneficiary. However, benefits provided to supplement a 
contributory benefit shall not be considered to be contributory benefits for this 
reason alone´$UWLFOHE%5 
Benefits meeting the regulation criteria and listed in Annex X follow the rules 
applicable to SNCBs. Both conditions are cumulative. It implies that benefits 
which are not listed in Annex X or which would be removed from Annex X by 
ruling of the CJEU227 are subject to standard rules of coordination and in 
particular to the principle of export.228 
If all conditions for belonging to the SNCB category are satisfied and if the 
claimant falls within the personal scope of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, 
SNCBs are provided exclusively in the Member State where the persons 
concerned reside, in accordance with its legislation, and are provided by and at 
the expense of the institution of the place of residence (Article 70(4) BR). The 
principle of waiving residence rules does not apply (Article 70(3) BR). If 
                                                 
227 The list of SNCBs in Annex has been reshaped by Regulation (EC) No 647/2005 to take 
account of CJEU case law (see e.g. the judgment in Commission v Parliament, C-299/05, 
EU:C:2007:608). The list of Annex X of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 is directly inspired by 
this case law. 
228 8QOHVV WKH\ ZRXOG IDOO H[FOXVLYHO\ ZLWKLQ WKH VFRSH RI µVRFLDO DVVLVWDQFH¶ LQ WKLV FDVH
coordination rules do not apply. 
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Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 no longer explicitly provides that the principles 
of aggregation and assimilation apply to SNCBs, this is still the case since 
Article 5 and 6 BR apply to SNCBs which are in the scope of the 
Regulation.229 
1.3.2 0U%UH\DQG0V'DQR¶VVWDWXVXQGHU5HJXODWLRQ(&1R 
In the past, access to SNCBs was analysed by the CJEU exclusively under 
coordination rules. If we disregard requirements from Directive 2004/38/EC, 
what would have been the status of Mr Brey and Ms Dano vis-à-vis benefits 
claimed in Austria and in Germany on the grounds of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 only? 
In the case of Mr Brey, the Austrian Pensionsversicherungsanstalt refused to 
grant him the compensatory supplement (Ausgleichzulage) provided for in 
Austrian legislation to augment his German retirement pension. Based on the 
concept of residence defined in the Swaddling case dealing with an SNCB,230 
it is likely that Mr Brey was habitually residing in Austria where he had the 
centre of his interests. The length of residence in the Member State in which 
payment of the benefit is sought cannot be regarded as an intrinsic element of 
the concept of residence.231 Thus, since the Ausgleichzulage is listed in Annex 
X and follows the conditions to be categorised as an SNCB, it would have 
been granted to Mr Brey since he received only a low (German) old-age 
pension. This outcome would not have been reversed by the fact that Mr Brey 
had not been previously subject to Austrian social security. Indeed, the CJEU 
made clear that benefit entitlement is no longer conditional on the claimant 
having previously been subject to the social security legislation of the State in 
which he or she applies for the benefit.232 
                                                 
229 See also the judgment in Dano EU:C:2014:2358, paragraph 49 and paragraph 53. 
230 Judgment in Swaddling, C-90/97, EU:C:1999:96. 
231 Judgment in Swaddling EU:C:1999:96, paragraph 30. 
232 Judgment in Snares EU:C:1997:518, paragraph 50. 
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In the case of Ms Dano, the Jobcenter Leipzig refused to grant her a benefit 
envisaged by German legislation, i.e. the subsistence benefit 
(Regelleistung/Grundsicherung für Arbeitsuchende). Again, since this benefit 
is listed in Annex X and meets the other SNCB regulations requirements to be 
classified as such, Ms Dano, who was a habitual resident in Germany under 
criteria set out in the Swaddling case, would have been granted the said benefit 
(also for the reason that, as said above, benefit entitlement is not conditional 
on the claimant having previously been subject to the social security 
legislation of the State in which he applies for the benefit). 
1.4 The interplay between Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and Directive 2004/38/EC: 
introductory elements 
Already in Snares, the CJEU touched upon the question of interactions 
between the predecessors of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and Directive 
2004/38/EC. A person like Mr Snares, who ceased occupational activity and 
moved from the UK to Spain, may not have been in receipt of benefits of an 
amount sufficient to avoid becoming a burden on the social security system of 
Spain during his period of residence there. 
How should the Regulation and the Directive interact? Neither the Regulation 
nor the Directive determine their mutual coordination. The Directive does not 
refer to the Regulation, nor vice versa. The interplay between both legal 
instruments leaves room for interpretation and makes a solution difficult. From 
an institutional point of view, there is no formal hierarchy between a 
regulation and a directive. Since both instruments were voted the same day (29 
April 2004), anteriority may not be a relevant criterion to set. The principle 
Lex specialis derogat legi generali does not seem relevant either to design 
rules of interaction between both texts. Both legal instruments, however, are 
different in their legal character. This matters for solving the conflict between 
concurring legislative acts. The Regulation creates immediate and direct 
individual rights; the Directive, however, is addressed to the Member States 
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DQG PDNHV WKHP FUHDWH GRPHVWLF OHJLVODWLRQ LQ OLQH ZLWK WKH (8 'LUHFWLYH¶V
standard. Therefore, both instruments have a different legal impact: the 
Regulation creates rights or duties, whereas the Directive empowers the 
Member States to take legislative action in the future. It raises the question to 
what extent provisions of a directive should/can be incorporated into a 
regulation. 
The three propositions made by the European Commission have a common 
denominator inspired by the recent case law of the CJEU: they acknowledge 
that the application of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 is without prejudice to 
requirements of Directive 2004/38/EC. This would be the result of the 
IROORZLQJ &-(8 DVVHUWLRQ ³The benefits [«] ZKLFK FRQVWLWXWH µVSHFLDO QRQ-
FRQWULEXWRU\ FDVK EHQHILWV¶ ZLWKLQ WKH PHDQLQJ RI $UWLFOH  RI WKH
regulation, are, under Article 70(4), to be provided exclusively in the Member 
State in which the persons concerned reside, in accordance with its 
legislation. It follows that there is nothing to prevent the grant of such benefits 
to Union citizens who are not economically active from being made subject to 
the requirement that those citizens fulfil the conditions for obtaining a right of 
residence under Directive 2004/38/EC in the host Member State´233. The 
&-(8DOVRUXOHG LQ WKHVDPHVSLULW WKDW LW³has consistently held that there is 
nothing to prevent, in principle, the granting of social security benefits to 
Union citizens who are not economically active being made conditional upon 
those citizens meeting the necessary requirements for obtaining a legal right 
of residence in the host Member State.´234 
The Brey and Dano case law has therefore addressed the relationship between 
the two regimes and opted for a priority of the residence approach over the 
coordination approach. Regarding this shift, it might nevertheless be worth 
                                                 
233 Judgment in Dano EU:C:2014:2358, paragraph 83. 
234 Judgment in Brey EU:C:2013:565, paragraph 44. 
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recalling that the CJEU has expressed the view that applying the Residence 
Directive should not result in a step back from the acquis.235 
Guided by the mandate,236 by recent cases Brey and Dano and within the 
context of the more global question of access to social benefits237 in the State 
of residence by economically inactive Union citizens, the report will take on 
board leading principles of the free movement of Union citizens and workers 
(and matching case law), social security coordination principles set out in the 
Treaty and the rationale of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, in particular of 
SNCBs. The report will focus exclusively on income-related SNCBs, leaving 
aside SNCBs the aim of which is the protection for the disabled (see Article 
70(2)(a)(ii)). Such benefits are indeed not targeted by the recent rulings of the 
CJEU.  
The report will thus proceed to an analysis of the status quo (part 2), of a 
limitation of the equal treatment principle for income-related SNCBs, under 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, by referring to the provisions of Directive 
2004/38/EC (part 3), and of the removal of the income-related SNCBs from 
the material scope of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (part 4). Since case law of 
the CJEU is not stable yet,238 the report will suggest alternative amendments to 
the European Commission propositions (part 5) before reaching final 
conclusions (part 6). 
                                                 
235 Judgment in Metock, C-127/08, EU:C:2008:449, paragraph 59; judgment in Lassal, C-
162/09, EU:C:2010:592, paragraph 30. See, however, the judgment in Brey EU:C:2013:565, 
paragraph 53. 
236 :KLFK LQGLFDWHV WKDW ³the aim of the possible amendment is to ensure the uniform 
application of these judgments in the Member States and to provide more legal clarity for EU 
citizens, the Member States and their social security institutions´ 
237
 7KHH[SUHVVLRQµVRFLDOEHQHILW¶XVHGLQWKLVUHSRUWKDVQRWEHHQGHILQHGLQ(8OHJLVODWLRQRULQ&-(8FDVHODZDQGLVWKXVQRt an 
(8 ODZ FRQFHSW XQOLNH VRFLDO DVVLVWDQFH ZLWKLQ WKH PHDQLQJ RI $UWLFOH  RI 'LUHFWLYH (& RU µVRcial 
DGYDQWDJHV¶ZLWKLQWKHPHDQLQJRI$UWLFOHRI5HJXODWLRQ(81Rµ6RFLDOEHQHILW¶UHIHUVWRDOODGYDQWDJHV
IDOOLQJ XQGHU WKH 8QLRQ FLWL]HQV¶ FODLP WR QRQ-discrimination (Articles 18/21 TFEU; Article 24(1), first sentence of 
Directive 2004/38/EC). It extends to all kinds of (social and other) advantages (in a wide sense) granted by national law. 
7KXV WKH FRQFHSW RI µVRFLDO EHQHILW¶ LV EURDGHU WKDQ WKH WHUP µVRFLDO DVVLVWDQFH¶ XVHG LQ $UWLFOH  RI 'LUHFWLYH
2004/38/EC such as interpreted in Dano.   
238 See, for instance, the opinion of the Advocate General in Alimanovic EU:C:2015:210. 
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2 Option 1: status quo: direct application of the case law 
2.1 Legal analysis of the proposal 
Option 1 sticks to the status quo by proposing a direct application of the Brey 
and Dano case law. As a starting point, these two rulings by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) will be presented (see 2.1.1). Next, the 
question will be discussed under which circumstances economically inactive 
Union citizens may claim access to income-related special non-contributory 
cash benefits (SNCBs) following this case law (see 2.1.2). 
2.1.1 Background: the cases Brey and Dano  
2.1.1.1 Brey (19 September 2013) 
a) Facts and preliminary questions (paragraph 16 et seq) 
On 19 September 2013, the CJEU ruled on a request for a preliminary ruling 
from the Austrian Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof). This case concerned 
two German nationals, Mr Brey and his wife, who moved to Austria in March 
DQGZKRVHLQFRPHDW WKLV WLPHVROHO\FRQVLVWHGRI0U%UH\¶VLQYDOLGLW\
SHQVLRQ¼SHUPRQWKDQGEHIRUHWD[DQGDFDUHDOORZDQFH¼SHU
month). Shortly after entry, Mr Brey applied at the responsible Austrian 
authority for a compensatory supplement. Though Mr Brey and his wife were 
granted an EEA citizen registration certificate, the application for the 
compensatory supplement was refused on the grounds that his low retirement 
pension did not suffice to establish lawful residence in Austria which requires 
having sufficient resources.  
After a successful action of Mr Brey against this refusal, the Austrian authority 
brought an appeal against the judgment before the Austrian Supreme Court. 
This Court decided to refer the case to the CJEU and raised the question, as 
reformulated by the CJEU,  
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³ZKHWKHU (8 ODZ ± in particular, Directive 2004/38/EC ± should be 
interpreted as precluding national legislatLRQ >«@ZKLFK GRHV QRW DOORZ WKH
JUDQWRIDEHQHILWVXFKDVWKHFRPSHQVDWRU\VXSSOHPHQW>«@WRDQDWLRQDORI
another Member State who is not economically active, on the grounds that, 
despite having been issued with a certificate of residence, he does not meet the 
necessary requirements for obtaining the legal right to reside on the territory 
of the first Member State for a period of longer than three months, since such 
a right of residence is conditional upon that national having sufficient 
resources not WRDSSO\IRUWKHEHQHILW´SDUDJUDSK 
b) Judgment of the CJEU 
First, the CJEU (again) confirmed that the Austrian compensatory supplement 
at issue in this case constitutes an SNCB within the meaning of Articles 3(3) 
and 70 BR and therefore falls within the scope of the coordination regime 
(paragraph 33 et seq). Next, the CJEU considered a solution based uniquely on 
the coordination regime which was proposed by the European Commission 
(EC). According to the latter, SNCBs have to be provided in the Member State 
of habitual residence (Articles 1(j), 70(4) BR) and the introduction of any 
further criteria applied uniquely to EU foreigners ± like a criterion of legal 
residence ± constitutes a violation of the non-discrimination principle 
enshrined in Article 4 BR (paragraph 37). 
The CJEU, however, rejected this reasoning by limiting the scope of the 
FRRUGLQDWLRQUHJLPH$UWLFOH%5³VHWVRXWDµFRQIOLFWUXOH¶´GHWHUPLQLQJ
the Member State responsible for granting SNCBs, but does not lay down 
criteria for entitlement to SNCBs which has to be determined by national 
legislation (paragraph 37 without dealing with the applicability of Article 4 
BR, however). 
Yet, the Member States do not enjoy unlimited discretion in this regard: the 
CJEU stressed that the criteria stipulated in national legislation have to comply 
with EU law. It then considered whether the requirement of sufficient 
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resources for legal residence and entitlement to the benefit at issue is in line 
with the right of all Union citizens to free movement (Article 21 TFEU) and to 
non-discrimination (Article 18 TFEU), as notably concretised by Directive 
2004/38/EC. In view of the economic criteria on which a right of residence for 
economically inactive persons depends according to Article 7(1)(b) of 
Directive 2004/38/EC, the CJEU in principle answered this question 
affirmatively. However, it also drew attention to the fact that these criteria 
must, being restrictions of the general right to free movement of all Union 
citizens (Article 21 TFEU), in view of the status of Union citizenship and in 
line with Article 14(3) of Directive 2004/38/EC, not be applied without a 
proportionality assessment in each individual case (paragraph 44 et seq):  
³>7@KHIDFWWKDWDQDWLRQDORIDQRWKHU0HPEHU6WDWHZKRLVQRWHFRQRPLFDOO\
active may be eligible, in light of his low pension, to receive that benefit could 
be an indication that that national does not have sufficient resources to avoid 
becoming an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host 
Member State for the purposes of Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38/EC [«] 
However, the competent national authorities cannot draw such conclusions 
without first carrying out an overall assessment of the specific burden which 
granting that benefit would place on the national social assistance system as a 
whole, by reference to the personal circumstances characterising the 
LQGLYLGXDOVLWXDWLRQRIWKHSHUVRQFRQFHUQHG´SDUDJUDSKHWVHT 
Regarding the relevance of the coordination regime in this respect, the CJEU 
stressed that the Austrian SNCB at issue qualifies as social assistance within 
the meaning of Directive 2004/38/EC and thus must not be left out, as the EC 
submitted in view of SNCBs in general (paragraph 48), when assessing 
whether a person has become a burden on the national social assistance 
scheme (paragraph 47 et seq). 
In conclusion, the CJEU held 
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³WKDW (8 ODZ ± in particular, as it results from Article 7(1)(b), Article 8(4) 
and Article 24(1) and (2) of Directive 2004/38/EC ± must be interpreted as 
precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, 
which, even as regards the period following the first three months of 
residence, automatically ± whatever the circumstances ± bars the grant of a 
benefit, such as the compensatory supplement provided for in Paragraph 
292(1) of the ASVG, to a national of another Member State who is not 
economically active, on the grounds that, despite having been issued with a 
certificate of residence, he does not meet the necessary requirements for 
obtaining the legal right to reside on the territory of the first Member State for 
a period of longer than three months, since obtaining that right of residence is 
conditional upon that national having sufficient resources not to apply for the 
EHQHILW´SDUDJUDSK 
2.1.1.2 Dano (11 November 2014) 
a) Facts and preliminary questions (paragraph 35 et seq) 
The Dano case handed down on 11 November 2014 concerned two Romanian 
nationals, Ms Dano and her minor son, both habitually residing in Germany. 
They live with the sister of Ms Dano who supports them financially. In 
DGGLWLRQ0V'DQRUHFHLYHVDFKLOGEHQHILWRI¼SHUPRQWKDVZHOODVDQ
DGYDQFH RQ PDLQWHQDQFH SD\PHQWV RI ¼  SHU PRQWK ERWK ILQDQFHG E\
German public funds. Ms Dano has never worked in Germany nor did she 
move to Germany in order to seek employment. Still, German authorities 
granted her an unlimited certificate of free movement for EU nationals. In 
2011 and again in 2012, Ms Dano applied for the basic provision for 
jobseekers (Arbeitslosengeld II), but the competent authority each time 
UHMHFWHG KHU FODLP 0V 'DQR¶V FKDOOHQJH RI WKH ODVW GHFLVLRQ ZDV DOVR
dismissed by the court. Subsequently, she brought another action before the 
social court of first instance in Leipzig, which referred the case to the CJEU 
and raised the question whether it is in line with EU coordination (Article 4 
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BR) and free movement law (Articles 18/21 TFEU; Article 24 of Directive 
2004/38/EC) to exclude economically inactive Union citizens from access to 
SNCBs. 
b) Judgment of the CJEU 
The CJEU first stressed that SNCBs fall within the scope of Article 4 BR 
(paragraph 55). Furthermore, it underlined that entitlement to the benefit in 
question has to be assessed in view of the principle of non-discrimination 
(Article 18 TFEU), which is given a specific expression in both Article 24 of 
Directive 2004/38/EC as well as in Article 4 BR. Regarding the former, even 
if SNCBs fall under the broad concept of social assistance used in Article 
24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC (paragraph 63), this exclusion does not apply in 
casu due to the specific circumstances of the case (residence in Germany for 
more than three months, but without seeking employment or being willing to 
work). Hence, only Article 24(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC applies, meaning 
that  
³D8QLRQFLWL]HQFDQFODLPHTXDOWreatment with nationals of the host Member 
State only if his residence in the territory of the host Member State complies 
ZLWKWKHFRQGLWLRQVRI'LUHFWLYH(&´SDUDJUDSK 
According to Article 7(1)(b) economically inactive persons (like Ms Dano) 
must have sufficient resources and a comprehensive sickness insurance. 
Hence, the CJEU concluded, without referring to the relativisation of these 
criteria in its established case law (Baumbast,239 Grzelczyk,240 Brey), that 
³>D@ 0HPEHU 6WDWH PXVW >«@ KDYH WKe possibility, pursuant to Article 7 of 
Directive 2004/38/EC, of refusing to grant social benefits to economically 
inactive Union citizens who exercise their right to freedom of movement solely 
                                                 
239
 Judgment in Baumbast, C-413/99, EU:C:2002:493. 
240
 Judgment in Grzelczyk, C-184/99, EU:C:2001:458. 
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LQRUGHUWRREWDLQDQRWKHU0HPEHU6WDWH¶VVRFLDODVVLVWDQFHDOthough they do 
QRWKDYHVXIILFLHQWUHVRXUFHVWRFODLPDULJKWRIUHVLGHQFH´SDUDJUDSK 
Finally, regarding Article 4 BR, 
³>W@KHVDPHFRQFOXVLRQPXVWEHUHDFKHG>«@7KHEHQHILWVDWLVVXHLQWKHPDLQ
SURFHHGLQJVZKLFKFRQVWLWXWH µVSHFLDOQRQ-contributor\FDVKEHQHILWV¶ZLWKLQ
the meaning of Article 70(2) of the regulation, are, under Article 70(4), to be 
provided exclusively in the Member State in which the persons concerned 
reside, in accordance with its legislation. It follows that there is nothing to 
prevent the grant of such benefits to Union citizens who are not economically 
active from being made subject to the requirement that those citizens fulfil the 
conditions for obtaining a right of residence under Directive 2004/38/EC in 
the host Member State´SDUDJUDSK 
2.1.2 Access to SNCBs under EU law241 
Summing up, both Brey and Dano concern the access of economically inactive 
persons to income-related SNCBs. Notably, Dano declares the equality of 
treatment rule of Article 4 BR applicable to SNCBs (paragraph 46 et seq). 
This provision stipulates: 
³8QOHVV RWKHUZLVH SURYLGHG IRU E\ WKLV 5HJXODWLRQ SHUVRQV WR ZKRP WKLV
Regulation applies shall enjoy the same benefits and be subject to the same 
obligations under the legislation of any Member State as the nationals 
WKHUHRI´ 
                                                 
241 &IRQWKLV):ROOHQVFKOlJHUµ.HLQH6R]LDOOHLVWXQJHQIUQLFKWHUZHUEVWlWLJH8QLRQVEUJHU"
Zur begrenzten Tragweite des Urteils des EuGH in der Rs. 'DQRYRP¶
NVwZ&IIXUWKHU'7K\Pµ7KHHOXVLYHOLPLWVRIVROLGDULW\5HVLGHQFHUights of and 
VRFLDOEHQHILWVIRUHFRQRPLFDOO\LQDFWLYH8QLRQFLWL]HQV¶CML Rev 52, 17; H. 
9HUVFKXHUHQ
3UHYHQWLQJ³EHQHILWWRXULVP´LQWKH(8$QDUURZRUEURDGLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH
possibilities offered by the CJEU in Dano?', (2015) CML Rev 52, ):ROOHQVFKOlJHUµ$
new Fundamental Freedom beyond Market Integration: Union Citizenship and its  
'\QDPLFVIRUVKLIWLQJWKH(FRQRPLF3DUDGLJPRI(XURSHDQ,QWHJUDWLRQ¶ELJ 17, 1. 
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However, this rule is not interpreted, as advocated by some,242 as a claim to 
equal treatment irrespective of legal residence in the host Member State. 
Rather, it is interpreted in line with the rules applicable to the access of 
economically inactive Union citizens to social benefits in Member States other 
than their country of origin, notably Article 24 of Directive 2004/38/EC 
(paragraph 82 et seq). Hence, the decisive question for access to SNCBs is 
whether a person enjoys a right of residence in the host Member State 
according to Residence Directive 2004/38/EC.243 This development might be 
termed a shift from a coordination approach to a residence approach regarding 
access to SNCBs.  
Thus, to answer the initial question of access of economically inactive persons 
to income-related SNCBs, the well-established case law of the CJEU, 
beginning with its ruling in the Sala case of 12 May 1998,244 as well as the 
respective provisions of the Residence Directive have to be presented. They 
confirm a (limited) claim of economically inactive persons to such SNCBs in 
the host Member State (see 2.1.2.1). It is important to stress that this finding 
KDVQRWEHHQFRQWUDGLFWHGE\WKH&-(8¶VUXOLQJLQWKHDano case, although the 
latter might be open to a different reading (see 2.1.2.2). Finally, it is also very 
important to stress that Brey and Dano do not provide the complete picture. 
After all, these rulings do not concern first-time jobseekers, family members, 
persons with a permanent residence right, former workers retaining their status 
of worker or workers with low income, to all of whom specific rules apply 
which should also be presented (see 2.1.2.3). 
                                                 
242 Cf e.g. Commission, the judgment in Brey EU:C:2013:565, paragraph 37; this approach was 
also followed in German case law, cf only LSG (Social Court of Second Instance) Bayern of 27 
May 2014, L 16 AS 344/14 B ER, paragraph 23 et seq. 
243 $FFRUGLQJWRWKH&-(8¶VFDVHODZHYHQDULJKWRIUHVLGHQFHEDVHGXQLTXHO\RQQDWLonal law 
may be sufficient for a claim to equal treatment, cf the judgment in Sala, C-85/96, 
EU:C:1998:217, paragraph 60 et seq; judgment in Trojani, C-456/02, EU:C:2004:488, 
paragraph 37 et seq. 
244 Judgment in Sala EU:C:1998:217. 
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2.1.2.1 Access of economically inactive persons to income-related SNCBs 
Even if Directive 2004/38/EC requires sufficient (own) resources to profit 
from a right of residence as an economically inactive person in the host 
Member State, a Union citizen who becomes dependent on SNCBs may under 
certain circumstances retain his or her right of residence (a) and enjoy access 
to social benefits, including SNCBs, in the host Member State (b). 
a) The right of residence of economically inactive Union citizens 
Generally speaking, the right of residence of economically inactive Union 
citizens (not belonging to one of the groups being discussed below in 2.1.2.3) 
for a period of residence of more than three months depends on the fulfilment 
of certain economic criteria. In this respect, Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 
2004/38/EC stipulates that: 
³>D@OO 8QLRQ FLWL]HQV VKDOO KDYH WKH ULJKW RI UHVLGHQFH RQ WKH WHUULWRU\ RI
DQRWKHU 0HPEHU 6WDWH IRU D SHULRG RI ORQJHU WKDQ WKUHH PRQWKV LI WKH\ >«@
have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to 
become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State 
during their period of residence and have comprehensive sickness insurance 
FRYHULQWKHKRVW0HPEHU6WDWH´ 
However, these economic criteria must not be applied literally.245 Already in 
its judgment in the Baumbast case, the CJEU relativised these conditions by 
applying the principle of proportionality to them. For, following the 
introduction of Union citizenship, they constitute a limitation to the right of 
free movement of all Union citizens guaranteed by EU primary law (Article 21 
TFEU). Hence, the fact that a sickness insurance, other than required by 
secondary law, does not cover all possible risks, does not justify denying a 
                                                 
245 Cf in more detail F. WolOHQVFKOlJHUµ$QHZ)XQGDPHQWDO)UHHGRPEH\RQG0DUNHW
Integration: Union Citizenship and its Dynamics for shifting the Economic Paradigm of 
(XURSHDQ,QWHJUDWLRQ¶(/-HWVHT 
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right of residence.246 The same is true, according to the judgment in the 
Grzelczyk case, with regard to the temporary reliance of a student on social 
assistance.247 Confirming this line of case law, in its judgment in the Brey case 
of September 2013 the CJEU concluded:  
³/DVWO\ LW VKRXOG EH ERUQH LQ PLQG that, since the right to freedom of 
movement is ± as a fundamental principle of EU law ± the general rule, the 
conditions laid down in Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38/EC must be 
FRQVWUXHGQDUURZO\>«@DQGLQFRPSOLDQFHZLWKWKHOLPLWVLPSRVHGE\(8Oaw 
DQG WKH SULQFLSOH RI SURSRUWLRQDOLW\ >«@ ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH PDUJLQ IRU
manoeuvre which the Member States are recognised as having must not be 
used by them in a manner which would compromise attainment of the 
objective of Directive 2004/38/EC, which is, inter alia, to facilitate and 
VWUHQJWKHQ WKH H[HUFLVH RI 8QLRQ FLWL]HQV¶ SULPDU\ ULJKW WR PRYH DQG UHVLGH
freely within the territory of the Member States, and the practical effectiveness 
RIWKDWGLUHFWLYH´SDUDJUDSKHWVHT 
Article 14(3) of Directive 2004/38/EC has codified the Baumbast and 
Grzelczyk case law. $FFRUGLQJWRWKLVSURYLVLRQ³(a)n expulsion measure shall 
QRW EH WKH DXWRPDWLF FRQVHTXHQFH RI D 8QLRQ FLWL]HQ¶V RU KLV RU KHU IDPLO\
PHPEHU¶VUHFRXUVHWRWKHVRFLDODVVLVWDQFHV\VWHPRIWKHKRVW0ember State.´
0RUHRYHU IROORZLQJ WKH&-(8¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJ LQBrey, even Article 7(1)(b) 
of Directive 2004/38/EC itself qualifies the criterion of sufficient resources by 
DGGLQJ ³not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host 
Member State during their period of residence´248 
Recital 16 of the same Directive specifies the proportionality test: 
                                                 
246 Judgment in Baumbast EU:C:2002:493, paragraph 90 et seq. Cf further the judgment in 
Brey EU:C:2013:565, paragraph 70, and, with a different conclusion, the judgment in Trojani 
EU:C:2004:488, paragraph 34 et seq. 
247 Judgment in Grzelczyk EU:C:2001:458, paragraph 37 et seq; in regard to the methodical 
difference with the judgment in Baumbast EU:C:2002:493, cf F. Wollenschläger, Grundfreiheit 
ohne Markt, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2007, p. 171 et seq. 
248 Judgment in Brey EU:C:2013:565, paragraph 63, 72, 77. 
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³$V ORQJ DV WKH EHQHILFLDULHV RI WKH ULJKW RI UHVLGHQFH GR QRW EHFRPH DQ
unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State 
they should not be expelled. Therefore, an expulsion measure should not be 
the automatic consequence of recourse to the social assistance system. The 
host Member State should examine whether it is a case of temporary 
difficulties and take into account the duration of residence, the personal 
circumstances and the amount of aid granted in order to consider whether the 
beneficiary has become an unreasonable burden on its social assistance 
system and to proceed to his expulsion. In no case should an expulsion 
measure be adopted against workers, self-employed persons or job-seekers as 
defined by the Court of Justice save on grounds of public policy or public 
VHFXULW\´ 
In its judgment in the Brey case, the CJEU interpreted Article 7(1)(b) of 
Directive 2004/38/EC in line with these limitations. The latter provision 
implies that  
³>E@\PDNLQJWKHULJKWRIUHVLGHQFHIRUDSHULRGRIORQJHUWKDQWKUHHPRQWKV
FRQGLWLRQDO XSRQ WKH SHUVRQ FRQFHUQHG QRW EHFRPLQJ DQ µXQUHDVRQDEOH¶
EXUGHQ RQ WKH VRFLDO DVVLVWDQFH µV\VWHP¶ of the host Member State, 
Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38/EC, interpreted in the light of recital 10 to 
WKDWGLUHFWLYH>«@WKDWWKHFRPSHWHQWQDWLRQDODXWKRULWLHVKDYHWKHSRZHUWR
assess, taking into account a range of factors in the light of the principle of 
proportionality, whether the grant of a social security benefit could place a 
EXUGHQRQWKDW0HPEHU6WDWH¶VVRFLDODVVLVWDQFHV\VWHPDVDZKROH'LUHFWLYH
2004/38/EC thus recognises a certain degree of financial solidarity between 
nationals of a host Member State and nationals of other Member States, 
particularly if the difficulties which a beneficiary of the right of residence 
HQFRXQWHUVDUHWHPSRUDU\´SDUDJUDSK 
Finally, from a general point of view, the interpretation of the economic 
residence criteria as conditions of the right to free movement should be 
questioned. For reasons of legal certainty it should at least be considered 
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interpreting these criteria as a mere justification to end the right of residence, 
but not as conditions on which the existence of the right of residence depends 
± similar to the understanding of the ordre public exception, which permits 
restrictions on the right of entry and the right of residence on grounds of 
public policy, public security or public health (Article 27 of Directive 
2004/38/EC).249 This interpretation would, moreover, seem more convincing 
than applying the general non-discrimination principle also in cases of a 
residence only based on national law.250 
b) Access of economically inactive Union citizens to social benefits 
In its case law, the CJEU has not only relativised the economic conditions of 
residence for economically inactive Union citizens. Rather, it has also 
acknowledged a (limited) entitlement to social benefits, including SNCBs, 
based on the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in EU primary law 
(Articles 18/21 TFEU) and EU secondary law (Article 24(1), first sentence of 
Directive 2004/38/EC).251 The latter reads: 
³6XEMHFWWRVXFKVSHFLILFSURYLVLRQVDVDUHH[SUHVVO\SURYLGHGIRULQWKH7UHDW\
and secondary law, all Union citizens residing on the basis of this Directive in 
                                                 
249 Cf for more details F. Wollenschläger, Grundfreiheit ohne Markt, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 
2007, p. 180 et seq, 187 et seq; further C. 6FK|QEHUJHU µ'LH 8QLRQVEUJHUVFKDIW DOV
Sozialbürgerschaft. Aufenthaltsrecht und soziale Gleichbehandlung von Unionsbürgern im 
5HJHOXQJVV\VWHP GHU 8QLRQVEUJHUULFKWOLQLH¶  ZAR  . 6WULFN µ$QVSUFKH DOWHU
XQGQHXHU8QLRQVEUJHUDXI6R]LDOKLOIHXQG$UEHLWVORVHQJHOG,,¶NJW, 2183, footnote 
15. 'LVDJUHHLQJ ' 7K\P µ6R]LDOOHLVWXQJHQ IU XQG $XIHQWKDOW YRQ QLFKWHUZHUEVWlWLJHQ
8QLRQVEUJHUQ¶  NZS, 81, 86 et seq; with qualifications in view of the right of 
permanent residence, judgment in Ziolkowski et al, C-424/10 and C-425/10, EU:C:2011:866, 
paragraph 36 et seq. 
250 Judgment in Sala EU:C:1998:217, paragraph 60 et seq; judgment in Trojani EU:C:2004:488, 
paragraph 37 et seq; disagreeing F. Wollenschläger, Grundfreiheit ohne Markt, Mohr Siebeck, 
Tübingen, 2007, p. 217 et seq; cf also D. Thym, op cit, (2014) NZS, 81, 89 et seq. 
251 &I IRU PRUH GHWDLOV ) :ROOHQVFKOlJHU µ$ QHZ )XQGDPHQWDO )UHHGRP EH\RQG 0DUNHW
Integration: Union Citizenship and its Dynamics for shifting the Economic Paradigm of 
(XURSHDQ ,QWHJUDWLRQ¶  ELJ 17(1), 20 et seq; idem, in A. Hatje & P.-C. Müller-Graff 
(eds), Enzyklopädie Europarecht, volume 1, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2014, paragraph 8/138 et 
seq; idem, Grundfreiheit ohne Markt, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2007, p. 197 et seq. 
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the territory of the host Member State shall enjoy equal treatment with the 
QDWLRQDOVRIWKDW0HPEHU6WDWHZLWKLQWKHVFRSHRIWKH7UHDW\´ 
$FFRUGLQJ WR WKH &-(8¶V FDVH ODZ (Baumbast, Grzelczyk, Brey), a Union 
citizen may rely on the non-discrimination principle252 to compensate the 
situation where she or he does not have sufficient resources or a 
comprehensive sickness insurance. One condition is required, though: under 
the circumstances of the individual case, refusing a right of residence would be 
disproportionate in view of the legitimate objective behind the economic 
residence conditions to avoid Union citizens becoming an unreasonable 
burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State.253  
This interpretation in favour of equality of treatment is reinforced by the fact 
that Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC excludes equal access to social 
DVVLVWDQFH ³only during the first three months of residence´ EXW QRW XQWil a 
Union citizen has acquired a permanent right of residence (which is usually 
the case after a period of residence of five years254). It would mean, a 
contrario, that equality of treatment may be the rule after the first three 
months of residence. This corresponds to the approach of the Union 
legislature: in the initial proposal of the Directive the European Commission 
formulated an exclusion until having acquired a right of permanent residence. 
Subsequently, however, this exclusion was modified during the legislative 
process in favour of the current rule (exclusion only for the first three months 
RIUHVLGHQFHLQRUGHUWRWDNHDFFRXQWRIWKH&-(8¶VMXGJPHQWLQWKHGrzelczyk 
case.255 In its judgment in the Brey case, other than in the Dano case, the 
CJEU referred to this provision as well as to Article 14(3) of Directive 
2004/38/EC (paragraph 70).  
                                                 
252 Article 18 TFEU; Article 24(1), sentence 1 of Directive 2004/38/EC. 
253 Cf above 2.1.2.1, a) The right of residence of economically inactive Union citizens. 
254 Cf Article 16 et seq of Directive 2004/38/EC. 
255 Cf Article 21(2) ± first draft of the Directive, COM (2001) 257 final, OJ C 270E, 5.9.2001, p. 
150, and the reasons for the modification, COM (2003) 199 final, OJ C 76, 25.04.2004, p. 13. 
Cf for more details F. Wollenschläger, Grundfreiheit ohne Markt, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 
2007, p. 275 et seq. 
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However, being able to invoke the principle of non-discrimination does not 
mean that an economically inactive Union citizen may (like nationals and 
economically active Union citizens) claim SNCBs from the very first day after 
having entered the host Member State and under all circumstances. Already 
Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC explicitly excludes, as just mentioned, 
equal access to social assistance during the first three months of residence. 
Furthermore, the CJEU made the claim dependent on an assessment of the 
duration of residence,256 the personal situation of the claimant,257 her or his 
integration into the host Member State,258 the nature of the benefit in 
question259 and the consequences for the national social system.260 261 Hence, 
RQO\EXWDW OHDVW³a certain degree of financial solidarity between nationals 
of a host Member State and nationals of other Member States´FIHJBrey, 
paragraph 72) has been acknowledged. Whereas the Dano judgment does not 
mention this principle,262 the CJEU has been more explicit in its ruling in the 
Brey case: 
³,QWKHOLJKWRIDOORIWKHIRUHJRLQJWKHDQVZHUWRWKHTXHVWLRQUHIHUUHGLVWKDW
(8ODZ>«@PXVWEHLQWHUSUHWHGDVSUHFOXGLQJQDWLRQDOOHJLVODWLRQ>«@ZKLFK
even as regards the period following the first three months of residence, 
automatically ± whatever the circumstances ± bars the grant of a benefit, such 
                                                 
256 Judgment in Bidar, C-209/03, EU:C:2005:169; judgment in Förster, C-158/07, 
EU:C:2008:630; judgment in Gottwald, C-103/08, EU:C:2009:597. 
257 Judgment in Brey EU:C:2013:565, paragraph 64, 69. 
258 Judgment in Bidar EU:C:2005:169, paragraph 57 et seq; judgment in Förster 
EU:C:2008:630, paragraph 49 et seq. 
259 Judgment in Collins, C-138/02, EU:C:2004:172; judgment in Ioannidis, C-258/04, 
EU:C:2005:559; judgment in Commission v Austria, C-75/11, EU:C:2012:605, paragraph 63 et 
seq. 
260 Judgment in Bidar EU:C:2005:169; judgment in Förster EU:C:2008:630; judgment in Brey 
EU:C:2013:565. 
261 Cf on the concept of a gradual integration of Union citizens in the host Member State C. 
Schönberger, Unionsbürger, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2005, p. 407 et seq; D. Thym, 
µ6R]LDOOHLVWXQJHQIUXQG$XIHQWKDOWYRQQLFKWHUZHUEVWlWLJHQ8QLRQVEUJHUQ¶NZS, 81, 
87 et seq; F. Wollenschläger, Grundfreiheit ohne Markt, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2007, p. 253 
et seq. 
262 Unlike Advocate General Wathelet in his opinion to this case (Opinion of Advocate General 
Wathelet in Dano EU:C:2014:341, paragraph 127). 
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as the compensatory supplement provided for in Paragraph 292(1) of the 
ASVG, to a national of another Member State who is not economically active, 
on the grounds that, despite having been issued with a certificate of residence, 
he does not meet the necessary requirements for obtaining the legal right to 
reside on the territory of the first Member State for a period of longer than 
three months, since obtaining that right of residence is conditional upon that 
QDWLRQDOKDYLQJVXIILFLHQWUHVRXUFHVQRWWRDSSO\IRUWKHEHQHILW´SDUDJUDSK
80)  
The Grzelczyk case constitutes one further example of this approach for a 
limited, albeit not absolute claim to equal access to social benefits.263 
Finally, it should be noted that important questions have been left open by the 
&-(8¶VFDVH ODZ ,W UHPDLQV WREHGHWHUPLQHGZKHWKHUD0HPEHU6Wate may 
only rely on the justification of protecting the national social assistance system 
ZKHQ ³the grant of a social security benefit could place a burden on that 
0HPEHU6WDWH¶VVRFLDODVVLVWDQFHV\VWHPDVDZKROH´264 which is a very strict 
test. Or, may unreasonableness also be assessed in view of the individual 
claimant? For this the judgment in the Dano case might be an authority.265 A 
further crucial issue is whether a Member State may lay down general rules for 
                                                 
263 Judgment in Grzelczyk EU:C:2001:458, paragraph 27 et seq. 
264 Judgment in Brey EU:C:2013:565, paragraph 72. Cf also the judgment in Bidar 
EU:C:2005:169SDUDJUDSKZKLFKPLJKWUHDGVOLJKWO\OHVVVWULFW³On this point, it must be 
observed that, although the Member States must, in the organisation and application of their 
social assistance systems, show a certain degree of financial solidarity with nationals of other 
Member States (see Grzelczyk, paragraph 44), it is permissible for a Member State to ensure 
that the grant of assistance to cover the maintenance costs of students from other Member 
States does not become an unreasonable burden which could have consequences for the 
overall level of assistance which may be granted by that State´ 
265 Cf the judgment in Dano (8&SDUDJUDSK³To accept that persons who do 
not have a right of residence under Directive 2004/38 may claim entitlement to social 
benefits under the same conditions as those applicable to nationals of the host Member State 
would run counter to an objective of the directive, set out in recital 10 in its preamble, namely 
preventing Union citizens who are nationals of other Member States from becoming an 
unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State´&IDOVR'
7K\Pµ7KHHOXVLYHOLPLWVRIVROLGDULW\5HVLGHQFHULJKWVRIDQGVRFLDOEHQHILWV for economically 
LQDFWLYH8QLRQFLWL]HQV¶CML Rev 52, 17, 27 et seq. 
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access to benefits (which facilitates administrative practice) or whether an 
individual assessment on a case-by-case basis is required.266 
2.1.2.2 DanoDUHYHUVDORIWKH&-(8¶VFDVHODZ" 
In Dano, the CJEU rejected a claim for income-related SNCBs by an 
economically inactive Union citizen who did not have sufficient resources to 
finance her living in the host Member State. Does this mean that the former 
case law with its limited claim to SNCBs for this category of persons, which 
has just been discussed, has been overruled? This is not the case, for the 
&-(8¶V UXOLQJ LQ Dano may be interpreted in two opposite ways. Not only 
PD\ LW EH FRQVLGHUHG D UHYHUVDO RI WKH &-(8¶V IRUPHU FDVH ODZ RQ 8QLRQ
citizenship granting economically inactive Union citizens a limited access to 
social assistance in the host Member State. It may also, in view of the 
particular facts of the case (Ms Dano did not intend to seek a job in Germany, 
but solely moved there in order to gain access to social benefits), be 
interpreted in line with the former CJEU case law.267 
6RPH DXWKRUV DUJXH WKDW ZLWK LWV FOHDU UHMHFWLRQ RI 0V 'DQR¶V FODLP IRU
HQWLWOHPHQW WR VRFLDO DVVLVWDQFH LQ *HUPDQ\ WKH &-(8 VHWV D ³prominent 
counterpoint to the expansive reading of Union citizenship in earlier case 
law´268 Understood as a reaction to anti-European developments within the 
Union in general and to the criticism in view of the CJEU allegedly promoting 
                                                 
266 Cf for the former solution the opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Dano 
(8&SDUDJUDSK³I also note that the Court has held, admittedly in a different 
FRQWH[WWKDWµJHQHUDOO\VSHDNLQJLWFDQQRWEHLQVLVWHGWKDWDPHDVXUH>«@VKRXOGLQYROYHDQ
LQGLYLGXDO H[DPLQDWLRQ RI HDFK SDUWLFXODU FDVH >«@ VLQFH WKH PDQDJHPHQW RI WKH UHJLPH
FRQFHUQHGPXVWUHPDLQWHFKQLFDOO\DQGHFRQRPLFDOO\YLDEOH¶´FIDOVRWKHMXdgment in Förster 
EU:C:2008:630. Emphasising the need for a case-by-case assessment: judgment in Prete, C-
367/11, EU:C:2012:668, paragraph 51. &I IXUWKHU ' 7K\P µ6R]LDOOHLVWXQJHQ IU XQG
$XIHQWKDOWYRQQLFKWHUZHUEVWlWLJHQ8QLRQVEUJHUQ¶NZS, 81, 85 et seq. 
267 6LPLODUO\ + 9HUVFKXHUHQ µ3UHYHQWLQJ %HQHILW WRXULVP LQ WKH (8 D QDUURZ RU EURDG
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHSRVVLELOLWLHVRIIHUHGE\WKH(&-LQ'DQR¶CML Rev 52, 363, 370 et 
seq. 
268 D. Thym, VerfBlog 2014/11/12, http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/eu-freizuegigkeit-als-rechtliche-
konstruktion-nicht-als-soziale-imagination/#.VSS78I5OKt8 (7 April 2015). 
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³VRFLDOWRXULVP´LQSDUWLFXODUDQGWKHUHIRUHDVDSUREDEO\ZLVHGHFLVLRQIURPD
political point of view,269 the ruling of the CJEU may be interpreted as 
generally excluding economically inactive persons from social assistance in 
the host Member State, without assessing their individual background or 
motivation for moving on a case-by-case basis. The general wording of 
paragraph 2 oIWKH&-(8¶Vdictum may support such a broad interpretation.270 
It reads: 
³$UWLFOH  RI 'LUHFWLYH (& >«@ PXVW EH LQWHUSUHWHG DV QRW
precluding legislation of a Member State under which nationals of other 
Member States are excluded from entitlemenW WR FHUWDLQ µVSHFLDO QRQ-
FRQWULEXWRU\FDVKEHQHILWV¶ZLWKLQWKHPHDQLQJRI$UWLFOHRI5HJXODWLRQ
No 883/2004, although those benefits are granted to nationals of the host 
Member State who are in the same situation, in so far as those nationals of 
other Member States do not have a right of residence under Directive 
(&LQWKHKRVW0HPEHU6WDWH´ 
Additionally, any reference to the principle of proportionality is lacking and 
RQH PD\ LQVWHDG UHDG WKH LQWURGXFWLRQ RI D ³right-to-reside-under-Directive 
2004/38/EC-test´ LQWR WKH UXOLQJ271 To complete the picture, the opinion of 
Advocate General Wathelet in the Alimanovic case follows the same lines and 
GRHV QRW PHQWLRQ WKH &-(8¶V IRUPHU FDVH ODZ LQFOXGLQJ Brey, when 
GLVFXVVLQJ WKH VLWXDWLRQ RI ³a national of a Member State who moves to the 
territory of another Member State and stays there for less than three months, 
or for more than three months but without pursuing the aim of seeking 
employment there´272 
                                                 
269 ,Q WKLV UHJDUG FI + 9HUVFKXHUHQ µ3UHYHQWLQJ %HQHILW WRXULVP LQ WKH (8 D QDUURZ RU
EURDGLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHSRVVLELOLWLHVRIIHUHGE\WKH(&-LQ'DQR¶CML Rev 52, 363, 
363 et seq; D. Thym, (2015) CML Rev 52, 17, 20 et seq. 
270 Cf H. Verschueren, op cit, (2015) CML Rev 52, 363, 377. 
271 Cf H. Verschueren, op cit, (2015) CML Rev 52, 363, 378. 
272 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Alimanovic, C-67/14, EU:C:2015:210, paragraph 
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Nonetheless, such an understanding of Dano as overruling the former case law 
of the CJEU on Union citizenship is questioned by the fact that the judgment 
GRHV QRW PHQWLRQ WKH &-(8¶V IRUPHU FDVH ODZ RQ 8QLRQ FLWL]HQVKLS ZLWK D
single word, in particular its rulings in the cases Baumbast,273 Grzelczyk274 and 
Brey.275 In these cases, the CJEU relativised the economic conditions of 
residence for economically inactive Union citizens moving from one Member 
state to another and also (in Grzelczyk and Brey) granted Union citizens 
limited access to social assistance in the host Member State even if not 
fulfilling the economic residence criteria.276 Moreover, the Dano case is based 
on a very specific factual background. The CJEU explicitly underlines in its 
findings that Ms Dano is not only an economically inactive person, but also 
moved to Germany solely in order to gain access to social benefits (paragraph 
66 et seq and 78 ± emphasis added): 
³It is apparent from the documents before the Court that Ms Dano has been 
residing in Germany for more than three months, that she is not seeking 
employment and that she did not enter Germany in order to work. She 
therefore does not fall within the scope ratione personae of Article 24(2) of 
Directive 2004/38/EC. In those circumstances, it must be established whether 
Article 24(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC and Article 4 of Regulation No 
883/2004 preclude refusal to grant social benefits in a situation such as that at 
LVVXHLQWKHPDLQSURFHHGLQJV>«@ 
A Member State must therefore have the possibility, pursuant to Article 7 of 
Directive 2004/38/EC, of refusing to grant social benefits to economically 
inactive Union citizens who exercise their right to freedom of movement solely 
LQRUGHU WRREWDLQDQRWKHU0HPEHU6WDWH¶VVRFLDODVVLVWDQFHalthough they do 
not have sufficient resources to clDLPDULJKWRIUHVLGHQFH´ 
                                                 
273 Judgment in Baumbast EU:C:2002:493. 
274 Judgment in Grzelczyk EU:C:2001:458. 
275 Judgment in Brey EU:C:2013:565. 
276 Cf in detail above, 2.1.2.1 a) The right of residence of economically inactive Union citizens. 
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$JDLQVWWKLVEDFNJURXQGLWLVSHUIHFWO\LQOLQHZLWKWKHIRUPHU&-(8¶VFDVH
law to deny access to the SNCB at issue, since such an exclusion does not 
seem disproportionate in view of the facts of the case.277 For these reasons, a 
narrow interpretation seems to be favourable.278 
2.1.2.3 SNCBs for jobseekers, family members, persons with a permanent resident 
right, former workers retaining their status as workers and workers with low 
income 
As a last and very important point, it should be emphasised that, irrespective 
of its wide or narrow interpretation, the judgment in the Dano case as well as 
the Brey case do not cover all situations in which access to SNCBs (of 
economically inactive persons) is at issue. Rather, specific rules apply to 
jobseekers (1), family members (2), persons with a permanent resident right 
(3), (former) workers (4) or workers with low income (5). 
a) SNCBs for jobseekers 
Since Ms Dano had not entered Germany in order to seek employment and the 
judgment consequently did not address this situation (cf paragraph 66), it has 
remained unclear whether and to what extent jobseekers are entitled to equal 
access to SNCBs (including the German SNCB at issue in the Dano case). 
Residence Directive 2004/38/EC grants jobseekers an (unconditional) right of 
UHVLGHQFHHYHQIRUSHULRGVRIUHVLGHQFHH[FHHGLQJWKUHHPRQWKV³as long as the 
Union citizens can provide evidence that they are continuing to seek 
employment and that they have a genuine chance of being engaged´$UWicle 
14(4)(b)). However, this privileged situation vis-à-vis other economically 
inactive persons (whose right of residence depends on the economic criteria 
                                                 
277 &I ) :ROOHQVFKOlJHU ¶.HLQH 6R]LDOOHLVWXQJHQ IU QLFKWHUZHUEVWlWLJH 8QLRQVEUJHU" =XU
begrenzten Tragweite des Urteils des EuGH in der Rs. 'DQRYRP¶NVwZ, 
1628, 1630. 
278 Similarly H. Verschueren, op cit, (2015) CML Rev 52, 363; F. Wollenschläger, op cit, (2014) 
NVwZ, 1628, 1630. 
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stipulated by Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38/EC) goes hand in hand with 
an exclusion from entitlement to social assistance in the host Member State (cf 
Article 24(2)) of Residence Directive 2004/38/EC). 
In Dano, the CJEU confirmed that this exclusion also applies to SNCBs. For, 
the concept of social assistance ³UHIHUV WRDOODVVLVWDQFHVFKHPHVHVWDblished 
by the public authorities, whether at national, regional or local level, to which 
recourse may be had by an individual who does not have resources sufficient 
to meet his own basic needs and those of his family and who by reason of that 
fact may, during his period of residence, become a burden on the public 
finances of the host Member State which could have consequences for the 
RYHUDOO OHYHO RI DVVLVWDQFH ZKLFK PD\ EH JUDQWHG E\ WKDW 6WDWH´ SDUDJUDSK
63; also Brey, paragraph 61 et seq). 
However, this does not mean that jobseekers may be totally excluded from 
entitlement to SNCBs. First, in its Collins case law, the CJEU acknowledged 
that, 
³>L@Q YLHZ RI WKH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI FLWL]HQVKLS RI WKH 8QLRQ DQG WKH
interpretation in the case-law of the right to equal treatment enjoyed by 
citizens of the Union, it is no longer possible to exclude from the scope of 
[Article 45 para. 2 TFEU] ± which expresses the fundamental principle of 
equal treatment, guaranteed by [Article 18 TFEU] ± a benefit of a financial 
nature intended to facilitate access to employment in the labour market of a 
Member State.´279  
Nonetheless, the Member States may define conditions for entitlement such as 
an appropriate minimum period of residence, if these conditions are applied to 
ensure WKDW ³a genuine link exists between the person seeking work and the 
                                                 
279 Judgment in Collins EU:C:2004:172, paragraph 63; cf further the judgment in Vatsouras 
and Koupatantze, C-22/08 and 23/08, EU:C:2009:344; judgment in Prete EU:C:2012:668, 
paragraph 51. 
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employment market of that State´280 7KH&-(8¶V ILQGLQJV LQ Collins do not 
allow for a substantial residence requirement. In fact, a period of residence 
must not exceed what is necessary in order for the national authorities to be 
able to satisfy themselves that the person concerned is genuinely seeking work 
in the employment market of the host Member State (paragraph 63). 
Moreover, the Prete case has even extended the aspects to be taken into 
account when assessing the genuine link to the labour market of the host 
Member State: 
³7KHH[LVWHQFHRIFORVHWLHV LQSDUWLFXODURIDSHUVRQDOQDWXUHZLWKWKHKRVW
Member State where the claimant has, following her marriage with a national 
of that Member state, settled and now habitually resides are such as to 
contribute to the appearance of a lasting connection between the claimant and 
the Member State in which she has newly established herself, including with 
WKHODERXUPDUNHWRIWKHODWWHU´281 
It is obvious that this case law does not justify a total exclusion of jobseekers 
from social benefits as provided for in Article 24(2) of Directive 
2004/38/EC.282 Consequently, in Vatsouras, the CJEU did not apply this 
exclusion to such benefits covered by Article 45(2) TFEU: 
³%HQHILWV RI D ILQDQFLDO QDWXUH ZKLFK LQGHSHQGHQWO\ RI WKHLU VWDWXV XQGHU
national law, are intended to facilitate access to the labour market cannot be 
                                                 
280 Judgment in Collins EU:C:2004:172, paragraph 69; cf the judgment in Vatsouras and 
Koupatantze EU:C:2009:344, paragraph 38; judgment in Prete EU:C:2012:668, paragraph 32 
et seq. 
281 Judgment in Prete EU:C:2012:668, paragraph 50. 
282 Cf only LSG (Social Court of Second Instance) Nordrhein-Westfalen of 12 March 2014, L 7 
$6%(57.LQJUHHQµ0LJUDWLRQXQG6R]LDOOHLVWXQJHQ- Rechtliche Anmerkungen zu 
HLQHPED\HULVFKHQ$XIUHJHU¶BayVBl, 289, 294. Disagreeing, LSG Bayern, (2014) NZS, 
308. Cf for more details and from a comparative perspective F. Wollenschläger & J. Ricketts, 
µ-REVHHNHUV¶5HVLGHQFH5LJKWVDQG$FFHVVWR6RFLDO%HQHILWV(8/DZDQGLWV,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ
LQWKH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶FMW ± Online Journal on Free Movement of Workers within the 
European Union 7, p. 8, 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=737&langId=en&pubId=7690&type=1&furtherPubs=yes (8 April 2015). 
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regarded as constituting µsocial assistance¶ within the meaning of Article 
24(2) of DireFWLYH(&´283 
This reasoning partially conflicts with Dano, i.e. if an SNCB is also qualified 
DV D µ&ROOLQV EHQHILW¶ IRU Dano has generally applied Article 24(2) of 
Directive 2004/38/EC to SNCBs. In this case, in view of the primacy of EU 
primary law over secondary law, the exclusion may only apply to the extent 
covered by the Collins case law.284 
Even if an SNCB granted to jobseeNHUVGRHVQRWTXDOLI\DVDµ&ROOLQVEHQHILW¶
and thus only Articles 18/21 TFEU apply, it is questionable whether a 
complete exclusion of jobseekers is in line with these provisions of EU 
primary law. After all, if economically inactive persons may claim a limited 
access to SNCBs in the host Member State,285 such a reasoning might all the 
more apply to jobseekers in view of their Janus-faced status as potential 
market actors.286 Consequently, in Vatsouras WKH &-(8 KHOG WKDW ³[i]n any 
event, the derogation provided for in Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC 
must be interpreted in accordance with Article 39(2) EC [=Article 45(2) 
TFEU] ´287 
However, Advocate General Wathelet has, in his opinion in the Alimanovic 
case (paragraph 98), excluded first-time jobseekers from access to social 
assistance (which seems questionable for the reasons just mentioned). He 
states 
³>W@KDWH[FOXVLRQ LV FRQVLVWHQWQRWRQO\ZLWK WKHZRUGLQJRI$UWLFOHRI
Directive 2004/38/EC, in that it authorises the Member States to refuse, 
                                                 
283 Judgment in Vatsouras and Koupatantze EU:C:2009:344, paragraph 45. 
284 Cf also the opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Alimanovic EU:C:2015:210, paragraph 
112 et seq. 
285 Cf above, 2.1.2.1 b) Access of economically inactive Union citizens to social benefits. 
286 Cf F. Wollenschläger & J. Ricketts, op cit, (2014) FMW ± Online Journal on Free Movement 
of Workers within the European Union 7, p. 8 et seq, 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=737&langId=en&pubId=7690&type=1&furtherPubs=yes (8 April 2015). 
287 Judgment in Vatsouras and Koupatantze EU:C:2009:344, paragraph 44. 
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beyond the period of the first three months of residence, to grant social 
assistance to the nationals of other Member States who have entered the 
territory of the host Member State to seek employment, but also with the 
objective difference ± established in the case-law of the Court and, inter alia, 
in Article 7(2) of Regulation No 492/2011 ± between the situation of nationals 
seeking their first job in the territory of the host Member State and that of 
WKRVHZKRKDYHDOUHDG\HQWHUHGWKH>ODERXU@PDUNHW´ 
b) SNCBs for family members 
Generally speaking, the residence right of family members of economically 
inactive Union citizens depends on the aforementioned economic criteria 
unless they enjoy an (unconditional) right of residence as economically active 
Union citizens themselves. Article 24(1), sentence 2 of Directive 2004/38/EC 
extends the claim for non-discrimination to family members of Union citizens. 
Hence, the same rules as discussed above apply. 
One important exception has to be noted, though. Following the C-(8¶VFDVH
law, Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 implies an unconditional 
right of residence for children of EU workers attending general educational 
courses in the host Member State (irrespective of the right of residence of their 
parents). This right has also been extended to the parent who is acting as 
primary carer,288 at least until the child reaches the age of majority or is still in 
need of the presence of that parent in order to complete education.289 Since 
these persons enjoy a right of residence, they are also able to rely on the non-
discrimination principle in order to gain access to social benefits, including 
SNCBs, be it on the basis of Article 24 of Directive 2004/38/EC (even if their 
                                                 
288 Judgment in Baumbast EU:C:2002:493, paragraph 63, 68 et seq; further the judgment in 
Ibrahim, C-310/08, EU:C:2010:80, paragraph 32 et seq and judgment in Teixeira, C-480/08, 
(8&SDUDJUDSKHWVHT&I LQGHWDLO):ROOHQVFKOlJHU µ$NWXHOOH)ragen der EU-
3HUVRQHQIUHL]JLJNHLW¶ LQ $ $FKHUPDQQ 0 &DURQL $ (SLQH\ : .lOLQ 0 6 1JX\HQ 	 3
Uebersax (eds), Jahrbuch für Migrationsrecht 2009/2010, Stämpfli, Bern, 2010, p. 3, 20 et 
seq. 
289 Judgment in Teixeira EU:C:2010:83, paragraph 76 et seq. 
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residence right is derived from a provision of Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 
and not directly from Article 24(1) of the Residence Directive), Article 4 BR, 
Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 492/2011, Article 45(2) TFEU or Article 
18 TFEU.290  
c) SNCBs for persons with a permanent residence right 
Pursuant to Article VHQWHQFHRI'LUHFWLYH(&SHUVRQV³who 
have resided legally for a continuous period of five years in the host Member 
State shall have the right of permanent residence there´ 7KH ULJKW RI
permanent residence does not depend on economic criteria; moreover, access 
to social assistance and SNCBs has to be granted according to Article 24 of 
Directive 2004/38/EC. 
d) SNCBs for former workers retaining their status of workers 
Union workers within the meaning of Article 45 TFEU enjoy a comprehensive 
and absolute claim to equal treatment with national workers regarding access 
to social benefits (cf Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No 492/2011, Article 
45(2) TFEU). In particular, no residence requirement may be justified.291 It 
should be added, though, that with regard to frontier workers, in its recent case 
ODZWKH&-(8KDVDFFHSWHGWKHUHTXLUHPHQWRID³sufficient link of integration 
with the society of that State´292 
                                                 
290 Cf in this respect H. Verschueren, op cit, (2015) CML Rev 52, 363, 376. 
291 Cf e.g. the judgment in Hoeckx, C-249/83, EU:C:1985:139, paragraph 23 et seq; judgment 
in Commission v Luxembourg, C-299/01, EU:C:2002:394, paragraph 12, 14; judgment in 
Frascogna, C-157/84, EU:C:1985:243, paragraph 24; judgment in Commission v Belgium, C-
326/90, EU:C:1992:419. 'LVDJUHHLQJHJ-6WHLQHUµ7KHULJKWWRZHOIDUHHTXDOLW\DQGHTXLW\
XQGHU &RPPXQLW\ ODZ¶  EL Rev 10, 21, 41. Cf on this issue F. Wollenschläger, 
Grundfreiheit ohne Markt, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2007, p. 38 et seq; idem, op cit, (2011) 
ELJ 17, 1, 6.  
292 Cf the judgment in Giersch, C-20/12, EU:C:2013:411, paragraph 63 (return to State after 
studies (paragraph 79) or parent has worked in the State for a certain minimum period of 
time (paragraph 78, 80)); judgment in Krier, C-379/11, EU:C:2012:798, paragraph 53 
(participation in the employment market and therefore contribution to the financing of social 
security (paragraph 53)); judgment in Commission v the Netherlands, C-524/09, 
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In view of access to SNCBs, it has to be highlighted that, under certain 
circumstances, a former worker retains her or his status of worker. The 
conditions are listed in Article 7(3) of Directive 2004/38/EC and relate to 
certain cases of temporary unableness to work, involuntary unemployment and 
vocational training. According to the case law of the CJEU these reasons are 
not exhaustive. Hence, (appropriate) maternity leave does not lead to a loss of 
the status of worker.293 Moreover, the application of Article 7(3) of Directive 
2004/38/EC raises further questions beyond the scope of this analysis.294 
Finally, in his opinion in the Alimanovic case, Advocate General Wathelet 
(paragraph 97 et seq) argued in favour of an entitlement of former workers 
seeking a new job to SNCBs (under certain circumstances), even if not 
fulfilling the criteria of Article 7(3) of Directive 2004/38/EC, if ³WKHH[LVWHQFH
RIDJHQXLQHOLQNZLWKWKHKRVW0HPEHU6WDWH´may be established: 
³,Q WKDW UHJDUG LQ DGGLWLRQ WR PDWWHUV WKDW FDQ EH LQIHUUHG IURP IDPLO\
FLUFXPVWDQFHV VXFK DV WKH FKLOGUHQ¶V HGXFDWLRQ WKH IDFW WKDW WKH person 
concerned has, for a reasonable period, in fact genuinely sought work is a 
factor capable of demonstrating the existence of that link with the host 
Member State. Having worked in the past, or even the fact of having found a 
new job after applying for the grant of social assistance, ought also to be 
WDNHQLQWRDFFRXQWLQWKDWFRQQHFWLRQ´ 
                                                                                                                                               
EU:C:2012:346, paragraph 64 (participation in the employment market and therefore 
contribution to the financing of social security (paragraph 66)); judgment in Geven, C-
213/05, EU:C:2007:438, paragraph 26 (substantial occupation (paragraph 26, 29)); judgment 
in Hartmann, C-212/05, EU:C:2007:437, paragraph 35 et seq (substantial contribution to the 
national labour market (paragraph 36)). Cf further the judgment in Hendrix, C-287/05, 
EU:C:2007:494, paragraph 57 et seq. 
293 Judgment in Saint Prix, C-507/12, EU:C:2014:2007, paragraph 27 et seq.  
294 &I 6 0DQWX µ$QDO\WLFDO 1RWH RQ WKH 5HWHQWLRQ RI (8 ZRUNHU VWDWXV ± Article 7(3)(b) of 
'LUHFWLYH¶DYDLODEOHDWhttp://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=475&langId=en&moreDocuments=yes 
(8 April 2015). 
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e) Social assistance for workers with low income 
It should be mentioned that the concept of worker in EU law is broad, so that 
also persons with low income or working only for a few hours per week may 
TXDOLI\ DV ZRUNHUV DV ORQJ DV WKH HPSOR\PHQW LV ³HIIHFWLYH DQG JHQXLQH´295 
The CJEU confirmed the status of worker for interns,296 part-time employees 
working three to 14 hours per week297 as well as employees with such a low 
income that they have to rely on social assistance.298 Again, persons qualified 
as workers according to this case law enjoy a comprehensive and absolute 
claim to equal treatment regarding access to social benefits.299 
2.1.3 Conclusion 
The case law of the CJEU, in particular Brey and Dano, shows that rules of 
access by economically inactive Union citizens to social benefits are far from 
clear. Not only can several categories of inactive migrants be identified, but 
the CJEU rulings themselves are subject to various interpretations. Even if the 
approach of a limited claim to social benefits definitely prevails, the nature of 
the limits is still largely unknown. 
2.2 Assessment of the proposal (pros/cons)   
When looking to the impacts of the status quo proposal from a legal and 
practical angle, the evaluation is ambiguous. 
                                                 
295 See, inter alia, the judgment in Kempf, C-139/85, EU:C:1986:223, paragraph 14. 
296 Judgment in URSSAF, C-27/91, EU:C:1991:441, paragraph 8; judgment in Bernini, C-3/90, 
EU:C:1992:89, paragraph 15 et seq. 
297 Judgment in Geven EU:C:2007:438, paragraph 17; judgment in Kempf EU:C:1986:223, 
paragraph 11 et seq; judgment in Nolte, C-317/93, EU:C:1995:438, paragraph 19. 
298 Judgment in Levin, C-53/81, EU:C:1982:105, paragraph 11 et seq; judgment in Kempf 
EU:C:1986:223, paragraph 13 et seq; judgment in Nolte EU:C:1995:438, paragraph 19; 
judgment in Mattern, C-10/05, EU:C:2006:220, paragraph 22.  
299 Cf above, 2.1.2.3 d) SNCBs for former workers retaining their status of workers. 
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2.2.1 Clarification 
The status quo leaves open a series of fundamental questions. What should be 
the status of jobseekers, of workers with low income, of family members, of 
former workers retaining their status of workers? How to deal with persons 
who have a genuine link with the Member State where they claim social 
assistance? Do some differences have to be made between social assistance 
benefits according to their objectives or nature? Furthermore, the concrete 
application of the test of proportionality is another source of uncertainty. It is 
indeed unclear under which circumstances a Member State can deny a social 
assistance payment because of an unreasonable burden on its financial 
system.300 In the Brey/Dano judgments, the CJEU underlined that the 
exemption from the equal treatment principle enshrined in Article 24(1) of 
Directive 2004/38/EC and Article 4 BR needs a clear and substantial 
justification by the specific circumstances of the given case. This case-by-case 
reasoning makes it difficult to identify a well-established general rule. 
The case law emphasises301 the right of the Member States to opt out from the 
equal treatment principle but also from the principles of EU coordination law. 
In the Sala302 judgment, the CJEU held that it is not forbidden for the Member 
States to reduce the access to welfare benefits. But if this is done, it should be 
figured out on a clear and explicit legal basis, not through uncodified case law. 
This possibility to give less credit to the principle of equality of treatment set 
out in Article 4 BR will have a great impact on the Member States, as they 
have a broad and diverging understanding of social assistance (see 2.3 below). 
                                                 
300 Judgment in Brey EU:C:2013:565+9HUVFKXHUHQµ)UHH0RYHPHQWRUEHQHILWWRXULVP7KH
UnreaVRQDEOH%XUGHQRI%UH\¶ European Journal of Migration and Law 16, 147-179, 
170 et seq. 
301 Judgment in Brey EU:C:2013:565; H. Verschueren, op cit, (2014) European Journal of 
Migration and Law 16, 147-HWVHT+9HUVFKXHUHQµ3UHYHQWLQJ³EHQHILWWRXULVP´LQ
WKH(8$QDUURZDQGDEURDGLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHSRVVLELOLWLHVRIIHUHGE\WKH&-(8LQ'DQR"¶
(2015) Common Market Law Review 52, 363-390, 370 et seq.  
302 Judgment in Sala EU:C:1998:217. 
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The latter concept is not restricted to means-tested benefits for needy persons, 
but it refers to a great variety of tax-financed social benefits, e.g. with regard 
to assisting persons with special needs due to sickness, unemployment or low 
income, persons of young or old age, with disabilities or an extraordinary 
burden to be borne (e.g. single parents, caretakers) or with regard to 
safeguarding the mobility of the persons entitled or other cases of elementary 
need. The material scope of the exemption is therefore vast and broad, but is 
defined by each Member State.   
$IXUWKHUGLIILFXOW\UHVXOWVIURPWKHYDULRXV0HPEHU6WDWHV¶ODZVZKLFKGHILQH
the conditions for benefit entitlement (see 2.3 below). The entitlement may not 
only depend on nationality, but also on minimum waiting periods. Member 
States do not necessarily have a coherent system to identify entitlement to 
social assistance. Among the national legislations a great variety of rules may 
be found. Further differences can be observed as to the formal requirements 
which are to be fulfilled when applying for benefits: registration, an 
examination of a SHUVRQ¶VHPSOR\DELOLW\RUWKHWHVWZKHWKHUDSHUVRQKDVKHU
or his habitual residence in a given Member State. There are many different 
criteria to determine D SHUVRQ¶V habitual residence. Therefore, when one 
compares the legislations of the Member States there is no common rule under 
which circumstances a social assistance benefit matures. 
2.2.2 Simplification 
7KH PRGHUQLVHG (8 FRRUGLQDWLRQ OHJLVODWLRQ RULJLQDWHG LQ WKH (8¶V µ6/,0¶
initiative3036LPSOHU/HJLVODWLRQIRUWKH,QWHUQDO0DUNHW7RVHWµVLPSOH¶UXOHV 
means to design legislation that is easy to be understood by the persons 
addressed and clear to apply by the administrations of the Member States. 
                                                 
303 Simpler legislation for the internal market (SLIM): a pilot project. Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. COM (96) 204 final, 8 May 1996. 
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Simplification of law is important to create a law which becomes relevant in 
social reality. 
Under the auspices of simplification of coordination law, Option 1 is 
problematic. First, if abstaining from codifying case law may be seen as a way 
to avoid more complex rules in the coordination Regulations, the status quo 
will leave unanswered many questions about the interpretation of Brey/Dano 
(see 2.2.1 above). Second, the status quo would make the situation of non-
active persons very complex with regard to social security coordination rules. 
In the Pinna I judgment304 the CJEU held that it is not permissible for EU law 
to increase the disparities that stem from the absence of harmonisation of 
national legislation. That would be the indirect consequence of the status quo. 
2.2.3 Protection of rights 
The overall target of coordination rules is to protect migrants from any loss of 
social security protection whilst using the fundamental freedom of EU law.305 
For all persons covered by a national social security system, these rules avoid 
botK D GRXEOH FRYHUDJH LQ WZR 0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶ V\VWHPV DQG WKH ODFN RI
coverage.306 If different Member states define the personal scope of their 
social security systems differently, these objectives are in danger. In further 
judgments, as to the BR the CJEU held WKDW LW KDV ³not only to prevent the 
                                                 
304 Judgment in Pinna v Caisse d'allocations familiales de la Savoie, C-41/84, EU:C:1986:1,1.  
305 Judgment in Van der Veen, C-100/63, EU:C:1964:65; judgment in Ciechelsky, C-1/67, 
EU:C:1967:27; judgment in Segers, C-79/85, EU:C:1986:308; W. Brechmann, in C. Calliess & 
M. Ruffert, EUV/AEUV, Beck, München, 2011, Article 48 AEUV Rn. 14 et seq; R. Langer, in M. 
Fuchs, Europäisches Sozialrecht, Beck, München, 2013 (6th edition), Article 48 AEUV Rn. 6 et 
seq. 
306 Judgment in Van der Vecht, C-19/67, EU:C:1967:49; judgment in Perenboom, C-102/76, 
EU:C:1977:71; judgment in Kuijpers, C-276/81, EU:C:1982:317; judgment in Ten Holder, C-
302/84, EU:C:1986:242; judgment in De Paep, C-196/90, EU:C:1991:381; judgment in Sehrer, 
C-302/98, EU:C:2000:322; judgment in Commission v Germany, C-68/99, EU:C:2001:137; S. 
Devetzi, Die Kollisionsnormen des Europäischen Sozialrechts, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 
2000, 39 et seq; F. Pennings, Introduction to European Social Security Law, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 1998 (2nd edition), 71 et seq. 
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simultaneous application of a number of national legislative systems and the 
complications which might ensue, but also to ensure that the persons covered 
by Regulation No 1408/71 are not left without social security cover because 
there is no legislation which is applicable to them.´307 The status quo might, 
however, have this effect if a person applies in the Member State of her or his 
residence for a social benefit which is to be qualified as an SNCB under the 
BR, but does not fulfil the criteria for this social assistance benefit in the 
legislation of the competent State. 
2SWLRQ  HQFRXUDJHV D OLPLWDWLRQ RI PLJUDQWV¶ DFFHVV WR VRFLDO EHQHILWV $
needy migrant, who entered a Member State as an unself-sufficient person, 
may not be entitled to social assistance benefits from her or his State of 
residence and will neither qualify ± due to the lack of legal residence ± for the 
social assistance benefits from his or her previous State of residence. This 
person is likely to be deprived of social protection completely.  
The Brey/Dano case law leads to distinctions between the coordination of 
SNCBs at EU level on one side and social assistance payments by countries at 
national level on the other side. Both types of benefits become a matter of 
shared responsibility for the EU and the Member States. This is new, but not 
XQLTXH8QGHU(8ODZDSULQFLSOHRIµPRUHIDYRXUDEOHWUHDWPHQW¶EHWZHHQ(8
ODZDQG WKH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶ GRPHVWLF UXOHV LV DFNQRZOHGJHG ,Q WKHSDVW LQ
particular in the Bosmann308 and Hudzinski309 cases, the CJEU set rules where 
social security coordination is built upon a European and a Member States 
OHYHO:KHQD0HPEHU6WDWH¶V ODZJLYHVPRUH ULJKWV WR WKHEHQHILFLDU\ WKDQ
the EU rule, the CJEU held that EU law should not hinder more preferential 
entitlements to family benefits. The recent Franzen case confirmed this 
methodology.310 This way to cope with competing legislations from different 
                                                 
307 Judgment in Kits van Heijningen, C-2/89, EU:C:1990:183, paragraph 12; judgment in De 
Paep EU:C:1991:381, paragraph 18. 
308 Judgment in Bosmann, C-352/06, EU:C:2008:290. 
309 Judgment in Hudzinski, C-611/10, EU:C:2012:339. 
310 Judgment in Franzen, C-382/13, EU:C:2015:261. 
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sources is, however, not translated into the Brey and Dano cases. If Member 
6WDWHV¶ social assistance laws differ as to the nationality of the applicant, 
whereas EU law does not, the outcome is detrimental to the beneficiary.   
The consequence of the Brey and Dano case law will be to restrict social 
assistance rights by the mere fact that the Member State of residence is 
changed. In this respect, the proposal does not contribute to widening the 
social protective function of the EU law. 
2.2.4 Administrative burden and implementation arrangements 
The Brey and Dano cases will increase the burden for national administrations. 
7KH DVVHVVPHQW RI µOHJDO UHVLGHQFH¶ ZLOO QHHG WR EH FDUULHG RXW LQ D UHOLDEOH
manner by a public body. Additionally, some Member States (see 2.3 below) 
may impose further tests to be applied by the administrations as to the 
employability, substantive work or successful search for work. Social 
administrations, which have to decide on social assistance benefits, will have 
to control many facts and situations occurring within the competent Member 
State. Distinctions will have to be made at national level between social 
assistance benefits, between claimants (jobseekers, workers with low income 
HWFWKHFRQFHSWRIµILQDQFLDOVROLGDULW\¶ZLOO have to be implemented; and the 
µJHQXLQH OLQN¶ SULQFLSOH QHHGV WR EH FRQFUHWLVHG 8QFRGLILHG FDVH ODZ ZLOO
make the missions of national welfare institutions hugely complex. 
For instance, the assessment as to what degree a social benefit would 
FRQVWLWXWHDQXQUHDVRQDEOHEXUGHQIRUD0HPEHU6WDWH¶VZHOIDUHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ
is hard to make. How should this requirement be tested? Does the individual 
case count or is the trend in general the decisive indicator? Which are the 
determining factors to identify such a burden? Which burden qualifies as 
unbearable (see 2.1 above)? All these criteria are vague, contingent and 
depend on a variety of facts which also undergo changes over time. For both 
the administration and the judiciary this seems to be difficult to deal with.  
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Option 1 will increase administrative procedures, bureaucratisation of mobility 
and will also make fundamental freedoms more difficult to be utilised. 
2.2.5 Avoiding the risk of fraud and abuse 
The debate on poverty migration within Europe is driven by the concern of a 
fraudulent creation of social entitlements by making use of the fundamental 
freedoms of EU law.311 )ROORZLQJ WKH HFRQRPLF WKHRU\ RQ WKH µZHOIDUH
PDJQHW¶312 a generous welfare system attracts migration of poor and welfare-
dependent persons. 
Notably the Dano case can at first glance be seen as an easy way to control 
fraud and abuse. Limits set by the CJEU should save countries from paying 
undue social assistance benefits. In the public debate the exemption of social 
assistance from the equal treatment clause is connected with the combat 
against fraud and abuse. 
Does Option 1 entail risks of double payment? The Dano case does not modify 
the principle in accordance with which the Member State in which the person 
does not habitually reside (be it the home State or the host State) is in general 
free from "SNCB burden". In sum, the State of habitual residence is 
competent; any other State can refuse benefits on the ground that it is not 
competent. Therefore, the risk of double payment seems to be largely reduced 
by Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.   
                                                 
311 .+DLOEURQQHU µ'LH8QLRQVEUJHUVFKDIWXQGGDV(QGH UDWLRQDOHU -XULVSUXGHQ]GXUFKGHQ
(X*+"¶NJW, 2185. 
312 &*UXOLHOOL	-:DQED µ:HOIDUH0LJUDWLRQ¶ LQ$)&RQVWDQW	.)=LPPHUPDQQHGV
International Handbook on the Economics of Migration, Edward Elgar, 
&KHOWHQKDP1RUWKDPSWRQ   * - %RUJDV µ,PPLJUDWLRQ DQG :HOIDUH 0DJQHW¶
(1999) Journal of Labor Economics 17, 607-613-.%UXHFNQHUµ:HOIDUH5HIRUPDQGUDFHWR
WKH%RWWRP7KHRU\DQG(YLGHQFH¶, (2000) Southern Economic Journal 66(3), p. 505-525; E. 
Eichenhofer & C. Abig, Zugang zu Steuerfinanzierten Sozialleistungen nach dem 
Staatsangehörigkeitsprinzip?, LIT, Münster, 2004. 
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This said, in a dual system, in which both the Regulation and Residence 
Directive 2004/38/EC would apply, the risk of double payment could increase 
for practical reasons. Entitlement to social assistance would largely depend on 
national rules, in a context of evolving CJEU case law. However, since Option 
1 does not include a coordination rule, but simply integrates persons into the 
solidarity system of the host Member State without addressing the issue of the 
fate of claims in the country of origin, this may lead to double payments. In 
borderline cases, in which it is unclear whether or not a person is entitled to 
minimum income support, the indicators for a genuine link to the competent 
State will depend on a huge variety of indicators ± related to residence and 
labour market integration ± which are difficult to assess, potentially giving 
leeway to abuse. Because of the legal uncertainties surrounding the 
interrelation between the Regulation and the Directive, it would become 
unclear and dubious how to implement the law, both for administrations and 
courts. This uncertainty could also affect the lacking coordination between the 
Member States ± especially between those who have to manage social 
assistance benefits for beneficiaries leaving this Member State, and those who 
have to decide which persons qualify for a social benefit because she or he has 
established a genuine link in the Member State of residence. It might occur 
that one Member State continues paying benefits to a beneficiary living 
outside that Member State and who can successfully apply for benefits in the 
Member State to which he or she has moved and where he or she tries to 
establish a genuine link. 7KLV FUHDWHV D FDWHJRU\ RI SHRSOH ³VLWWLQJ RQ WZR
VWRROV´ In addition, where a document on the legal residence is issued by the 
administrations, it can be unclear on which facts such a residence is certified. 
Quite often the certificate is issued on the basis of the intention to take 
residence in the Member State, without further proof of whether the residence 
is actually taken. This practice jeopardises the reliability of the certificates. It 
also endangers the risk of double payments by both the out and the ingoing 
Member States as residence can be established easily and formally. 
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2.2.6 Potential financial implications 
The financial impact of the option is hard to assess. The first impression is that 
it might be possible to think that the overall amount of social assistance 
benefits paid will be lower in the EU area. However, since each EU Member 
State will define its own system of entitlement to social assistance, it is likely 
that the new case law will mainly shift the distribution of the financial burden 
between EU Member States: those with generous rules of entitlement or loose 
rules of control may have to pay more benefits. 
As mentioned above, fraud may include situations where a migrant might 
simultaneously receive social assistance in two Member States. 
2.3 A mapping of the impact in the Member States   
In the Member States examined, the right to social assistance depends on and 
GHILQLWHO\ UHTXLUHV WKH DSSOLFDQW¶V SHUPDQHQW VWD\ ZLWKLQ WKH WHUULWRU\ RI WKH
Member State. This form of stay is conceived as habitual residence, which 
depends on a permanent residence in a given State. This condition for 
entitlement to a social assistance benefit in all Member States is compatible 
with the conditions under which persons are entitled to an SNCB in the 
context of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 
987/2009 (IR)). 
In some Member States, like Cyprus, the notion of habitual residence is 
unknown, but the concept is applied in the context of defining a permanent 
stay. In the United Kingdom, the habitual residence test applies to many non-
contributory benefits ± above all also to EEA jobseekers. Exempted from the 
test, however, are EEA workers or self-employed persons (which have to do 
genuine and effective work) and their family members, if they are workers, 
self-employed, jobseekers, pensioners or self-sufficient, and, finally, persons 
who were in the past employed in the United Kingdom, and are temporarily ill, 
in vocational training, disabled or old.  
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To test whether a person has her or his habitual residence in a given Member 
State, a wide range of circumstances is taken into account in national 
legislation. A person¶V FHQWUH RI LQWHUHVW LV LGHQWLILHG E\ FULWHULD OLNH WKH
duration of stay, the employment, the living conditions and the relation to 
family members and further indicators that the person belongs to a given State 
socially. In Hungary the test is based upon the accommodation, the 
employment and the ability to guarantee the subsistence of the applicant and 
her or his family. In Ireland similar criteria apply, such as the length and 
continuity of stay, the nature of employment, the centre of interest and future 
intentions as to the change of permanent stay. In Germany a cumulative 
analysis of various indicators and in the Netherlands a global test apply as to 
DSHUVRQ¶VJHQXLQH OLQN WR WKH ODERXUPDUNHW DQG WKH VRFLHW\RI WKH0HPEHU
State. These criteria widely correspond with the rules established by Article 11 
IR, which stipulates the same criteria than the habitual residence test under 
domestic law. 
The legal concept of social assistance is broad and not to be restricted to 
means-tested benefits for needy persons. It also includes non-contributory 
social benefits to assist persons with special needs due to sickness, 
unemployment (AT, DE, IE, IT, LV, and UK), low income (AT, DE, NL and 
UK), their young (NL) or old age (AT, DE, HU, IE, IT, LV, UK), a disability 
(AT, DE, HU, IE, IT, LV and UK) or an extraordinary burden to be borne ± 
e.g. for single parents (IE and IT), caretakers (LV, LT) ± due to the mobility 
of the persons entitled (UH, LT), housing costs (UK) or other cases of 
elementary need (IE, UK). 
In addition, Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, 
Lithuania and the Netherlands demand from the beneficiaries to have their 
legal residence within this Member State. For the United Kingdom this 
condition has to be fulfilled for child benefits, and by jobseekers with regard 
to entitlements for a means-tested universal benefit, including child and 
housing benefits. Further conditions for benefits are residence in accordance 
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with the Member StDWHV¶ ODZV RQ PLJUDWLRQ ,Q VRPH 0HPEHU 6WDWHV WKH
requirements for a legal residence depend on a minimum period of previous 
residence, e.g. a minimum period of permanent stay of 20 years (for those 
under the age of 40 years) or 35 years (for those over the age of 18 years) in 
the Member State (CY); or 60 months and within this period a permanent 
residence in this State for at least 12 months (LV) before the benefit may be 
requested. In Austria the law on EU migration and EU migrants explicitly 
forbids to take residence without having sufficient resources to safeguard the 
PLJUDQW¶V VXEVLVWHQFH RU IRU SXUSRVHV RWKHU WKDQ WR WDNH XS HPSOR\PHQW ,Q
this context, the concept of and, hence, the minimum requirements for an 
adequate employment are formally characterised by law. The right to 
residence can be temporarily restricted. In the United Kingdom this can be 
done for jobseekers after six months of inefficient search, a lack of linguistic 
abilities or substantial work. 
In the context of the right to social assistance this means that the residence 
WDNHQPXVWEH ODZIXOXQGHU WKH0HPEHU6WDWH¶V ODZRQ WKHPLJUDWLRQRI(8
citizens. In addition, there may be formal requirements such as having a 
personal number for identification, an explicit residence permit issued by the 
competent Member State (AT, CY, HU, IE, IT, LV) or a medical document 
FRQFHUQLQJDSHUVRQ¶VHPSOR\DELOLW\LV, UK). This law has to be in line with 
the requirements established by Directive 2004/38/EC. The interplay between 
the factual and the legal concept of residence is, however, not in all Member 
States clear and settled (e.g. DE). 
A further fundamental distinction is made by the Member States with regard to 
the nationality of the beneficiaries. In some of the Member States, the social 
minimum protection for jobseekers is excluded for EU migrants. For them, if 
they come to the Member State where they take their habitual residence, an 
additional restriction is provided for. This can be based on a further period of 
up to three months as a jobseeker after the establishment (AT) in the labour 
PDUNHWRIWKH0HPEHU6WDWHRIUHVLGHQFHRURIWKHEHQHILFLDU\¶VQDWLRQDOLW\ 
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7KH GHFLVLRQ RQ WKH EHQHILFLDU\¶V ULJKW LV VLQJOHG RXW DV WR WKH VSHFLILF
circumstances of the individual case, insofar as the habitual and legal 
residence test is concerned. Further tests of the individual situation apply as to 
WKHIDFWDQGGXUDWLRQRIDQDSSOLFDQW¶VGHJUHHRIODERXUPDUNHWLQWHJUDWLRQ,Q
many countries the Brey and Dano judgments raised great public and 
academic attention and led to doubts within the administration and judiciary. 
Much concern was expressed regarding how to assess whether a social benefit 
could turn into an unreasonable burden for a Member State. 
2.4 General evaluation of Option 1     
Retaining the status quo will leave the legal development open for further case 
law. In this respect, this is an acceptable proposition, given that the Brey and 
Dano rulings are far from covering all concrete situations. Risks of fraud and 
abuse are probably limited. Nevertheless, Option 1 raises problems outside 
and inside the coordination rules. 
The status quo means that Member States may differentiate between their 
nationals and non-nationals with regard to access to social assistance. The 
treatment of poor people vis-à-vis social assistance will vary widely according 
to the country of residence. National rules are likely to become more and more 
restrictive, with all the usual problems when conflicting national laws apply to 
transnational situations. Many poor migrants will find themselves without 
VRFLDODVVLVWDQFH6WLOOWKHUHZRXOGEHQRJXDUDQWHHWKDW(8FRXQWULHV¶RYHUDOO
expenditure on social assistance will diminish: migrants may simply shift from 
one Member State to another and double payment situations could increase. 
The status quo allows an exemption from key principles of EU social security 
coordination law. How will case law interact with rules on SNCBs? With 
regard to this question, various practices might occur between countries and 
within countries. This case law affects the internal coherence of the 
coordination rules in general and of SNCBs in particular. It will also be the 
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source of practical problems for national and local social security institutions 
having to deal with several sources of law for the determination of social 
assistance rights claimed by non-active migrants: to what extent coordination 
rules will have to be left unapplied or adapted is not easy to determine.  
Negative effects of Option 1 may, however, be the necessary counterpart if the 
legislature wants to wait until case law stabilises. In particular, the statuses of 
jobseekers, former workers, frontier workers, workers with low income and 
family members need to be clarified. The CJEU also needs to be more specific 
about the proportionality test FRQFHUQLQJ WKH µILQDQFLDO EXUGHQ¶ DQG KRZ WKH
SULQFLSOH RI µILQDQFLDO VROLGDULW\¶ LPSDFWV DFFHVV WR VRFLDO DVVLVWDQFH LQ
concrete cases, in order to guarantee a uniform application and therefore legal 
certainty within the Union. 
Option 1 is, however, not supposed to be a long-term option. Option 1 leaves 
room for further step-by-step developments in the case law of the CJEU, yet it 
results in legal uncertainty and leaves many questions open. Moreover, the 
ability of case law to lay down general rules going beyond specific cases is 
very limited. Furthermore, fundamental political issues are involved (the 
degree of social solidarity owed to economically inactive EU citizens) which, 
in view of democratic legitimation, should be addressed by the Union 
legislature. The CJEU case law should be considered as a work in progress 
with an unforeseeable future. Under these circumstances a wait-and-see 
position should be appropriate for the next few years. Later, legislative action 
should be taken at its best on the basis of a matured case law, in which the 
growing pains have been removed. 
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3 Option 2a: limitation of the equal treatment principle set out in 
Article 4 BR for special non-contributory cash benefits (SNCBs) 
3.1 Legal analysis of the proposal 
3.1.1 Incorporation of Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC into 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
The codification of Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC into Regulation 
(EC) No 883/2004 (BR) could make sense. Let us recall that this provision 
VWDWHVWKDW³the host Member State shall not be obliged to confer entitlement to 
social assistance during the first three months of residence or, where 
appropriate, the longer period provided for in Article 14(4)(b), nor shall it be 
obliged, prior to acquisition of the right of permanent residence, to grant 
maintenance aid for studies, including vocational training, consisting in 
student grants or student loans to persons other than workers, self-employed 
persons, persons who retain such status and members of their families´ 
Option 2a intends to incorporate rules on social assistance for migrants which 
the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regards as 
being intertwined. This option would, therefore, create symmetric rules in the 
freedom of movement law and the social security coordination.  
Deviation from the equal treatment principle set out in Article 4 BR is legally 
possible. Such a revision could close the gap between the CJEU case law and 
Article 4 BR. Exemptions from the equal treatment principle would be 
explicitly stipulated in the BR. The key problem is to determine the best legal 
way to implement Option 2a. 
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3.1.2 Possible legislative solutions 
The emergence of SNCBs was an outcome of the case law of the CJEU. It 
provided for a new, distinct and special system of social security coordination 
for mixed benefits. This system is built on special principles and establishes 
coordination principles on its own.313 It is based on three interrelated 
SULQFLSOHVWKHDSSOLFDEOHODZLVWKHODZRIWKHFODLPDQW¶VFRXQWU\RIUHVLGHQFH
the non-discrimination of persons as to their nationality and, finally, the non-
exportability of the benefits applies.314 This special coordination regime was 
built separate from the general coordination system, but at the same time took 
on board some of its principles. Such principles would be substantially 
affected by Option 2a. 
First, the meaning of residence would not be the one found in Article 11 of 
Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. Residence is conceived as a factual concept. In 
the context of Directive 2004/38/EC, however, it is defined as a legal 
concept.315 Second, the principle of equal treatment of persons, irrespective of 
their nationality, would be exposed to a profound change: differences between 
nationals and non-nationals would be permitted. The proposal would not only 
modify, but deeply alter the current system of coordination of SNCBs. 
With regard to the incorporation of Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC into 
the BR, it should be noted that the Directive is not primarily about setting 
standards of social security coordination. It gives Member States the right to 
establish their own rules of social assistance entitlement. If Article 24(2) was 
incorporated into the BR, this rule would change its function from an option 
for the Member States to a necessity at EU law level. 
                                                 
313
 See 1 above 
314 See 1 DERYH + 9HUVFKXHUHQ µ)UHH 0RYHPHQW RU %HQHILW 7RXULVP 7KH 8QUHDVRQDEOH
%XUGHQRI%UH\¶The European Journal of Migration and Law 16, 169 et seq. 
315 See 1 above; and this despite the case law does not require the Member States to restrict 
the social assistance benefits to a legal residence.  
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On the basis of these preliminary remarks, it appears that Article 24(2) could 
be inserted into the BR in different ways: 
 A first solution could be to introduce this provision as a general rule of 
coordination in Article 4 BR. 
 A second solution could be to create a specific exemption in the context of 
Article 70 BR.  
 A third solution could be to introduce Article 24(2) as part of Article 3(5) BR. 
 Finally it could be examined to find an appropriate solution on the basis of the 
µJHQXLQHOLQN¶FRQFHSWLQWKHFRQWH[WRI$UWLFOH%5 
Each sub-option needs to be evaluated. 
3.1.2.1 Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC as an exemption of Article 4 BR? 
$UWLFOH%5SURYLGHV WKDW³[a]ll persons shall enjoy the same rights and be 
subject to the same obligations under the legislation of any Member State as 
the nationals thereof´´unless otherwise provided for´E\WKH%57KHUHIRUH
such an exemption could be made. 
This sub-option would, however, be problematic, not only because it would go 
against RecLWDO  %5 ZKLFK GHFODUHV WKDW ´it is necessary, within the 
framework of such coordination, to guarantee within the Community equality 
of treatment under the different national legislation for the person concerned´ 
Sub-option a would indeed put too great an emphasis on social assistance. This 
branch of social protection is important, but ± both from the social and the 
economic view ± less important than the social security risk related branches. 
Article 4 BR applies to all rules of coordination and all social security 
benefits. The new exemption would set a false accent on benefits which are 
not at the heart of the coordination system. 
)XUWKHUPRUHLQWKH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶ODZWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEDVHGRQQDWLRQDOLW\LV
just one factor to exclude migrants from social assistance. There are other 
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factors, above all the lawful residence and labour market/society integration. 
Bearing those criteria in mind, it would not be sufficient to adapt the equality 
treatment principle to codify the CJEU case law. 
It is therefore not recommended to incorporate Article 24(2) of Residence 
Directive 2004/38/EC into Article 4 BR. 
3.1.2.2 Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC as an exemption of Article 70 BR? 
Article 24(2) of the Residence Directive relates to social assistance as do the 
provisions on SNCBs. Since Article 70 BR refers to social assistance 
specifically, it would seem the appropriate place to integrate an additional 
provision on social assistance benefits. SNCBs have a hybrid character: they 
are part of both social security and social assistance legislation. The 
integration of rules into Article 70 BR could be done even if social assistance 
benefits as such are not listed as SNCBs and do not follow the general rules 
established by Article 70 BR. Therefore, a provision on social assistance could 
find its place in Article 70 BR. 
There is, however, a problem to underline: social assistance payments may not 
necessarily be SNCBs, nor are SNCBs necessarily social assistance benefits.316 
A first difficulty would be to make a distinction between the two categories of 
benefits. This distinction should be added to the definition of SNCBs given by 
Article 70(2)2 BR. A second and major difficulty derives from the fact that if 
Article 24(2) was taken as a rule to abandon the principles established for 
SNCBs by Article 70(2) BR (entitlement based on residence, non-exportation 
and equal treatment of all EU nationals), internal coherence of the legal system 
of SNCBs would be affected in two respects. First, it would introduce a 
different notion of residence (legal versus factual). Second, the equal treatment 
clause ± decisive for the SNCBs ± would be left out for social assistance 
payments. Only the non-exportation clause would apply to both categories of 
                                                 
316
 Cf however the judgment in Dano EU:C:2014:2358, paragraph 63. 
 307 
 
benefits. The integration of derogatory residence/equal treatment rules into 
Article 70 BR would establish a deep contrast within the provision itself. It is 
difficult to imagine that opposing imperatives would apply within the same 
Article aiming to coordinate social benefits of a similar character and both 
with a social assistance dimension.  
Despite the fact that Brey and Dano emphasise that SNCBs fall under the 
meaning of µsocial assistance¶ in Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC, it 
should not be recommended to incorporate this provision in Article 70 BR. 
The concepts of µsocial assistance¶ and µSNCB¶ differ; the first is broader than 
the latter. Article 3(5) BR excludes social assistance from the substantive 
scope of application of the BR: why should it become a concept within the 
BR? Additionally, Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC does not primarily 
concern coordination in the EU context, but non-coordination of benefits 
ULJKWV RQ WKH EDVLV RI0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶ SUHURJDWLYHV )LQDOO\ Article 24(2) of 
Directive 2004/38/EC allows distinctions for social benefits ± above all 
nationality and lawful residence ± which are unlawful under the BR. 
Therefore, to incorporate Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC would 
establish a profound contradiction between on the one hand the special 
coordination law ± EU rules for SNCBs ± and on the other hand the 
integration of a provision which allows the Member States to abandon the 
leading principles of the BR ± and this in respect of µsocial assistance¶ benefits 
which are in general and in substance completely excluded from the BR. 
Our conclusion is that it is not recommended that Article 24(2) of Directive 
2004/38/EC is integrated into Article 70 BR. 
3.1.2.3 Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC as part of Article 3(5) BR 
Article 24(2) of the Residence Directive could be integrated into the BR as a 
part of Article 3(5) BR. Pursuant to this provision, social and medical 
assistance benefits are excluded from EU coordination.  
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This solution would concur with the intention of Article 24(2) since it enables 
the Member States to establish rules about the transnational dimensions of 
their social assistance legislation without any EU law interference. This 
insertion would create coherence within EU coordination law.   
Still, there is a first hindrance which makes this proposal problematic. It would 
revitalise the question whether the complete exclusion of a very broad range of 
social benefits (providing minimum means of existence from EU coordination) 
could be justified if they are at the same time regarded as social security 
benefits due to their characteristic as SNCBs. In this respect, the question 
arises whether the case law, which emphasises the double characteristic of 
these benefits as both SNCBs in the meaning of the BR and as social 
assistance benefits in the meaning of Directive 2004/38/EC could be 
compatible with such legislation. Article 3(3) BR identifies SNCBs as a 
category of social security benefits. As long as this rule exists, it would be 
inconsistent with the EU rules to exclude social assistance benefits from the 
material scope of the coordination if they are at the same time qualified as 
61&%V7KHFRQWUDGLFWLRQEHWZHHQWKH(8UXOHVDQGWKH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶UXOHV
on social assistance benefits would be kept.  
If Article 24(2) was integrated into Article 3(5) BR, this would also overrule 
the previous and constant case law of the CJEU as to which social assistance 
benefits with minimum protection characteristic should be conceived as social 
security benefits under the concept of SNCBs. This reasoning and ruling of the 
CJEU historically led to the incorporation of SNCBs into the BR.   
Finally, the rationale of Article 24(2) is not the exclusion of certain categories 
of social benefits from the coordination regime. Its main intention is to 
exclude persons from entitlement to social benefits because they are not 
adequately integrated into the society of a Member State. This problem relates 
to the question which persons are covered under the BR by the legislation of a 
Member State, but it does not primarily relate to the question which subject 
matters should be conceived as part of EU coordination law.   
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Therefore, this option should also be disregarded. 
3.1.2.4 6ROXWLRQ RQ WKH EDVLV RI WKH µJHQXLQH OLQN¶ FRQFHSW LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI $Uticle 
11(3) BR 
Whereas Article 11(3)(a) to (e) BR sets rules of conflict of law, Article 24(2) 
of the Residence Directive enables Member States to exclude persons from 
their social assistance legislation by rules they can establish. Therefore, could 
Article 24(2) be integrated in the form of a negative clause to the existing rules 
of conflict of law set out in Article 11(3)(a) to (e) BR? 
Article 11(3)(e) BR could provide an exemption. Thus, according to rules of 
conflict of law a competent Member State could exclude migrants from social 
assistance ± even if the benefits concerned are income-related SNCBs ± if 
these migrants have neither a legal residence, nor a link to the labour market, 
nor the nationality of the competent State. In this proposal the other main rules 
on the coordination of SNCBs ± in particular the ones examined (Articles 4, 
70, 3(5) BR) ± could be kept unchanged. 
This solution would also coincide with the CJEU case law where a genuine 
link between the applicant and the Member State more or less overtly assumes 
a key role.317 In this approach, it could be provided that social assistance 
benefits to which non-active persons are in principle entitled due to their 
residence in the competent Member State, can be restricted by the Member 
6WDWHV¶ OHJLVODWLRQ WR PLJUDQWV ZKR KDYH D OHJDO UHVLGHQFH ZKR KDYH WKH
nationality of the competent State and who are integrated into the labour 
market of this State. 
This approach could combine the provisions on the freedom of movement with 
the social legislation in such a manner that the exclusion of unself-sufficient 
migrants, as in the cases Dano and Brey, could be adequately dealt with within 
                                                 
317 This was the main argument in the opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in the currently 
pending case Alimanovic, delivered on 26 March 2015 (Opinion in Alimanovic, C-67/14, 
EU:C:2015:210). 
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the BR rules. The BR indeed translates the concept of a genuine link in Article 
D DQG H %5 LQWR VSHFLILF WLHV WKH ZRUNSODFH IRU WKH ZRUNHUV¶
protection, the legal seat for the self- HPSOR\HG SHUVRQV¶ SURWHFWLRQ DQG
finally, the residence as the key connecting factor for non-working persons.     
This new provision could be enacted in Article 11 in conjunction with section 
HDQGFRXOGEHH[SUHVVHGLQWKHIROORZLQJZRUGV³The Member States ± 
competent on the basis of Article 11(3)(e) BR because of a residence in this 
State, may exclude persons from social assistance benefits who are neither 
nationals nor a legal resident nor integrated into the labour market of the 
Member State as a worker, self-employed person, jobseeker or family 
member.´ 
3.2 Assessment of the proposal (pros/cons)   
When considering the four legislative alternatives reflected upon in the 
previous parts, the first three turn out not to adequately express the intention of 
Article 24(2) of the Residence Directive. Only Sub-option d is worth being 
explored. Therefore, this option alone will be assessed. The outcome of the 
evaluation is ambiguous. 
3.2.1 Clarification 
The proposal to introduce a negative clause in the provisions of the BR on 
applicable law might be regarded as unusual. One might argue that the 
integration of negative clauses in order to determine the applicable law would 
lead to a paradox. It may also affect the coherence of the system of rules of 
conflict of law. 
Such a negative clause would need to be supplemented by an additional legal 
provision to allow the Member States to deny access to social assistance 
benefits on the basis of and in line with CJEU case law. 
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However, important problems of implementation would remain in practice and 
would have to be dealt with by each Member State separately. What is social 
assistance? What is legal residence? Who would be considered integrated into 
the labour market?  
3.2.2 Simplification 
The introduction of a negative clause of conflict of law would be a way to 
EHWWHUFRRUGLQDWH WKH&-(8¶VUXOLQJVRQVRFLDODVVLVWDQFHDQGWKHIXQFWLRQing 
of income-related SNCBs. In this respect, it should bring simplification.    
However, the integration of the provision into the BR would increase the 
complexity of the rules incorporated therein. It would also enhance the 
difficulties mentioned in how to interpret the conditions under which the 
exclusive rule applies with regard to Article 24(2).   
3.2.3 Protection of rights 
The proposal does not concern opening access to social rights or safeguarding 
social rights in transnational contexts, but restricts entitlement to social 
DVVLVWDQFHWRWKRVHZKRDUHQRWUHJDUGHGDVSDUWRID0HPEHU6WDWH¶VVRFLHW\. 
Therefore, this proposal is problematic with regard to Recital 1 BR, which 
states that ´>W@KHUXOHVIRUFRRUGLQDWLRQRIQDWLRQDOVRFLDOVHFXULW\V\VWHPVIDOO
within the framework of the free movement of persons and should contribute 
towards improving their standard of living and conditions of employment.´ 
3.2.4 Administrative burden and implementation arrangements 
The same problems as described in Option 1 would be observed. The proposal 
would not reduce the complex assessments and evaluations to be performed. 
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3.2.5 Avoiding the risk of fraud and abuse 
Since entitlement to social assistance will depend on national rules in a context 
of unstable CJEU case law, there could be an increased risk of social tourism ± 
non-active migrants moving to countries where entitlement conditions are the 
easiest to comply with or where administrative control is loose. More 
generally, the risk of fraud may increase since the assessment of the residence 
condition will be based on factual and unclear elements. The assessment of 
Option 1 in terms of fraud and abuse is largely transposable to Option 2a. 
3.2.6 Potential financial implications 
The same observation made for the previous option applies to this option.   
3.3 A mapping of the impact in the Member States  
The concept of legal residence differs between Member States. Some Member 
States demand a minimum period of previous residence. In Cyprus, legal 
residence depends on a permanent stay of 20 or 35 years. In Latvia residence 
is required of 60 months and within this period of permanent residence at least 
12 months, before a person is entitled. Some Member States explicitly forbid 
to take residence without having sufficient resources to safeguard the 
mLJUDQW¶VVXEVLVWHQFHRUIRUSXUSRVHVRWKHUWKDQWRWDNHXSHPSOR\PHQWAT, 
DE, HU, LV, LT, UK). Consequently, the concept of and, hence, the 
minimum requirements for an adequate employment characterised by national 
law might vary. 
Further complications result from distinctions made concerning the 
EHQHILFLDULHV¶ QDWLRQDOLW\ AT, CY, HU, IE, IT, LV) or an additional 
restriction for a further period of up to three months for jobseekers after the 
establishment in the labour market of the Member State of residence (AT). 
7KLVHQWDLOVGHYLDWLRQVIURP(8ODZE\FRQIOLFWLQJ0HPEHU6WDWHV¶ ODZ7KH
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same is true for criteria according to which the benefits are accessible. As in 
the United Kingdom, a complex test is to be applied to determine whether a 
person has his or her habitual residence in a Member State or is substantially 
employed, active as a jobseeker or has the prospect of being considered as 
employable.  
The different Member States have enacted various criteria to define the 
circumstances: identifications by means of an explicit residence permit issued 
by the competent State (AT, CY, HU, IE, IT, LV) or a medical document 
FRQFHUQLQJ D SHUVRQ¶V HPSOR\DELOLW\ Latvia, UK), which are to be fulfilled 
both in substance and in the procedure for a social assistance benefit.  
Therefore, even if it could be feasible to define on EU level and within the BR 
criteria for social assistance benefits on the basis of the two cases, it would 
remain an open question how to cope with the on-going differences between 
the EU UXOHV DQG WKH 0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶ GLYHUJHQW DQG QRQ-concurring laws on 
social assistance. 
3.4 General evaluation of Option 2a     
It appears that it is very difficult to transpose the limitation of the equal 
treatment principle for income-related SNCBs into the coordination 
Regulations. 
The analyses of four sub-propositions show that there is a great risk that the 
overall coherence of the SNCB system is undermined and that legal 
inconsistencies are generated within the coordination Regulations. In this 
regard, the last sub-proposition (the insertion of a negative rule of conflict) 
might be the only one without such effect, even if its complexity and the 
consequences it would have on the system of rules of conflict of law raise 
questions about its relevance.     
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In any case, since the equality of treatment is only one side of the question, a 
modification of the coordination rules dealing exclusively with this matter 
would not be sufficient to clarify rules applicable to social assistance. 
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4 Option 2b: Removal of the special non-contributory cash benefits 
(SNCBs) from the material scope of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
4.1 Legal analysis of the proposal 
4.1.1 Introduction 
Option 2b consists in the removal of the income-related SNCBs from the 
scope of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (BR). The CJEU included hybrid 
benefits in the scope of the Regulation, against the wishes of the Council. Two 
decades later the Council responded by devising the special system for 
SNCBs. As that system has now been destabilised by the CJEU, it is 
understandable that the option of removing the SNCBs from the scope of the 
Regulation holds some appeal. Option 2b would have the effect of subjecting 
DOO µVRFLDO DVVLVWDQFH¶ ZLWKLQ WKH PHDQLQJ RI 'LUHFWLYH (& WR D
common legal regime: it would be governed by national law, Directive 
2004/38/EC and the TFEU. 
This section determines the impact of Option 2b on citizens and 
administrations. It identifies the provisions of the Regulation that are relevant 
to SNCBs and that would no longer govern SNCBs under Option 2b. 
Furthermore, it analyses the consequences of this change. Essentially, this 
section concludes that: 
 Option 2b would replace Article 70 BR as far as income-related SNCBs are 
concerned and Article 6 BR with a difficult, case-by-case appraisal of whether a 
claimant has sufficient links with a Member State to claim its ex-SNCBs; 
 the repeal of the provisions of the BR on equal treatment and assimilation is 
largely neutral, as the same rights and duties derive from the TFEU and 
Directive 2004/38/EC; 
 Option 2b would complicate the cooperation and communication between social 
security institutions. 
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Overall, it seems that the attractiveness of Option 2b does not resist closer 
examination. 
As a preliminary point, it needs to be specified that Option 2b is not relevant 
to persons who lack a right to reside. Such persons can be excluded from 
income-related SNCBs in the circumstances described under Option 1. 
Whether or not SNCBs are still covered by the Regulation has no influence on 
their legal position. In other terms, since Ms Dano and her son could not 
derive any protection from the Regulation, the inapplicability thereof would 
not in the slightest affect their rights. 
The Regulation is however relevant to persons who have a right to reside in 
the State where they claim SNCBs. This concerns, inter alia, the nationals of 
that State and persons holding the status of long-term resident under Article 16 
of Directive 2004/38/EC. Under national and international law,318 the nationals 
of a State have a right to reside on its territory. For instance, while Irish 
nationals automatically satisfy the right-to-reside condition in Ireland, they 
may fail to actually qualify for SNCBs on other grounds. The Regulation 
might assist such citizens in claiming income-related SNCBs. The same is true 
for the categories of migrant citizens against whom right-to-reside conditions 
may not be enforced. Finally, Member States are free to set right-to-reside 
requirements or not. Where a State does not require the applicant for certain 
SNCBs to have a right to reside, persons, even where they do not have such a 
right, might derive protection from the Regulation. These three categories 
cannot be (or are not) denied benefits on the basis of Dano; they may therefore 
find the Regulation helpful in claiming benefits. The removal of income-
related SNCBs from the scope of the Regulation is liable to have an impact on 
their legal position. 
                                                 
318 E.g. the judgment in McCarthy, C-434/09, EU:C:2011:277, paragraph 29 and cases cited. 
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4.1.2 Towards a case-by-case assessment of the real link 
Under the current coordination framework, SNCBs are served in one Member 
State only, i.e. the State in which a person habitually resides.319 If the 
institutions of different Member States hold different views on the location of 
DSHUVRQ¶VKDELWXDOUHVLGHQFHWKH\PXVWUHDFKDQDJUHHPHQWXQGHU$UWLFOH
of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 (IR) 7KDW SURYLVLRQ GHPDQGV ³an overall 
assessment of all available information relating to relevant facts´ ,WV ILUVW
paragraph contains a non-exhaustive list of indicators.320 Article 11(2) IR 
provides that, in the event that the institutions fail to reach an agreement, the 
SHUVRQ¶V LQWHQWLRQ DV DSSDUHQW IURP WKH FLUFXPVWDQFHV LV GHFLVLYH 3HUVRQV
have one ± and only one ± place of habitual residence. In Wencel, the CJEU 
held that a person cannot have more than one habitual centre of interests.321 It 
is generally accepted that everyone must have one place of habitual 
residence,322 which may be located outside the EU.323 As a result, every citizen 
who lives in a Member State can claim benefits in that Member State ± and 
nowhere else.324 Of course, right-to-reside conditions and other requirements 
may prevent a migrant from effectively enjoying SNCBs in the competent 
Member State. 
                                                 
319 Article 1(j) BR and Article 70 BR. 
320 I.e. the duration and continuity of presence on the territory of the Member States 
concerned; the nature and the specific characteristics of any activity pursued, in particular 
the place where such activity is habitually pursued, the stability of the activity, and the 
duration of any work contract; his or her family status and family ties; the exercise of any 
non-remunerated activity; in the case of students, the source of their income; his or her 
housing situation, in particular how permanent it is; the Member State in which the person is 
deemed to reside for taxation purposes. There is no order of preference between those 
indicators (judgment in I v Health Service Executive, C-255/13, EU:C:2014:1291, paragraph 
46). 
321 Judgment in Wencel, C-589/10, EU:C:2013:303, paragraph 48, paragraph 51. 
322 Cf Article 11 IR. 
323 European Commission, Practical guide on the applicable legislation in the European Union 
(EU), the European Economic Area (EEA) and in Switzerland, 2013, p. 42-43. Consider e.g. the 
situation of the claimant in the judgment in Collins EU:C:2004:172. 
324 The CJEU ruled that a worker could access an SNCB in his or her Member State of work in 
which he or she no longer lived, given that he or she had maintained all of his or her 
economic and social links to that State (judgment in Hendrix EU:C:2007:494). 
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Option 2b removes this guarantee of one single competent State. In some 
situations, a person may be able to claim benefits in more than one State. For 
instance, the national of a Member State may be deemed resident for the 
purposes of national law eight weeks after returning there. At that point, he or 
she might still be considered as resident in the State which he or she just left, 
and in which he or she worked and lived for several years. As a result, he or 
she would unduly cumulate similar benefits from each State. Obviously, 
Member States may enact anti-overlapping rules, but they might not be aware 
of the fact that similar benefits are awarded abroad. 
Conversely, a citizen might fall between two stools, if he or she is not 
considered resident in any Member State and therefore receives no SNCBs at 
all. At first sight, it seems that Option 2b would enable a Member State to 
refuse SNCBs to persons who do have a right to reside, on the grounds that 
they have not lived in its territory long enough, that they are not domiciled 
there, etc. For instance, could a Member State require two years of prior 
residence? 
The TFEU and Directive 2004/38/EC raise a number of important limits to 
0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶ DELOLW\ WR UHVWULFW WKH DFFHVV WR WKHLU income-related SNCBs. 
Residence requirements are intrinsically liable to negatively affect migrant 
citizens more than sedentary, national citizens. Therefore, they amount to 
indirect discrimination (when applied to foreign nationals) or to a non-
discriminatory restriction of free movement rights (when enforced by a State 
against its own nationals). According to the CJEU, it is legitimate for a 
Member State to grant benefits such as SNCBs only to persons who have 
HVWDEOLVKHG³a certain degree of integration into the society of that State´325 
7KH&-(8 IXUWKHUPRUHDFFHSWV WKDW UHVLGHQFH LQ WKDW6WDWHGXULQJ³a certain 
length of time´ GHPRQVWUDtes such integration for economically inactive 
                                                 
325 Judgment in Bidar EU:C:2005:169, paragraph 57. 
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citizens.326 Yet, it insists that the condition must be proportionate. It is settled 
FDVH ODZ WKDW ³a condition of residence may be disproportionate if it is too 
exclusive in nature because it favours an element which is not necessarily 
representative of the real and effective degree of connection and excludes all 
other representative elements´327 The CJEU accepts that the following factors 
might indicate the existence of a genuine link: (stable) residence,328 
connections to a social security system,329 family circumstances,330 language 
skills,331 nationality,332 work,333 work-seeking334 etc.335 
Member States who wish to introduce additional requirements must therefore 
tread cautiously. They are free to require that the recipients of their benefits 
demonstrate a real link. To that end, they may set residence-related conditions 
or other territorial conditions. However, they must ascertain, in each individual 
case, that these conditions do not go further than strictly necessary. In 
                                                 
326 E.g. the judgment in Bidar EU:C:2005:169, paragraph 59; judgment in Collins 
EU:C:2004:172, paragraph 72; judgment in Prinz and Seeberger, C-523/11 and C-585/11, 
EU:C:2013:524, paragraph 38. 
327 Judgment in Giersch EU:C:2013:411, paragraph 72 and case law cited. 
328 E.g. the judgment in Collins EU:C:2004:172, paragraph 72; judgment in Stewart, C-503/09, 
EU:C:2011:500, paragraph 101; judgment in Prinz and Seeberger EU:C:2013:524, paragraph 
38. 
329 E.g. the judgment in Stewart EU:C:2011:500, paragraph 97-99; judgment in Commission v 
Germany, C-269/07, EU:C:2009:527, paragraph 60. 
330 E.g. the judgment in Thiele Meneses, C-220/12, EU:C:2013:683, paragraph 38; judgment in 
Martens, C-359/13, EU:C:2015:118, paragraph 41. 
331 E.g. the judgment in Prinz and Seeberger EU:C:2013:524, paragraph 38; judgment in 
Thiele Meneses  EU:C:2013:683, paragraph 38; judgment in Martens EU:C:2015:118, 
paragraph 41. 
332 Ibid. 
333 E.g. the judgment in Hendrix EU:C:2007:494, paragraph 57-58; judgment in Commission v 
the Netherlands EU:C:2012:346, paragraph 65; judgment in Krier EU:C:2012:798, paragraph 
53; judgment in Giersch EU:C:2013:411, paragraph 63. The CJEU listed the former 
employment of the father of a dependent and economically inactive citizen as an indicator of 
her integration in the judgment in Stewart EU:C:2011:500, paragraph 100, and the judgment 
in Martens EU:C:2015:118, paragraph 41, paragraph 44. 
334 E.g. the judgment in Collins EU:C:2004:172, paragraph 70, paragraph 72; the judgment in 
Vatsouras and Koupatantze EU:C:2009:344, paragraph 39. 
335 The open-ended nature is emphasised in the cases mentioned in footnote 331. This does 
not mean that the Member States always have to take account of all social ties (see e.g. the 
judgment in Förster EU:C:2008:630; the judgment in Geven EU:C:2007:438). 
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particular, they must accept that a multitude of elements can prove the 
existence of a link. This real link test is neither particularly clear, nor easy to 
administer. It would however become standard practice if Option 2b were 
chosen. Any attempt to specifically limit the rights of (lawfully residing) 
migrant citizens to ex-income-related SNCBs would amount to restriction of 
their free movement rights, which needs due justification; the real link is 
virtually the only successful justification ground. 
The Stewart case provides a topical example.336 It concerned the UK short-
term incapacity benefit in youth, a non-contributory benefit providing persons 
aged 16 to 25 who have a long-term disability with the necessary means to 
meet their needs. As will be demonstrated below, this benefit fulfilled all the 
conditions for being considered as an SNCB, except that the UK did not list it 
LQ $QQH[ ,,D 0V 6WHZDUW ZDV D %ULWLVK QDWLRQDO VXIIHULQJ IURP 'RZQ¶V
syndrome. She moved to Spain with her parents age ten. Her mother claimed 
the UK short-term incapacity benefit in youth on her behalf when she became 
16. The claim failed because Ms Stewart resided abroad. UK law required the 
young invalid person to have been present in the UK for a period of at least 26 
weeks in the 52 weeks immediately preceding the date of the application and 
to be present there on that date. The UK argued that the past presence 
requirement was proportionate, as it was short. It had to be satisfied only on 
the date of the claim and there simply were no other alternatives to determine 
the existence of a genuine link. The CJEU conceded that the existence of such 
a link can be proven by a stay for a reasonable period in the UK. Yet, the 26 
weeks requirement was too exclusive. It excluded other elements that may 
demonstrate a real connection, such as the relationship between the claimant 
and the social security system (Ms Stewart was already entitled to the UK 
disability living allowance, and was credited with UK national insurance 
contributions); the claiPDQW¶VIDPLO\FLUFXPVWDQFHVKHUSDUHQWVUHFHLYHG8.
pensions, and her father had worked in the UK); and the fact that the claimant, 
                                                 
336 Judgment in Stewart EU:C:2011:500. 
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a UK national, had lived in the UK. According to the CJEU, these elements 
suffice to demonstrate the existence of a genuine and sufficient connection 
between Ms Stewart and the UK. The requirement of past presence was thus 
disproportionate and contrary to Article 21(1) TFEU. On the same grounds, 
the CJEU decided that the financial balance of the British schemes was not 
endangered, and that the condition of presence on the date on which the claim 
is made was disproportionate. In sum, an economically inactive person could 
not be required to reside in the UK when claiming a benefit that closely 
resembles SNCBs, because she had sufficiently strong attachments with the 
UK. 
The same scenario risks unfolding for ex income-related SNCBs under Option 
2b. Currently, SNCBs are conditional upon habitual and, where applicable, 
lawful residence. Option 2b seems to enable Member States to require more 
than just habitual and lawful residence. They could demand stronger 
attachments to their society, for instance durational residence. However, the 
TFEU could oppose the additional requirements of links, as soon as they are 
not strictly necessary. What is necessary is hard to predict, but it seems clear 
that rules that attach importance only to one single indicator (or just a very few 
indicators) are very vulnerable to a challenge under EU law. In answer to our 
earlier question, a Member State requiring citizens who have a right to reside 
to have lived on its territory during a number of years would most probably 
run counter EU law. 
4.1.3 The principle of equal treatment (Article 4 BR) 
Article 4 BR is a specific expression of the principle of non-discrimination 
laid down in Article 18 TFEU,337 Article 45(2) TFEU, Article 49 TFEU and 
                                                 
337 Judgment in Dano EU:C:2014:2358, paragraph 61. 
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Article 56 TFEU. In Dano the CJEU entirely aligned Article 4 BR to Article 
24 of Directive 2004/38/EC.338 
Option 2b would make little difference when compared to the current state of 
affairs. Persons lacking a right to reside have no right to equal treatment under 
either Article 4 BR or any other provisions mentioned above. Persons 
possessing a right to reside would be able to claim equal treatment under 
Article 24 of Directive 2004/38/EC and/or the aforementioned provision of the 
TFEU, even if they could no longer rely on Article 4 BR because Option 2b 
was enacted. As illustrated above, the principle of equal treatment and the 
prohibition on restrictions of free movement allow a citizen who has a 
sufficiently close connection to a Member State to challenge territorial 
conditions laid down in its legislation. 
4.1.4 The principle of equal treatment of facts (Article 5 BR) 
Article 5 BR lays down the principle of equal treatment of benefits, income, 
facts or events.339 It essentially provides that, where the legislation of the 
competent Member State attaches legal effects to the occurrence of certain 
facts or events, that State must take account of equivalent facts or events 
taking place in another Member State as though they had taken place on its 
own territory (Article 5(b) BR). Article 5(a) sets out a similar rule: the receipt 
of social security benefits and other income in another Member State must be 
equated to the receipt of domestic benefits or income. Article 5 can be both 
beneficial and detrimental to citizens ± we examine both situations in turn. 
Article 5 BR allows the eligibility conditions to be satisfied in another 
Member State. That provision then benefits the migrant. For instance, SNCBs 
are regularly granted in the form of a supplement; their payment is often 
                                                 
338 idem, paragraph 60 et seq. 
339 6HH IXUWKHU 1 5HQQX\ µ$VVLPLODWLRQ WHUULWRULDOLW\ DQG UHYHUVH GLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶ 
European Journal of Social Law, 289. 
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conditional upon receipt of national social security benefits. Article 5(a) BR 
(previously Article 10(3) of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71) provides that 
equivalent foreign benefits should be treated as national benefits. Consider a 
French SNCB which, by hypothesis, is only granted as a supplement to a 
French old-age pension. If a French institution wanted to refuse a person 
receiving a Spanish pension that SNCB, it would either have to demonstrate 
that the Spanish pension is not equivalent to the French pension,340 or that its 
refusal is necessary to safeguard a legitimate interest. 
Option 2b would not change this state of affairs. It is settled case law that, 
insofar as it is beneficial to migrants, the equal treatment of facts is required 
by the free movement rights laid down in the Treaty341 and/or Directive 
2004/38/EC.342 A refusal to assimilate foreign facts amounts to indirect 
discrimination or to a restriction to free movement, as it only affects migrants. 
If the facts are equivalent, a refusal must be justified by demonstrating the 
legitimacy of the objective pursued and the suitability and necessity of the 
means deployed. The outcome of the French case would be identical. 
Article 5 BR can also be relied upon to the detriment of migrants, where 
disentitling conditions are satisfied in another Member State. For instance, 
many SNCBs are means-tested or income-tested. Article 5(a) BR equates 
foreign income and means to domestic income and means. Whether the 
personal or familial income of the applicant reaches the upper limit for the 
grant of SNCBs is then determined by reference to the income he or she earns 
                                                 
340 Cf the judgment in Larcher, C-523/13, EU:C:2014:2458. 
341 E.g. the judgment in Roviello v Landesversicherungsanstalt Schwaben, C-20/85, 
EU:C:1988:283 (Article 48 and Article 51 EEC Treaty); judgment in O'Flynn v Adjudication 
Officer, C-237/94, EU:C:1996:206 (Article 7(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68); judgment in 
Elsen v Bundesversicherungsanstalt für Angestellte, C-135/99, EU:C:2000:647 (Article 18 EC, 
Article 39 EC and Article 42 EC); judgment in Kauer, C-28/00, EU:C:2002:82 (Article 18 EC, 
Article 39 EC and Article 43 EC); judgment in Duchon, C-290/00, EU:C:2002:234 (Article 
39(2) EC and Article 42 EC); judgment in D'Hoop, C-224/98, EU:C:2002:432 (the provisions 
on EU citizenship). 
342 E.g. the judgment in Commission v Austria EU:C:2012:605 (Article 18, 20 and 21 TFEU and 
Article 24 of Directive 2004/38). 
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in all the Member States. The same applies to rules precluding the overlapping 
of SNCBs with other social benefits. Member States must however be careful 
to avoid creating an unjustified non-discriminatory obstacle to the free 
movement of persons.343  
Assimilation detrimental to migrants could still be performed if Option 2b 
were LPSOHPHQWHG 7KH &-(8 KHOG WKDW $UWLFOH  DQG  7)(8 ³do not 
prohibit ² though they do not require ² the treatment by the institutions of 
Member States of corresponding facts occurring in another Member State as 
equivalent to facts which, if they occur on the national territory, constitute a 
ground for the loss or suspension of the right to cash benefits´344 
Accordingly, the UK was free to deprive a prisoner of social security 
protection, even though he served his sentence in Ireland instead of the UK. 
In sum, the disappearance of Article 5 BR for SNCBs would not significantly 
affect the substance of the rights and duties of individuals and administrations. 
4.1.5 The principle of aggregation (Article 6 BR) 
The so-called principle of aggregation laid down in Article 6 BR provides that, 
ZKHUH WKH OHJLVODWLRQ RI WKH FRPSHWHQW 0HPEHU 6WDWH ³061´ SURYLGHV WKDW
the acquisition or retention of benefits is conditional upon the completion of 
periods of insurance, employment, self-employment or residence, the 
competent institution must take into account periods of insurance, 
employment, self-employment or residence completed under the legislation of 
DQRWKHU 0HPEHU 6WDWH ³062´ DV LI WKH\ ZHUH FRPSOHWHG XQGHU LWV RZQ
legislation. Whether periods were validly completed under the legislation of 
MS2 LV GHWHUPLQHG E\ WKDW 6WDWH¶V LQVWLWXWLRQV ZKLFK FRPPXQLFDWH WKHLU
decision to MS1. For instance, in order to qualify for the Cypriot social 
pension, currently an SNCB, a person must have lawfully stayed in Cyprus for 
                                                 
343 Judgment in Somova, C-103/13, EU:C:2014:2334. 
344 Judgment in Kenny, C-1/78, EU:C:1978:140. 
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20 years since reaching the age of 40, or for 35 years since reaching the age of 
18. A person who now lives in Cyprus, but previously lived in another 
Member State, is entitled to the Cypriot pension after aggregation. The Cypriot 
authorities do not need to check whether the applicant actually lived abroad; 
they can simply ask the institutions of the Member State in question to make 
the necessary verifications. 
Would the situation be any different under Option 2b? The CJEU has ruled on 
the question whether a Member State should aggregate in circumstances where 
Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 does not apply. In one case, it held that periods 
completed in Germany that are comparable to those required by Greek 
legislation should be aggregated on the basis of Article 48 and 51 of the EEC 
Treaty (now Article 45 and 48 TFEU) for the purpose of determining the 
acquisition of a Greek old-age pension.345 The discrimination arose because 
³the problem of recognition of periods completed in other Member States of 
the Community confronts only workers who have exercised their right to 
freedom of movement.´346 In cases on economically inactive citizens, the 
CJEU tends to waive durational residence requirements as soon as they exceed 
what is necessary to establish the existence of a sufficient connection with the 
society of the State whose benefits are claimed. Therefore, it seems that the 
disappearance of Article 6 BR would not entail the end of all duties to 
aggregate. Should MS1 wish to refuse to aggregate periods, it should either 
demonstrate that the periods at issue are not equivalent to the periods required 
under its legislation, or that the applicant has no genuine connection to its 
society. Both entail an individual and labour-intensive assessment of the facts 
of the case, which is unnecessary under Article 6 BR. 
                                                 
345 Judgment in Vougioukas v Idryma Koinonikon Asfalisseon, C-443/93, EU:C:1995:394. 
346 Judgment in Vougioukas v Idryma Koinonikon Asfalisseon EU:C:1995:394, paragraph 41. 
In other cases, the CJEU found that periods of employment should be aggregated so as to 
determine the amount of a parental benefit (C judgment in Rockler, C-137/04, 
EU:C:2006:106; judgment in Öberg, C-185/04, EU:C:2006:107). 
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Article 6 brings about a certain administrative convenience, which would 
come to an end under Option 2b. The institutions of MS1 (Cyprus, in our 
example) would have to determine whether periods of insurance, (self-
)employment or residence were validly completed under the legislation of MS2 
± a law with which they are unfamiliar. They could no longer request MS2 to 
apply its own legislation. 
4.1.6 Agencies (Title IV BR) 
The fourth title of the BR lays down the rules concerning different agencies. 
By extracting SNCBs from their field of action, Option 2b would deprive the 
Member States and the European Commission of: 
 the forum that is the Administrative Commission, which facilitates cooperation;  
 the technical assistance provided by the Technical Commission; 
 the data of the Audit Board; 
 the counsel of the Advisory Committee. 
These are useful fora for monitoring, managing and possibly improving the 
provision of SNCBs. 
4.1.7 Administrative cooperation (Title V BR) 
Article 76 BR lays down duties of administrative cooperation, which are 
flanked by Article 77 BR in respect of data protection347 and refined, with 
respect to fraud and error specifically, by Decision H5 of the Administrative 
Commission.348 These guarantees are crucial for the verification of facts which 
materialised in another Member State, and thus for the prevention of fraud and 
                                                 
347 See Article 2 to 5 IR. 
348 Decision No H5 of 18 March 2010 concerning cooperation on combating fraud and error 
within the framework of Council Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and Regulation (EC) No 
987/2009, OJ C 149, 8.6.2010, p. 5±7. 
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error. For instance, given the objective of SNCBs to guarantee a certain 
minimum standard of living, foreign income, means and benefits are routinely 
taken into account in order to determine whether a person qualifies. Likewise, 
the amount of SNCBs may depend on the circumstances of family members 
who live or work abroad. The Member State awarding SNCBs would struggle 
to control such conditions without assistance from other Member States. 
Option 2b would deprive the Member States of the possibility to claim 
administrative cooperation in order to verify whether the conditions for 
receiving SNCBs are fulfilled. The TFEU does not endow social security 
institutions with a right to administrative cooperation.349 Accordingly, a State 
seeking to check whether a person receives a pension from another Member 
State or earns a salary there, would be entirely dependent on the goodwill of 
the latter State. 
Electronic exchange of data, when implemented, should greatly facilitate the 
flows of information and contribute to reducing error and fraud (Article 78 
BR). This useful instrument for the national institutions would be inaccessible 
if Option 2b were put into effect. 
The recovery of benefits that were erroneously paid may, by virtue of Article 
84 BR, be effected in other Member States. Enforceable judicial and 
administrative decisions are in principle to be recognised and enforced upon 
request by the competent State.350 If Option 2b were chosen, the institutions of 
the Member States may expect more difficulties to recover SNCBs that were 
wrongly paid. 
                                                 
349 Article 4(3) TEU states that the Member States sKDOO ³assist each other in carrying out 
tasks which flow from the Treaties´ DQG ³shall take any appropriate measure, general or 
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from 
the acts of the institutions of the Union´7KLVSURYLVLRQLVOLPLWHGWRDFWLRQVQHFHVVDU\IRUWKH
compliance with EU primary or secondary law and the pursuit of EU objectives. Whether a 
0HPEHU 6WDWH ZRXOG EH DEOH WR LQYRNH LW LQ RUGHU WR UHTXHVW DQRWKHU 0HPEHU 6WDWH¶V
assistance in preventing fraud and error against its own legislation ± a purely national 
objective, if SNCBs were removed from the scope of the BR ± may be seriously doubted. 
350 More specific rules are laid down in Article 71 to 85 IR. 
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4.1.8 The complete irrelevance of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004? 
Contrary to what can be expected, the disappearance of the category of 
income-related SNCBs might not remove all the benefits which are now 
considered as SNCBs from the scope of the Regulation. Indeed, much in line 
with its early case law in which it emphasised that hybrid benefits have 
features of both social assistance and social security,351 the CJEU might 
categorise certain ex-SNCBs as social security benefits. A recent sign in that 
direction is the 2011 Stewart case.352 This would have far-reaching 
consequences, as those benefits would in principle be governed by the 
provisions of thH5HJXODWLRQIRUµFODVVLF¶VRFLDOVHFXULW\ULVNV 
In Stewart, the CJEU qualified the UK short-term incapacity benefit in youth 
as an invalidity benefit within the meaning of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71. 
The sole condition for that characterisation was that, at the moment of the 
application, it was clear that the claimant had a permanent or long-term 
disability. The benefit in question is a non-contributory, non-means-tested 
weekly payment which provides persons aged 16 to 25, who are incapable of 
work due to sickness or disability, with the financial means to meet their 
needs. It does not seek to replace lost wages; on the contrary, it is open to 
those who have never worked. The short-term incapacity benefit in youth 
expires after one year, at which point it is replaced by the long-term incapacity 
benefit, which can be drawn until retirement age. The main eligibility 
FRQGLWLRQV DUH D SHUVRQ¶V DJH KLV RU KHU XQILWQHVV IRU ZRUN DQG KLV RU KHU
residence and presence in Great Britain. Whilst the CJEU did not examine the 
question from that angle, it seems that the UK short-term incapacity benefit in 
\RXWKLVDQ61&%LQDOOEXWLQQDPH,WLVERWKµVSHFLDO¶DQGµQRQ-FRQWULEXWRU\¶
in the light of the case law of the CJEU. It is very similar to the Dutch benefit 
for young persons who are already suffering from total or partial long-term 
                                                 
351 E.g. the judgment in Frilli EU:C:1972:56, paragraph 13. 
352 Judgment in Stewart EU:C:2011:500. 
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incapacity for work before joining the labour market. In Kersbergen-Lap, the 
CJEU decided that this Dutch benefit, which was not means-tested, was both 
special and non-contributory.353 The UK short-term incapacity benefit is 
EODWDQWO\ LQWHQGHG WR SURYLGH ³solely specific protection for the disabled, 
closely linked to the said person's social environment in the Member State 
concerned´DVVWDWHGLQ$UWLFOHDLLRI5HJXODWLRQ(&No 883/2004. 
Only the fact that the UK did not list it in Annex IIa of Regulation (EEC) No 
1408/71 stood in the way of its qualification as an SNCB. Yet, the CJEU, after 
a lengthy examination (paragraph 29-54), considered it as an invalidity 
benefit. 
If a benefit that meets all the substantial criteria for being listed as an SNCB is 
qualified as social security, could the same not be true in respect of a benefit 
that used to be an SNCB, before Option 2b was enacted? There is a risk that 
some former SNCBs woXOG EH UHTXDOLILHG E\ WKH &-(8 DV µVRFLDO VHFXULW\¶
within the meaning of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. In theory, they would 
then be covered by all the provisions of that Regulation, including the 
provision on export. In Stewart, the residence condition was waived on the 
basis of that provision. It is however more likely that the CJEU would retain 
the non-H[SRUW UXOH JLYHQ WKDW LW DFFHSWV WKDW ³the grant of benefits closely 
linked with the social environment may be made subject to a condition of 
residence´.354 Even then, if certain former SNCBs were considered as social 
security, this would largely undermine Option 2b. An interpretation of former 
SNCBs as classic social security might be unlikely, but it certainly is possible.  
4.1.9 Overview 
 
                                                 
353 Judgment in Kersbergen-Lap and Dams-Schipper, C-154/05, EU:C:2006:449. 
354 E.g. the judgment in Snares EU:C:1997:518, paragraph 42. The CJEU has been seen to 
bend the rules of the Regulations in order to avoid disrupting minimum subsistence benefits 
(judgment in Office National des Pensions v Levatino, C-65/92, EU:C:1993:149). 
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Option 1 Option 2b 
Legal framework Regulation (EC) No 883/2004; 
Directive 2004/38/EC; TFEU 
Directive 2004/38/EC; TFEU 
Decisive element for 
attribution of responsibility 
genuine link test / habitual residence National law, which sets inter alia 
conditions of residence / real link 
How many Member States 
are responsible? 
In principle, only one 
 
Exceptions: Bosmann, Hendrix, 
Hudzinski and Wawrzyniak 
None, one, or more than one 
Equal treatment Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 
Article 24 of Directive 2004/38/EC and 
TFEU are functionally equivalent to 
Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 
Assimilation of facts Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 (+ genuine link test?) 
Article 24 of Directive 2004/38/EC and 
TFEU could be considered to be 
functionally equivalent to Article 5 of 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (the 
genuine link test would be applicable) 
Aggregation of periods Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 (+ genuine link test?) 
 
Article 24 of Directive 2004/38/EC and 
TFEU could entail a duty of 
aggregation; non-aggregation would be 
based on objective difference or be 
objectively and proportionately justified 
(e.g. the genuine link test). Competent 
Member State may have to apply 
foreign legislation. 
Administrative cooperation Duties of administrative cooperation 
 
In future, electronic exchange of data 
 
Recovery of benefits 
Goodwill of requested Member State 
 
No electronic exchange of data 
 
No procedure on recovery 
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4.2 Assessment of the proposal 
4.2.1 Clarification 
Under the current state of affairs, the provision of SNCBs is regulated by the 
Regulation. The provisions of the TFEU are only relevant in exceptional 
circumstances.355 Option 2b accords decisive importance to the open-ended 
prohibitions on discrimination and on non-discriminatory obstacles of the 
7)(8)RULQVWDQFHWKHGHILQLWLRQRIµKDELWXDOUHVLGHQFH¶DQGWKHSURFHGXUHWR
reconcile conflicting views is lost. This may in turn lead to a lack of social 
protection, where no Member State deems the person concerned to reside on 
its territory; or to an excess thereof, in the less likely event that more than one 
Member State should consider the person resident. The strength of the real link 
that may be required is to be determined in the light of the TFEU. It is clear 
WKDW ³the proof required to demonstrate the genuine link must not be too 
exclusive in nature or unduly favour one element which is not necessarily 
representative of the real and effective degree of connection between the 
claimant and this Member State, to the exclusion of all other representative 
elements´356 This requirement of individualised assessment is labour-
intensive, unpredictable and complex. The requisite type of link depends on 
the constitutive elements of the benefit, including its nature and purpose.357 
Despite more than a decade of intense litigation on the cross-border access to 
study grants from the perspective of the real link, the permissible degree of 
integration is still unclear. The development of a reasonably operational notion 
of a real link for SNCBs ± a group of benefits that is less homogenous than 
study grants ± is bound to be challenging. 
The functions of Article 4, Article 5 and Article 6 BR could be taken over by 
the TFEU and Directive 2004/38/EC. Yet, this would come at a price in terms 
                                                 
355 E E.g. the judgment in Hendrix EU:C:2007:494. 
356 Judgment in Prinz and Seeberger EU:C:2013:524, paragraph 37 and cited case law. 
357 Judgment in Commission v Austria EU:C:2012:605, paragraph 63. 
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of visibility and clarity. Article 6 BR is an absolute rule, with no derogations. 
By contrast, prima facie restrictions of free movement can be objectively 
justified. Moreover, Article 6 BR dispenses Member States from the complex 
tasks of ascertaining whether periods were validly completed under foreign 
law, and of determining whether these foreign periods are equivalent to the 
required periods. 
)LQDOO\WKHULVNRIDTXDOLILFDWLRQRIIRUPHU61&%VDVQRUPDOµVRFLDOVHFXULW\¶
cannot be excluded. 
4.2.2 Simplification 
For the reasons mentioned under 4.2.1, Option 2b would not entail a 
simplification of the legal framework. 
4.2.3 Protection of rights 
The Regulation is relevant to persons in possession of a right to reside and to 
persons lacking a right to reside, claiming SNCBs in a Member State that does 
not or may not make their payment conditional upon lawful residence. Option 
2b would be detrimental to the protection of their rights. It might allow 
Member States to raise the level of connection required for the eligibility for 
SNCBs. Even where the TFEU is functionally equivalent to provisions of the 
Regulations, the loss in visibility might engender an enforcement deficit, 
where European rights translate less well into national practices. The loss in 
clarity and the complications in administrative cooperation are liable to result 
in unpredictability and to cause delays. Besides, migrants would lose 
procedural rights, such as the right to the provisional grant of benefits (Article 
6 IR). 
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4.2.4 Administrative burden and implementation arrangements 
Option 2b would significantly raise the burden resting on the institutions 
administering SCNBs. As indicated above, the individual assessment that 
regularly replaces the mechanic application of the provisions of the 
Regulations is costly to the Member States. The refusal of SNCBs on 
territorial grounds is liable to raise an obstacle to free movement. Such 
restriction can be justified by positively demonstrating that, on the facts of the 
case, the measure is proportionate to the objective of ensuring a sufficient 
degree of integration (or by arguing that, in casu, the facts occurring abroad 
are not equivalent to the required facts). The institutions would lose the ability 
to claim the cooperation of their counterparts in other Member States. This 
significantly complicates the operation of SNCBs when certain relevant facts 
materialise abroad. For instance, where the overlap of SNCBs with certain 
foreign benefits is forbidden, administrations may struggle to obtain the 
necessary information. They would be deprived of the procedures to recover 
benefits unduly paid and, in future, of the advantages of the EESSI system. 
Besides, the Member States would lose the assistance of the four agencies. 
4.2.5 Avoiding the risk of fraud and abuse 
Cross-border fraud, abuse and error is largely attributed to deficiencies in 
cooperation and in flows of information across borders. Imperfect though it 
may be in its implementation, the BR lays down an obligatory mechanism for 
administrative cooperation, upon which a Decision of the Administrative 
Commission builds further.358 Once operational, the electronic exchange of 
data will further the fight against fraud, abuse and error. 
                                                 
358 Decision No H5 of 18 March 2010 concerning cooperation on combating fraud and error 
within the framework of Council Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and Regulation (EC) No 
987/2009, OJ C 149, 8.6.2010, p. 5-7. 
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Whereas it is generally recommended to enhance cross-border cooperation and 
communication in order to tackle fraud and error,359 Option 2b could have the 
opposite effect. If implemented, Member States would have to rely on bilateral 
agreements, memorandums of understanding or cooperation on other levels. 
Such a bilateral network cannot approximate the current framework in terms 
of scope (many Member States will not be mutually bound) or strength. 
Moreover, this might induce Member States to increasingly rely on privacy 
and data protection as reasons to refuse to share data.   
An argument could be made that vague rules are inherently more difficult to 
circumvent than clear ones. Consequently, it may be inferred that the very 
opacity which Option 2b entails would in itself hinder fraud and abuse. In our 
view the promotion of vague legislation to prevent fraud and abuse is not 
convincing. It could be objected that the current notion of habitual residence 
resists circumvention if properly applied. In order to qualify for an income-
related SNCB in a Member State, a citizen must have his or her habitual centre 
of interests there, as determined on the basis of a multitude of indicia (Article 
11 IR). This centre of gravity test essentially prevents persons from claiming 
such benefits in a Member State without relocating their entire life there. 
Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that vagueness affects not only persons 
with fraudulent intent, but also all bona fide claimants. 
Option 2b may enable Member States to exclude more persons from SNCBs. 
7KLVFRXOGEHIUDPHGDVDQLQFUHDVHGOHHZD\WREDQ³ZHOIDUHWRXULVWV´7RGR
so in compliance with the TFEU, a State would however have to demonstrate 
either that the person in question, despite lawfully residing on its territory, 
lacks a sufficient link; or that the claim is abusive or fraudulent. Under the 
FXUUHQW IUDPHZRUN WKH5HJXODWLRQV³cannot be relied on for the purposes of 
                                                 
359 4th recital in the preamble to Decision H5, ibid; Y. Jorens, D. Gillis and I. Plasschaert, Fraud 
and Error in the Field of Social Security Coordination, Network Statistics FMSSFE, European 
Commission, 2014, unpublished report. 
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abuse or fraud´360 Persons who have their habitual centre of interests in a 
Member State within the meaning of the Regulations are very likely to have a 
genuine link with that State. These two elements reduce the added value of 
Option 2b in the prevention of fraud and abuse in comparison with the current 
framework, which does contain adequate guarantees regarding real links and 
abuse. 
On balance, Option 2b would hinder the fight against fraud, abuse and error 
more than facilitate it. 
4.2.6 Potential financial implications  
Member States may make some financial gains by excluding migrants who are 
not affected by Dano. For instance, whereas Dano does not affect the rights of 
German citizens to German SNCBs, under Option 2b Germany might find it 
easier to disallow their claims. This financial gain is however mitigated by 
increased costs in handling cases. If Option 2b were put into effect, Member 
States wishing to reject applications for their SNCBs would need to perform 
an individualised assessment. Moreover, difficulties in cross-border 
communication, an increased risk of fraud and error and a complication in the 
recovery of benefits wrongly paid might add to the operational costs. 
4.3 A mapping of the impact in the Member States 
Option 2b has a very diverse effect on citizens and Member States. The focus 
of this section lies on the notion of habitual residence, as issues pertaining to 
legal residence have been studied in the context of Options 1 and 2a. The 
following is an overview of the concept of residence as currently required by 
the laws of a number of Member States. 
                                                 
360
 E.g. the judgment in Brennet v Paletta, C-206/94, EU:C:1996:182, paragraph 24. 
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According to Dutch OHJLVODWLRQDSHUVRQµUHVLGHV¶LQWKH1HWKHUODQGVZKHQKH
or she has a durable relationship of a personal nature with the Netherlands. 
This is determined on the basis of a number of factors such as the work and 
living circumstances, family relationships, the place where the children attend 
education, political or cultural activities, durable housing, finances, 
registration at the population register and possession of a residence permit for 
a short or longer period of time. It is not necessary for the relationship with the 
Netherlands to be stronger than the relationship with another State. In 
Germany, habitual residence is not defined; rather, it must be interpreted with 
regard to the specific benefit and its aims. Generally speaking, the 
circumstances must indicate that the stay is not temporary. Latvia requires the 
applicants of certain SNCBs (i) to be permanently resident on its territory, (ii) 
to have lived there for five years in total, and (iii) to have lived there 
continuously during the year preceding the application. Italy UHTXLUHVµUHDODQG
KDELWXDOUHVLGHQFH¶ZKLFKLWLQWHUSUHWVLQOLQHZLWK$UWLFOH,5Finland also 
uses a concept of residence that is very close to that of Article 11 IR; in the 
event of divergence the European definition displaces the Finnish definition. 
In Lithuania D SHUVRQ PXVW EH UHJLVWHUHG LQ WKH 5HVLGHQW¶V 5HJLVWU\
Likewise, Hungary requires the place of habitual residence to be registered. 
Hungary essentially incorporates the criteria set in Article 11 IR. Under Irish 
legislation, habitual residence is understood as incorporating both a significant 
period of past residence and the intention to remain in Ireland for the 
foreseeable future. The main (but non-exhaustive) indicators are the length and 
continuity of residence in Ireland or in any other particular country; the length 
and purpose of any absence from Ireland; the nature and pattern of 
employment; the applicant's main centre of interest; the future intention of the 
applicant concerned as it appears from all the circumstances. Cyprus requires 
applicants to reside on its territory for at least 12 consecutive months in order 
to qualify for two of its SNCBs. 
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It is a matter of speculation how Member States may react to the enactment of 
Option 2b. Yet, this short overview demonstrates that the definition laid down 
in Article 11 IR is not adopted in all Member States. This increases the 
likelihood of divergent views on the lRFDWLRQRIDSHUVRQ¶VKDELWXDOUHVLGHQFH
rendering the reconciliation procedure more important. 
4.4 General evaluation of Option 2b 
It should be underlined at the outset that the Brey and Dano rulings in no way 
require the removal of SNCBs from the scope of the Regulation. They merely 
enable Member States to set a requirement of lawful residence, which affects 
only certain categories of applicants. For instance, the nationals of a Member 
State always have a right to reside on their territory. 
The recommendation would be not to propose Option 2b. Removal does not 
answer the question of how to handle entitlement to SNCBs in future; without 
any regulation they would be somewhere between Directive, Regulation and 
primary law. The removal of SNCBs from the scope of the Regulation would 
be detrimental to both citizens and administrations. It would raise the cost of 
DGPLQLVWHULQJ61&%VGHFUHDVHOHJDOFHUWDLQW\DQGWKHSURWHFWLRQRIPLJUDQWV¶
rights, disincentivise mobility and, on balance, hinder the fight against fraud, 
abuse and error. The assessment is negative from every angle. Moreover, all 
provisions relevant to SNCBs have an added value for citizens and 
administrations. The repeal of any provision would thus be ill-advised. 
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5 Additional proposals 
All three proposals of the European Commission (EC) clearly choose an 
adaptation of the social security coordination rules related to income-related 
special non-contributory cash benefits (SNCBs) in order to align them with the 
requirements of legal residence as laid down in Directive 2004/38/EC. The 
first opts for a status quo, allowing for derogations from the equal treatment 
principle in line with the decisions in these cases. The other two proposals 
relate to a limitation and, even further stretched, a removal of the equal 
treatment principle in the SNCB coordination rules. 
However, as is clear from our above legal assessments, we are of the opinion 
WKDW WKHFXUUHQW VWDWHRI WKHFDVH ODZVKRXOGQRWEH UHJDUGHGDV µVWDEOH¶7KH
analytical reading of both Brey and Dano as such already reveals pending 
TXHVWLRQVLQWKH&-(8¶VDSSURDFKWRZDUGVWKHOLPLWDWLRQRIWKHHTXDOWUHDWPHQW
principle based on legal residence requirements. Whereas the CJEU puts 
emphasis on a proportionality test in the Brey case, this test is absent in the 
Dano case. Although this can very likely be explained by the specific 
circumstances of each case, it should be stressed that this is still uncertain and 
that the above assessment makes clear that many other questions are pending. 
The most pressing question at this stage, in our view preventing to depart from 
the Brey/Dano case law as a basis for law-making, is whether the Dano 
judgment should be interpreted narrowly or broadly.361 From a purely legal 
perspective, it has been defended that the Dano judgment should be construed 
QDUURZO\ $V WKH &-(8¶V GHFLVLRQ UHODWHV WR WKH OLPLWDWLRQ RI D IXQGDPHQWDO
principle of EU law, it is to be narrowly interpreted. In this sense, it should be 
clear that the limitation of the equal treatment principle with regard to SNCBs 
can only be understood with full respect of the fundamental principle of free 
                                                 
361 See 2.1 above. 
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movement of EU citizens and, even more important in view of the Dano 
judgment, the general principle of proportionality. 
However, the present assessment shows that the current proposals as put 
forward by the EC do not take into account the principle of proportionality 
upon integrating the recent case law in Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. While 
2SWLRQOHDYHVWKHFXUUHQWVWDWHRI(8ODZµDVLV¶WKLVOHDYHs room for a broad 
interpretation of the Dano judgment, excluding a proportionality test and a 
potential breach of the fundamental freedoms. It is apparent that in the current 
political climate, several Member States could take advantage of this 
possibility to illegitimately exclude non-active Union citizens from access to 
SNCBs. Option 2a merely proposes a referral to the provisions of Directive 
(& ZKLFK FRXOG DOVR WULJJHU D ULJLG µ(&-residence-WHVW¶ LQ
the SNCB chapter of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, i.e. excluding entitlement 
to SNCBs if there is no legal residence in line with the provisions of Directive 
2004/38/EC. Option 2b even removes equal treatment with regard to SNCB 
entitlement. 
In view of the above, it appears that the current proposals are only translating 
the impact of Directive 2004/38/EC on the coordination system for SNCBs in 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 as if clear priorities are set after the Brey/Dano 
judgments. In our view, this is not the case. In the Brey/Dano case law, the 
CJEU has applied the provisions of both instruments to the specific 
circumstances of each case, taking into account the specific argumentation of 
all parties involved. After only two decisions, no definitive rules of priority 
can be deduced. Only upon a clear intervention from the legislature, the 
relationship between both instruments can be definitively settled. As the 
instruments at stake do not refer to each other in their current versions, the 
CJEU can only apply the relevant provisions next to each other. 
In other words, a proposal from the EC should not necessarily go in the 
direction in which the CJEU prima facie seems to be pointing in its recent case 
law, integrating legal residence requirements in the social security 
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coordination system. The main purpose of a legislative intervention should 
rather be to settle the relationship between both instruments, taking into 
account the free movement of Union citizens and the principle of 
proportionality. The integration of the latter into the current proposals could be 
considered a key issue to safeguard the protection of social rights for mobile 
citizens within the European Union. 
In the light of the above and as explained in the impact assessments, both 
Option 1 and 2a do not sufficiently guarantee an adequate level of protection 
RI FLWL]HQV¶ ULJKWV ZKHQ PRYLQJ ZLWKLQ WKH (8 DQG VKRXOG EH IXUWKHU
accommodated to safeguard full respect of the principle of free movement of 
EU citizens and the principle of proportionality. Next to this, it should be 
stressed that the European legislature can also opt for a clear-cut safeguard of 
the coordination principles from the impact of the residence requirements 
resulting from Directive 2004/38/EC. However, first of all, it should be 
considered whether the current state of EU law actually requires change in 
order to meet concerns related to the relationship between legal residence and 
equal treatment. 
5.1 $µVWDWXVTXR¶IURPWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRI5HJXODWLRQ(&1R 
Before embarking on the possible adaptation of the current proposals or 
exploring new proposals, it is useful to reflect on the current state of EU law in 
order to assess whether the alleged problems of benefit tourism have to be 
solved by new legislation. On the one hand, this implies an assessment of the 
Brey/Dano FDVH ODZ DQG WKH 0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶ UHVSRQVH WR EHQHILW WRXULVP E\
stressing the importance of legal residence within the meaning of Directive 
2004/38/EC when considering access to social benefits. On the other hand, this 
also requires an accurate view on the current state of EU law with regard to 
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equal treatment of mobile non-active EU citizens, considering the relevant 
secondary legislation and CJEU case law.362 
It is essential to highlight the responses that are already laid down in the 
current system of social security coordination, notably in the coordination 
V\VWHP IRU 61&%V 7KH 0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶ PDLQ DLP LV WR SUHYHQW QRQ-active 
persons lacking a genuine link with the host Member State from having access 
to social benefits. One has to wonder whether the current SNCB regime does 
not already address these concerns. Indeed, it could be argued that the current 
SNCB regime ± as it stands now ± already ensures the existence of a genuine 
link between the claimant of such a benefit and the host Member State.  
With regard to SNCBs, it was already analysed above that the European 
legislature and the CJEU both accepted the (factual) habitual residence 
condition of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 as creating a sufficiently genuine 
link between the claimant and the host Member State for the entitlement to 
such mixed benefits. This was a crucial element of the balance achieved after 
the neutralisation of the export principle for these specific benefits. 
In the light of the aforementioned case law, it should however be emphasised 
that this notion in Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 also seems to fit perfectly 
into the main tendency of the CJEU case law concerning the requirement of a 
certain degree of integration. The variety of elements that has to be taken into 
account to establish whether a person has his or her habitual centre of interest 
in a Member State indeed appears to be in harmony with the case law 
FRQFHUQLQJWKHµJHQXLQHOLQN¶ 
This variety of factors was introducHG E\ WKH &-(8¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH
residence concept in Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 and has now been codified 
in a further elaborated form in Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. 
According to this Article, in the event of a difference of views between the 
institutions of two or more Member States, an overall assessment of all 
                                                 
362 See 2.1 above. 
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available information relating to the relevant facts should be performed in 
RUGHUWRGHWHUPLQHDSHUVRQ¶VFHQWUHRILQWHUHVW7KHGXUDWLRQDQGFRQWLQXLW\RI
presence on the territory is one element in this assessment, but cannot be more 
decisive than other relevant elements. This evaluation based on all the relevant 
individual circumstances of the case aligns with the way the CJEU has 
interpreted the establishment of a certain degree of integration between a 
claimant of certain social benefits and the granting Member State. 
The case law of the CJEU has proven that EU law is sensitive to the Member 
6WDWHV¶GHVLUHRIWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDJHQXLQHOLQNEHWZHHQDSHUVRQFODLPLQJ
residence-based non-contributory benefits and the Member State granting the 
benefit. The residence concept of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 also seems to 
meet these aspirations, both formally and substantially. It could thus be 
observed that the current residence concept of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
might already contain the necessary safeguards to avoid benefit tourism, i.e. 
non-active citizens moving to another Member State with the sole purpose of 
obtaining social benefits without any genuine link with that State. 
5.2 Integrating proportionality in the current proposals 
5.2.1 Status quo and proportionality 
If the option of a status quo would be further explored, it is crucial that further 
initiatives are taken at the European level to clarify the relationship between 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and Directive 2004/38/EC. This could be done 
by providing further guidance to the Member States on how to apply the 
Brey/Dano case law in practice, i.e. when dealing with claims for SNCBs by 
non-active EU citizens. Logically, such administrative guidelines should serve 
the competent authorities of the Member States to have a clear view on how 
and to which extent requirements of legal residence can impact their decisions 
with regard to entitlement to SNCBs if the Member State concerned is to be 
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regarded as the Member State of residence in line with Article 11 of 
Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. 
The main goal of these guidelines would be to strike a correct balance between 
the equal treatment provision of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and legal 
residence requirements for non-active persons. In this regard, the Member 
States should have a clear view on how to integrate the principle of 
proportionality. This would require further investigation into which criteria 
have to be taken into account. But, it is clear that ± by analogy with the 
proportionality criteria of Directive 2004/38/EC ± such assessment should take 
into account the duration of the residence, the personal circumstances of the 
individual and the amount of aid granted in order to assess whether the 
LQGLYLGXDOKDVEHFRPHDQXQUHDVRQDEOHEXUGHQRQWKHFRPSHWHQW6WDWH¶VVRFLDO
assistance system. 
5.2.2 Referring to Directive 2004/38/EC and proportionality 
A mere referral to Directive 2004/38/EC would have the same result as 
choosing a status quo. Therefore, it would be our recommendation to also 
draft clear guidelines (as described above) for the Member States on how to 
apply both instruments together, with full respect for the principle of free 
movement of Union citizens and according to the principle of proportionality. 
Alternatively, rather than a mere referral to Directive 2004/38/EC, it might 
provide more clarity and legal certainty if the relevant articles restricting equal 
access to social assistance in Directive 2004/38/EC were to be translated and 
integrated into the SNCB title.363 It can also be observed that the mere 
reference to the Directive will not be sufficiently transparent, neither for social 
security institutions nor for EU citizens. A mere reference requires a thorough 
knowledge of both systems and, in lack thereof, could lead to wrong 
                                                 
363 On the other hand, this would also require a clear view on how both instruments would 
further interact in order to avoid another layer of complexity in the relationship. 
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application and loss of rights for citizens. In that regard, it might be better to 
translate the residence requirements of Directive 2004/38/EC explicitly into 
the text of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
The provisions on entitlement to SNCBs could be aligned with the provisions 
on equal treatment with regard to social assistance of Article 24 of Directive 
2004/38/EC as follows: 
 First three months: no entitlement to SNCBs without any assessment of legal 
residence; 
 Between three months and five years: for entitlement to SNCBs, the competent 
authority can make an assessment of the legal residence taking into account the 
duration of the residence, the personal circumstances of the individual and the 
amount of aid granted in order to assess whether the individual has become an 
XQUHDVRQDEOHEXUGHQRQWKHFRPSHWHQW6WDWH¶VVRFLDODVVLVWDQFHV\VWHP 
 Five years: full entitlement to SNCBs without any assessment. 
For the first three months, it seems acceptable from a legal point of view that a 
claim can be rejected without a proportionality test. If the individual 
concerned already claims SNCBs almost immediately after arrival in the host 
Member State, he or she can be deemed to move to that Member State for the 
sole purpose of obtaining the SNCB concerned. This approach seems to be in 
line with the Dano case law. 
However, even in the first three months of residence the proportionality 
principle should not be overlooked. The choice for a uniform and dominant 
residence duration requirement of three months without the possibility to 
demonstrate that the person already has a genuine link with the host Member 
State, would ignore this fundamental principle of Union law. An overall 
assessment of all the facts of the individual case should still be required in 
order to possibly overrule the waiting period. 
It could for instance be clarified that, during the first three months of 
residence within the meaning of Directive 2004/38/EC, a person 
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is not considered resident yet in the host Member State within the meaning of 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, ³unless this person can prove the opposite´364 
This last addition ± which opens the possibility to provide proof of a genuine 
link with the host Member State ± is important, given the need to take into 
account the principle of proportionality when restricting the free movement of 
Unions citizens, as already described above. 
Next to this, it has to be recalled that the introduction of a three-month waiting 
period for SNCBs breaks the balance that was struck by the SNCB chapter and 
should be compensated to prevent mobile EU citizens from falling between 
two stools, contrary to the goals of Article 48 TFEU. If such a waiting period 
were introduced, the persons concerned should be considered as having kept 
their residence in the Member State of origin during this first period. The latter 
would thus still be the competent State as to the entitlement to SNCBs. If this 
necessary corollary of postponing the establishment of residence in a Member 
State was omitted, such a new regime for SNCBs could fall foul of the 
fundamental right to free movement as guaranteed by the Treaties and of the 
main aim of social security coordination. 
An alternative option would be to seek a better sharing of the burden amongst 
the Member States. Such burden-sharing could be accomplished by retaining 
the responsibility for these persons in the Member State of origin via cost 
compensation between the Member States concerned. The latter would then 
still be financially responsible for the first three months. During this period, 
the institutions of the host Member State would consequently provide the 
SNCBs in accordance with its legislation on behalf of the institution of the 
Member State of origin, which would be obliged to fully reimburse the costs 
incurred by the host Member State.  
                                                 
364 See the judgment in Swaddling EU:C:1999:96: an individual in the specific circumstances 
of Mr Swaddling should not be confronted with a waiting period of eight weeks.   
 346 
 
Between three months and five years, the claimant is building up integration 
within the Member State concerned and has the opportunity to create a 
µJHQXLQHOLQN¶RUµFHUWDLQGHJUHHRILQWHJUDWLRQ¶DVKDVEHHQFRQVWUXFWHGLQ(8
citizenship case law. It will depend on the concrete circumstances of each case 
whether there is sufficient integration. Therefore, a proportionality test is 
indispensable, as the mere claim of an SNCB cannot result in an automatic 
expulsion and, logically, neither in an automatic refusal of the grant of the 
benefit concerned which could lead to expulsion. In our view, consideration 16 
of the preamble provides inspiration for the proportionality test which has to 
be inWHJUDWHG$VWRWKHµSHUVRQDOFLUFXPVWDQFHV¶IXUWKHUJXLGDQFHLVSUREDEO\
needed. The explicit reference to a proportionality test should make it 
abundantly clear that each case has to be assessed on its merits and that an 
automatic refusal is prohibited. 
It goes without saying that after five years365 the claimant is entitled to full 
equal treatment with regard to SNCBs. 
The abovementioned adaptations to the current proposals from the EC can be 
regarded as a mitigation of the effect which the integration of a hard 
µ(&-residence-WHVW¶ IROORZLQJ D EURDG Dano interpretation, would 
have on the social protection of mobile EU citizens. It would guarantee that 
the proportionality principle is respected upon integration of legal residence 
requirements for access to SNCBs. However, nothing excludes that the 
relationship between the instruments concerned would be settled more 
drastically. 
5.3 Safeguarding SNCB coordination from residence requirements in Directive 
2004/38/EC 
It has to be reiterated that the current proposals presented by the EC are only 
pointing in the direction of integrating the requirement for legal residence 
                                                 
365 To be determined whether this should be a period of lawful and uninterrupted residence. 
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stemming from Directive 2004/38/EC into the EU social security coordination 
system of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. The proposals thereby depart from 
the idea that the CJEU has had its final say on the relationship between both 
instruments. 
It cannot be denied that the CJEU has clearly stated that nothing prevents that 
the requirements of the Directive have to be taken into account when applying 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. From a legal-technical point of view, this is 
absolutely correct and cannot be countered. Indeed, no provision is provided 
for in either instrument to arrange the relationship between them. However, 
the lack of such provision also means that, in principle, nothing prevents a 
conclusion in the other direction, i.e. that the coordination rules of the 
Regulation have to be taken into account when applying Directive 
2004/38/EC. More precisely, the latter should not touch upon the coordination 
system which is aimed at preserving entitlement to social security benefits in 
the light of the free movement of Union citizens within the European Union. 
In that regard, it should be kept in mind that the European legislature can still 
provide for a clear provision on the relationship between Directive 
2004/38/EC and Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
It might be useful to take a step back and assess the historical background of 
the issue at stake. The requirement of sufficient resources and health coverage 
as conditions for legal residence were conditions in the former residence 
directives,366 repealed by Directive 2004/38/EC, as well. The same goes for 
the SNCB chapter in the old Regulation (EC) No 1408/71. They functioned 
next to each other and there was no apparent friction. Clearly, it was obvious 
that the entitlement to SNCBs had to be decided on in the framework of the 
coordination Regulations and the residence directives did not intrude into the 
coordination system, which was and is based on a system of factual residence. 
This previous cohabitation of legal residence with respect to entitlement to 
                                                 
366 Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 
90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC. 
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social security benefits of a mixed nature could be consolidated. It worked 
well until the political climate changed and some Member States decided to 
link both instruments. 
A first option would be to remove all doubts on the relationship between 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and Directive 2004/38/EC by accepting a status 
RIµOH[VSHFLDOLV¶IRUWKHFRRUGLQDWLRQ5HJXODWLRQ7KLVZRXOGH[SOLFLWO\DIILUP
the current state of EU law and the normal application of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004. In concreto, this could be effectuated by inserting a safeguarding 
clause in Directive 2004/38/EC, confirming that the Directive does not affect 
the coordination rules of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. Inspiration for such a 
clause could be found in Article 36(2) of Regulation 492/2011, which provides 
IRU WKH IROORZLQJ FODXVH LQ LWV ILQDO SURYLVLRQV ³This Regulation shall not 
affect measures taken in accordance with Article 48 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union´ 
In the same line of reasoning, a definition of social assistance could be 
provided for in Directive 2004/38/EC as not encompassing SNCBs that were 
included in Annex X of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. This could be done in a 
JHQHUDO ZD\ E\ HTXDWLQJ ³social assistance within the meaning of Directive 
2004/38/EC´ZLWK ³social assistance within the meaning of Regulation (EC) 
No 883/2004´ +RZHYHU WDNLQJ LQWR DFFRXQW WKH Brey judgment, the 
OHJLVODWXUH FRXOG DOVR FKRRVH WR LQWHJUDWH WKH &-(8¶V GHILQLWLRQ RI VRFLDO
assistance, excluding SNCBs listed in Annex X: 
³Social assistance within the meaning of this Directive is all assistance 
introduced by the public authorities, whether at national, regional or local 
level, that can be claimed by an individual who does not have resources 
sufficient to meet his own basic needs and the needs of his family and who, by 
reason of that fact, may become a burden on the public finances of the host 
Member State during his period of residence which could have consequences 
for the overall level of assistance which may be granted by that State. Social 
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security benefits as defined in Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 are 
not social assistance within the meaning of this Directive.´367 
5.4 ,QWURGXFLQJDµIUDXGDQGDEXVHRIULJKWV¶LQ5HJXODWLRQ(&1R 
The analysis of the Dano judgment appears to reveal that the CJEU mainly 
DLPVWRWDFNOHµEHQHILWWRXULVP¶LHPRYLQJWRDQRWKHU0HPEHU6WDWHVolely to 
benefit from the welfare system of the host Member State. In that regard, it 
could be observed that it would suffice to introduce an explicit coordination 
rule tackling fraud and abuse of rights by claimants. Such clause could be 
incorporated in the SNCB chapter, but could also be a general provision on 
fraud and abuse in the coordination Regulations. 
It is acknowledged that one has to be very careful with the use of these 
concepts in EU law, as they have traditionally been interpreted 
very narrowly by the CJEU. There is no abuse when EU citizens and their 
family members obtain a right of residence under Union law in a Member 
6WDWHRWKHUWKDQWKDWRIWKH(8FLWL]HQ¶VQDWLRQDOLW\DVWKH\DUHEHQHILWLQJIURP
an advantage inherent in the exercise of the right of free movement protected 
by the Treaty,368 regardless of the purpose of their move to that State.369 
However, both the CJEU and the EC define abuse 
as ³an artificial conduct entered into solely with the purpose of obtaining the 
right of free movement and residence´370 A residence which in actual fact is a 
                                                 
367 7KH(&¶VWDVNRIWKRURXJKO\YHULI\LQJZKHWKHUDEHQHILWLVWREHUHJDUGHGDVDQ61&%RUDV
social assistance would become all the more important. 
368 Judgment in Centros, C-212/97, EU:C:1999:126, paragraph 27 and the judgment in 
Commission v Austria EU:C:2012:605, paragraph 67-68. 
369 Judgment in Akrich, C-109/01, EU:C:2003:491, paragraph 55 and judgment in Jia, C-1/05, 
EU:C:2007:1, paragraph 31. 
370 One should keep in mind that, when the freedom of movement was extended from the 
economically active to the economically non-active population in the context of Union 
citizenship, there was a political agreement that freedom of movement should not be 
extended to economically non-active persons who take the freedom of movement as a means 
to get the highest possible social benefit. The idea was to deprive those citizens of the right 
to free movement, if they intended to change residence driven by the mere motive to get 
more social benefits. 
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³fake residence´ FI WKH SUREOHPV PHQWLRQHG ZLWK UHJDUG WR ³addresses of 
convenience´ would fall under such a concept of abuse. This 
of course cannot create rights under EU law. 
It is however also apparent that in Dano the CJEU has further elaborated the 
FRQFHSWRIDEXVHRI(8ODZDQGKDVDOORZHGWKDW³the purposes of the move´
are taken into account by the host Member State. This can be regarded as a 
green light to integrate a fraud and abuse article in Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004. 
Article 35 of Directive 2004/38/EC could be a guiding article for this purpose, 
as it provides that Member States may adopt the necessary measures to refuse, 
terminate or withdraw any right conferred by this Directive in the case of 
DEXVH RI ULJKWV RU IUDXG VXFK DV PDUULDJHV RI FRQYHQLHQFH $Q ³address of 
convenience´RUD³shift of residence with the sole purpose of obtaining social 
benefits´FRXOGEHWUHDWHGLQWKHVDPHZD\DQGFRXOGFRQVHTXHQWO\OHDGWRWKH
refusal, termination or withdrawal of the right to reside in a host Member 
State. A similar provision could be incorporated in Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004. 
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6 Conclusion 
6.1 General evaluation of the proposals 
The propositions made by the European Commission (EC) have a common 
denominator: they acknowledge that special non-contributory cash benefits 
(SNCBs) do not need to be paid during the first three months of residence and 
thereafter only if the recipient has a lawful right of residence according to the 
economic criteria set out in Directive 2004/38/EC in the host Member State 
(which have been interpreted restrictively by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU). 
The authors of this report need to underline that key questions about the 
PHDQLQJRIWKH&-(8¶VFDVHODZUHPDLQXQUHVROYHG,VWKH&-(8¶VFDVHODZ
notably as a consequence of the Dano judgment, to be interpreted broadly 
(general exclusion of economically inactive persons from social assistance in 
the host Member State, without any individual assessment) or narrowly (denial 
of access to social assistance when it is not disproportionate in view of the 
facts of the case)? How will the CJEU analyse claims of SNCBs by 
jobseekers, former workers, family members or workers with low income? In 
some cases, may the e[LVWHQFHRID µJHQXLQH OLQN¶ZLWK WKHFRXQWU\ LQZKLFK
the claim is made justify entitlement to social assistance and how would this 
link be assessed in accordance with EU primary law? How will the 
UHTXLUHPHQW RI µILQDQFLDO VROLGDULW\¶ LPSDFW DFFHVV WR VRFial assistance? It is 
hard to anticipate responses which partly depend on how Treaty principles will 
be applied by the CJEU.  
In the light of these remarks, differences between the three options are narrow. 
Whereas Option 1 (status quo) entails that access to social assistance is subject 
to a condition of legal residence in the host Member State such as defined by 
the recent case law of the CJEU, Option 2a aims at reaching an equivalent 
effect with the transposition of the CJEU case law into Regulation (EC) No 
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883/2004 (limitation of the principle of equality of treatment for SNCBs). 
Option 2b would have a broader impact: by deleting the category of SNCBs, 
µPL[HG EHQHILWV¶ PD\ QR ORQJHU WDNH DGYDQWDJH RI DQ\ RI WKH FRRUGLQDWLRQ
principles.   
Even if the objective of unifying the regime of social assistance for migrants 
into one single instrument could improve clarity and simplicity, the complex 
and unstable legal context makes it necessary to highlight the drawbacks of the 
(&¶VSURSRVDOV 
Option 2b appears to be the most problematic one. The removal of SNCBs 
from the scope of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 would be detrimental to both 
citizens and administrations. It would raise the cost of administering SNCBs, 
decrease legal certainty, endanger the protection RI PLJUDQWV¶ ULJKWV DQG
hinder the fight against fraud, abuse and error. Above all, the Brey and Dano 
rulings in no way require the removal of SNCBs from the scope of the 
coordination Regulation.  
Option 2a would raise beforehand the delicate question how to concretely 
insert Article 24 of Residence Directive 2004/38/EC into the coordination 
Regulation. It appears indeed that it is very difficult to transpose the limitation 
of the equal treatment principle into the coordination Regulation. The analysis 
carried out shows that there is a great risk of undermining the overall 
coherence of the SNCB system and of generating legal inconsistencies within 
the coordination Regulation. The fact that the CJEU case law is not stable yet 
makes it even less reasonable to set rules aiming to limit the equal treatment 
principle for SNCBs. In addition, is it consistent to combine two instruments 
which have very different institutional features? The amendment of the 
coordination Regulation would affect the historical compromise of Regulation 
(EEC) No 1247/92 on SNCBs. 
The proposal to retain the status quo (Option 1) would give the CJEU time to 
refine its case law. In this respect, this could be a reasonable choice given that 
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Brey and Dano are far from covering all concrete situations. Nevertheless, 
Option 1 has many disadvantages. The status quo means that Member States 
may differentiate between their nationals and non-nationals with regard to 
access to social assistance. The treatment of poor people vis-à-vis social 
assistance will vary widely according to the country of residence. National 
rules are likely to be more and more restrictive with all the usual problems 
when conflicting national laws apply to transnational situations. Many poor 
migrants will find themselves without social assistance. There would be no 
guarantee that the overall expenditure by EU countries on social assistance 
would diminish: they may simply move from certain countries to others. There 
would be a flow of cases on the interpretation of Directive 2004/38/EC, 
whereas the implementation of the coordination Regulations as far as SNCBs 
are concerned would become more complex. Negative effects of Option 1 
may, however, be the necessary counterpart if the legislature decides to wait 
until case law stabilises. Let us recall that for cross-border care, Directive 
2011/24/EU of 9 March 2011 was published more than 10 years after the first 
Kohll and Decker cases. Option 1 is not supposed to be a long-term option. 
The CJEU case law should be considered as a work in progress. A wait-and-
see position should be appropriate for the next few years. Later, legislative 
action should be taken at its best on the basis of a matured case law. 
A common consequence of the three propositions is that protection of rights 
would be in danger. Inactive citizens will be deterred from exercising their 
right to mobility within the EU, not only because they will not know in 
advance their social assistance rights in the host Member State, but also 
because they may find themselves in situations where they have no entitlement 
to social assistance in any of the Member States they have a connection with. 
Some Member States may even take advantage of the new legal system to 
raise the level of integration required for the eligibility for social assistance. 
This evolution could lead to violations of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
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of the EU and other international instruments such as the European Social 
Charter. 
Administrative burden would increase under all three options. The concept of 
lawful residence will become central with a great risk of divergent concepts 
within the Member States. ShoXOG WKH FRQFHSW RI µJHQXLQH OLQN¶ FRQWLQXH WR
apply, it will be subject to recurrent problems of interpretation/evaluation. 
More generally, national institutions will have to permanently adjust to further 
rulings of the CJEU, which will be a source of unwanted administrative 
burden. In order to coordinate their actions, national administrations may be 
inclined to negotiate bilateral agreements, generating extra work for 
unsatisfactory results since they would be limited to signatories. 
Concerning risks of fraud and abuse, the assessment of the three options is not 
simple. For Options 1 and 2a, the Dano case does not modify the principle in 
accordance with which the Member State in which the person does not 
habitually reside is in general free from "SNCB burden". Therefore, the risk of 
double payment seems to be largely reduced by Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
This said, in a dual system in which both the Regulation and Residence 
Directive 2004/38/EC would apply, the risk of double payment could increase 
for practical reasons. On balance, Option 2b would hinder the fight against 
fraud, abuse and error more than facilitate it. 
As far as financial implications are concerned, savings made by some Member 
States thanks to stricter rules on access to social assistance would probably be 
compensated by extra administrative costs and new forms of fraud due to a 
lack of administrative cooperation. A precise financial analysis is at this stage 
impossible to carry out. 
6.2 Alternative/adapted proposals 
All three proposals of the EC opt for an adaptation of the social security 
coordination rules related to SNCBs in order to align them with the 
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requirements of legal residence as laid down in Directive 2004/38/EC. 
Alternative/adapted options are worth being explored. They aim to settle a 
balanced relationship between the Residence Directive and the coordination 
Regulations. The alternative propositions aim to preserve the coherence of 
coordination rules and to protect the social rights of mobile citizens within the 
European Union. 
Three types of actions are envisaged. 
If the option of a status quo (Option 1) was further explored, some initiatives 
would need to be taken at the European level to clarify the relationship 
between Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and Directive 2004/38/EC. The main 
goal of these guidelines would be to strike a correct balance between the equal 
treatment provision of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and legal residence 
requirements for non-active persons. 
If an explicit integration of the relevant articles of Directive 2004/38/EC into 
the SNCB title of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 would remain on the agenda, 
it would be possible to translate the residence requirements of Directive 
2004/38/EC explicitly into the text of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 through 
DQ µ2SWLRQ ¶ 7KLV RSWLRQ ZRXOG FRQQHFW WKH VRFLDO DVVLVWDQFH ULJKWV WR WKH
length of stay: first three months, between three months and five 
years/acquisition of permanent right of residence, over five years. 
Alternatively, it could be sufficient to insert an explicit rule into the 
coordination Regulations tackling fraud and abuse of rights by claimants.   
Instead of adapting Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, it would be conceivable to 
preserve its coherence. A first option would be to remove all doubts on the 
relationship between Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and Directive 2004/38/EC 
E\GHILQLQJDVWDWXVRIµlex specialis¶IRUWKHFRRUGLQDWLRQ5HJXODWLRQ(YHQLI
it could raise difficulties since both regimes would apply with potentially 
different results, a second option would be to provide a definition of social 
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assistance in Directive 2004/38/EC that would not encompass SNCBs 
included in Annex X of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
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Introduction 
 
The purpose of this report is to provide further support to the Commission in drafting the 
Impact Assessment report for the revision of Regulations (EC) No 883/2004 and (EC) 
No 987/2009.371 In preparation of this impact assessment a study has been made by a team of 
Deloitte Consulting and HIVA - Catholic University of Leuven under contract VC/2012/0949 
¶6WXG\ IRU DQG LPSDFW DVVHVVPHQW IRU UHYLVLRQ RI 5HJXODWLRQV (& 1R 883/2004 and (EC) No 
·KHUHDIWHUWKHVWXG\ 
The study provides among others socio-economic data and indicators to evaluate the mobility 
trends of the insured persons and their family members, as well as the related costs for the 
0HPEHUV6WDWHV·VRFLDOVHFXULW\VFKHPHs. 
The aim of this report is to provide further support to the Commission services to integrate 
directly the relevant data and statistics in the analytical part of the Impact Assessment report. This 
UHSRUWSURYLGHVDFOHDUDQVZHU¶RQZKDWLVWKHQDWXUHDQG scale of the problem, how is it evolving 
aQGZKRLVPRVWDIIHFWHGE\LW"· As well for the baseline scenario of the present situation, its further 
development, and the potential impact of the alternative options, this is documented in quantitative 
terms. Those quantitative pictures reveal size and scope of the problem, the baseline scenario and 
the impact and changes from the baseline scenario for several options. 
. 
                                                 
371
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CHAPTER 1 | Data collection, limitations and applied methodology  
1 |  Data collection, limitations and applied methodology 
 
1.1 Data collection 
 
:LWKLQWKH¶6WXG\IRUDQLPSDFWDVVHVVPHQWIRUUHYLVLRQRI5HJXODWLRQV(&1RVDQG
·372 it was the ambition to collect in 14 Member States administrative data on the 
coordination rules of LTC and unemployment benefits. This questionnaire referred explicitly to the 
old E-forms, the current Portable Documents and Structured Electronic Documents (SED) in 
order to obtain a well understanding of the data needs. Although those 14 Member States cover the 
complete range of welfare state regimes, this administrative data collection, in terms of involved 
Member States and in terms of available data, was too narrow to assess in detail the baseline 
scenarios and the different proposed options. 
To obtain a more detailed quantitative view on the baseline scenario and the different options, 
mainly data from the EU Labour Force Survey (LFS)373 and the EC 2012 Ageing Report was 
exploited. The LFS is the main source of information with regard to the labour market situation 
and labour market trends in the European Union. The main advantage of this survey is the data 
availability for all EU-Member States. The EC 2012 Ageing Report contains state of the art 
information on the coverage of social protection schemes and its budgetary cost in all EU countries 
including projections for the future presents projections. 
1.2 Limitations 
 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 is applicable to countries of the European Economic Area (EEA) 
and Switzerland. However, calculations have been made for only 27 Member States. 
1.3 Applied methodology 
 
Both figures below provide a first overview of the applied methodology to estimate/calculate the 
budgetary impact of the baseline scenario and the different options. It was the ambition to collect 
in 14 Member States administrative data from the competent institutions. Afterwards, the results 
would have been extrapolated to the EEA countries and Switzerland. Although those 14 Member 
States cover the complete range of welfare state regimes, this administrative data collection, in 
terms of involved Member States and in terms of available data, was too narrow to assess in detail 
the baseline scenarios and the different proposed options. As result, mainly data from the LFS, the 
                                                 
372
  Regulation (EC) No 883 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2004 on the coordination of social 
security systems. Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 
laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
373
  Council Regulation (EC) No. 577/98 of 9 March 1998 on the organisation of a labour force sample survey in the 
Community. 
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CHAPTER 1 | Data collection, limitations and applied methodology  
Ageing Report and the Audit Board Report was exploited to estimate the number of involved 
persons and the budgetary impact.   
1.3.1 Unemployment benefits 
 
Based on Labour force Survey (LFS) data, an estimation of the number of cross-border workers 
could be made (based on the question ¶:KDWLVWKHQDPHDQGDGGUHVVRIWKHlocal unit of the enterprise where 
\RXZRUN"·DQGYDULDEOHV ¶&28175<:·FRXQWU\RISODFHRIZRUNDQG ¶&28175<·FRXQWU\RI
residence) in the database). In the further analysis we considered all workers who work in another 
country than the country of residence as cross-border workers. Workers who work in a 
neighbouring country are considered as frontier workers. This is different from the legal 
definition. 
National unemployment rates were applied to the number of cross-border workers to estimate 
the number of unemployed cross-border workers.374 The national unemployment rates of 2010 
(from 20 to 64 years) defined in the 2012 Ageing Report were used. The unemployment rates of 
the country of employment and not of the country of residence have been applied on the 
number of cross-border workers calculated by way of the LFS. 
In order to estimate the budgetary impact of the baseline scenario, the estimated number of 
unemployed cross-border workers (based on the LFS and the unemployment rates of the 2012 
Ageing Report) is multiplied by the annual unemployment benefit per unemployed person 
(unemployment benefit spending in 2010 prices / (labour force * unemployment rate)) (data from 
the 2012 Ageing Report). This yearly expenditure assumes that the unemployed person did not find 
a job during the first year of unemployment. However, a PRUH ¶UHDOLVWLF·FDOFXODWLRQRI WKH\HDUO\
expenditure is taken up in this report by taking into account the annual average duration of the 
payment of the unemployment benefit.375 However, also the amount of the reimbursement 
claim should be taken into account. The analysis assumes 3 months of claims (minimum scenario) 
where a distinction should be made between the claim made by the country of residence and the 
actual payment by the country of last activity. 
Under current rules unemployed frontier workers must claim unemployment benefits in the 
country of residence while unemployed other cross-border workers can choose to claim 
unemployment benefits in the country of last employment or in the country of residence. Due to 
the fact other cross-border workers can choose (between the country of last activity or the country 
of residence), an assumption has to be made about how many of them return to the country of 
residence and how many stay in the country of last activity. We assume that the unemployed 
persons will choose for the country which is paying the highest unemployment benefit. 
                                                 
374
  In order to support the use of national unemployment rates for cross-border workers, DG EMPL confirmed, on the basis 
of Eurostat EU-LFS data, that the overall characteristics of cross-border workers seem quite close to the average national 
workers (people working in the same country than their country of residence). No large differences in terms of highest 
level of education or age, two important factors when it comes to unemployment, appear. 
375
  Calculations are based on the duration of the unemployment (which can be calculated with LFS data). If the duration of 
unemployment < 1 month, we assume a payment of the UB of 0.5 months; Between 1-2 months of unemployment = 1.5 
months UB paid; Between 3-5 months of unemployment = 4 months UB paid; Between 6 and 11 months of 
unemployment = 8.5 months UB paid; 12 months and longer of unemployment = 12 months UB paid. This cut-off period 
of 12 months stems from the fact that the expenditure is calculated for only one year. It should be noted that the duration 
in unemployment may be underestimated since it is measured at a certain moment in time (e.g. he/she may still remain 
unemployed), see Employment in Europe 2008, chapter 2 and Employment and Social developments in Europe Review 
2012, chapter 1.  
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Figure 1.1 Applied methodology ² Unemployment benefits 
 
Source HIVA KU Leuven 
 
1.3.2 LTC 
 
The fact there is no specific coordination regime and a common definition, difficulties appeared 
during the data collection on LTC. Member States do not explicit collect data on LTC and have not 
a common understanding of LTC benefits. At the moment, administrative data on LTC are only 
available in specific forms dealing with the coordination rules of the sickness chapter. 
 
The number of those insured for health care living in another country than the 
competent country ± which sometimes includes long-term care or to which LTC-
insurance is closely linked ± can be calculated based on the number of PD S1 - or E106 
forms (insured person), E109 forms (family member of insured person) and E121 forms 
(pensioner and family member of pensioner). The number of PD S1 was estimated by 
the sum of 3 categories:  
x Cross-border workers (and their family members); 
x Retired former cross-border workers (and their family members); 
x Other mobile pensioners (and their family members). 
First, by way of the LFS, the number of cross-border workers were estimated. Second, we 
assumed in the calculation model that 20% of the cross-border workers will have an insured family 
member. Third, to estimate the total number of retired former cross-border workers, we applied 
the percentage of cross-border workers on the labour market to the number of pensioners in 2010 
(figure from 2012 Aging Report- YDULDEOH ¶3HQVLRQHUV DJHG · DQG WKLV E\ LQGLYLGXDO IRUPHU
working Member State. Fourth, an estimation of the number of migrant pensioners was calculated 
by using WKH/)6 VHOHFWLRQRI¶UHWLUHGSHUVRQVDJHGROGHUWKDQDWDUULYDO·RIZKLFKFRXQWU\RI
birth= EU27 and country of residence=EU27). Final, we assume in the calculation model that 25% 
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of the pensioners will have also an insured family member. The sum of all these categories results in 
an estimate of the number of PD S1. 
 
As next step we have estimated the cross-border expenditure on health care and long-term care 
EDVHGRQILJXUHVIURPWKH$JHLQJ5HSRUWYDULDEOHV¶+HDOWKFDUHVSHQGLQJLQSULFHV per 
SHUVRQ·¶3RSXODWLRQPLOOLRQ·DQG¶/RQJ-WHUPFDUHVSHQGLQJLQSULFHVLQELOOLRQ(XURV· 
We calculated our estimates on average benefits for the total of the insured population. It is as 
mobile citizens (workers, pensioners, their family members) are using this system of LTC as if they 
ZHUHQDWLRQDOV7KLV LQYROYHVD ¶SRWHQWLDO·RYHUHVWLPDWLRQRI WKHQXPEHURIXVHUVRIFURVV-border 
LTC benefits and the related expenditure due to fact some MS consider their LTC benefit as not 
exportable. At the VDPH WLPH WKHVH HVWLPDWHV DVVXPH D FRPSOHWH ¶WDNH-XS· RI ULJKWV E\ PRELOH
citizens which will not be the case in the baseline scenario. A distinction could be made between 
LTC benefits in kind, LTC benefits in cash and informal LTC by more detailed data from 
DG ECFIN. 
 
Figure 1.2 Applied methodology - LTC 
 
Source HIVA KU Leuven 
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2 |  Analysis and results 
2.1 Unemployment benefits 
 
In the baseline scenario, frontier workers (people who work in one country and live in another, 
and return home daily or at least once a week) who become wholly unemployed must apply for 
unemployment benefits in their country of residence. Cross-border workers, other than frontier 
workers, may apply for unemployment benefits and register with the employment service in either 
the country of last activity or the country of residence (right of choice). The country of last activity will 
reimburse the institution of the country of residence an amount of the benefits provided to the 
returned frontier workers and other cross-border workers by the latter institution during the first 
three or five months.  
Option 2 implies that frontier workers also have the choice between applying for unemployment 
benefits and registering with the employment services either in the country of last activity or in the 
country of residence (all cross-border workers have a right of choice). 
In option 3, the unemployed person should claim unemployment benefits and register with the 
employment services in the country of last activity. Reimbursement claims are no longer necessary.  
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Table 2.1 Applicable rules baseline scenario and different options 
 Option 1: Baseline scenario Option 2: Right of choice Option 3: Country of 
last activity 
Country of last activity 
Other cross-border workers UB paid to other cross-border 
workers when highest UB in 
country of last activity (rational 
decision) 
UB paid to other cross-border 
workers when highest UB in 
country of last activity (rational 
decision) 
UB paid to other cross-
border workers 
Frontier workers  UB paid to frontier workers 
when highest UB in country of 
last activity (rational decision) 
UB paid to frontier 
workers 
Reimbursement Reimbursement claim paid of 3 or 
5 months to country of residence 
Reimbursement claim paid of 3 
or 5 months to country of 
residence 
No reimbursement 
Country of residence 
Other cross-border workers UB paid to other cross-border 
workers when highest UB in 
country of residence (rational 
decision) 
UB paid to other cross-border 
workers when highest UB in 
country of residence (rational 
decision) 
* 
Frontier workers UB paid to frontier workers UB paid to frontier workers 
when highest UB in country of 
residence (rational decision) 
* 
Reimbursement Reimbursement claim received of 3 
or 5 months from country of last 
activity 
Reimbursement claim received 
of 3 or 5 months from country 
of last activity 
 
* A PD U1 could be issued by the country of residence to prove (self-)employed or insured periods in 
the country of residence to open unemployment rights in the country of last activity. 
Source HIVA KU Leuven based on information from DG EMPL 
 
Table 2.2 provides an overview of the figures we have used to estimate the number of 
unemployed cross-border workers and the cross-border expenditure related to unemployment 
benefits. The table shows that on average 1 million cross-border workers are employed in the 
EU27, of which on average 701.000 frontier workers are employed in a neighbouring country. For 
the first the MS is the country of last activity and competent country, for the latter the MS is the 
country of residence. The number of incoming and outgoing cross-border workers will differ 
between Member States. The total budgetary impact of the coordination regulation is the 
combination of both situations. E.g. Belgium employs 62 thousand incoming cross-borders 
workers (of which 50 thousand incoming frontier workers) while 97 thousand cross-border workers 
OLYH LQ %HOJLXP EXW ZRUN LQ DQRWKHU FRXQWU\   ¶RXWJRLQJ FURVV-ERUGHU ZRUNHUV· RI ZKLFK 
thousand outgoing frontier workers). National unemployment rates were applied to the number of 
cross-border workers to estimate the number of unemployed cross-border workers. This results in 
an estimate of 73.7 thousand unemployed cross-border workers of which 45.2 thousand frontier 
workers. The annual unemployment benefit per unemployed person was taken to estimate the 
cross-border expenditure. 
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Table 2.2 UB: Main parameters for estimating the baseline scenario and the different options 
 
* The annual unemployment benefit per unemployed person= unemployment benefit spending in 2010 prices / 
unemployed persons (20-64) 
Source LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
 
Reimbursement claims can be made by the country of residence to the country of last activity for 
fully unemployed frontier workers but also for other cross-border workers who have decided to 
register with the competent institution in their country of residence. The country of last activity 
shall reimburse the unemployed benefits provided in the country of residence during the first three 
months or five months (when the unemployed person during the preceding 24 months, completed 
at least 12 months of (self)employment in the country of last activity). However, the amount of 
reimbursement by the country of last activity to the country of residence cannot be higher than the 
amount payable under the legislation of the country of last activity (see art. 65, 6 Regulation (EC) 
No. 883/2004). This specific rule implies for the baseline scenario that the reimbursement will be 
27% lower than the possible actual claim. The % difference between claim and actual payment will 
be influenced by the amount of the unemployment benefit paid in the country of last activity 
compared to this in the country of residence (last column of table 2.3). E.g. claims made to Poland 
(lowest estimated annual expenditure UB per person) will imply a high % difference (95%) with the 
actual payment while claims made to the Netherlands (highest estimated annual expenditure UB per 
person) will imply no % difference with the actual payment. 
2010 2010
Country
Incoming 
Cross-
border 
workers 
(in .000)
Of which: 
Incoming 
frontier 
workers 
(in .000)
Outgoing 
cross-
border 
workers 
(in .000.)
Of which: 
Outgoing 
frontier 
workers 
(in 000)
Unemployment 
rate (20-64)
Incoming 
unemployed 
Cross-border 
workers (in .000)
Of which: 
Incoming 
unemployed 
frontier workers 
(in .000)
Outgoing 
unemployed 
cross-border 
workers (in .000)
Of which: 
Outgoing 
unemployed 
frontier workers 
(in .000)
Annual 
unemployment 
benefit per 
unemployed person 
 ?ŝŶ ? ?
BE 62 50 97 93 8,0% 4,9 4,0 5,1 4,7 19.116
BG 2 0 21 6 10,2% 0,2 0,0 2,2 0,8 454
CZ 61 60 24 17 7,1% 4,4 4,3 1,8 1,2 1.386
DK 35 29 4 3 6,9% 2,4 2,0 0,3 0,2 9.400
DE 186 142 165 141 7,1% 13,2 10,1 9,6 6,9 8.919
EE 1 1 18 15 16,7% 0,1 0,1 1,4 1,2 729
IE 17 8 10 9 13,2% 2,3 1,1 0,7 0,6 14.970
GR 12 6 0 0 12,5% 1,5 0,8 0,0 0,0 2.164
ES 40 10 23 6 19,5% 7,9 1,9 1,8 0,5 4.735
FR 47 30 160 150 9,0% 4,3 2,7 10,5 9,7 12.577
IT 76 5 24 7 8,1% 6,1 0,4 2,1 0,6 5.815
CY 4 0 0 0 6,4% 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 3.282
LV 0 0 7 1 18,4% 0,1 0,1 0,6 0,1 590
LT 0 0 2 0 17,8% 0,1 0,0 0,2 0,0 401
LU 130 129 3 2 4,3% 5,6 5,5 0,2 0,2 25.048
HU 14 12 53 23 11,1% 1,5 1,3 3,4 1,1 833
MT 1 0 1 0 6,0% 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 2.204
NL 110 82 21 20 4,0% 4,4 3,3 1,6 1,5 28.769
AT 101 94 32 29 4,2% 4,2 4,0 2,5 2,2 12.715
PL 8 6 92 50 9,6% 0,7 0,6 6,3 3,6 397
PT 5 2 11 6 11,1% 0,5 0,2 1,6 1,2 3.628
RO 4 0 88 0 7,3% 0,3 0,0 8,6 0,0 803
SI 1 1 9 7 7,2% 0,1 0,1 0,5 0,4 1.537
SK 6 6 117 84 13,9% 0,9 0,8 8,3 5,7 405
FI 20 16 2 1 7,7% 1,5 1,2 0,1 0,1 14.892
SE 12 3 29 23 7,3% 0,9 0,2 2,1 1,6 5.978
UK 78 9 20 8 6,9% 5,4 0,6 2,1 1,1 2.219
EU-27 1.032 701 1.032 701 10,5% 73,7 45,2 73,7 45,2 6.073
Average 2010 and 2011 Average 2010 and 2011
384 
 
CHAPTER 2 | Analysis and results  
Table 2.3 UB: estimated reimbursement claims and impact of maximum reimbursement country of last activity 
(baseline scenario) 
 
Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
 
Tables 2.4 to 2.8 assume for the calculation of the ¶DQQXDO expenditure RI 8%· that the 
unemployed person did not find a job during the first year of unemployment. However, a more 
¶UHDOLVWLF·estimate of the yearly expenditure is taken up in this report by taking into account the 
annual average duration of the payment of the unemployment benefit. For that reason, we discuss 
only tables 2.9 to 2.15. Tables 2.4 and 2.8 describe in more detail the calculations made in the ¶6WXG\
for and impact assessment for revision of Regulations (EC) No DQG(&1R·. 
For that reason, we keep them in this additional analysis. These tables were also presented in the 
AC Working Party of 10 October 2013. 
 
Country of last activity
Cross-border 
workers       
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Of which:  
frontier workers 
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Cross-border 
workers        
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Of which:  
frontier workers 
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
% difference 
amount claim 
received vs. 
paid
Annual 
expenditure 
UB per person 
 ?ŝŶ ? ?
BE 15.200 15.200 13.533 13.533 -11% 19.116
BG 441 0 20 0 -95% 454
CZ 1.278 1.215 526 519 -59% 1.386
DK 3.428 3.342 3.395 3.342 -1% 9.400
DE 25.390 25.256 15.024 14.944 -41% 8.919
EE 115 62 19 14 -84% 729
IE 684 600 664 600 -3% 14.970
GR 1.037 88 329 88 -68% 2.164
ES 7.627 3.148 4.108 1.871 -46% 4.735
FR 8.659 8.568 6.483 6.395 -25% 12.577
IT 1.466 803 732 406 -50% 5.815
CY 37 0 7 0 -82% 3.282
LV 26 11 10 9 -62% 590
LT 34 5 5 4 -85% 401
LU 18.804 18.804 18.804 18.804 0% 25.048
HU 797 336 190 145 -76% 833
MT 75 0 23 0 -69% 2.204
NL 10.969 10.969 10.969 10.969 0% 28.769
AT 4.102 4.020 4.062 4.020 -1% 12.715
PL 1.574 1.201 73 58 -95% 397
PT 648 238 293 182 -55% 3.628
RO 557 5 54 5 -90% 803
SI 174 174 26 26 -85% 1.537
SK 932 899 87 82 -91% 405
FI 438 323 399 323 -9% 14.892
SE 1.316 536 771 283 -41% 5.978
UK 6.678 2.283 1.514 338 -77% 2.219
EU-27 112.488 98.088 82.122 76.961 -27%
Amount of the claims received 
as debtor  ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Amount of the claims paid as 
debtor ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
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Table 2.4 UB: estimated expenditure UB incoming cross-border workers becoming unemployed, baseline scenario, breakdown by country of last activity and country of 
residence and impact of reimbursement 
 
* Only the annual expenditure is taken into account while there will possibly be a shift of the social security system from the country of last activity to the country of residence 
Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
Country of 
employment
Number of 
unemployed 
incoming cross-
border workers        
(in .000)
Of which incoming 
unemployed frontier 
workers                            
(in .000)
Estimated annual 
expenditure UB paid by 
the country of 
residence  ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Estimated annual 
expenditure UB 
paid by the country 
of last activity       
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Reimbursement 
country of last activity 
(3 months)                   
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
% share of cost 
country of 
residence
% share of cost 
country of last 
activity
% share of cost 
country of 
residence
% share of cost 
country of last 
activity
BE 4,9 4,0 60.800 17.621 13.533 78% 22% 66% 34%
BG 0,2 0,0 1.764 0 20 100% 0% 99% 1%
CZ 4,4 4,3 5.111 68 526 99% 1% 90% 10%
DK 2,4 2,0 13.711 3.628 3.395 79% 21% 66% 34%
DE 13,2 10,1 101.560 27.711 15.024 79% 21% 70% 30%
EE 0,1 0,1 462 10 19 98% 2% 94% 6%
IE 2,3 1,1 2.735 17.817 664 13% 87% 13% 87%
GR 1,5 0,8 4.149 508 329 89% 11% 83% 17%
ES 7,9 1,9 30.508 19.401 4.108 61% 39% 56% 44%
FR 4,3 2,7 34.635 19.539 6.483 64% 36% 57% 43%
IT 6,1 0,4 5.865 32.046 732 15% 85% 15% 85%
CY 0,2 0,0 148 721 7 17% 83% 17% 83%
LV 0,1 0,1 105 6 10 94% 6% 87% 13%
LT 0,1 0,0 138 0 5 100% 0% 96% 4%
LU 5,6 5,5 75.216 1.323 18.804 98% 2% 79% 21%
HU 1,5 1,3 3.187 9 190 100% 0% 94% 6%
MT 0,0 0,0 300 12 23 96% 4% 89% 11%
NL 4,4 3,3 43.877 31.923 10.969 58% 42% 51% 49%
AT 4,2 4,0 16.410 3.292 4.062 83% 17% 69% 31%
PL 0,7 0,6 6.294 0 73 100% 0% 99% 1%
PT 0,5 0,2 2.592 652 293 80% 20% 73% 27%
RO 0,3 0,0 2.228 2 54 100% 0% 98% 2%
SI 0,1 0,1 697 52 26 93% 7% 90% 10%
SK 0,9 0,8 3.729 0 87 100% 0% 98% 2%
FI 1,5 1,2 1.751 3.981 399 31% 69% 29% 71%
SE 0,9 0,2 5.265 2.361 771 69% 31% 63% 37%
UK 5,4 0,6 26.713 5.828 1.514 82% 18% 78% 22%
EU-27 73,7 45,2 449.952 188.512 82.122 70% 30% 62% 38%
Cost without reimbursement Cost with reimbursement
Option 1: No policy change (Baseline scenario): Frontier workers return; other cross-border workers take a rational decision (= highest UB)
Incoming unemployed  crossborder workers Expenditure
 CHAPTER 2 | Analysis and results  
Table 2.5 UB: estimated bXGJHWDU\LPSDFWEDVHOLQHVFHQDULRDQGRSWLRQVLQ½  
 
* The annual expenditure (12 months) is estimated without taking into account national legislation and as such the possible limitation in time of the payment of UB. 
Annual 
expenditure UB 
in own country 
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Actual claims 
paid to country 
of residence    
(3 months)       
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Actual claims 
received from 
country of last 
activity              
(3 months)           
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Total 
expenditure 
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? %
Annual 
expenditure 
UB in own 
country          
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Actual claims 
paid to country 
of residence    
(3 months)       
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Actual claims 
received from 
country of last 
activity            
(3 months)         
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Total 
expenditure 
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? %
Annual 
expenditure 
UB in own 
country         
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Actual claims 
paid to country 
of residence    
(3 months)       
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Actual claims 
received from 
country of last 
activity            
(3 months)        
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Total 
expenditure 
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? %
BE 114.301 13.533 19.727 108.107 100% 119.326 5.077 8.935 115.467 107% 94.166 0 0 94.166 87%
BG 354 20 88 286 100% 0 221 0 221 77% 82 0 0 82 29%
CZ 1.736 526 334 1.928 100% 6.012 848 117 6.743 350% 6.045 0 0 6.045 313%
DK 6.368 3.395 450 9.313 100% 25.257 43 599 24.701 265% 22.728 0 0 22.728 244%
DE 112.967 15.024 16.167 111.825 100% 91.243 24.804 4.864 111.183 99% 117.867 0 0 117.867 105%
EE 894 19 219 694 100% 106 78 10 174 25% 96 0 0 96 14%
IE 28.156 664 455 28.365 100% 44.358 42 2.434 41.966 148% 34.274 0 0 34.274 121%
GR 508 329 0 837 100% 2.177 475 0 2.651 317% 3.142 0 0 3.142 375%
ES 25.118 4.108 949 28.277 100% 29.223 4.287 629 32.882 116% 37.178 0 0 37.178 131%
FR 148.335 6.483 26.361 128.457 100% 94.861 6.226 13.574 87.513 68% 53.527 0 0 53.527 42%
IT 40.718 732 1.444 40.006 100% 38.633 1.068 711 38.990 97% 35.719 0 0 35.719 89%
CY 721 7 0 727 100% 721 19 0 739 102% 748 0 0 748 103%
LV 81 10 16 75 100% 42 18 6 55 73% 48 0 0 48 64%
LT 6 5 1 9 100% 7 18 0 25 272% 20 0 0 20 217%
LU 6.747 18.804 637 24.914 100% 145.470 0 1.233 144.237 579% 140.046 0 0 140.046 562%
HU 928 190 208 910 100% 1.235 435 44 1.625 179% 1.285 0 0 1.285 141%
MT 16 23 0 39 100% 16 38 0 53 136% 105 0 0 105 269%
NL 78.376 10.969 5.167 84.179 100% 172.848 0 11.199 161.649 192% 126.395 0 0 126.395 150%
AT 34.366 4.062 4.253 34.175 100% 84.772 41 7.381 77.433 227% 53.868 0 0 53.868 158%
PL 1.416 73 354 1.136 100% 0 1.387 0 1.387 122% 293 0 0 293 26%
PT 5.139 293 1.111 4.321 100% 738 443 11 1.170 27% 1.825 0 0 1.825 42%
RO 41 54 10 85 100% 8 280 0 288 338% 219 0 0 219 258%
SI 719 26 154 591 100% 133 173 9 297 50% 162 0 0 162 27%
SK 2.307 87 577 1.818 100% 42 908 3 948 52% 350 0 0 350 19%
FI 5.739 399 161 5.977 100% 24.057 57 369 23.746 397% 22.604 0 0 22.604 378%
SE 14.116 771 2.663 12.224 100% 4.409 926 256 5.079 42% 5.444 0 0 5.444 45%
UK 8.290 1.514 615 9.189 100% 5.888 4.481 8 10.362 113% 11.885 0 0 11.885 129%
EU-27 638.464 82.122 82.122 638.464 100% 891.583 52.391 52.391 891.583 140% 770.121 0 0 770.121 121%
Option 1: No policy change (Baseline scenario): Frontier workers return; 
other cross-border workers take a rational decision (= highest UB)
Option 2: Right of choice: cross-border workers take a rational 
decision (= highest amount) Option 3: UB provided by the country of last activity
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Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
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Table 2.6 UB: comparison of options between MS, estimated budgetary impact option 1 (100%) compared to 
other options 
 
* Green: lowest budgetary impact; Red: highest budgetary impact 
Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
Option 1: No 
policy change 
(Baseline 
scenario)
Option 2: Right 
of choice
Option 3: UB 
provided by the 
country of last 
activity
BE 100% 107% 87%
BG 100% 77% 29%
CZ 100% 350% 313%
DK 100% 265% 244%
DE 100% 99% 105%
EE 100% 25% 14%
IE 100% 148% 121%
GR 100% 317% 375%
ES 100% 116% 131%
FR 100% 68% 42%
IT 100% 97% 89%
CY 100% 102% 103%
LV 100% 73% 64%
LT 100% 272% 217%
LU 100% 579% 562%
HU 100% 179% 141%
MT 100% 136% 269%
NL 100% 192% 150%
AT 100% 227% 158%
PL 100% 122% 26%
PT 100% 27% 42%
RO 100% 338% 258%
SI 100% 50% 27%
SK 100% 52% 19%
FI 100% 397% 378%
SE 100% 42% 45%
UK 100% 113% 129%
EU-27 100% 140% 121%
Lowest  impact 15 3 9
Highest impact 9 12 6
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Table 2.7 UB: comparison of options between MS, estimated lowest and highest budgetary impact 
 
Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
Table 2.8 UB: impact estimated cross-border expenditure* on total expenditure UB**, by option 
 
* Total cross-border expenditure: without taking into account the UB paid to unemployed EU migrant workers. 
** Total expenditure UB: ESSPROS data 
Option 1: No 
policy change 
(Baseline 
scenario)
Option 2: 
Right of 
choice
Option 3: UB 
provided by the 
country of last 
activity
Option 1: No 
policy change 
(Baseline 
scenario)
Option 2: 
Right of 
choice
Option 3: UB 
provided by the 
country of last 
activity
BE X X BE
BG X X BG
CZ X X CZ
DK X X DK
DE X X DE
EE X X EE
IE X X IE
GR X X GR
ES X X ES
FR X X FR
IT X X IT
CY X X CY
LV X X LV
LT X X LT
LU X X LU
HU X X HU
MT X X MT
NL X X NL
AT X X AT
PL X X PL
PT X X PT
RO X X RO
SI X X SI
SK X X SK
FI X X FI
SE X X SE
UK X X UK
EU-27 15 3 9 9 12 6 EU-27
Lowest budgetary impact Highest budgetary impact
Total expenditure UB in 
2010 - cash benefits               
 ?ŝŶDŝůůŝŽŶ ? ?
Estimated cross-border 
expenditure: Baseline 
scenario                             
 ?ŝŶDŝůůŝŽŶ ? ?
% impact baseline 
scenario on total 
expenditure
Estimated cross-
border expenditure 
(Option 2: Right of 
choice)                          
 ?ŝŶDŝůůŝŽŶ ? ?
% impact 
option 2 on 
total 
expenditure
Estimated cross-
border expenditure 
(Option 3: Country of 
last activity)                    
 ?ŝŶDŝůůŝŽŶ ? ?
% impact 
option 3 on 
total 
expenditure
BE 13.297 108 0,8% 115 0,9% 94 0,7%
BG 202 0 0,1% 0 0,1% 0 0,0%
CZ 1.196 2 0,2% 7 0,6% 6 0,5%
DK 5.293 9 0,2% 25 0,5% 23 0,4%
DE 40.564 112 0,3% 111 0,3% 118 0,3%
EE 88 1 0,8% 0 0,2% 0 0,1%
IE 5.188 28 0,5% 42 0,8% 34 0,7%
GR 2.146 1 0,0% 3 0,1% 3 0,1%
ES 34.773 28 0,1% 33 0,1% 37 0,1%
FR 39.331 128 0,3% 88 0,2% 54 0,1%
IT 12.958 40 0,3% 39 0,3% 36 0,3%
CY 184 1 0,4% 1 0,4% 1 0,4%
LV 190 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0%
LT 192 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0%
LU 489 25 5,1% 144 29,5% 140 28,7%
HU 796 1 0,1% 2 0,2% 1 0,2%
MT 27 0 0,1% 0 0,2% 0 0,4%
NL 9.230 84 0,9% 162 1,8% 126 1,4%
AT 3.621 34 0,9% 77 2,1% 54 1,5%
PL 1.392 1 0,1% 1 0,1% 0 0,0%
PT 2.487 4 0,2% 1 0,0% 2 0,1%
RO 693 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0%
SI 206 1 0,3% 0 0,1% 0 0,1%
SK 594 2 0,3% 1 0,2% 0 0,1%
FI 3.840 6 0,2% 24 0,6% 23 0,6%
SE 3.756 12 0,3% 5 0,1% 5 0,1%
UK 9.387 9 0,1% 10 0,1% 12 0,1%
EU-27 192.121 638 0,3% 892 0,5% 770 0,4%
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Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
 
7DEOHSURYLGHVDQRYHUYLHZRIWKHDSSOLHGPHWKRGRORJ\WRHVWLPDWHWKH¶DQQXDO expenditure 
RI8%EDVHGRQ WKHDQQXDODYHUDJHGXUDWLRQRI WKHSD\PHQWRI WKH8%·2QDYHUDJHPRQWKV
(EU-27) the UB was paid to unemployed persons (calculated for the total year)376 7KH ¶DQQXDO
H[SHQGLWXUHRI8%EDVHGRQWKHDYHUDJHGXUDWLRQSD\PHQW8%·ZDVHVWLPDWHGE\PXOWLSO\LQJ WKH
monthly expenditure (Annual expenditure UB in own country / 12) with the duration of the 
payment of the UB. This deliYHUVDPRUH¶UHDOLVWLF·YLHZRQWKHDQQXDOH[SHQGLWXUH 
 
Tables 2.10 to 2.12 compare the budgetary impact of the different options. The calculation of the 
total expenditure takes not only the expenditure of the UB into account but also the amount of the 
claims received (as country of residence = creditor) and the amount of the claims paid (as country 
of last activity = debtor). These aVVXPSWLRQVUHVXOWLQDWRWDOH[SHQGLWXUHRI½0LOOLRQIRUWKH
EDVHOLQHVFHQDULR½0LOOLRQIRURSWLRQ(right of choice) DQG½ 437 Million for option 3 (provided by 
the country of last activity). Both new options are more expensive than the baseline scenario. The 
expenditure increases with 33% in option 2 compared to the baseline scenario and increases with 
16% in option 3. The budgetary impact differs between Member States. For 16 Member States the 
baseline scenario has the lowest budgetary impact (CZ, DK, DE, IE, GR, ES, CY, LT, LU, HU, 
MT, NL, AT, RO, FI, UK). Option 2 has only for 1 Member State the lowest budgetary impact 
(PT) while option 3 is least expensive for 10 Member States (BE, BG, EE, FR, IT, LV, PL, SI, SK, 
SE). Option 2 is for 16 Member States the most expensive option (BE, BG, CZ, DK, DE, IE, CY, 
LT, LU, HU, NL, AT, PL, RO, FI, UK). For 8 Member States the baseline scenario is the most 
expensive option (EE, FR, IT, LV, PT, SI, SK, SE) and for 3 Member states this will be option 3 
(GR, ES, MT). 
                                                 
376
  Calculations are based on LFS data. If the duration of unemployment < 1 month, we assume a payment of the UB of 0,5 
months; Between 1-2 months of unemployment = 1,5 months UB paid; Between 3-5 months of unemployment = 4 
months UB paid; Between 6 and 11 months of unemployment = 8,5 months UB paid; 12 months and longer of 
unemployment = 12 months UB paid. 
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Table 2.9 UB: Annual average duration of payment UB and impact on annual expenditure UB 
 
* Based on Eurostat - LFS LQGLFDWRUµ8QHPSOR\PHQWE\VH[DJHDQGGXUDWLRQRIXQHPSOR\PHQW¶'XUDWLRQRIXQHPSOR\PHQWPRQWK PRQWKV8%SDLG%HWZHHQ-2 months of unemployment = 
1,5 months UB paid; Between 3-5 months of unemployment = 4 months UB paid; Between 6 and 11 months of unemployment = 8,5 months UB paid; 12 months and longer of unemployment = 12 months UB paid. 
Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
Country
Annual average 
duration of payment 
UB (in months)
Annual 
expenditure UB 
in own country 
LQ¼
Annual expenditure 
UB based on 
average duration 
payment UB         
LQ¼
Annual 
expenditure UB 
in own country    
LQ¼
Annual 
expenditure UB 
based on average 
duration payment 
8%LQ¼
Annual 
expenditure UB 
in own country    
LQ¼
Annual 
expenditure UB 
based on average 
duration payment 
8%LQ¼
BE 7,4 114.301 70.891 119.326 74.007 94.166 58.403
BG 8,7 354 256 0 0 82 59
CZ 7,6 1.736 1.097 6.012 3.798 6.045 3.819
DK 5,7 6.368 3.029 25.257 12.014 22.728 10.811
DE 7,3 112.967 69.040 91.243 55.763 117.867 72.034
EE 8,2 894 609 106 73 96 65
IE 9,1 28.156 21.239 44.358 33.461 34.274 25.854
GR 9,0 508 381 2.177 1.632 3.142 2.356
ES 7,6 25.118 15.919 29.223 18.520 37.178 23.563
FR 7,0 148.335 86.602 94.861 55.382 53.527 31.250
IT 8,4 40.718 28.531 38.633 27.070 35.719 25.028
CY 6,5 721 391 721 391 748 405
LV 8,2 81 55 42 29 48 33
LT 8,2 6 4 7 5 20 14
LU 6,2 6.747 3.510 145.470 75.684 140.046 72.862
HU 8,0 928 615 1.235 819 1.285 852
MT 7,8 16 10 16 10 105 68
NL 6,3 78.376 41.060 172.848 90.552 126.395 66.216
AT 5,4 34.366 15.426 84.772 38.052 53.868 24.180
PL 7,4 1.416 872 0 0 293 181
PT 8,1 5.139 3.457 738 497 1.825 1.228
RO 7,4 41 26 8 5 219 136
SI 7,9 719 475 133 88 162 107
SK 9,8 2.307 1.880 42 35 350 285
FI 4,6 5.739 2.206 24.057 9.246 22.604 8.687
SE 4,8 14.116 5.651 4.409 1.765 5.444 2.179
UK 6,6 8.290 4.529 5.888 3.217 11.885 6.492
EU-27 7,5 638.464 377.761 891.583 502.113 770.121 437.167
Option 1: No policy change (Baseline 
scenario): Frontier workers return; 
other cross-border workers take a 
rational decision (= highest UB)
Option 2: Right of choice: cross-
border workers take a rational 
decision (= highest UB)
Option 3: UB provided by the 
country of last activity
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Table 2.10 UB: estimated budgetary impact baseline VFHQDULRDQGRSWLRQVLQ½FRUUHFWHGE\$QQXDODYHUDJHGXUDWLRQRISD\PHQW8% 
 
* Based on Eurostat - LFS LQGLFDWRUµ8QHPSOR\PHQWE\VH[DJHDQGGXUDWLRQRIXQHPSOR\PHQW¶'XUDWLRQRIXQHPSOR\PHQW 1 month = 0,5 months UB paid; Between 1-2 months of unemployment = 
1,5 months UB paid; Between 3-5 months of unemployment = 4 months UB paid; Between 6 and 11 months of unemployment = 8,5 months UB paid; 12 months and longer of unemployment = 12 months UB paid. 
Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
Annual 
expenditure UB 
based on 
average 
duration 
payment UB       
LQ¼
Actual claims 
paid to country 
of residence    
(3 months)       
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Actual claims 
received from 
country of last 
activity              
(3 months)           
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Total 
expenditure 
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? %
Annual 
expenditure 
UB based on 
average 
duration 
payment UB   
LQ¼
Actual claims 
paid to country 
of residence    
(3 months)       
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Actual claims 
received from 
country of last 
activity            
(3 months)         
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Total 
expenditure 
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? %
Annual 
expenditure 
UB based 
on average 
duration 
payment UB  
LQ¼
Actual claims 
paid to country 
of residence    
(3 months)       
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Actual claims 
received from 
country of last 
activity            
(3 months)        
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Total 
expenditure 
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? %
BE 70.891 13.533 19.727 64.697 100% 74.007 5.077 8.935 70.149 108% 58.403 0 0 58.403 90%
BG 256 20 88 188 100% 0 221 0 221 117% 59 0 0 59 31%
CZ 1.097 526 334 1.289 100% 3.798 848 117 4.529 351% 3.819 0 0 3.819 296%
DK 3.029 3.395 450 5.974 100% 12.014 43 599 11.458 192% 10.811 0 0 10.811 181%
DE 69.040 15.024 16.167 67.897 100% 55.763 24.804 4.864 75.703 111% 72.034 0 0 72.034 106%
EE 609 19 219 409 100% 73 78 10 140 34% 65 0 0 65 16%
IE 21.239 664 455 21.448 100% 33.461 42 2.434 31.069 145% 25.854 0 0 25.854 121%
GR 381 329 0 710 100% 1.632 475 0 2.107 297% 2.356 0 0 2.356 332%
ES 15.919 4.108 949 19.078 100% 18.520 4.287 629 22.179 116% 23.563 0 0 23.563 124%
FR 86.602 6.483 26.361 66.724 100% 55.382 6.226 13.574 48.035 72% 31.250 0 0 31.250 47%
IT 28.531 732 1.444 27.819 100% 27.070 1.068 711 27.427 99% 25.028 0 0 25.028 90%
CY 391 7 0 397 100% 391 19 0 409 103% 405 0 0 405 102%
LV 55 10 16 49 100% 29 18 6 41 84% 33 0 0 33 67%
LT 4 5 1 7 100% 5 18 0 23 306% 14 0 0 14 183%
LU 3.510 18.804 637 21.677 100% 75.684 0 1.233 74.451 343% 72.862 0 0 72.862 336%
HU 615 190 208 597 100% 819 435 44 1.209 203% 852 0 0 852 143%
MT 10 23 0 33 100% 10 38 0 47 142% 68 0 0 68 205%
NL 41.060 10.969 5.167 46.862 100% 90.552 0 11.199 79.353 169% 66.216 0 0 66.216 141%
AT 15.426 4.062 4.253 15.235 100% 38.052 41 7.381 30.713 202% 24.180 0 0 24.180 159%
PL 872 73 354 592 100% 0 1.387 0 1.387 234% 181 0 0 181 31%
PT 3.457 293 1.111 2.639 100% 497 443 11 929 35% 1.228 0 0 1.228 47%
RO 26 54 10 69 100% 5 280 0 285 411% 136 0 0 136 196%
SI 475 26 154 347 100% 88 173 9 252 73% 107 0 0 107 31%
SK 1.880 87 577 1.391 100% 35 908 3 940 68% 285 0 0 285 20%
FI 2.206 399 161 2.444 100% 9.246 57 369 8.935 366% 8.687 0 0 8.687 356%
SE 5.651 771 2.663 3.759 100% 1.765 926 256 2.435 65% 2.179 0 0 2.179 58%
UK 4.529 1.514 615 5.427 100% 3.217 4.481 8 7.690 142% 6.492 0 0 6.492 120%
EU-27 377.761 82.122 82.122 377.761 100% 502.113 52.391 52.391 502.113 133% 437.167 0 0 437.167 116%
Option 1: No policy change (Baseline scenario): Frontier workers return; 
other cross-border workers take a rational decision (= highest UB)
Option 2: Right of choice: cross-border workers take a rational 
decision (= highest amount) Option 3: UB provided by the country of last activity
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Table 2.11 UB: comparison of options between MS, estimated budgetary impact option 1 (100%) compared to 
other options (corrected by Annual average duration of payment UB) 
 
Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
 
Option 1: No 
policy change 
(Baseline 
scenario)
Option 2: Right 
of choice
Option 3: UB 
provided by the 
country of last 
activity
BE 100% 108% 90%
BG 100% 117% 31%
CZ 100% 351% 296%
DK 100% 192% 181%
DE 100% 111% 106%
EE 100% 34% 16%
IE 100% 145% 121%
GR 100% 297% 332%
ES 100% 116% 124%
FR 100% 72% 47%
IT 100% 99% 90%
CY 100% 103% 102%
LV 100% 84% 67%
LT 100% 306% 183%
LU 100% 343% 336%
HU 100% 203% 143%
MT 100% 142% 205%
NL 100% 169% 141%
AT 100% 202% 159%
PL 100% 234% 31%
PT 100% 35% 47%
RO 100% 411% 196%
SI 100% 73% 31%
SK 100% 68% 20%
FI 100% 366% 356%
SE 100% 65% 58%
UK 100% 142% 120%
EU-27 100% 133% 116%
Lowest  impact 16 1 10
Highest impact 8 16 3
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Table 2.12 UB: comparison of options between MS, estimated lowest and highest budgetary impact 
(corrected by Annual average duration of payment UB) 
 
Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
 
The budgetary impact of cross-border expenditure related to UB is ¶PDUJLQDO· FRPSDUHG WR WKH
total national expenditure. It is only 0.2% of the total EU-27 spending on unemployment benefits 
in the baseline scenario. But also the 2 other options will have a limited impact on the total budget. 
Only for Luxembourg we observe a high impact of the cross-border spending on the total national 
budget (4.4% of total expenditure). The budgetary impact increases considerably in option 2 (15.2% 
of total expenditure) and in option 3 (14.9% of total expenditure). 
 
Option 1: No 
policy change 
(Baseline 
scenario)
Option 2: 
Right of 
choice
Option 3: UB 
provided by the 
country of last 
activity
Option 1: No 
policy change 
(Baseline 
scenario)
Option 2: 
Right of 
choice
Option 3: UB 
provided by the 
country of last 
activity
BE X X BE
BG X X BG
CZ X X CZ
DK X X DK
DE X X DE
EE X X EE
IE X X IE
GR X X GR
ES X X ES
FR X X FR
IT X X IT
CY X X CY
LV X X LV
LT X X LT
LU X X LU
HU X X HU
MT X X MT
NL X X NL
AT X X AT
PL X X PL
PT X X PT
RO X X RO
SI X X SI
SK X X SK
FI X X FI
SE X X SE
UK X X UK
EU-27 16 1 10 8 16 3 EU-27
Lowest budgetary impact Highest budgetary impact
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Table 2.13 UB: impact estimated cross-border expenditure* on total expenditure UB**, by option (corrected by 
Annual average duration of payment UB) 
 
* Total cross-border expenditure: without taking into account the UB paid to unemployed EU migrant workers. 
** Total expenditure UB: ESSPROS data 
Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
 
Table 2.14 presents the distribution of the cost taking into consideration the current rules. We 
have made our calculations from the perspective of incoming cross-border workers who become 
unemployed. The estimated 45 thousand incoming frontier workers who became unemployed have 
to return to their country of UHVLGHQFHZKLOH WKH ¶RWKHUXQHPSOR\HGFURVV-ERUGHUZRUNHUV· DERXW
28 thousand persons) have a right of choice. We assume that this group will take choose for the 
country with highest UB. The baseline scenario (taking into account the assumptions we had to 
PDGHLPSOLHVWKDWWKHFRXQWU\RIODVWDFWLYLW\ZLOOSD\RIWKHWRWDOH[SHQGLWXUHRQO\IRU¶RWKHU
unemployed cross-ERUGHUZRUNHUV·ZKRFKRRVHIRUWKHFRXQWU\RIODVWDFWLYLW\DQGWKHFRXQWU\RI
residence 70% of the total expenditure (for the unemplo\HG IURQWLHU ZRUNHUV DQG WKH ¶RWKHU
unemployed cross-ERUGHUZRUNHUV·ZKRFKRRVHWRUHWXUQ7KHVHFXUUHQWUXOHVLPSO\WKDWD0HPEHU
State with a very high number of incoming frontier workers only has to pay a small part of the cost. 
E.g. almost all unemployed cross-border workers in Luxembourg could be considered as 
¶XQHPSOR\HG IURQWLHU ZRUNHUV· ZKLFK LPSO\ WKDW /X[HPERXUJ LV RQO\ SD\LQJ  RI WKH WRWDO
expenditure of UB paid to former cross-border workers employed in Luxembourg. However, this 
disproportion is corrected by a reimbursement procedure (the country of last activity shall 
reimburse the unemployed benefits provided in the country of residence during the first three 
months or five months). We assume in the calculation model a reimbursement of 3 months. This 
UHLPEXUVHPHQWSURFHGXUHPDNHV WKHGLVWULEXWLRQRI WKHFRVW ¶PRUH IDLU·1RZ WKHFRXQW\RI ODVW
activity will pay 43% of the cost (or an increase with 13 % points). E.g. Luxembourg will pay no 
longer 1% of the cost but 30%. At the same time, this reimbursement procedure is an incentive for 
the country of residence to keep the duration of unemployment below the reimbursement period 
(of 3 or 5 months). 
Total expenditure UB in 
2010 - cash benefits               
 ?ŝŶDŝůůŝŽŶ ? ?
Estimated cross-border 
expenditure: Baseline 
scenario                             
 ?ŝŶDŝůůŝŽŶ ? ?
% impact baseline 
scenario on total 
expenditure
Estimated cross-
border expenditure 
(Option 2: Right of 
choice)                          
 ?ŝŶDŝůůŝŽŶ ? ?
% impact 
option 2 on 
total 
expenditure
Estimated cross-
border expenditure 
(Option 3: Country of 
last activity)                    
 ?ŝŶDŝůůŝŽŶ ? ?
% impact 
option 3 on 
total 
expenditure
BE 13.297 65 0,5% 70 0,5% 58 0,4%
BG 202 0 0,1% 0 0,1% 0 0,0%
CZ 1.196 1 0,1% 5 0,4% 4 0,3%
DK 5.293 6 0,1% 11 0,2% 11 0,2%
DE 40.564 68 0,2% 76 0,2% 72 0,2%
EE 88 0 0,5% 0 0,2% 0 0,1%
IE 5.188 21 0,4% 31 0,6% 26 0,5%
GR 2.146 1 0,0% 2 0,1% 2 0,1%
ES 34.773 19 0,1% 22 0,1% 24 0,1%
FR 39.331 67 0,2% 48 0,1% 31 0,1%
IT 12.958 28 0,2% 27 0,2% 25 0,2%
CY 184 0 0,2% 0 0,2% 0 0,2%
LV 190 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0%
LT 192 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0%
LU 489 22 4,4% 74 15,2% 73 14,9%
HU 796 1 0,1% 1 0,2% 1 0,1%
MT 27 0 0,1% 0 0,2% 0 0,2%
NL 9.230 47 0,5% 79 0,9% 66 0,7%
AT 3.621 15 0,4% 31 0,8% 24 0,7%
PL 1.392 1 0,0% 1 0,1% 0 0,0%
PT 2.487 3 0,1% 1 0,0% 1 0,0%
RO 693 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0%
SI 206 0 0,2% 0 0,1% 0 0,1%
SK 594 1 0,2% 1 0,2% 0 0,0%
FI 3.840 2 0,1% 9 0,2% 9 0,2%
SE 3.756 4 0,1% 2 0,1% 2 0,1%
UK 9.387 5 0,1% 8 0,1% 6 0,1%
EU-27 192.121 378 0,2% 502 0,3% 437 0,2%
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The currents rules assume that the amount of reimbursement cannot be higher than the amount 
payable under the legislation of the country of last activity (see art. 65, 6 Regulation (EC) No. 
883/2004). This specific rule implies that in many cases the reimbursement by the country of last 
activity will be lower than the actual claim of the country of residence (see also Table 2.3). 
Table 2.15 summarizes the distribution of the cost by assuming that the amount of reimbursement 
is equal to the actual claim made by the country of residence. So the reimbursement procedure is no 
longer taking into account the amount of the unemployment benefit in the country of last activity 
but the amount of the unemployment benefit in the country of residence (= actual claim). The 
reimbursement based on the UB of the country of residence has a positive impact on the 
distribution of the cost. 46% of the cost will be paid by the country of last activity (which is an 
increase with 3% points compared to the calculations made in Table 2.14).  
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Table 2.14 UB: estimated expenditure UB incoming cross-border workers becoming unemployed, baseline scenario, breakdown by country of last activity and country of residence and 
impact of reimbursement (corrected by Annual average duration of payment UB) 
 
* Only the annual expenditure of UB is taken into account while there will possibly be a shift of the social security system from the country of last activity to the country of residence. Source Estimate based on data 
LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
Country of 
employment
Number of 
unemployed 
incoming cross-
border workers        
(in .000)
Of which incoming 
unemployed frontier 
workers                            
(in .000)
Estimated annual 
expenditure UB based 
on average duration 
payment UB paid by 
the country of 
residence  ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Estimated annual 
expenditure UB 
based on average 
duration payment 
UB paid by the 
country of last 
activity                      
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Reimbursement 
country of last activity 
(3 months)                   
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
% share of cost 
country of 
residence
% share of cost 
country of last 
activity
% share of cost 
country of 
residence
% share of cost 
country of last 
activity
BE 4,9 4,0 34.334 10.929 13.533 76% 24% 58% 42%
BG 0,2 0,0 1.052 0 20 100% 0% 98% 2%
CZ 4,4 4,3 3.327 43 526 99% 1% 85% 15%
DK 2,4 2,0 6.410 1.726 3.395 79% 21% 56% 44%
DE 13,2 10,1 55.161 16.936 15.024 77% 23% 63% 37%
EE 0,1 0,1 203 7 19 97% 3% 89% 11%
IE 2,3 1,1 1.516 13.440 664 10% 90% 10% 90%
GR 1,5 0,8 2.613 381 329 87% 13% 79% 21%
ES 7,9 1,9 18.472 12.296 4.108 60% 40% 53% 47%
FR 4,3 2,7 21.483 11.407 6.483 65% 35% 55% 45%
IT 6,1 0,4 3.250 22.455 732 13% 87% 12% 88%
CY 0,2 0,0 92 391 7 19% 81% 19% 81%
LV 0,1 0,1 62 4 10 93% 7% 81% 19%
LT 0,1 0,0 71 0 5 100% 0% 93% 7%
LU 5,6 5,5 45.350 688 18.804 99% 1% 70% 30%
HU 1,5 1,3 1.911 6 190 100% 0% 91% 9%
MT 0,0 0,0 167 8 23 95% 5% 84% 16%
NL 4,4 3,3 27.063 16.724 10.969 62% 38% 49% 51%
AT 4,2 4,0 10.184 1.478 4.062 87% 13% 65% 35%
PL 0,7 0,6 3.797 0 73 100% 0% 98% 2%
PT 0,5 0,2 1.572 439 293 78% 22% 68% 32%
RO 0,3 0,0 1.304 1 54 100% 0% 96% 4%
SI 0,1 0,1 343 34 26 91% 9% 85% 15%
SK 0,9 0,8 1.814 0 87 100% 0% 95% 5%
FI 1,5 1,2 1.019 1.530 399 40% 60% 35% 65%
SE 0,9 0,2 2.811 945 771 75% 25% 62% 38%
UK 5,4 0,6 17.332 3.183 1.514 84% 16% 79% 21%
EU-27 73,7 45,2 262.713 115.053 82.122 70% 30% 57% 43%
Cost without reimbursement Cost with reimbursement
Option 1: No policy change (Baseline scenario): Frontier workers return; other cross-border workers take a rational decision (= highest UB)
Incoming unemployed  crossborder workers Expenditure
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Table 2.15 UB: estimated expenditure UB incoming cross-border workers becoming unemployed, baseline scenario, breakdown by country of last activity and country of residence and 
impact of reimbursement (corrected by Annual average duration of payment UB) 
 
* Only the annual expenditure of UB is taken into account while there will possibly be a shift of the social security system from the country of last activity to the country of residence. Source Estimate based on data 
LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
Country of 
employment
Number of 
unemployed 
incoming cross-
border workers        
(in .000)
Of which incoming 
unemployed frontier 
workers                            
(in .000)
Estimated annual 
expenditure UB based 
on average duration 
payment UB paid by 
the country of 
residence  ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Estimated annual 
expenditure UB 
based on average 
duration payment 
UB paid by the 
country of last 
activity                      
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Actual claim by 
country of residence 
(3 months)                   
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
% share of cost 
country of 
residence
% share of cost 
country of last 
activity
% share of cost 
country of 
residence
% share of cost 
country of last 
activity
BE 4,9 4,0 34.334 10.929 24.170 76% 24% 49% 51%
BG 0,2 0,0 1.052 0 88 100% 0% 92% 8%
CZ 4,4 4,3 3.327 43 417 99% 1% 88% 12%
DK 2,4 2,0 6.410 1.726 685 79% 21% 73% 27%
DE 13,2 10,1 55.161 16.936 21.314 77% 23% 59% 41%
EE 0,1 0,1 203 7 221 97% 3% 47% 53%
IE 2,3 1,1 1.516 13.440 2.585 10% 90% 9% 91%
GR 1,5 0,8 2.613 381 0 87% 13% 87% 13%
ES 7,9 1,9 18.472 12.296 1.429 60% 40% 57% 43%
FR 4,3 2,7 21.483 11.407 32.199 65% 35% 33% 67%
IT 6,1 0,4 3.250 22.455 2.168 13% 87% 12% 88%
CY 0,2 0,0 92 391 0 19% 81% 19% 81%
LV 0,1 0,1 62 4 19 93% 7% 73% 27%
LT 0,1 0,0 71 0 1 100% 0% 98% 2%
LU 5,6 5,5 45.350 688 1.356 99% 1% 96% 4%
HU 1,5 1,3 1.911 6 230 100% 0% 89% 11%
MT 0,0 0,0 167 8 1 95% 5% 95% 5%
NL 4,4 3,3 27.063 16.724 11.613 62% 38% 49% 51%
AT 4,2 4,0 10.184 1.478 7.768 87% 13% 52% 48%
PL 0,7 0,6 3.797 0 354 100% 0% 91% 9%
PT 0,5 0,2 1.572 439 1.122 78% 22% 50% 50%
RO 0,3 0,0 1.304 1 10 100% 0% 99% 1%
SI 0,1 0,1 343 34 167 91% 9% 63% 37%
SK 0,9 0,8 1.814 0 577 100% 0% 76% 24%
FI 1,5 1,2 1.019 1.530 440 40% 60% 34% 66%
SE 0,9 0,2 2.811 945 2.939 75% 25% 42% 58%
UK 5,4 0,6 17.332 3.183 616 84% 16% 82% 18%
EU-27 73,7 45,2 262.713 115.053 112.488 70% 30% 54% 46%
Option 1: No policy change (Baseline scenario): Frontier workers return; other cross-border workers take a rational decision (= highest UB)
Incoming unemployed  crossborder workers Expenditure Cost without reimbursement Cost with reimbursement
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Unemployed workers have a limited possibility of export of unemployment benefits for 
3 months, with a possible extension to 6 months (when he/she looks for work in another Member 
State). It is the competent institution of the Member State paying the unemployment benefits that 
may extend this period to 6 months.  
Table 2.16 tackles the impact of the current rules by describing in detail the situation of the 
¶%HOJLDQ·XQHPSOR\HGSHUVRQVZKRKDYHORRNHGIRUDMREDEURDGEDVHGRQDGPLQLVWUDWLYHGDWD,Q
2011, Belgium paid to 1 081 unemployed jobseekers at least 1 month an unemployment benefit 
during their period of export. Only 57 jobseekers received longer than 3 months an unemployment 
benefit. So, for this group we can assume they have received a prolongation of export. It implies 
that only 5.3% of the jobseekers who looked for a job abroad asked and received a prolongation. 
481 of the 1 081 jobseekers were after their period of export no longer registered with the Belgian 
FRPSHWHQW LQVWLWXWLRQ ,W VXSSRVHVD ¶VXFFHVV UDWH·  MREVHHNHUV DEURDGZKRKDYH ILQGD MRERI
44%.377 At the same time we observe that tKH ¶VXFFHVV UDWH· ZLOO EH KLJKHU IRU WKH JURXS ZKLFK
received a prolongation of export (success rate of 53% or 30 out of 57 persons). However, this 
should be considered as a broad definition of the ¶success rate·7KHIDFWWKHXQHPSOR\HGSHUVRQLV
no longer registered with the Belgian competent institution might be for different reasons: they 
have found work in the country of export, they have found work in Belgium, or they moved to 
another country. 
Table 2.16 Impact of prolongation period on finding a job abroad (success rate*), Belgian case, 2011 
 
* Broad definition of success rate: no longer registered in database. 
Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
 
Eurostat provides an overview of the distribution of the unemployed according to the duration 
spent in unemployment based (on LFS data) (see Figure 2.1). However, this period is measured at a 
certain moment which implies a possible underestimation of the duration of unemployment. The 
                                                 
377
  The success rates for Poland and Sweden are 10% and 12%. For the incoming jobseekers in the Netherlands a success 
rate of 22.8% was obtained (based on administrative data). 
Country 
of 
export
Received at least 
1 month an 
'export benefit' 
(A)
Received longer 
than 3 months an 
'export benefit'    
(B)
Theoretical 
prolongation 
(B/A)
Not longer 
registered after 
period of export    
(for total group)      
(C )
Succes rate total 
group                          
(C/A)
Not longer registered 
after period of export 
(for group which 
received longer than 3 
months an 'export 
benefit') (D)
Succes rate 
group 
longer than 
3 months 
(D/B)
Succes rate group 
lower than 3 
months                   
(C-D)/(A-B)
BE
BG 1 0 0,0% 0 0% 0 0%
CZ 4 1 25,0% 3 75% 1 100% 67%
DK 6 0 0,0% 2 33% 0 33%
DE 57 6 10,5% 31 54% 5 83% 51%
EE 1 0 0,0% 0 0% 0 0%
IE 9 0 0,0% 7 78% 0 78%
GR 10 0 0,0% 7 70% 0 70%
ES 183 10 5,5% 66 36% 3 30% 36%
FR 501 26 5,2% 232 46% 13 50% 46%
IT 51 1 2,0% 23 45% 1 100% 44%
CY 2 0 0,0% 0 0% 0 0%
LV 1 0 0,0% 0 0% 0 0%
LT 1 0 0,0% 0 0% 0 0%
LU 19 0 0,0% 7 37% 0 37%
HU 2 0 0,0% 0 0% 0 0%
MT 1 0 0,0% 0 0% 0 0%
NL 76 5 6,6% 39 51% 4 80% 49%
AT 19 2 10,5% 7 37% 1 50% 35%
PL 17 0 0,0% 6 35% 0 35%
PT 29 2 6,9% 13 45% 0 0% 48%
RO 2 0 0,0% 0 0% 0 0%
SI 3 1 33,3% 2 67% 1 100% 50%
SK 2 0 0,0% 0 0% 0 0%
FI 7 0 0,0% 3 43% 0 43%
SE 17 2 11,8% 8 47% 1 50% 47%
UK 60 1 1,7% 25 42% 0 0% 42%
EU27 1.081 57 5,3% 481 44% 30 53% 44%
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period to find a job abroad within 3 months can be considered as a very short period observing an 
average duration of unemployment of 15 months. Also, only 55% of the unemployed persons are 
unemployed for less than one year.378 The cumulative figures can be considered as a proxy of an 
¶H[LWUDWH·ZKLFKLVVHHQDVLQFUHDVLQJZLWKDOPRVWSRLQWVEHWZHHQREVHUYHGSHULRGVOHVVWKDQ
3 months = 22.7% and less than 6 months = 37.5%).379 But of course the composition of the 
group of jobseekers looking for a job abroad may (totally) differ from the general group of 
unemployed persons we have describe in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 Distribution of unemployed according to duration in unemployment (in months), aged 15 to 64 
years, 2012, EU-28 
 
* Duration of unemployment is the duration of the search for employment or the length of the period since leaving 
last job (measured at a certain moment which implies a possible underestimation of the average duration of unemployment). 
Source (XURVWDWLQGLFDWRUµ8QHPSOR\PHQWE\VH[DJHDQGGXUDWLRQRIXQHPSOR\PHQW¶ 
2.2 Long-term care benefits  
 
The number of PD S1 (persons who are insured for health care living in another country than the 
competent country) was estimated by the sum of 3 categories: incoming cross-border workers (and 
their family members), retired cross-border workers (and their family members) and migrant 
pensioners (and their family members). By counting these different categories together, we 
                                                 
378
  On the basis of the methodology developed in ESDE review 2012 ( chapter 1, section 1.3.2), the persistence rate in 
unemployment for persons  (aged 15-64, EU-28) unemployed less than one year can be estimated for 2011-12 to be 
around 39%. In other words, 39% of those unemployed less than one year in 2011 were still unemployed one year later. 
However, due to the methodology used, this does not imply that all the remaining 61% (the 'exit rate') have necessarily 
found a job as they could have become inactive (or be again short-term unemployed after a spell in employment). 
379
  On the basis of the methodology developed in ESDE review 2012 ( chapter 1, section 1.3.2), the exit rate of 
unemployment for persons  (aged 15-64, EU-28) unemployed less than three months  can be estimated for 2012 to be 
around 35% - while for persons unemployed less than 6 months, it would be between 52 and 55%. It means that there 
would be a gain around 17-21 % points in exit rate between 3 and 6 months of time in unemployment.  It is to be noted 
that the gain in exit rate for persons unemployed between 6 months and one year is much lower (around 6 to 9 % points, 
i.e.: the difference between 61% mentioned in previous footnote and 52-55%).  
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estimated a total number of about 2 million insured persons living in another Member State than 
the competent Member State. Some 60% is determined by the present cross-border workers which 
imply some 40% is related to mobile pensioners or retired cross-border workers. Most PD S1 
certificates were issued by Germany (18.6% of total), UK (11% of total) and Luxembourg (10.5% 
of total) while most of the PD S1 certificates were received by France (15.7% of total) and 
Germany (13.8%). 
Table 2.17 LTC: Estimated number of PD S1 issued and received, by category, in .000 
 
Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
 
Based on the estimated number of PD S1 (Table 2.17), we have estimated the potential users of 
LTC. A distinction should be made between LTC benefits in cash and LTC benefits in kind. This is 
not only an important distinction in the LTC itself, but also in the coordination regulation. We 
apply on this total PD S1 the same percentages of use of LTC in cash or in kind as is the case in the 
WRWDOSRSXODWLRQRIWKH(87KLVLVDFFHSWDEOHVLQFHWKHVWUXFWXUHRIWKLV¶6SRSXODWLRQ·LVVLPLODU
to the total population including active persons, retired persons and their family members. Those 
percentages of users are derived from the Ageing report 2012 (additional data was delivered by DG 
ECFIN, necessarily for making a distinction between LTC in kind, LTC in cash and informal LTC). 
For the baseline scenario we estimate that some 48 thousand mobile citizens are using LTC in kind 
and 45 thousand mobile citizens LTC in cash. The number of users will be multiplied by the 
average amount per dependent person using LTC in kind or in cash to obtain the cross-border 
expenditure related to LTC. 
Incoming cross-
border workers 
+ 20% family 
members         
(in .000)
Retired cross-
border workers 
only worked 
abroad + 25% 
family members 
(in .000)
Migrant 
pensioners 
+ 25% family 
members 
(in .000)
Total 
number 
of PD S1 
issued 
(in .000)
Share of 
total 
insured 
persons 
(in %)
Outgoing cross-
border workers 
+ 20% family 
members         
(in .000)
Retired cross-
border workers 
only worked 
abroad + 25% 
family members 
(in .000)
Migrant 
pensioners + 
25% family 
members    
(in .000)
Total 
number 
of PD S1 
issued 
(in .000)
Share of 
total 
insured 
persons 
(in %)
BE 74 35 5 113 5,7% 116 41 68 225 11,4%
BG 2 1 1 4 0,2% 25 11 0 37 1,9%
CZ 74 25 2 101 5,1% 29 12 2 43 2,2%
DK 42 14 1 57 2,9% 5 2 3 10 0,5%
DE 223 101 44 368 18,6% 198 75 0 273 13,8%
EE 1 0 0 2 0,1% 22 9 0 30 1,5%
IE 21 6 1 29 1,4% 12 5 7 24 1,2%
GR 14 7 1 23 1,1% 0 0 2 2 0,1%
ES 48 18 4 71 3,6% 27 11 77 115 5,8%
FR 57 27 19 102 5,2% 192 77 43 311 15,7%
IT 91 50 27 167 8,5% 29 13 5 47 2,4%
CY 4 1 0 5 0,3% 0 0 5 5 0,3%
LV 1 0 0 1 0,0% 8 3 0 12 0,6%
LT 0 0 0 1 0,0% 2 1 0 3 0,2%
LU 156 50 1 207 10,5% 3 1 2 7 0,3%
HU 17 8 3 28 1,4% 64 28 0 92 4,7%
MT 1 0 0 1 0,1% 1 0 1 2 0,1%
NL 132 43 28 203 10,2% 26 12 2 39 2,0%
AT 121 55 1 177 8,9% 39 17 11 66 3,4%
PL 9 3 4 17 0,8% 110 45 1 156 7,9%
PT 5 2 2 10 0,5% 13 5 2 20 1,0%
RO 4 2 0 6 0,3% 105 52 0 158 8,0%
SI 2 1 0 3 0,1% 10 5 0 16 0,8%
SK 7 2 2 11 0,6% 141 55 0 196 9,9%
FI 24 9 0 33 1,7% 2 1 1 4 0,2%
SE 15 6 2 23 1,2% 35 12 6 53 2,7%
UK 93 36 88 218 11,0% 24 9 0 34 1,7%
EU-27 1.239 503 238 1.980 100,0% 1.239 503 238 1.980 100,0%
Competent country Residing country
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Table 2.18 LTC: Estimated number of users baseline scenario, in .000 
 
Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
 
In the baseline scenario (current rules) LTC benefits in kind are provided according to the 
legislation of the Member State of residence (if they exist) and reimbursed by the 
competent Member State while LTC benefits in cash (if they exist) are provided and paid by 
the competent Member State. In Option 3.1, the Member State of residence shall provide 
LTC benefits (in cash and in kind) on the basis of its legislation and reimbursed by the 
competent Member State (with or without a supplement from the competent Member 
State if benefits in the Member State of residence are at a lower level). In Table 2.19 we 
assume that there is no supplement paid by the competent Member State. Finally, in 
Option 3.2 the competent Member State shall provide LTC care benefits to insured 
persons residing abroad (export). 
 
Tables 2.19 to 2.22 compare the budgetary impact of the different options. For all options a 
distinction is made between LTC benefits in kind and in cash. This results in a total expenditure of 
½0LOOLRQIRUWKHEDVHOLQHVFHQDULR½0LOOLRQIRURSWLRQ (provided by the Member State of 
residence without a supplement) DQG ½ 1 277 Million for option 3.2 (provided by the competent country). 
Compared to the baseline scenario, option 3.1 is less expensive (a decrease of 19% of the 
expenditure). In option 3.1 the LTC benefit in cash is also provided by the country of residence and 
no longer by the competent country. It implies a considerably decrease of the budget which is 
needed to finance the cross-ERUGHU XVH RI /7& EHQHILWV LQ FDVK IURP ½  0LOOLRQ WR ½ 191 
Million or a decrease of 49%). Option 3.2 is more expensive compared to the baseline scenario (an 
increase of 28% of the expenditure). The higher expenditure is influenced by the fact that the 
competent Member State will provide the LTC benefits in kind and no longer the country of 
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residence. Because of this, the budget needed to finance the cross-border use of LTC benefits in 
NLQG LQFUHDVHV ZLWK  IURP ½  0LOOLRQ WR ½  0LOOLRQ 7KH EXGJHWDU\ LPSDFW GLIIHUV
considerably between Member States. We do noWREVHUYHDFRQVLVWHQW ¶EHVWRSWLRQ·IRUDOO(8-27 
Member States. For 6 Member States the baseline scenario has the lowest budgetary impact (BE, 
IE, FR, LT, LU, SE). Option 3.1 has for 8 Member State the lowest budgetary impact (CZ, DK, 
GR, IT, NL, AT, FI, UK) while option 3.2 is least expensive for 13 Member States (BG, DE, EE, 
ES, CY, LV, HU, MT, PL, PT, RO, SI, SK). However, option 3.2 is also for 12 Member States the 
most expensive option (BE, DK, IE, GR, FR, IT, LU, NL, AT, FI, SE, UK). For 5 Member States 
the baseline scenario is the most expensive option (CZ, DE, EE, CY, HU) and for 10 Member 
states this will be option 3.1 (BG, ES, LV, LT, MT, PL, PT, RO, SI, SK, FI). 
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Table 2.19 LTC: estimated bXGJHWDU\LPSDFWEDVHOLQHVFHQDULRDQGRSWLRQVLQ½  
 
Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
Debtor
In kind               
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
In cash          
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Total               
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? %
In kind        
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
In cash         
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Total         
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
% difference 
option 1
In kind       
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
In cash       
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Total          
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
% difference 
option 1
% difference 
option 3.1
BE 58.064 16.538 74.602 100% 58.064 16.865 74.929 100% 69.829 16.538 86.368 116% 115%
BG 1.574 64 1.638 100% 1.574 897 2.470 151% 36 64 100 6% 4%
CZ 6.179 7.434 13.613 100% 6.179 2.651 8.831 65% 3.927 7.434 11.361 83% 129%
DK 54.521 49.202 103.723 100% 54.521 4.189 58.710 57% 59.331 49.202 108.533 105% 185%
DE 120.077 52.782 172.860 100% 120.077 50.201 170.278 99% 114.948 52.782 167.730 97% 99%
EE 715 54 769 100% 715 52 767 100% 33 54 87 11% 11%
IE 7.479 0 7.479 100% 7.479 2.684 10.163 136% 10.889 0 10.889 146% 107%
EL 3.732 1.607 5.339 100% 3.732 1.415 5.147 96% 4.638 1.607 6.245 117% 121%
ES 13.938 2.292 16.230 100% 13.938 4.408 18.346 113% 11.133 2.292 13.425 83% 73%
FR 37.403 10.440 47.843 100% 37.403 11.955 49.358 103% 55.885 10.440 66.325 139% 134%
IT 25.015 36.973 61.988 100% 25.015 6.437 31.452 51% 45.141 36.973 82.114 132% 261%
CY 263 181 444 100% 263 118 381 86% 12 181 193 43% 51%
LV 53 8 61 100% 53 28 81 134% 35 8 43 71% 53%
LT 60 17 77 100% 60 36 96 124% 74 17 91 118% 95%
LU 104.120 15.256 119.377 100% 104.120 25.372 129.493 108% 150.866 15.256 166.122 139% 128%
HU 3.383 1.586 4.969 100% 3.383 1.206 4.589 92% 711 1.586 2.297 46% 50%
MT 638 0 638 100% 638 189 827 130% 129 0 129 20% 16%
NL 73.246 93.099 166.346 100% 73.246 23.346 96.592 58% 182.590 93.099 275.690 166% 285%
AT 26.614 49.760 76.374 100% 26.614 14.090 40.705 53% 47.961 49.760 97.721 128% 240%
PL 7.341 571 7.913 100% 7.341 2.671 10.013 127% 556 571 1.127 14% 11%
PT 2.671 0 2.671 100% 2.671 516 3.187 119% 476 0 476 18% 15%
RO 1.979 4 1.983 100% 1.979 1.188 3.167 160% 228 4 231 12% 7%
SI 572 304 876 100% 572 555 1.127 129% 516 304 819 94% 73%
SK 1.270 75 1.345 100% 1.270 1.504 2.773 206% 330 75 405 30% 15%
FI 4.421 3.460 7.881 100% 4.421 1.458 5.879 75% 24.556 3.460 28.017 355% 477%
SE 7.948 1.360 9.308 100% 7.948 4.144 12.092 130% 31.618 1.360 32.978 354% 273%
UK 55.003 33.314 88.317 100% 55.003 13.681 68.685 78% 83.879 33.314 117.193 133% 171%
EU27 618.281 376.381 994.662 100% 618.281 191.857 810.137 81% 900.327 376.381 1.276.709 128% 158%
Option 3.2: LTC provided by the competent MSOption 1: No policy change (Baseline scenario)
Option 3.1: LTC provided by the MS of residence 
(without supplement)
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Table 2.20 LTC: comparison of options between MS, estimated budgetary impact option 1 (100%) compared 
to other options, breakdown by type of LTC-benefit 
 
* In option 3.1 LTC benefits in cash are provided by the MS of residence. This will cause an important budgetary increase 
for some competent MS without or with few national social rights related to LTC benefits in cash (eJ526.%*«
This explains the high percentages of these MS. 
Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
Debtor 
country
In kind In cash Total In kind In cash Total In kind In cash Total
BE 100% 100% 100% 100% 102% 100% 120% 100% 116%
BG 100% 100% 100% 100% 1401% 151% 2% 100% 6%
CZ 100% 100% 100% 100% 36% 65% 64% 100% 83%
DK 100% 100% 100% 100% 9% 57% 109% 100% 105%
DE 100% 100% 100% 100% 95% 99% 96% 100% 97%
EE 100% 100% 100% 100% 96% 100% 5% 100% 11%
IE 100% 100% 100% 136% 146% 146%
EL 100% 100% 100% 100% 88% 96% 124% 100% 117%
ES 100% 100% 100% 100% 192% 113% 80% 100% 83%
FR 100% 100% 100% 100% 115% 103% 149% 100% 139%
IT 100% 100% 100% 100% 17% 51% 180% 100% 132%
CY 100% 100% 100% 100% 65% 86% 5% 100% 43%
LV 100% 100% 100% 100% 367% 134% 67% 100% 71%
LT 100% 100% 100% 100% 209% 124% 123% 100% 118%
LU 100% 100% 100% 100% 166% 108% 145% 100% 139%
HU 100% 100% 100% 100% 76% 92% 21% 100% 46%
MT 100% 100% 100% 130% 20% 20%
NL 100% 100% 100% 100% 25% 58% 249% 100% 166%
AT 100% 100% 100% 100% 28% 53% 180% 100% 128%
PL 100% 100% 100% 100% 468% 127% 8% 100% 14%
PT 100% 100% 100% 119% 18% 18%
RO 100% 100% 100% 100% 32385% 160% 11% 100% 12%
SI 100% 100% 100% 100% 183% 129% 90% 100% 94%
SK 100% 100% 100% 100% 2004% 206% 26% 100% 30%
FI 100% 100% 100% 100% 42% 75% 555% 100% 355%
SE 100% 100% 100% 100% 305% 130% 398% 100% 354%
UK 100% 100% 100% 100% 41% 78% 152% 100% 133%
EU27 100% 100% 100% 100% 51% 81% 146% 100% 128%
Option 3.1: LTC provided by the 
MS of residence (without 
supplement)
Option 3.2: LTC provided by the 
competent MS
Option 1: No policy change 
(Baseline scenario)
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Table 2.21 LTC: comparison of options between MS, estimated budgetary impact option 1 (100%) compared 
to other options 
 
Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
Table 2.22 LTC: comparison of options between MS, estimated lowest and highest budgetary impact 
 
Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
 
Debtor country
Option 1: No 
policy change 
(Baseline 
scenario)
Option 3.1: LTC 
provided by the MS 
of residence 
(without 
supplement)
Option 3.2: LTC 
provided by the 
competent MS
BE 100% 100% 116%
BG 100% 151% 6%
CZ 100% 65% 83%
DK 100% 57% 105%
DE 100% 99% 97%
EE 100% 100% 11%
IE 100% 136% 146%
EL 100% 96% 117%
ES 100% 113% 83%
FR 100% 103% 139%
IT 100% 51% 132%
CY 100% 86% 43%
LV 100% 134% 71%
LT 100% 124% 118%
LU 100% 108% 139%
HU 100% 92% 46%
MT 100% 130% 20%
NL 100% 58% 166%
AT 100% 53% 128%
PL 100% 127% 14%
PT 100% 119% 18%
RO 100% 160% 12%
SI 100% 129% 94%
SK 100% 206% 30%
FI 100% 75% 355%
SE 100% 130% 354%
UK 100% 78% 133%
EU27 100% 81% 128%
Lowest impact 6 8 13
Highest impact 5 10 12
Debtor
Option 1: No 
policy change 
(Baseline 
scenario)
Option 3.1: LTC 
provided by the 
MS of residence 
(without 
supplement)
Option 3.2: LTC 
provided by the 
competent MS
Option 1: No 
policy change 
(Baseline 
scenario)
Option 3.1: LTC 
provided by the 
MS of residence 
(without 
supplement)
Option 3.2: LTC 
provided by the 
competent MS Debtor
BE X X BE
BG X X BG
CZ X X CZ
DK X X DK
DE X X DE
EE X X EE
IE X X IE
GR X X GR
ES X X ES
FR X X FR
IT X X IT
CY X X CY
LV X X LV
LT X X LT
LU X X LU
HU X X HU
MT X X MT
NL X X NL
AT X X AT
PL X X PL
PT X X PT
RO X X RO
SI X X SI
SK X X SK
FI X X FI
SE X X SE
UK X X UK
EU-27 6 8 13 5 10 12 EU-27
Lowest budgetary impact Highest budgetary impact
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The budgetary impact of cross-border expenditure related to LTC is only a fraction of the total 
national expenditure. It is 0.4% of the total EU-27 spending on LTC in the baseline scenario. Even 
option 3.2 (which is the most expensive option) has only an impact of 0.6% on the total LTC 
budget. Again, we observe the highest budgetary impact in Luxembourg (29.4% of total 
expenditure). The budgetary impact increases considerably in option 3.2 (40.9% of total 
expenditure) and less in option 3.1 (31.9% of total expenditure). 
 
 
Table 2.23 LTC: impact estimated cross-border expenditure on total expenditure LTC*, by option 
 
* Total expenditure LTC: data 2012 Ageing Report 
Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
 
In Table 2.19 three different options were compared with each other. However, option 3.1 
(provided by the Member State of residence) assumes that no supplement was paid by the competent 
Member State. In Table 2.20 we have estimated the cost when this supplement would be added to 
option 3.1. The amount of the supplement was estimated by subtracting option 3.2 (provided by the 
competent Member State) from option 3.1 (provided by the Member State of residence without supplement). If the 
difference is negative, no supplement will be paid. In total an additional supplement of 
½ 520 Million has to be paid by the competent Member States. This increases the budget of 
option 3.1 (we call it option 3.1bis (provided by the Member State of residence with supplement)) to a total 
DPRXQWRI½ 330 Million. The budget needed for option 3.1bis (with supplement) increases with 
34% compared to the baseline scenario. The total expenditure estimated for this option is even 
higher than for option 3.2 (provided by the competent Member State).  
Total expenditure  
LTC in 2010                   
 ?ŝŶDŝůůŝŽŶ ? ?
Estimated cross-border 
expenditure LTC: 
Baseline scenario         
 ?ŝŶDŝůůŝŽŶ ? ?
% impact 
baseline 
scenario on 
total 
expenditure
Estimated cross-border 
expenditure LTC                     
(Option 3.1: Provided by 
country of residence)           
 ?ŝŶ ?DŝůůŝŽŶƐ ?
% impact 
option 3.1 on 
total 
expenditure
Estimated cross-border 
expenditure LTC 
(Option 3.2: Provided 
by competent country) 
 ?ŝŶ ?DŝůůŝŽŶƐ ?
% impact 
option 3.2 on 
total 
expenditure
BE 8.271 75 0,9% 75 0,9% 86 1,0%
BG 169 2 1,0% 2 1,5% 0 0,1%
CZ 1.179 14 1,2% 9 0,7% 11 1,0%
DK 10.559 104 1,0% 59 0,6% 109 1,0%
DE 35.776 173 0,5% 170 0,5% 168 0,5%
EE 77 1 1,0% 1 1,0% 0 0,1%
IE 1.705 7 0,4% 10 0,6% 11 0,6%
GR 3.123 5 0,2% 5 0,2% 6 0,2%
ES 8.703 16 0,2% 18 0,2% 13 0,2%
FR 42.065 48 0,1% 49 0,1% 66 0,2%
IT 29.526 62 0,2% 31 0,1% 82 0,3%
CY 29 0 1,6% 0 1,3% 0 0,7%
LV 121 0 0,1% 0 0,1% 0 0,0%
LT 335 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0%
LU 406 119 29,4% 129 31,9% 166 40,9%
HU 824 5 0,6% 5 0,6% 2 0,3%
MT 41 1 1,6% 1 2,0% 0 0,3%
NL 22.577 166 0,7% 97 0,4% 276 1,2%
AT 4.638 76 1,6% 41 0,9% 98 2,1%
PL 2.579 8 0,3% 10 0,4% 1 0,0%
PT 532 3 0,5% 3 0,6% 0 0,1%
RO 762 2 0,3% 3 0,4% 0 0,0%
SI 516 1 0,2% 1 0,2% 1 0,2%
SK 181 1 0,7% 3 1,5% 0 0,2%
FI 4.529 8 0,2% 6 0,1% 28 0,6%
SE 13.425 9 0,1% 12 0,1% 33 0,2%
UK 33.461 88 0,3% 69 0,2% 117 0,4%
EU-27 226.107 995 0,4% 810 0,4% 1.277 0,6%
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Table 2.24 LTC: estimated budgetary impact of paying a SUPPLEMENT (option 3.1 - ZLWKDQGZLWKRXWVXSSOHPHQWLQ½ 
 
* The budget needed for option 3.1bis (with supplement) increases with 34% compared to the baseline scenario. 
Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
  
Debtor
In kind       
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
In cash           
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Total          
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
For LTC in kind     
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
For LTC in cash    
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Total               
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
In kind          
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
In cash         
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Total            
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
%-difference 
option 3.1
BE 58.064 16.865 74.929 11.765 0 11.765 69.829 16.865 86.694 116%
BG 1.574 897 2.470 0 0 0 1.574 897 2.470 100%
CZ 6.179 2.651 8.831 0 4.782 4.782 6.179 7.434 13.613 154%
DK 54.521 4.189 58.710 4.810 45.013 49.823 59.331 49.202 108.533 185%
DE 120.077 50.201 170.278 0 2.582 2.582 120.077 52.782 172.860 102%
EE 715 52 767 0 2 2 715 54 769 100%
IE 7.479 2.684 10.163 3.409 0 3.409 10.889 2.684 13.572 134%
EL 3.732 1.415 5.147 906 192 1.098 4.638 1.607 6.245 121%
ES 13.938 4.408 18.346 0 0 0 13.938 4.408 18.346 100%
FR 37.403 11.955 49.358 18.482 0 18.482 55.885 11.955 67.840 137%
IT 25.015 6.437 31.452 20.126 30.536 50.662 45.141 36.973 82.114 261%
CY 263 118 381 0 64 64 263 181 444 117%
LV 53 28 81 0 0 0 53 28 81 100%
LT 60 36 96 14 0 14 74 36 110 114%
LU 104.120 25.372 129.493 46.746 0 46.746 150.866 25.372 176.239 136%
HU 3.383 1.206 4.589 0 380 380 3.383 1.586 4.969 108%
MT 638 189 827 0 0 0 638 189 827 100%
NL 73.246 23.346 96.592 109.344 69.754 179.098 182.590 93.099 275.690 285%
AT 26.614 14.090 40.705 21.347 35.670 57.017 47.961 49.760 97.721 240%
PL 7.341 2.671 10.013 0 0 0 7.341 2.671 10.013 100%
PT 2.671 516 3.187 0 0 0 2.671 516 3.187 100%
RO 1.979 1.188 3.167 0 0 0 1.979 1.188 3.167 100%
SI 572 555 1.127 0 0 0 572 555 1.127 100%
SK 1.270 1.504 2.773 0 0 0 1.270 1.504 2.773 100%
FI 4.421 1.458 5.879 20.135 2.002 22.138 24.556 3.460 28.017 477%
SE 7.948 4.144 12.092 23.670 0 23.670 31.618 4.144 35.762 296%
UK 55.003 13.681 68.685 28.876 19.632 48.508 83.879 33.314 117.193 171%
EU27 618.281 191.857 810.137 309.630 210.609 520.240 927.911 402.466 1.330.377 164%
Option 3.1: LTC provided by the MS 
of residence (without supplement) Supplement
Option 3.1bis: LTC provided by the MS of residence 
(with supplement)
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2.3 Synoptic overview 
Table 2.25 Synoptic overview of the scope of the cross border use of unemployment benefits and LTC benefits 
Indicator Year Unit Amount Type 
variable 
Coordination of unemployment benefits     
Cross-border workers within EU-27 2010-2011 in thousand 1.032,0 stock 
of which frontier workers  2010-2011 in thousand 701,0 stock 
Migrant workers (from 15 to 64 years, within 
EU 27)*** 2011 in thousand 1.017,0 yearly flow 
Posted workers (PD A1 issued) 2011 in thousand 1.508 yearly issued 
Estimated number of unemployed cross-
border workers 2010-2011 in thousand 73,7 stock 
as share of total unemployment 
 
in % 0,35% 
 
of which frontier workers  2010-2011 in thousand 45,2 stock 
Unemployed recent migrant workers 2011 in thousand 94,8 stock 
Estimated number of proven period of 
insurance PD U1  2010 in thousand 341,2 stock 
as share of total unemployment 2010 in % 1,60% 
 
Estimated number of exported unemployment 
benefit PD U2  2011 in thousand 23,7 stock 
as share of total unemployment 
 
in % 0,11% 
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Coordination of long-term care benefits 
Migrated pensioners*** 2011 in thousand 44,1 yearly flow 
Total estimated number of persons insured 
for LTC (PD S1) 2010-2011 in thousand 1.980,0 stock 
as % of total population EU 27  in % 0,4%  
Of which:     
cross border workers and family members 2010-2011 in thousand 1.239,0 stock 
retired cross border workers and family 
members 2010-2011 in thousand 503,0 stock 
mobile pensioners and family members 2010-2011 in thousand 238,0 stock 
Estimate of mobile persons obtaining LTC 2010-2011 in thousand 93 stock 
Outstanding reimbursement claims for 
health, Audit Board 2011 PLOOLRQV¼ 3.607,3 stock 
Reimbursement claims for health, Audit board 2011 PLOOLRQV¼ 3.590,9 flow 
Estimated reimbursement claims for LTC 
benefits in kind on figures Audit Board 2011 PLOOLRQV¼ 592,0 flow 
Estimated health expenditures for mobile 
citizens on LFS and Ageing Report * 2010 PLOOLRQV¼ 3.167,4 flow 
Estimated reimbursement claims for benefits in 
kind  for mobile citizens based on LFS and 
Ageing Report  
2010 PLOOLRQV¼ 618,3 flow 
Estimated LTC benefits in  cash for mobile 
citizens based on LFS and Ageing Report  2010 PLOOLRQV¼ 376,4 flow 
 ANNEX X ANALYSIS OF THE CHARACTERISTICS AND THE DURATION OF EMPLOYED 
ACTIVITY BY CROSS-BORDER AND FRONTIER WORKERS FOR THE PURPOSES 
OF COORDINATING UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
 
 
Total estimated expenditure LTC  for mobile 
citizens based on LFS and Ageing Report  2010 PLOOLRQV¼ 994,7 flow 
as % of total LTC spending 
 
in % 0,4% 
 
as % of GDP 
 
in % 0,008% 
 
* Figure calculated in the interim report 
** Figures described in detail in several chapters of this report 
*** No data for BE, BG, HU, MT, NL, PL and RO 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE CHARACTERISTICS AND 
THE DURATION OF EMPLOYED ACTIVITY BY 
CROSS-BORDER AND FRONTIER WORKERS 
FOR THE PURPOSES OF COORDINATING 
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS  
 
Prof. dr. Jozef Pacolet & Frederic De Wispelaere 
 
 ANNEX X ANALYSIS OF THE CHARACTERISTICS AND THE DURATION OF EMPLOYED 
ACTIVITY BY CROSS-BORDER AND FRONTIER WORKERS FOR THE PURPOSES 
OF COORDINATING UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
 
 
Research commissioned by DG EMPL ² VT/2013/124 
  
 ANNEX X ANALYSIS OF THE CHARACTERISTICS AND THE DURATION OF EMPLOYED 
ACTIVITY BY CROSS-BORDER AND FRONTIER WORKERS FOR THE PURPOSES 
OF COORDINATING UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
 
 
 
Published by 
KU Leuven 
HIVA - RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR WORK AND SOCIETY 
Parkstraat 47 box 5300, 3000 LEUVEN, Belgium 
hiva@kuleuven.be 
www.hiva.be 
 
 
D/typ het jaartal/4718/typ het depotnummer ² ISBN typ het ISBN 
 
COVER DESIGN  typ de naam van het ontwerpbureau 
COVER ILLUSTRATION  typ de bronvermelding 
 
 
© 2013 HIVA-KU Leuven 
Niets uit deze uitgave mag worden verveelvuldigd en/of openbaar gemaakt door middel van druk, fotocopie, microfilm of op welke andere 
wijze ook, zonder voorafgaande schriftelijke toestemming van de uitgever. 
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by mimeograph, film or any other means, without permission in writing from the 
publisher. 
415 
 
Contents 
Contents 
LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................................................. 5 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 7 
1 | APPLIED METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................ 9 
2 | ANALYSIS AND RESULTS ....................................................................................... 11 
2.1 Unemployment benefits ................................................................................... 11 
 
417 
 
List of tables 
 
Table 2.1 UB: Applicable rules baseline scenario and different options 12 
Table 2.2 UB: Main parameters for estimating option 4 14 
Table 2.3 UB: estimated expenditure UB option 4 (corrected by Annual average 
duration of payment UB) 15 
7DEOH  8% HVWLPDWHG EXGJHWDU\ LPSDFW EDVHOLQH VFHQDULR DQG RSWLRQV LQ ½ 
  (corrected by 
Annual average duration of payment UB) 16 
Table 2.5 UB: comparison of options between MS, estimated budgetary impact option 
1 (100%) compared to other options (corrected by Annual average duration of payment 
UB) 17 
Table 2.6 UB: comparison of options between MS, estimated lowest and highest 
budgetary impact (corrected by Annual average duration of payment UB) 17 
Table 2.7 UB: estimated expenditure UB incoming cross-border workers becoming 
unemployed, option 4, breakdown by country of last activity and country of residence 
(corrected by Annual average duration of payment UB) 19 
Table 2.8 UB: estimated expenditure UB incoming cross-border workers becoming 
unemployed, baseline scenario, breakdown by country of last activity and country of 
residence and impact of reimbursement (corrected by Annual average duration of 
payment UB) 20 
Table 2.9 UB: Estimated administrative burden (corrected by Annual average duration 
of payment UB) 22 
 
419 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of the report is to provide the Commission with a statistical data analysis that will give 
insight of the characteristics of the work pattern of frontier and cross-border workers and the 
duration that cross-border and frontier workers on average spend in their current job. This report 
shows how the policy option (option 4) differs from the baseline scenario and the other options. 
 
A new 'conflict rule' will be introduced according to which: 
-       A person receives the unemployment benefits in the country of residence, except: 
-       When the last 12 months of employment have been completed in another Member State. In 
that case, the country of last activity will become competent. It is not necessary that the person has 
continuously worked for 12 months in the other Member State without interruption or that he has   
worked there up to the date when he starts to receive unemployment benefits, but only that he has 
accumulated 12 months of employment before unemployment (e.g. with period of sickness) 
without having been employed anywhere else during this period. 
 There will be no reimbursement mechanism for the country of residence (we assume that the 
person has in the past paid contributions into that scheme). 
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Applied methodology 
 
Based on Labour force Survey (LFS) data, an estimation of the number of cross-border workers 
could be made (based on the question ¶:KDWLVWKHQDPHDQGDGGUHVVRIWKHlocal unit of the enterprise where 
\RXZRUN"·DQGYDULDEOHV ¶&28175<:·FRXQWU\RISODFHRIZRUNDQG ¶&28175<·FRXQWU\RI
residence) in the database). In the further analysis we considered all workers who work in another 
country than the country of residence as cross-border workers. Workers who work in a 
neighbouring country are considered as frontier workers. This is different from the legal 
definition. 
For the new introduced option 4 a breakdown by the period of employment of the cross-border 
ZRUNHUKDG WREHPDGH7KHEUHDNGRZQ LV H[WUDFWHG IURP WKH/)6YDULDEOH ¶67$57,0(· 7LPH
since person started to work). 
Some limitations of the use of this indicator need to be taken into account.380 There is a risk of 
underestimation of the duration as the indicator used is a measure of the employment spell in-
progress (e.g.: not finished, as the person is 'not yet' unemployed). E.g.: people having currently 
worked 6 months may keep the same job still for few months/years/decades. However, on the 
other side, there is a risk of overestimation as it can be measured only for employed persons ² and 
that there is therefore an over-representation of people with long job tenure. E.g.: people having 
become unemployed recently after having worked few months are not accounted for (same holds 
for those having recently lost their job after 10 years but they are less numerous). 
Still, the ideal would be to know how much time unemployed previously cross-border workers 
have worked in the country of last activity. However, the employment history of currently 
unemployed persons is not available in any EU-LFS variable. 
National unemployment rates were applied to the number of cross-border workers to estimate 
the number of unemployed cross-border workers. The national unemployment rates381 of 2010 
(from 20 to 64 years) defined in the 2012 Ageing Report were used. The unemployment rates of 
the country of employment and not of the country of residence have been applied on the 
number of cross-border workers calculated by way of the LFS. 
In order to estimate the budgetary impact of the baseline scenario and the different options, 
the estimated number of unemployed cross-border workers (based on the LFS and the 
unemployment rates of the 2012 Ageing Report) is multiplied by the annual unemployment benefit 
per unemployed person (unemployment benefit spending in 2010 prices / (labour force * 
unemployment rate)) (data from the 2012 Ageing Report). This yearly expenditure assumes that the 
unemployed person did not find a job during the first year of unemployment. However, a more 
¶UHDOLVWLF· FDOFXODWLRQ RI WKH \HDUO\ H[SHQGLWXUH is calculated by taking into account the annual 
average duration of the payment of the unemployment benefit.382 
                                                 
380
  Input received from DG EMPL, based on Employment in Europe 2009, chapter 2 and Employment and Social 
Developments in Europe Review 2012, chapter 1.  
381
  In order to support the use of national unemployment rates for cross-border workers, DG EMPL confirmed, on the basis 
of Eurostat EU-LFS data, that the overall characteristics of cross-border workers seem quite close to the average national 
workers (people working in the same country than their country of residence). No large differences in terms of highest 
level of education or age, two important factors when it comes to unemployment, appear. 
382
  Calculations are based on the duration of the unemployment (which can be calculated with LFS data). If the duration of 
unemployment < 1 month, we assume a payment of the UB of 0.5 months; Between 1-2 months of unemployment = 1.5 
months UB paid; Between 3-5 months of unemployment = 4 months UB paid; Between 6 and 11 months of 
unemployment = 8.5 months UB paid; 12 months and longer of unemployment = 12 months UB paid. Based on LFS data 
we obtained an average duration of unemployment of 15 months. However, this average duration is measured at a certain 
moment which implies a possible underestimation of the duration of the unemployment (e.g. he/she may still remain 
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unemployed). However, the expenditure is calculated for only one year. This explains the cut-off at 12 months. This will 
result in an annual average duration of payment of the unemployment of 7.5 months.  
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Analysis and results 
1.19 Unemployment benefits 
 
In the baseline scenario, frontier workers (people who work in one country and live in another, 
and return home daily or at least once a week) who become wholly unemployed must apply for 
unemployment benefits in their country of residence. Cross-border workers, other than frontier 
workers, may apply for unemployment benefits and register with the employment service in either 
the country of last activity or the country of residence (right of choice). The country of last activity will 
reimburse the institution of the country of residence an amount of the benefits provided to the 
returned frontier workers and other cross-border workers by the latter institution during the first 
three or five months.  
Option 2 implies that frontier workers also have the choice between applying for unemployment 
benefits and registering with the employment services either in the country of last activity or in the 
country of residence (all cross-border workers have a right of choice). 
In option 3, the unemployed person should claim unemployment benefits and register with the 
employment services in the country of last activity. Reimbursement claims are no longer necessary.  
In new option 4, the country of last activity will pay the unemployment benefit of unemployed 
former cross-border workers employed longer than 12 months in this country while the country of 
residence will pay the unemployment benefit of unemployed former cross-border workers 
employed no longer than 12 months in the country of last activity. No reimbursement mechanism 
is foreseen in this option. 
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Table 2.1 UB: Applicable rules baseline scenario and different options 
 Option 1: Baseline scenario Option 2: Right of choice Option 3: 
Country of last 
activity 
Option 4: cut-off 
by period of 
employment 
Country of last activity 
Other cross-border 
workers 
UB paid to other cross-border 
workers when highest UB in 
country of last activity 
(rational decision) 
UB paid to other cross-
border workers when 
highest UB in country of 
last activity (rational 
decision) 
UB paid to other 
cross-border 
workers UB paid to cross-
border workers 
longer than 12 
months employed 
in the country of 
last activity 
Frontier workers  UB paid to frontier 
workers when highest UB 
in country of last activity 
(rational decision) 
UB paid to 
frontier workers 
Reimbursement Reimbursement claim paid of 
3 or 5 months to country of 
residence 
Reimbursement claim 
paid of 3 or 5 months to 
country of residence 
No 
reimbursement 
No reimbursement 
Country of residence 
Other cross-border 
workers 
UB paid to other cross-border 
workers when highest UB in 
country of residence (rational 
decision) 
UB paid to other cross-
border workers when 
highest UB in country of 
residence (rational 
decision) 
*  
 
UB paid to cross-
border wokers no 
longer than 12 
months employed 
in the country of 
last activity 
Frontier workers UB paid to frontier workers UB paid to frontier 
workers when highest UB 
in country of residence 
(rational decision) 
* 
Reimbursement Reimbursement claim received 
of 3 or 5 months from country 
of last activity 
Reimbursement claim 
received of 3 or 5 months 
from country of last 
activity 
  
* A PD U1 could be issued by the country of residence to prove (self-)employed or insured periods in 
the country of residence to open unemployment rights in the country of last activity. 
Source HIVA KU Leuven based on information from DG EMPL 
 
On average (2010 and 2011) 256.8 thousand cross-border workers (or 25% of the total number of 
cross-border workers) are currently no longer than 12 months employed in their country of 
employment compared to 775.5 thousand cross-border workers (or 75% of the total number of 
cross-border workers) who are currently longer than 12 months employed in the country of 
HPSOR\PHQW7DEOH+RZHYHU¶WKHFRQQHFWLRQ·WRWKHODERXUPDUNHWRIFURVV-border workers 
will differ between Member States. E.g. currently 86% of the incoming cross-border workers in 
/X[HPERXUJDUHORQJHUWKDQPRQWKVHPSOR\HGLQWKLVFRXQWU\,WSURYHVD¶JHQXLQHOLQN·RIPRVW
of the cross-ERUGHU ZRUNHUV $W WKH VDPH WLPH WKLV ¶JHQXLQH OLQN· ZLOO FDXVH D EXGJHWDU\ FRVW
National unemployment rates were applied to the number of cross-border workers to estimate the 
number of unemployed cross-border workers. This results in an estimated number of 
53.8 thousand unemployed former cross-border workers longer than 12 months employed in the 
country of last activity and 19.9 thousand unemployed former cross-border workers no longer than 
12 months employed.  
The breakdown by period of employment will influence the budgetary cost for the country of last 
activity and the country of residence (Table 2.3). A country will pay the unemployment benefit for 
the unemployed former incoming cross-border workers who were longer than 12 months employed 
(or 53.8 thousand persons) and for the unemployed former outgoing cross-border workers who 
were no longer than 12 months employed (or 19.9 thousand persons). E.g. Luxembourg will pay 
for 4.8 thousand unemployed former incoming cross-border workers (or 86% of the incoming 
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cross-border workers) and for 0.1 thousand unemployed former outgoing cross-border workers (or 
24% of the outgoing cross-border workers) an unemployment benefit. 
7KHEXGJHWDU\FRVWWDEOHLVHVWLPDWHGDW½PLOOLRQIRUWKHXQHPSOR\HGIRUPHURXWJRLQJ
cross-ERUGHUZRUNHUVDQGDW½IRUWKHXQHPSOR\HGIRUPHULQFRPLQJFURVV-border workers. It 
resXOWV LQ D WRWDO H[SHQGLWXUH RI ½ 678.6 Million However, this will be the estimated expenditure 
assuming that all unemployed persons did not find a job during the first year of unemployment. A 
PRUH ¶UHDOLVWLF· estimate of the yearly expenditure is calculated by also taking into account the 
annual average duration of the payment of the unemployment benefit. On average 7.5 months 
(EU-27) the UB was paid to unemployed persons (calculated for the total year)383. It results in a 
WRWDOHVWLPDWHGEXGJHWDU\FRVWRI½384 Million. 
Tables 2.4 to 2.6 compare the budgetary impact of the different options. The calculation of the 
total expenditure takes not only the expenditure of the UB into account but also the amount of the 
claims received of the reimbursement procedure (as country of residence = creditor) and the 
amount of the claims paid of the reimbursement procedure (as country of last activity = debtor). It 
results LQDWRWDOH[SHQGLWXUHRI½0LOOLRQIRUWKHEDVHOLQHVFHQDULR½0LOOLRQIRr option 2 
(right of choice), ½0LOOLRQ IRURSWLRQ SURYLGHGE\ WKH FRXQWU\RI ODVW DFWLYLW\ DQG½
Million for option 4 (cut-off of 12 months). All three options are more expensive than the baseline 
scenario. The expenditure increases with 33% in option 2 compared to the baseline scenario, with 
16% in option 3 and only with 2% in option 4.  
The budgetary impact differs between Member States. On 12 Member States the baseline 
scenario has the lowest budgetary impact (CZ, DK, IE, GR, LT, LU, HU, MT, NL, AT, RO, FI). 
Option 2 has only on 1 Member State the lowest budgetary impact (PT) while option 3 is least 
expensive for 8 Member States (BG, EE, FR, LV, PL, SI, SK, SE). Finally, option 4 has to lowest 
budgetary impact on 6 Member States (BE, DE, ES, IT, CY, UK). 
Option 2 is for 12 Member States the most expensive option (BE, CZ, DK, DE, IE, CY, LU, 
NL, AT, PL, FI, UK). For 7 Member States the baseline scenario is the most expensive option (EE, 
FR, IT, PT, SI, SK, SE) and for 5 Member states this will be option 4 (BG, LV, LT, HU, RO). 
Finally, option 3 will has to highest budgetary impact on 3 Member States (GR, ES, MT). 
                                                 
383
  Calculations are based on LFS data. If the duration of unemployment < 1 month, we assume a payment of the UB of 0,5 
months; Between 1-2 months of unemployment = 1,5 months UB paid; Between 3-5 months of unemployment = 4 
months UB paid; Between 6 and 11 months of unemployment = 8,5 months UB paid; 12 months and longer of 
unemployment = 12 months UB paid. 
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Table 2.2 UB: Main parameters for estimating option 4 
 
2010
Country
Incoming 
Cross-border 
workers 
longer than 
12 months 
employed 
(in .000)
% of 
incoming 
cross-border 
workers
Incoming 
Cross-border 
workers not 
longer than 
12 months 
employed 
(in .000)
% of 
incoming 
cross-border 
workers
Outgoing 
Cross-border 
workers 
longer than 
12 months 
employed 
(in .000)
% of 
outgoing 
cross-border 
workers
Outgoing 
Cross-border 
workers not 
longer than 12 
months 
employed      
(in .000)
% of outgoing 
cross-border 
workers
Unemployment 
rate (20-64) 
country of 
employment
Incoming 
unemployed 
Cross-border 
workers longer 
than 12 months 
employed         
(in .000)
Incoming 
unemployed 
Cross-border 
workers not 
longer than 12 
months employed 
(in .000)
Outgoing 
unemployed 
Cross-border 
workers longer 
than 12 months 
employed           
(in .000)
Outgoing 
unemployed 
Cross-border 
workers not 
longer than 12 
months 
employed             
(in .000)
BE 47,2 77% 14,4 23% 85,6 89% 11,0 11% 8,0% 3,8 1,1 4,5 0,6
BG 1,8 100% 0,0 0% 9,6 45% 11,5 55% 10,2% 0,2 0,0 1,0 1,2
CZ 52,2 85% 9,2 15% 19,5 81% 4,6 19% 7,1% 3,7 0,7 1,5 0,4
DK 27,4 78% 7,6 22% 2,8 64% 1,6 36% 6,9% 1,9 0,5 0,2 0,1
DE 140,9 76% 45,2 24% 134,3 81% 31,1 19% 7,1% 10,0 3,2 7,7 1,9
EE 0,6 74% 0,2 26% 11,9 66% 6,2 34% 16,7% 0,1 0,0 1,0 0,5
IE 14,2 82% 3,1 18% 8,5 85% 1,5 15% 13,2% 1,9 0,4 0,6 0,1
GR 5,7 49% 5,9 51% 0,0 0,0 12,5% 0,7 0,7 0,0 0,0
ES 24,7 61% 15,5 39% 13,0 58% 9,5 42% 19,5% 4,8 3,0 1,0 0,8
FR 33,8 71% 13,5 29% 132,0 83% 27,7 17% 9,0% 3,0 1,2 8,6 1,9
IT 37,1 49% 38,7 51% 17,8 73% 6,6 27% 8,1% 3,0 3,1 1,5 0,6
CY 2,9 81% 0,7 19% 0,0 0,0 6,4% 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0
LV 0,4 85% 0,1 15% 3,2 46% 3,7 54% 18,4% 0,1 0,0 0,3 0,3
LT 0,1 52% 0,1 48% 1,1 57% 0,8 43% 17,8% 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1
LU 111,2 86% 18,8 14% 2,1 76% 0,7 24% 4,3% 4,8 0,8 0,2 0,1
HU 12,0 86% 1,9 14% 38,8 73% 14,6 27% 11,1% 1,3 0,2 2,5 0,9
MT 0,2 20% 0,6 80% 0,6 70% 0,3 30% 6,0% 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
NL 91,8 84% 18,1 16% 19,1 90% 2,1 10% 4,0% 3,7 0,7 1,5 0,2
AT 77,0 76% 23,9 24% 27,6 86% 4,5 14% 4,2% 3,2 1,0 2,1 0,4
PL 6,5 85% 1,2 15% 63,1 69% 28,6 31% 9,6% 0,6 0,1 4,3 1,9
PT 2,9 64% 1,6 36% 6,5 62% 4,0 38% 11,1% 0,3 0,2 1,1 0,5
RO 3,2 86% 0,5 14% 34,0 39% 53,8 61% 7,3% 0,2 0,0 3,4 5,1
SI 1,4 93% 0,1 7% 6,9 80% 1,7 20% 7,2% 0,1 0,0 0,4 0,1
SK 5,3 85% 1,0 15% 100,1 86% 17,0 14% 13,9% 0,7 0,1 7,1 1,2
FI 13,8 70% 5,9 30% 1,1 65% 0,6 35% 7,7% 1,1 0,5 0,1 0,1
SE 8,7 70% 3,8 30% 20,8 72% 8,2 28% 7,3% 0,6 0,3 1,5 0,6
UK 52,6 68% 25,0 32% 15,3 75% 5,0 25% 6,9% 3,6 1,7 1,6 0,5
EU-27 775,5 75% 256,8 25% 775,5 75% 256,8 25% 10,5% 53,8 19,9 53,8 19,9
Average 2010 and 2011 Average 2010 and 2011
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Source LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
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Table 2.3 UB: estimated expenditure UB option 4 (corrected by Annual average duration of payment UB) 
 
* Only the annual expenditure of UB is taken into account while there will possibly be a shift of the social security system from the country of last activity to the country of residence 
Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
Incoming unemployed 
Cross-border workers 
longer than 12 months 
employed (in .000)
Outgoing unemployed Cross-
border workers not longer 
than 12 months employed            
(in .000)
UB paid for incoming cross-
border workers employed 
ůŽŶŐĞƌƚŚĂŶ ? ?ŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
UB paid for outgoing cross-border 
workers employed not longer 
ƚŚĂŶ ? ?ŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Annual expenditure 
h ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Annual average 
duration of 
payment UB    
(in months)
Annual expenditure UB based 
on average duration payment 
h ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
BE 3,8 0,6 72.217 10.972 83.190 7,4 51.300
BG 0,2 1,2 82 552 634 8,7 460
CZ 3,7 0,4 5.141 486 5.627 7,6 3.564
DK 1,9 0,1 17.790 1.147 18.937 5,7 8.995
DE 10,0 1,9 89.245 17.327 106.572 7,3 64.832
EE 0,1 0,5 71 349 419 8,2 286
IE 1,9 0,1 28.062 1.555 29.617 9,1 22.460
GR 0,7 0,0 1.539 0 1.539 9,0 1.154
ES 4,8 0,8 22.823 3.747 26.570 7,6 16.827
FR 3,0 1,9 38.239 23.915 62.154 7,0 36.256
IT 3,0 0,6 17.472 3.385 20.857 8,4 14.600
CY 0,2 0,0 602 0 602 6,5 326
LV 0,1 0,3 41 171 211 8,2 144
LT 0,0 0,1 11 24 35 8,2 24
LU 4,8 0,1 119.795 1.286 121.081 6,2 62.559
HU 1,3 0,9 1.108 763 1.870 8,0 1.247
MT 0,0 0,0 21 41 62 7,8 40
NL 3,7 0,2 105.588 4.729 110.317 6,3 57.916
AT 3,2 0,4 41.104 4.542 45.647 5,4 20.541
PL 0,6 1,9 249 770 1.019 7,4 628
PT 0,3 0,5 1.163 1.767 2.930 8,1 1.978
RO 0,2 5,1 188 4.121 4.309 7,4 2.657
SI 0,1 0,1 150 154 304 7,9 200
SK 0,7 1,2 296 467 763 9,8 623
FI 1,1 0,1 15.827 813 16.640 4,6 6.379
SE 0,6 0,6 3.797 3.713 7.510 4,8 3.004
UK 3,6 0,5 8.050 1.115 9.165 6,6 5.041
EU-27 53,8 19,9 590.671 87.911 678.581 7,5 384.042
Number of involved unemployed cross-border workers Budgetary impact
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Table 2.4 UB: estimated bXGJHWDU\LPSDFWEDVHOLQHVFHQDULRDQGRSWLRQVLQ½  (corrected by Annual average duration of payment UB)  
 
* The annual expenditure (12 months) is estimated without taking into account national legislation and as such the possible limitation in time of the payment of UB. 
Annual 
expenditure UB 
based on 
average 
duration 
payment UB        
LQ¼
Actual claims 
paid to country 
of residence    
(3 months)       
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Actual claims 
received from 
country of last 
activity              
(3 months)           
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Total 
expenditure 
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? %
Annual 
expenditure 
UB based on 
average 
duration 
payment UB     
LQ¼
Actual claims 
paid to country 
of residence    
(3 months)       
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Actual claims 
received from 
country of last 
activity            
(3 months)         
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Total 
expenditure 
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? %
Annual 
expenditure 
UB based on 
average 
duration 
payment UB     
LQ¼
Actual claims 
paid to country 
of residence    
(3 months)       
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Actual claims 
received from 
country of last 
activity            
(3 months)        
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Total 
expenditure 
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? %
Annual expenditure 
UB based on average 
duration payment UB 
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? %
BE 70.891 13.533 19.727 64.697 100% 74.007 5.077 8.935 70.149 108% 58.403 0 0 58.403 90% 51.300 79%
BG 256 20 88 188 100% 0 221 0 221 117% 59 0 0 59 31% 460 244%
CZ 1.097 526 334 1.289 100% 3.798 848 117 4.529 351% 3.819 0 0 3.819 296% 3.564 277%
DK 3.029 3.395 450 5.974 100% 12.014 43 599 11.458 192% 10.811 0 0 10.811 181% 8.995 151%
DE 69.040 15.024 16.167 67.897 100% 55.763 24.804 4.864 75.703 111% 72.034 0 0 72.034 106% 64.832 95%
EE 609 19 219 409 100% 73 78 10 140 34% 65 0 0 65 16% 286 70%
IE 21.239 664 455 21.448 100% 33.461 42 2.434 31.069 145% 25.854 0 0 25.854 121% 22.460 105%
GR 381 329 0 710 100% 1.632 475 0 2.107 297% 2.356 0 0 2.356 332% 1.154 163%
ES 15.919 4.108 949 19.078 100% 18.520 4.287 629 22.179 116% 23.563 0 0 23.563 124% 16.827 88%
FR 86.602 6.483 26.361 66.724 100% 55.382 6.226 13.574 48.035 72% 31.250 0 0 31.250 47% 36.256 54%
IT 28.531 732 1.444 27.819 100% 27.070 1.068 711 27.427 99% 25.028 0 0 25.028 90% 14.600 52%
CY 391 7 0 397 100% 391 19 0 409 103% 405 0 0 405 102% 326 82%
LV 55 10 16 49 100% 29 18 6 41 84% 33 0 0 33 67% 144 295%
LT 4 5 1 7 100% 5 18 0 23 306% 14 0 0 14 183% 24 319%
LU 3.510 18.804 637 21.677 100% 75.684 0 1.233 74.451 343% 72.862 0 0 72.862 336% 62.559 289%
HU 615 190 208 597 100% 819 435 44 1.209 203% 852 0 0 852 143% 1.247 209%
MT 10 23 0 33 100% 10 38 0 47 142% 68 0 0 68 205% 40 121%
NL 41.060 10.969 5.167 46.862 100% 90.552 0 11.199 79.353 169% 66.216 0 0 66.216 141% 57.916 124%
AT 15.426 4.062 4.253 15.235 100% 38.052 41 7.381 30.713 202% 24.180 0 0 24.180 159% 20.541 135%
PL 872 73 354 592 100% 0 1.387 0 1.387 234% 181 0 0 181 31% 628 106%
PT 3.457 293 1.111 2.639 100% 497 443 11 929 35% 1.228 0 0 1.228 47% 1.978 75%
RO 26 54 10 69 100% 5 280 0 285 411% 136 0 0 136 196% 2.657 3828%
SI 475 26 154 347 100% 88 173 9 252 73% 107 0 0 107 31% 200 58%
SK 1.880 87 577 1.391 100% 35 908 3 940 68% 285 0 0 285 20% 623 45%
FI 2.206 399 161 2.444 100% 9.246 57 369 8.935 366% 8.687 0 0 8.687 356% 6.379 261%
SE 5.651 771 2.663 3.759 100% 1.765 926 256 2.435 65% 2.179 0 0 2.179 58% 3.004 80%
UK 4.529 1.514 615 5.427 100% 3.217 4.481 8 7.690 142% 6.492 0 0 6.492 120% 5.041 93%
EU-27 377.761 82.122 82.122 377.761 100% 502.113 52.391 52.391 502.113 133% 437.167 0 0 437.167 116% 384.042 102%
Option 1: No policy change (Baseline scenario): Frontier workers return; 
other cross-border workers take a rational decision (= highest UB)
Option 2: Right of choice: cross-border workers take a rational 
decision (= highest amount) Option 3: UB provided by the country of last activity Option 4: 'cut-off' of 12 months
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Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
431 
 
CHAPTER 0Analysis and results  
Table 2.5 UB: comparison of options between MS, estimated budgetary impact option 1 (100%) compared to 
other options (corrected by Annual average duration of payment UB) 
 
* Green: lowest budgetary impact; Red: highest budgetary impact 
Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
Option 1: No 
policy change 
(Baseline 
scenario)
Option 2: Right 
of choice
Option 3: UB 
provided by the 
country of last 
activity
Option 4: 
'cut-off' of 
12 months
BE 100% 108% 90% 79%
BG 100% 117% 31% 244%
CZ 100% 351% 296% 277%
DK 100% 192% 181% 151%
DE 100% 111% 106% 95%
EE 100% 34% 16% 70%
IE 100% 145% 121% 105%
GR 100% 297% 332% 163%
ES 100% 116% 124% 88%
FR 100% 72% 47% 54%
IT 100% 99% 90% 52%
CY 100% 103% 102% 82%
LV 100% 84% 67% 295%
LT 100% 306% 183% 319%
LU 100% 343% 336% 289%
HU 100% 203% 143% 209%
MT 100% 142% 205% 121%
NL 100% 169% 141% 124%
AT 100% 202% 159% 135%
PL 100% 234% 31% 106%
PT 100% 35% 47% 75%
RO 100% 411% 196% 3828%
SI 100% 73% 31% 58%
SK 100% 68% 20% 45%
FI 100% 366% 356% 261%
SE 100% 65% 58% 80%
UK 100% 142% 120% 93%
EU-27 100% 133% 116% 102%
Lowest  impact 12 1 8 6
Highest impact 7 12 3 5
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Table 2.6 UB: comparison of options between MS, estimated lowest and highest budgetary impact (corrected 
by Annual average duration of payment UB) 
 
Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
Table 2.7 presents the distribution of the cost taking into account the applicable rules for 
option 4. We have made our calculations from the perspective of incoming cross-border workers 
who become unemployed. The estimated 53.8 thousand unemployed former incoming cross-border 
workers who were no longer than 12 months employed in the country of last activity will receive an 
unemployment benefit from their country of residence while the other 19.9 thousand unemployed 
former incoming cross-border worker who were longer than 12 months employed in the country of 
last activity will receive an unemployment benefit from the country of last activity.  
It implies (taking into account the assumptions we had to made) that the country of last activity 
will pay 88% of the total expenditure and the country of residence 12% of the total expenditure. 
The distribution of the cost is mainly influenced by the fact 75% of the cross-border workers are 
longer than 12 months employed. However, also the amount of the unemployment benefit and the 
period of unemployment will influence the budgetary cost. Again, differences between Member 
States appear. 
Table 2.8 presents the distribution of the cost taking into account the current rules in the baseline 
scenario. The baseline scenario (also taking into account the assumptions we had to made) implies 
WKDWWKHFRXQWU\RIODVWDFWLYLW\ZLOOSD\RIWKHWRWDOH[SHQGLWXUHRQO\IRU¶RWKHUXQHPSOR\HG
cross-ERUGHU ZRUNHUV· ZKR FKRRVH IRU WKH FRXQWU\ RI ODVW DFWLYLW\ DQG WKH FRXQWU\ RI UHVLGence 
 RI WKH WRWDO H[SHQGLWXUH IRU WKH XQHPSOR\HG IURQWLHU ZRUNHUV DQG WKH ¶RWKHU XQHPSOR\HG
cross-ERUGHU ZRUNHUV· ZKR FKRRVH WR UHWXUQ +RZHYHU WKLV GLVSURSRUWLRQ LV FRUUHFWHG E\ D
reimbursement procedure. Now, the county of last activity will pay 43% of the cost and the country 
of residence 57%. 
Comparing the distribution of the cost for option 4 to the baseline scenario (after 
reimbursement), a much higher share of the cost is paid by the country of last activity (88% 
compared to 43%). Only Italy is confronted with a lower share of cost in option 4 (85%) compared 
WRWKHEDVHOLQHVFHQDULR)RUWKDWUHDVRQRSWLRQFDQEHFRQVLGHUHGDV¶PRUHIDLU·FRPSDUHG
to the baseline scenario. 
 
 
Option 1: No 
policy change 
(Baseline 
scenario)
Option 2: 
Right of 
choice
Option 3: UB 
provided by the 
country of last 
activity
Option 4: 'cut-off' 
of 12 months
Option 1: No 
policy change 
(Baseline 
scenario)
Option 2: 
Right of 
choice
Option 3: UB 
provided by the 
country of last 
activity
Option 4: 'cut-off' 
of 12 months
BE X X BE
BG X X BG
CZ X X CZ
DK X X DK
DE X X DE
EE X X EE
IE X X IE
GR X X GR
ES X X ES
FR X X FR
IT X X IT
CY X X CY
LV X X LV
LT X X LT
LU X X LU
HU X X HU
MT X X MT
NL X X NL
AT X X AT
PL X X PL
PT X X PT
RO X X RO
SI X X SI
SK X X SK
FI X X FI
SE X X SE
UK X X UK
EU-27 12 1 8 6 7 12 3 5 EU-27
Lowest budgetary impact Highest budgetary impact
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Table 2.7 UB: estimated expenditure UB incoming cross-border workers becoming unemployed, option 4, breakdown by country of last activity and country of residence (corrected by 
Annual average duration of payment UB) 
 
* Only the annual expenditure of UB is taken into account while there will possibly be a shift of the social security system from the country of last activity to the country of residence 
Country of last 
activity
Number of unemployed 
incoming cross-border 
workers not longer than 12 
months employed             
(in .000)
Number of unemployed 
incoming cross-border 
workers longer than 12 
months employed             
(in .000)
Estimated annual expenditure 
UB by country of residence 
based on average duration 
payment UB  ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Estimated annual 
expenditure UB by country 
of last activity UB based on 
average duration payment 
UB   ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
% share of cost 
country of 
residence
% share of cost 
country of last 
activity
BE 3,8 1,1 7.033 44.534 14% 86%
BG 0,2 0,0 0 59 0% 100%
CZ 3,7 0,7 352 3.256 10% 90%
DK 1,9 0,5 1.357 8.450 14% 86%
DE 10,0 3,2 7.252 54.291 12% 88%
EE 0,1 0,0 43 48 47% 53%
IE 1,9 0,4 960 21.280 4% 96%
GR 0,7 0,7 819 1.154 42% 58%
ES 4,8 3,0 6.766 14.454 32% 68%
FR 3,0 1,2 4.110 22.306 16% 84%
IT 3,0 3,1 2.096 12.231 15% 85%
CY 0,2 0,0 34 326 9% 91%
LV 0,1 0,0 5 28 14% 86%
LT 0,0 0,0 12 7 62% 38%
LU 4,8 0,8 6.432 61.894 9% 91%
HU 1,3 0,2 368 738 33% 67%
MT 0,0 0,0 97 14 87% 13%
NL 3,7 0,7 3.496 55.434 6% 94%
AT 3,2 1,0 2.846 18.497 13% 87%
PL 0,6 0,1 578 153 79% 21%
PT 0,3 0,2 297 785 27% 73%
RO 0,2 0,0 213 116 65% 35%
SI 0,1 0,0 3 99 3% 97%
SK 0,7 0,1 202 242 46% 54%
FI 1,1 0,5 444 6.067 7% 93%
SE 0,6 0,3 665 1.519 30% 70%
UK 3,6 1,7 5.152 4.427 13% 87%
EU-27 53,8 19,9 51.631 369.169 12% 88%
Incoming unemployed  crossborder workers Share of costExpenditure
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Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
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Table 2.8 UB: estimated expenditure UB incoming cross-border workers becoming unemployed, baseline scenario, breakdown by country of last activity and country of residence and 
impact of reimbursement (corrected by Annual average duration of payment UB) 
 
* Only the annual expenditure of UB is taken into account while there will possibly be a shift of the social security system from the country of last activity to the country of residence 
Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
 
Country of 
employment
Number of 
unemployed 
incoming cross-
border workers        
(in .000)
Of which incoming 
unemployed frontier 
workers                            
(in .000)
Estimated annual 
expenditure UB based 
on average duration 
payment UB paid by 
the country of 
residence  ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Estimated annual 
expenditure UB 
based on average 
duration payment 
UB paid by the 
country of last 
activity                      
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Reimbursement 
country of last activity 
(3 months)                   
 ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
% share of cost 
country of 
residence
% share of cost 
country of last 
activity
% share of cost 
country of 
residence
% share of cost 
country of last 
activity
BE 4,9 4,0 34.334 10.929 13.533 76% 24% 58% 42%
BG 0,2 0,0 1.052 0 20 100% 0% 98% 2%
CZ 4,4 4,3 3.327 43 526 99% 1% 85% 15%
DK 2,4 2,0 6.410 1.726 3.395 79% 21% 56% 44%
DE 13,2 10,1 55.161 16.936 15.024 77% 23% 63% 37%
EE 0,1 0,1 203 7 19 97% 3% 89% 11%
IE 2,3 1,1 1.516 13.440 664 10% 90% 10% 90%
GR 1,5 0,8 2.613 381 329 87% 13% 79% 21%
ES 7,9 1,9 18.472 12.296 4.108 60% 40% 53% 47%
FR 4,3 2,7 21.483 11.407 6.483 65% 35% 55% 45%
IT 6,1 0,4 3.250 22.455 732 13% 87% 12% 88%
CY 0,2 0,0 92 391 7 19% 81% 19% 81%
LV 0,1 0,1 62 4 10 93% 7% 81% 19%
LT 0,1 0,0 71 0 5 100% 0% 93% 7%
LU 5,6 5,5 45.350 688 18.804 99% 1% 70% 30%
HU 1,5 1,3 1.911 6 190 100% 0% 91% 9%
MT 0,0 0,0 167 8 23 95% 5% 84% 16%
NL 4,4 3,3 27.063 16.724 10.969 62% 38% 49% 51%
AT 4,2 4,0 10.184 1.478 4.062 87% 13% 65% 35%
PL 0,7 0,6 3.797 0 73 100% 0% 98% 2%
PT 0,5 0,2 1.572 439 293 78% 22% 68% 32%
RO 0,3 0,0 1.304 1 54 100% 0% 96% 4%
SI 0,1 0,1 343 34 26 91% 9% 85% 15%
SK 0,9 0,8 1.814 0 87 100% 0% 95% 5%
FI 1,5 1,2 1.019 1.530 399 40% 60% 35% 65%
SE 0,9 0,2 2.811 945 771 75% 25% 62% 38%
UK 5,4 0,6 17.332 3.183 1.514 84% 16% 79% 21%
EU-27 73,7 45,2 262.713 115.053 82.122 70% 30% 57% 43%
Cost without reimbursement Cost with reimbursement
Option 1: No policy change (Baseline scenario): Frontier workers return; other cross-border workers take a rational decision (= highest UB)
Incoming unemployed  crossborder workers Expenditure
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In table 2.9. the administrative burden of this new option is estimated based on the same 
assumptions used for the estimation of the baseline scenario and the other options.384 However, the 
correction of the yearly expenditure by taking into account the annual average duration of the 
payment of the UB will imply a higher administrative cost as % of total expenditure for the baseline 
scenario and the other options. In the baseline scenario the total administrative cost is estimated at 
½PLOOLRQRIZKLFKFRXOGEHDOORFDWHGWRWKHFRXQWU\RIUHVLGHQFH7KHVKDUHRIWKHWRWDO
administrative burden in the total budget is some 2.2%. A right of choice will decrease the 
administrative cost to 59% of the baseline scenario. The share of the administrative cost in the total 
budget is 1%. The lowest administrative cost is estimated for the option where the country of last 
activity is providing the unemployment benefit. The administrative cost is further reduced to 36% 
of the baseline scenario. The share of the administrative cost in the total budget is 0.7% for this 
option. For the new option it was already estimated that 53.8 thousand unemployed cross-border 
workers will receive an unemployment benefit from the country of last activity while 19.9 thousand 
unemployed cross-border workers will receive the benefit from their country of residence. Also, 
there will be no reimbursement procedure. This will imply an important shift of the administrative 
burden to the country of last activity compared to the baseline scenario. 39% of the administrative 
FRVWHVWLPDWHGDW½PLOOLRQFRXOGEHDOORcated to the country of residence (compared to 64% in 
the baseline scenario). The administrative cost will decrease to 51% of the baseline scenario. . The 
share of the administrative cost in the total budget is 1.1%. 
                                                 
384
  For a more detailed description of the methodology, see Deloitte Consulting (2013), Study for the impact assessment for 
revision of Regulations (EC) Nos 883/2004 and 987/2009. 
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Table 2.9 UB: Estimated administrative burden (corrected by Annual average duration of payment UB) 
 
Source Estimate based on data LFS and 2012 Ageing Report 
Direct paying Reimbursement Direct paying Reimbursement
Control unemployed  ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
U1  ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Reimbursement  ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Total administrative unit 
cost - UB Residence  ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Total administrative unit 
cost - UB Last activity  ? ? ? ? ?
UB Residence  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
UB Last activity  ? ?  ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?
Administrative cost
Grand total 
% cost country of 
residence in total 
administrative cost
Grand total annual 
expenditure UB  (in 
millions)
Administrative cost as % 
of budgetary cost
Estimated 
reimbursement (in 
millions)  ? ? ?
UB Residence  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
UB Last activity  ? ?  ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?
Administrative cost
Grand total 
As % of baseline scenario
% cost country of 
residence in total 
administrative cost
Grand total annual 
expenditure UB  (in 
millions)
Administrative cost as % 
of budgetary cost
Estimated 
reimbursement (in 
millions)  ? ? ?
UB Residence  ? ?  ? ?  ? ?  ? ?
UB Last activity  ? ?  ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?
Administrative cost
Grand total 
As % of baseline scenario
% cost country of 
residence in total 
administrative cost
Grand total annual 
expenditure UB  (in 
millions)
Administrative cost as % 
of budgetary cost
Estimated 
reimbursement (in 
millions)  ? ?
UB Residence  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
UB Last activity  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Administrative cost
Grand total 
As % of baseline scenario
% cost country of 
residence in total 
administrative cost 39%
Grand total annual 
expenditure UB  (in 
millions)
Administrative cost as % 
of budgetary cost
Estimated 
reimbursement (in 
millions)  ? ?
Option B2: right of choice: rational decision (=highest amount UB)
Administrative unit cost
Administrative cost  
39%
Country of last activityCountry of residence
Baseline scenario2: Frontier workers return; other cross-border workers 
rational decision (=highest amount UB)
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
 ? ? ? ?
2,2%
 ? ? ? ?
1,0%
59%
 ? ? ? ?
1,1%
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
64%
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Option C: UB provided by the country of last activity
 ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
0,7%
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
36%
0%
 ? ? ? ?
Option D: cutt-off of 12 months
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
51%
  
 
 
